Nash Equilibrium Strategies in Extensive Form Games and Sub Games
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.61841/gszj8k05Keywords:
Nash Equilibrium Strategies Pure Strategy, Mixed Strategy, Extensive Form Games, Sub GamesAbstract
Nash Equilibrium solutions are a common solution concept of extensive form games in two-player zero-sum games and bimatrix games. It determines the analysis of subgame-perfect pure and mixed strategy equilibria and the sequential equilibria concept. The main aim of the paper is to investigate the pure and mixed Nash equilibrium strategies of two-person zero-sum games with extensive form games and subgames and provide tools for its systematic study.
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