Capital Structure, Internal Governance Mechanisms And Firm Performance

Authors

  • Muhammad Harith Zulqarnain Bin Noor Helmy Azman Hashim International Business School, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia Johor Bahru, Johor, Malaysia Author
  • Goh Chin Fei Azman Hashim International Business School, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia Johor Bahru, Johor, Malaysia Author
  • Tan Owee Kowang Azman Hashim International Business School, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia Johor Bahru, Johor, Malaysia Author
  • Ong Choon Hee Azman Hashim International Business School, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia Johor Bahru, Johor, Malaysia Author
  • Tan Seng Teck Faculty of Business, Communication & Law, INTI International University, Persiaran Perdana BBH, Putra Nilai, 71800, Nilai, Negeri Sembilan, Malaysia. Author
  • Lim Kim Yew Faculty of Business, Communication & Law, INTI International University, Persiaran Perdana BBH, Putra Nilai, 71800, Nilai, Negeri Sembilan, Malaysia. Author
  • Wong Chee Hoo Faculty of Business, Communication & Law, INTI International University, Persiaran Perdana BBH, Putra Nilai, 71800, Nilai, Negeri Sembilan, Malaysia. Author

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.61841/p7kwvx26

Keywords:

Corporate Governance, Board Independence, CEO Duality, Firm Performance.

Abstract

This study examines the impact of capital structure and internal governance mechanisms on Malaysian manufacturing firms’ performance. A total of 183 companies were selected from the list of listed companies in Bursa Malaysia within the year 2007 to 2010. We collect the corporate governance data from the annual financial data from Thompson Reuter’s DataStream. The study shows the positive impact of capital structure on firm performance of manufacturing firms in Malaysia. However, this study found CEO duality and independent director do not affect firm performance. The implication of this study is that the manufacturing firms in Malaysia should achieve optimal capital structure in improving firm performance.

 

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Published

30.09.2020

Issue

Vol. 24 No. 7 (2020): 24 (7) 2020

Section

Articles

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How to Cite

Bin Noor Helmy, M. H. Z., Fei, G. C., Kowang, T. O., Hee, O. C., Teck, T. S., Yew, L. K., & Hoo, W. C. (2020). Capital Structure, Internal Governance Mechanisms And Firm Performance. International Journal of Psychosocial Rehabilitation, 24(7), 7313-7321. https://doi.org/10.61841/p7kwvx26