POLITICAL PATRONAGE OF ISLAMIC COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION OF JOXZIN

(*Jogjakarta Islamic Never Die)* WITH PARTAI PERSATUAN PEMBANGUNAN (PPP) ISLAMIC POLITIC IN THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 2019 IN THE SPECIAL REGION OF YOGYAKARTA- INDONESIA

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***Abstract***

*After the reformation era with the fall of the New Order (Soeharto) in 1998, the internal conflict of the United Development Party (PPP) in Indonesia did not end until its time before the general elections in 2019. The impact of the internal conflict occurred in some regions. One of which was in the Special Region of Yogyakarta. The impact that happened was the practice of political patronage between Islamic community organizations Joxzin (Jogjakarta Islamic Never Die) with the PPP Islamic political parties with the intention and purpose of winning legislative candidates nominated by PPP. The majority of literature sources or previous studies have revealed and explained in political patronage that the position of the patron is above the client in terms of ownership of economic, social, or power resources. However, what happens in research done using social network analysis methods and NodeXL and NVivo 12 Plus get results precisely the client (Joxzin) has the power and power above the patron (PPP). One example that occurred was when Joxzin appointed someone to be the chairman of the United Development Party Branch Development Board (DPC PPP). Political patronage conducted by Joxzin paid off by their two winning legislative candidates whose PPP supported as members of the Regional People's Representative Council in the city of Yogyakarta (Yogyakarta DPRD) and also in DPRD of Yogyakarta. In the future, Joxzin will continue to do political patronage with PPP and also affiliate with the Islamic political party.*

***Keywords****: Political patronage, Islamic mass organizations, Joxzin, political parties, PPP, 2019 general election.*

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## INTRODUCTION

Political parties Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) is one of the oldest Islamic political parties in Indonesia. It is a political party the result of several previous Islamic political parties, such as the Nahdlatul Ulama Party (PNU), the Indonesian Islamic Sarikat Party (PSII), Parmusi, and the Indonesian Tarbiyah Islamiyah Unity Party (Perti) in 1973. Then, two decades after the 1998 reformation era, the internal conflict of the PPP party until the 2019 general election never finished. As a result, political parties broke into two groups; the Romahurmuzy group and Djan Faridz group.

Internal PPP conflict caused several cadres to form the "PPP Khittah" declared on May 4, 2018, in Yogyakarta, led by Tamam Achda. PPP Khittah was the new axis in the body of PPP political parties. The impact of internal conflicts within the PPP body resulted in disputes in several regions, including one in the Yogyakarta Special Region (DIY), the site of the PPP Khittah declaration. PPP conflict between the two groups and also the emergence of PPP Khittah resulted in PPP in the DIY region practicing political patronage.

Patronage is a two-way relationship between patron and client. A patron is an individual or group that has resources (material and non-material) above the client, while resources are where the actor has control and has specific interests [1] In political patronage, the relationship between patron and client is in the scope or dynamics of politics, and the two-way relationship between political party elites (political parties) with voters, campaigners, government bureaucracy or community organizations (organizations) with the aim of interests. One of the benefits is to win votes in the dynamics of the political sphere, assisted by clientelism brokers. Brokers are "liaison" or "traders" in political practices that become networks for interacting with each other [2].

In Indonesia, especially in Yogyakarta, political patronage usually takes place before the five annual democratic party elections (legislative candidates and presidential elections), during the event, and also afterward. Political patronage may also occur outside such as local elections, regional elections, and in the government bureaucracy. Political parties are more likely to engage in political patronage with anyone, with the reason to win a majority and win. For example, what happened in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam in the 2009 elections did political patronage in achieving consolidation for the interests of their political parties [3].

Political patronage relations are increasingly widespread in political dynamics. It also occurred in Jakarta's regional elections in 2017. Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga Uno, as candidates, cooperated with organizations in scooping the winning votes, namely Forum Komunikasi Anak Betawi (FORKABI), which should be independent, because of the relationship of political patronage into an extension of the political elite and political party elite [4].

Political parties in Indonesia consist of a combination of various organizations so that they could stand as a political party, in addition to having a combined organization, a task force, a paramilitary party, or a mass party organization. Political parties deliberately form part of CSOs as a sub-contract network in expanding social control and also political control in society [5]. The fall of Soeharto's heyday (the New Order or New Order) was the liberalization of the political system, the "bouncers" in the mass organizations or task force of political parties and "thugs" who competed over patronage for the territory, and also a struggle for his followers [5].

Joxzin (Jogjakarta Islamic Never Die) is an Islamic organization with a social base of Islamic students. However, they are not the ones who have studied at Islamic boarding schools, because the mass base is mostly in the southern region of DIY where several Islamic boarding schools take place. Besides that, Joxzin also mentions its social support from the "thugs." Instead, Joxzin that exists now is the face of political Islam by accommodating Muslim youths to explore the potential in channeling actions and political expressions and aspirations of "*Amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*" [6].

In the 2019 election, Joxzin continued to support the victory of Presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto, as well as when they helped in winning the presidency in 2014. Also, the discussion here will focus more on Joxzin's Islamic mass organization support for legislative candidates (candidates) from Partai Persatuan

 Direct interview with I. C, a former member of Joxzin and GPK, located in Yogyakarta, on Tuesday, May 29, 2018.

Pembangunan (the United Development Party) PPP), which planned to become a member of the Yogyakarta Special Representative Council (DPRD DIY) in 2019.

Below is a table of winning legislative members from PPP supported and promoted by Joxzin in the 2014 election candidates in DIY who managed to win the seat of the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD).

Table 1.1

Joxzin's support in the legislative elections of 2014

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **No.** | **Joxzin support at region and district level** | **Total of legislative electoral districts** |
| 1 | Yogyakarta | 2 |
| 2 | Kulon Progo | 0 |
| 3 | Gunung Kidul | 0 |
| 4 | Sleman | 0 |
| 5 | Bantul | 0 |

Source: Interview with I. C, 2018

The table above shows the success of Joxzin's mass support. One of which is in the success of Sela Rita, S.H., M.H, and Ida to become a member of the DPRD level II Yogyakarta. For voting support in Kulon Progo, Gunung Kidul, Sleman, and Bantul, they did not win legislative candidates. Still, votes supported by Joxzin received a large number of votes. Candidates who were promoted by PPP and supported by Joxzin always win, although not all of them win the election. Joxzin's loyalty and militancy towards PPP in DIY are exciting to study regarding the relationship of political patronage between mass organizations and political parties. Besides, Joxzin's militancy and loyalty in supporting PPP in the 2014 elections were marked by the surge in PPP votes in the city of Yogyakarta, which rose almost 300% of the votes or got 1,500 votes.

This study further corroborates the findings in the depiction of the Indonesian political system regarding the two-way relationship of patronage and clientelism, which not many researchers study [7]. The post-New Order hegemony crisis caused elite political parties to seek allies with existing "thug" groups by developing ideological closeness to facilitate future integration in the power structure [8].

Political patronage in the twenty-first century is now a slight shift. Some of the previous studies mentioned that the client was weak in resources and did not have power. In [9], [10], [11], [12], and [13] mention that the position of CSOs is weak in its existence, because of the legitimacy of political patronage caused by a group of elites with interest in monopolizing the people with their political control. Regarding this issue, the writer does not fully agree and will see the lack of previous studies that the mass organizations as clients have the power and power in terms of resources.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

Patronage is an original term that shows a special relationship between a person who protects (usually a nobleman) and a protected person (usually a commoner) [14]. In the patronage relationship pattern, the patron benefits more than the client because the client is in a weak position so that it depends on the patron [14]. Community organizations (CSOs) serve the needs of the community and the nation's community. At the same time, the government educates in the formation of political education with the aim of not creating dirty politics or political patronage that raises money politics, and also the state and CSOs should act as partners for the interests of the country, not only in patronage matters [15]; [16].

Political patronage relations continue to occur in the era of development, and the current era of democracy, both local, national and global democratic systems, such matters occur in developing countries, developing countries, and developed countries that appear and occur. In [17], [18], [19], [20], and [21], statements of previous studies reinforcing the practice of political patronage also occurred in Yogyakarta. The pattern of

patronage relations between community organizations (mass organizations) and political parties (political parties) or vice versa the occurrence of has "mutual protection." The role of CSOs can be as clientelism brokers to enter into the grassroots circles that make the bargaining power of voters in the political patronage of [22], [17], [23], and [24].

The relationship of political patronage that occurs between CSOs and political parties, in this case, sometimes the position of CSOs or CSO elites becomes a liaison between voters and political elites. It can also be CSO elites and on behalf of CSOs become clients of clientelism in terms of being agents of political parties in elections [25]. The leader or the head of the CSO group can act as a broker by distributing benefits to its members to encourage the winning of political parties or elite political parties (politicians) to be promoted and supported. The CSO chairperson is often associated with the political parties he argues, with political alliances run to mutually agree on winning mobilization votes in exchange for benefits [26].

CSOs serve the needs of the community and the nation's community. At the same time, the government educates in the formation of political education with the aim of not creating dirty politics or political patronage that raises money politics, and also the state and CSOs should play a role as partners for the interests of the state, not just on patronage [15]; [16]. It should be an essential point when CSOs conduct a two-way relationship of patronage, for common interests, namely the interests of the masses and the people in the right direction and building a democratic local and central government [27]. One example that occurred in Romania was that the power of mass organizations in politics could control interests not only for personal or group interests, but for the common good, and mutual progress [12]; [28].

What mass organizations in political parties have done is not only do patronage with the elite. They also promote religious activities with the propaganda movement to the masses (political parties or not from political parties) with the aim of orientation and participation to the mass of supporters to win political sympathy and the election [29]. In a two-way relationship, patronage needs consideration, namely the possibility of conflict at the elite and mass levels, because existing mass organizations sometimes intimidate violence against other organizations. However, not all mass organizations intimidate other groups or masses, and this happens on the patronage of mass organizations in Tarakan Indonesia [30].

The existence of mass organizations in politics with the intention and purpose of the social and community sphere is to get recognition and presence in other social and political spaces [31]. The patronage of political parties works as a short exchange between the political elite and the people. Therefore all patronage relations can be done without exception [13]. Political racialization carried out by political parties has formed a route to political power, then expanded political patronage to other regions, because the two-way relationship of patronage already exists and occurs in any region [32]. The two-way relationship of patronage that happens in politics, one of the causes is the emergence of political alliances due to the struggle for patronage. Anyone can do patronage by not looking at the rich or deprived of the resources owned [33]. From previous studies, there are several variables and indicators of political patronage, below is a table of variables and indicators as well as from the pattern of political patronage relations between CSOs and political parties.

Table 2.1

Variables and Indicators of Political Patronage

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **No.** | **The pattern of political patronage relations between community organizations (mass organizations) and**  **political parties** | **Indicators** |
| 1 | Clientelism | As an agent between the political party elite and the  voting masses |
| 2 | Political alliances | Advantages in protection |
| 3 | Power relations | Political power at the regional level |



Mass organization (ormas)

Political parties

Elite actor ormas

Clientelism (broker) practies

Political patronage relations

Elite actor parpol

The emergence of clientelism, political alliances, power relations, and money politics

The target of winning regional elections, legislative elections, presidential elections by winning a majority of votes through a mass base

1. Clientelism
2. Political alliances
3. Power relations
4. Money politics

Relationship between political patronage of mass organizations and political parties

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 4 | Money politic | Rewards in political support for individuals or groups |

Source: Literature review

From the literature review or studies done by previous researchers, all of which the majority discussed that the patron position is above the client in terms of resources, whether economic, political, social. Regarding the strength and power of CSOs as clients in terms of political patronage, there has not been much discussion about whether the advantages and capabilities of CSO elites are equal to the strengths and powers of political party elites. Also, if elite CSOs can control political party elites, and the researchers' current position will discuss the subject that is rare to consider.

## DATA COLLECTION

The researchers will focus more on the relationship between political patronage between mass organizations and political parties, from the literature review obtained with the emergence or use of patronage theory that is more focused on discussing political patronage. The pattern of patronage in the twenty-first century

(21) has experienced a slight shift from the pattern of patrons who have resources above the client. Still, at this time, the position of the client can be equal or equal to the patron in terms of strength and power with elite organizations. In Indonesia, the pattern of strength and power of mass organizations are visible from the post- collapse of the new order where the practice of "backing" as an expression of the relationship between patron and client, because patrons need clients with power and power as political elites [5]. In the practice of political patronage between mass organizations and political parties to better explain the pattern of the relationship that occurs between the two is clear from the framework of research theory with several variables. So that it can affect the pattern of political patronage between the two (mass organizations with political parties), and below is the theoretical framework of research used.

Chart 1.1 Research Theory Framework

From the theoretical framework above, the relationship between political patronage that occurs between CSOs and political parties contains a pattern of relationship lines resulting in first, the emergence of Clientelism practices: As an agent between political party elites and mass voters. Second is political alliances, and third is advantages in protection: Power relations, the political power in political parties, and political power at the regional level. The last is money and politics: Rewards in political support for individuals or groups. From the research theory framework previously written, the analysis implemented Social Networks Analysis/ SNA data analysis using NVivo 12 Plus and NodeXL to see the interrelationship between Joxzin with PPP or any mass organization under the PPP structure.

## DATA ANALYSIST

In this type of research to retrieve data that occurs in political patronage between community organizations (ORPs) and political parties (political parties) about using mixed type convergent research methods (qualitative and quantitative data). This type of mixed convergent method of research in question is to combine qualitative and quantitative data through separate analyzes by comparing or linking the results of findings whether they confirm or not confirm one [34].

Chart 2.1

The convergent mixture method



Compare or connect

Interpretation

Collection and analysis of qualitative power

Collection and analysis of quantitative power

Source: Research Design, Creswell, 2018

The chart above is a type of method that is familiar to use in mixed-type research, namely the convergent parallel mixed method. For qualitative data will be taken from interviews, Focus Group Discussions (FGD), documents and relevant records found in the field, and will be an instrument of observational checklist, the subject will be done open-ended, while quantitative data collection is closed-ended as a response to the problem statement. The qualitative interview data and the questionnaire data the questions will be the same, there is no difference. This type of mixed method will be analyzed using the NodeXL application and also the NVivo 12 Plus.

## FINDING OF POLITICAL PATRONAGE OF ISLAMIC SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS

**JOXZIN (*Jogjakarta Islamic Never Die*) WITH PARTAI PERSATUAN PEMBANGUNAN (PPP)**

From 1980 to 1985, the first generation of Joxzin began to form, which at first was just an ordinary youth association or association. The young people came from young Muslims (the majority of whom were Muhammadiyah students) who often hung out in the North Square area of Yogyakarta. For them, Alun-Alun is a place to share feelings while experiencing the fatigue of the learning atmosphere in the school and a spot to hang

out for the gas station vendors. Initially, Joxzin is an abbreviation of the word "Gasoline Pojox." The first generation Joxzin was initiated and formed by M. Inung Nurzaeni, Ivan Ho, Eko Haryanto, Rahmadi, and Rudi. All of whom are from Kauman. Maman Sulaiman was the owner of a gas station at the time, and Maman was one of the commanders of PPP Yogyakarta Security Forces. Maman is a respected figure and a protector of young Joxzin. Besides Maman, the first generation of Joxzin had a senior named Ivan Ho. Ivan Ho's name is known to be close to the caretaker of the Krapyak Islamic Boarding School, Kyai H. Ali Maksum, and he is known by several Joxzin members who say that Ivan Ho is the adopted son of Gus Maksum.

The second name after "Pojok Bensin," namely "Jogja Sindikat," then after that, "Joko Zhinting." Joxzin's youngsters have intense religious fanaticism, pride in the name of their organizations, and also a stable stance with Islamic-based parties. With extremism towards Islam, Joxzin has both positive and negative sides. Its positive values can gather and accommodate the power of youth against religious fanaticism or religious propaganda. Besides that, Joxzin also often performs social service activities while the negative side of Joxzin in that era was when they hung out every Friday night, which then changed to Sunday night in the KH street area. Ahmad Dahlan, and at that time there were several persons from the mass organization who still liked to drink, and went around Yogyakarta just for a duel (a muscle or strength competition) to show the existence of his gang. Therefore, if the members do not take care of Joxzin properly, it could direct to a lousy clique.

Joxzin, at the beginning of around 1983, was a community of young BMX bicycle club race, Kauman Geng Cetul, inspired by small fish in the pond of Gede Kauman mosque. Then, many young people from outside Kauman began to join in a place for racing bicycle communities, from Godean and Kotagede. Besides, their current development replaced BMX bikes using motorcycles in the 1984s.

One study conducted by Pandu Yuhsina Adaba with the title "Rivalry of Gangs in the Political Dynamics of Yogyakarta," states that Kauman has a long history of politics in Yogyakarta [6]. The majority of Kauman residents obey religious norms, and politics have affiliations with political parties with Islamic ideology. The political direction began in the 1982s by joining political party campaigns, and in that village, a group of young people, known as Joxzin, was born.

Hery Prasetyo, aka Sotong in 2001, led the second generation of Joxzin, and this was the era after the fall of the new order. Officially, the second generation Joxzin with an Islamic base in Karangkajen declared itself as a supporter of the PPP Islamic political parties. Since then, Joxzin changed the name to "Jogjakarta Islamic Never Die," until now. Politically the closeness between Joxzin and PPP is natural because Joxzin members are all Muslim, and also, as Islamic mass organizations, who were born in the Islamic base area and young members who attend Muhammadiyah schools.

At the time of the reformation era, more Islamic parties were emerging, but Joxzin remained to support PPP. Some have moved to other Islamic parties. For example, some members of the Joxzin area of Kotagede formed a mass organization with the name paramilitary Baskara, who supported Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN).

The internal PPP conflict between Romahurmuzy (Romy) and the Djan Faridz led to the emergence of the "PPP Khittah," declared in Yogyakarta on May 4, 2018. Internal chaos in the body of the Central United Development Party (DPP PPP) also caused chaos in the regions. One of them was in the Special Region of Yogyakarta (DIY). The Joxzin community organizations that support PPP and are involved in political patronage are engaged in supporting Romy's side.

Historically the formation of Joxzin is better known from 3K (Kauman, Karangkajen, and Kotagede). Joxzin's mass organizations from the 1980s have been part of political campaigns in DIY after two years of the fall of the New Order. As political developments in DIY are slightly heating up and chaotic, in 2021 comes to the second generation Joxzin with a different name, namely "Brigade Joxzin, but still better known as Joxzin (Jogjakarta Islamic Never Die)" to distinguish the name of the new generation. From the second period, it has

 Direct interviews with N. I, a PPP political party elite, located in Yogyakarta and Bantul, on Sunday, September 8, 2019.

 Direct interview with I. C, a former member of Joxzin and GPK, located in Yogyakarta, on Tuesday, May 29, 2018

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started to get involved in politics, not only enlivening the general election campaign party but to mobilize the masses to cast their votes for the presidential and legislative candidates promoted by the PPP.

The establishment of the second generation Joxzin was initiated by a new commander (previously a young member of Joxzin). Joxzin currently arises because of the large number of paramilitary groups, wing organizations, or mass organizations that have sprung up, then affiliated to PPP, and also paramilitary groups that support other political parties. Also, a second-generation Joxzin appeared to commemorate the current commander of Joxzin in his teens, Hery Prasetyo Sotong, who was more active in political parties.

The involvement of Joxzin's political patronage in the underlying United Development Party (PPP) is competition with the establishment of paramilitary parties from political parties (PPP) in the PPP and also from competitors such as the paramilitary forces from Golkar, PDIP, and other political parties. Besides, the PPP organizational structure in DIY or even in cities and regencies that are not entirely running is still not optimal. If the existing structure in PPP ran optimally, Joxzin might not have existed. For example, the lowest-tier organizational structure of PPP is Branch Child Management (PAC). When people established PAC, the management and organizational structure did not run optimally as the spearhead to attract mass sympathizers in choosing or voting for legislative candidates or presidential candidates who were promoted by the PPP. From the problem of the maximum structure in the lowest structure, Joxzin emerged with hopes and objectives as the spearhead while substituting for PAC in reaching the masses of voters. Joxzin might also remain to have an affiliation with PPP to win the votes of the political parties.

The history of Joxzin's closeness to PPP was evident, in which Joxzin got involved in political patronage in the 2019 general election. When Joxzin was involved in politics in 2019, Joxzin supported the PPP and prospective legislators. The split of the two camps between the Romy camp and the Djan Faridz camp before the 2019 election, which had a lot of detrimental effects on future candidates in the legislative elections in 2019. The internal PPP confusion that led to the mass organizations Joxzin Sotong's brother directly appointed Anang to become the Leadership Council The branch (DPC PPP). It proves that the client has power in terms of political patronage. The results of the research do not fully agree with the previous study. They revealed that the position of CSOs was weak in resources and did not have power [9], [10], [11], [12], and [13]. The appointment was due to uneasy feelings towards Syukri Fadholi. From there, the reluctance of the PPP elite moved forward as chairman and did not dare to become chairman of the PPP DPC.

PPP khittah arises the impact of PPP internal conflict. While Syukri Fadholi was serving as chair of PPP for two periods and running for the legislative candidates of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR RI), he always lost and never passed to the DPR RI seats, even the PPP vote in DIY was decreasing. The PPP conflict by the government is deliberately maintained because Islamic political parties have two different camps given a decree (SK) by the government to support the government. The decree fell on Romy's stronghold, and Syukri Fadholi, who was already close to Djan Faridz, felt uncertain.

In Yogyakarta, Romy's side appointed Amin Zakaria as chairman of the PPP Regional Leadership Council (DPW PPP). When Amin Zakaria arranged the DPW PPP management, he had already communicated with Syukri Fadholi about four times. However, Syukri Fadholi did not respond and did not want to consolidate with Amin Zakaria. From there, the legal management of the DIY PPP DPW existed. Syukri Fadholi felt that he had long been a PPP administrator from DPC to DPW. When there was a next-generation who would replace his position as chairman of the DPW DIY, Syukri Fadholi was less agreeable. Thus, he only involved in establishing PPP khittah, which returned to the initial establishment of PPP as a fusion political party (a joint political party from the Nahdlatul Ulama Party (PNU), the Indonesian Islamic Union Party (PSII), the Tarbiyah Islamiyah Union (Perti), and the Indonesian Muslim Union (Parmusi or Permi).

When Syukri Fadholi still wanted to return to a PPP that was not khittah, he would bring all the old PPP members. However, the majority of PPP members no longer agreed with the idea. Joxzin and Sotong have big names, and when it comes to the formation of PPP management, Romy's side members are afraid of Syukri

 Direct interview with N. I, a PPP political party elite, located in Yogyakarta and Bantul, on Sunday, September 8, 2019

 Direct interview with N. I, a PPP political party elite, located in Yogyakarta and Bantul, on Sunday, September 8, 2019.

Fadholi. Only Sotong and Joxzin who dared to go forward and give orders by appointing Anang brothers as DPC. Sotong was not in line with Syukri Fadholi, and Fuad as the head of the Kaaba Khittah Youth Movement (GPK Khittah) of Yogyakarta. Sotong inevitably takes a stand if he wants to be hostile to Syukri Fadholi and Fuad.

Between the elite actor, Joxzin and the elite PPP have a healthy relationship, especially the elite Joxzin with Romy's side. The relationship between the Regional Leadership Council (DPW) and the PPP Branch Management Board (DPC) from Romy's camp with Joxzin is excellent, and there have been no problems until now. Even Joxzin, with other organizations in the PPP structure, is fine, except with the GPK Khittah of Yogyakarta, which is more towards the PPP Khittah. For the relationship between the chairman or leader of Joxzin and the head of the regency Non-Khittah GPK, it is also excellent (in addition to the GPK Khittah), and some of the first generation Joxzin founders who currently occupy the chair of GPK Non-Khittah).

Amin Zakaria, as the head of the PPP DPW in making tactical and strategic decisions, always involves and considers Joxzin. In other words, Amin Zakaria will listen to what Joxzin says. Amin Zakaria, as DPW PPP, respects Joxzin mass organizations.

The relation between actors between Joxzin CSOs with PPP or with other CSOs under the PPP structure is interconnected or interactions seen in the metric table and the relationship picture below using NodeXL.

Table 3.1

A topographic table of Joxzin's connection with PPP

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Metrics** | **Formal Authority Network** |
| Node Count- Edges | 2-402 |
| Density | 0,1626 > 0,7137 (High) |
| Diameter | 2 |
| Average Distance | 1,04 |

Source: Processed using NodeXL

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Score** | |
| Minimum Degree | 3 |
| Maximum Degree | 22 |
| Average Degree | 21,000 |
| Median Degree | 22,000 |
| Minimum In-Degree | 3 |
| Maximum In-Degree | 22 |
| Average In-Degree | 16,417 |
| Median In-Degree | 17,500 |
| Minimum Out-Degree | 0 |
| Maximum Out-Degree | 22 |
| Average Out-Degree | 16,417 |
| Median Out-Degree | 19,000 |
| Minimum Betweenness Centrality | 0,190 |

Source: Processed using NodeXL

Table 4.1


Central score of the connectedness of community organization actors and PPP parties

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Actor of Community Organizations and PPP Party** | **Degree** | **In Degree** | **Out Degree** | **Betwenness Centrality** | **Closnness Centrality** | **Eigenvector Centrality** |
| PPP | 22 | 22 | 22 | 0,390 | 0,042 | 0,044 |
| Joxzin | 20 | 20 | 7 | 0,190 | 0,038 | 0,040 |
| Gerakan Pemuda Ka'bah Khittah | 21 | 20 | 21 | 0,190 | 0,040 | 0,042 |
| GPKNon-Khittah | 22 | 22 | 21 | 0,390 | 0,042 | 0,044 |
| Hamka Darwis | 22 | 10 | 20 | 0,390 | 0,042 | 0,044 |
| Laskar Hizbullah | 22 | 14 | 19 | 0,390 | 0,042 | 0,044 |
| Angkatan Muda Ka'bah | 22 | 12 | 20 | 0,390 | 0,042 | 0,044 |
| Barisan Muda Ka'bah | 22 | 13 | 19 | 0,390 | 0,042 | 0,044 |
| Himpunan Anak Muda Ka'bah | 22 | 14 | 18 | 0,390 | 0,042 | 0,044 |
| Laskar Ashabul Kahfi | 22 | 14 | 17 | 0,390 | 0,042 | 0,044 |
| Laskar Singo Bangkit | 22 | 15 | 16 | 0,390 | 0,042 | 0,044 |
| Laskar Arafat | 22 | 16 | 15 | 0,390 | 0,042 | 0,044 |
| Hamka Kauman | 22 | 17 | 14 | 0,390 | 0,042 | 0,044 |
| Hamka Izro'il | 22 | 18 | 13 | 0,390 | 0,042 | 0,044 |
| Laskar Hajar Aswad | 22 | 18 | 22 | 0,390 | 0,042 | 0,044 |
| Laskar Gorok | 22 | 18 | 22 | 0,390 | 0,042 | 0,044 |
| Hababil | 22 | 18 | 22 | 0,390 | 0,042 | 0,044 |
| Laskar Sajam | 21 | 19 | 6 | 13,533 | 0,040 | 0,040 |
| Laskar el-Buroq | 22 | 20 | 9 | 13,533 | 0,042 | 0,042 |
| Laskar al-Haidar | 22 | 18 | 10 | 13,533 | 0,042 | 0,042 |
| Laskar al-Jibra | 22 | 20 | 19 | 0,390 | 0,042 | 0,044 |
| Laskar Al Fatah | 22 | 17 | 21 | 0,390 | 0,042 | 0,044 |
| Brigade Hamzah | 21 | 16 | 21 | 0,190 | 0,040 | 0,042 |

Source: Processed using NodeXL

Figure 1.1

Image analysis of network structure



Source: Processed using NodeXL

From the analysis of the network structure above, that in PPP, there are several mass organizations or paramilitaries in supporting the party cadres winning, namely. They are Joxzin, Khittah Ka'bah Youth Movement (GPK Khittah), Non-Khittah Ka'bah Youth Movement (GPK Non-Khittah), Hamka Darwis, Hezbollah Warriors, Kaaba Youth Force (AMK), Kaaba Young Rows (BMK), Kaaba Youth Association, Laskar Ashabul Kahfi, Laskar Singo Bangkit, Laskar Arafat, Hamka Kauman, Hamka Izro'il, Laskar Hajar Aswad, Laskar Gorok, Hababil, Laskar Sajam, Laskar el-Buroq, Laskar al-Haidar, Laskar al-Jibra, Laskar Al Fatah, and Hamzah Brigade. Of the many warriors or mass organizations, the researchers will more specifically see and analyze the connection between Joxzin's mass organizations and PPP in political patronage in the 2019 general elections. However, some mass organizations have interconnectedness or interact with their actors with PPP and Joxzin.


PPP in the network structure analysis picture is green, and red Joxzin only contacts or interacts with PPP, and also with only several CSO actors. It includes the Non-Khittah Ka'bah Youth Movement (GPK Non-Khittah), Hamka Dervish, Laskar Hizbullah, Kaaba Youth Force (AMK), Kaaba Youth Barisan (BMK), and Kaaba Youth Association. However, all the organizations in the PPP structure the actors have contact or interaction with Joxzin. It is different from Hamka Darwis in the orange network structure analysis picture seen from the figure of its position away from the collection of main actors in PPP, caused by the lack of interconnection or interaction with other CSO actors.

Joxzin, in directional relations or self-choices relationship, is seen with the arrow lines in the network structure analysis picture. Many other CSO actors contacted Joxzin because of the mutual interaction between CSOs in PPP. While in non-directional relations, where the connections of the actors are symmetrical (relationships without straight arrows), for Joxzin himself in this relationship had occurred when supporting the regional head candidates in the election of regional heads (mayors) of political parties other than PPP. It is Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP).

The relationship between political patronage between Joxzin Islamic mass organizations and the PPP Islamic political parties has led to the emergence and occurrence of clientelism practices, political alliances, power relations, and money politics.

Figure 2.1

Measuring variables; (1) Clientelism, (2) Political Alliances, (3) Power Relations, and (4) Money

Politics

Source: Processed using *Nvivo 12+*


The picture above is an analysis using NVivo 12 Plus from the results of interviews, Focus Group Discussion (FGD), questionnaires to mass organizations, and also some elite political parties. Some variables already exist, namely, clientelism, political alliances, power relations, and money politics, resulting in the practice of political patronage between Joxzin Islamic mass organizations and PPP Islamic political parties. In the case of clientelism, it has a similarity between Joxzin and PPP of 30%. In other words, between Joxzin and PPP, there is the practice of clientelism in the 2019 elections. While in terms of political alliances, Joxzin has 31% results and PPP 41%, PPP needs Joxzin more for winning votes, and Joxzin will continue and continue to support PPP.

Then, regarding power relations with Joxzin is 27% while PPP is 22%. It means that Joxzin has power compared to PPP with one example when PPP decision making always involves and asks Joxzin, and also appoints Anang's brother as the chairman of PPP DPC. Furthermore, regarding the results of money politics, both have the same result of 4%, in other words having a little practice of money politics, even though during the interview, Focus Group Discussion (FGD), and the results of the questionnaire did not find money politics in Joxzin.

Below is a picture of a query group in which there are groupings between one node and the case from the results of observation, interviews, Focus Group Discussion (FGD), and distributing questionnaires to the Joxzin elite, the PPP elite, the Joxzin mass and also the PPP mass.

Figure 3.1

The figure of the query group Grouping between one node and other cases



Source: Processed using *Nvivo 12+*

From the query group figure above, the grouping between nodes and cases from Joxzin actors and PPP actors are clear. Nodes are indicators, and the cases are research variables. In contrast, the cases are the result of a literature review, which is then to search for data through interviews, Focus Group Discussions (FGD), and questionnaires.

In the query group, there are variables (case), namely: clientelism, political alliances, power relations, and money politics. The clientelism variable consists of political party agents. Then, the variable political alliances include advantage in protection. Furthermore, the power relations variable consists of political power at the regional level, and then the last variable is money politics consisting of rewards in political support.

The existing nodes are the results of observations, interviews, Focus Group Discussions (FGD), and questionnaires to elite political parties, elite organizations, mass organizations, and former members of CBOs. From the results of the query group, some PPP elites, Joxzin elites, and also former Joxzin members regarding political patronage that occurred between Joxzin and PPP in the 2019 elections led to the emergence of clientelism, political alliances, power relations, and money politics. Still, the difference is the result of the percentage of the practice. The most exciting part of the patronage relationship between Joxzin and PPP is the power and power of the Joxzin elite, who can appoint the PPP elite to become the chairman of the PPP DPC.

The impact of Joxzin's involvement on PPP in supporting legislative candidates in the 2019 general election was Hasan (M. Hasan Widagno Nugroho) electoral district 5, Kotagede, Yogyakarta successfully managed to win Yogyakarta Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) [35]. While for the Sleman district, Joxzin supported Yayid (Muhammad Yazid) from electoral district 5, which finally pitched successfully at the Yogyakarta Provincial DPRD for the 2019-2024 period [35].

In the relationship of political patronage, the client's position is unfavorable in government and also the consolidation of democracy. However, regarding patronage becoming a culture and character in Indonesia, as well as in DIY, there should be a systematic way to strengthen a country's political system and government system, to eliminate clientelism and also political protection [36]; [37]; [38]; [39]; and [40] and the relationship of political patronage between Joxzin and PPP with the practice of clientelism and mutual protection.

The involvement of Joxzin's political patronage with PPP in the 2019 elections had a base on competition from mass organizations or paramilitary groups that were increasingly standing to win political parties supported, organizations from PPP itself, or competing political parties. In the future, Joxzin has the goal to establish PPP, without seeing the figure of the chairman. Still, Joxzin has the principle of the desired figure of the chairman. In other words, it must have in common with the vision and mission of his organization. Also, the PPP organizational structure in DIY or even in cities and regencies that are not entirely running is still not optimal. If the existing structure in PPP ran optimally, Joxzin might not have joined in the 2019 elections.

The relationship between Joxzin with PPP or organizations that exist in the PPP structure is excellent. Except for the Khittah PPP and organizations that are under the Khittah PPP structure, there were a few problems in the 2019 elections. Chairperson of the DPW PPP DIY (Amin Zakaria) always involves Joxzin in making tactical and strategic decisions for political parties. The legacy of Joxzin affects the PPP candidates to win the DPRD of Yogyakarta for the 2019-2024 period.

The role or position of CSOs, in this study, is inversely proportional to some opinions stating that CSOs are in a weak spot, due to the legitimacy of political patronage, caused by a group of elites with interest in monopolizing the community with their political control [9], [10], [11], [12], and [13]. The result was that Joxzin has a strong position in political patronage in the twenty-first century (21) being able to appoint Anang to be a chairman of the PPP Branch Leadership Council (DPC). The researchers found the opinion of Schulte- Bockholt (2006) that after the fall of the New Order, elite political parties sought allies with groups of thugs with an element of closeness to facilitate future integration in the power structure. In this case, there was a mention that Joxzin was the first-generation social base of thugs. Still, Joxzin now (the second generation) is the face of political Islam by accommodating Muslim youth to explore the potential in channeling action and political expression and aspirations of "*Amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*."

In political patronage between mass organizations and political parties, mass organizations can act as a client political clientelism that enters the grassroots by making bargaining power to voters, according to [22]; [17]; [23], and [24]. The opinion of the previous researchers is related to the political patronage between organizations (Joxzin) and political parties (PPP). In other words, they agree because Joxzin organizations exist to spearhead the PPP due to the less optimal role of the PPP PAC. Also, sometimes the position of mass organizations or elite organizations becomes a link between voters and political elites, and even elite organizations due to the mass organizations become clients of agents of the potential political parties in elections, according to [25]. The researchers also agree with his statement.

The researchers are in line with previous studies. Democracy today should not be littered or tainted by political patronage. The researchers' opinion is strengthened by [36], [37], [38], [39], and [40] that there must be a systematic system in strengthening the political system and governance system of a country, to eliminate the practice of clientelism and also the practice of political protection.

According to Gerardo Scherlis, political patronage in Argentina is an active subject in political patronage. It is inversely proportional to the results of political patronage between Joxzin and the PPP in DIY. Joxzin was more active in reaching the mass of voters proven by Joxzin as a substitute for PAC being the direct spearhead of PPP with the mass voters. Similar to Janette Bulkan in political patronage that occurred in Africa, the appointment of agents or organizations within the scope of political patronage can cause problems in the bureaucracy of political patronage. Instead, Joxzin, as a political party agent, does not create difficulties for PPP. Joxzin's involvement gives benefits for political parties by strengthening power relations between the two (Joxzin and PPP) with the achievement of political power in political parties and political power at the regional level.

## STUDY RESULTS, SUMMARY AND CONTRIBUTION

From the results from the literature review and research in the field using data collection through observation, interviews, Focus Group Discussion (FGD), and questionnaires, then NodeXL and NVivo 12 Plus, the analysis of social networks between Joxzin and PPP in political patronage in the 2019 election of Yogyakarta, there is a similarity or concordance of the results between the sources of several previous studies contained in the

literature review with the results of the study, and also the inequality or discrepancy between several variables and indicators in the study.

There are several variables obtained from the study. They are 1) Clientelism, 2) Political alliances, 3) Relations of power, and 4) Money politics. These variables appear to reinforce and clarify the data retrieval in research. From the clientelism variable, indicators appear as an agent between the political party elite and the voting masses. Then, from the political alliance variable, the indicators are advantages in protection - furthermore, the variable power relations include political power at the regional level. The last variable is money politics with its indicators, namely rewards in political support for individuals or groups.

The four (4) variables as a reference in the study have similarities with the results from the literature review source, although there are also minimal inequality results. From the results, the majority said that the client was weak and under the patron in terms of resources. Instead, what happened was the opposite. The client (Joxzin) has power or strength that is dominant compared to the patron (PPP political parties) with one of the examples obtained from the results of the study is that the client can appoint someone to be the chairman of the PPP Yogyakarta (DPC PPP DIY).

The practice of clientelism and the political alliance is large and dominant because, in the future, Joxzin will continue to conduct political patronage by supporting PPP in militancy and loyalty to these political parties. For the practice of power relations and money politics, Joxzin and PPP do this practice, even though it is not dominant. From the practice of political alliance between Joxzin and PPP, it leads to the practice of profit in protection, with one example when there are social problems from one of the mass organizations or political party elites. They protect each other when there are problems. Regarding the agreement between the mass organizations and political parties that did not happen, Joxzin never asks for compensation from the PPP.

The practice of power relations raises political power in political parties and political power at the regional level. It is clear that with Joxzin in DIY, the political power is reliable in supporting candidates in the 2019 elections. While the practice of money politics, the emergence of reward practices in political support results of analysis says, there is the practice. Still, results in the field do not occur. In other words, Joxzin does not receive rewards in the form of material or services from PPP.

This study recommends that CSOs should serve the needs of the community and the nation's community. At the same time, the government educates in the formation of political education to avoid dirty politics or political patronage that raises money politics. Also, the state and CSOs should play a role as partners for the interests of the state, not just on matters patronage. Patronage should have become a culture to avoid a similar issue happening again in the future, leading to the emergence of money politics and the practice of clientelism. In other words, all related parties such as governments, agencies, organizations, and civil society support each other to eliminate patronage.

Finally, this study recommends that future researchers in political patronage can broaden the scope of investigations and explore using other methods (i.e., a comparative approach to political patronage responses between community organizations (mass organizations) and political parties. It aims to understand cross-sector collaboration in political patronage between mass organizations and political parties. This research is only limited to data collected in the study area within the scope of the Special Region of Yogyakarta (DIY).

Regarding patronage, it is difficult to eliminate. However, a minimalization should be possible to avoid similar issues happen again in the future between Joxzin and PPP. The recommended solution is that PPP must strengthen the regeneration for political party structures and also the structure of the Subsidiary Leadership (PAC). As the spearhead of political parties, it must run optimally, with everything in the political party problem no longer brings out political patronage.

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## Interview

1. Direct interview with N. I, a PPP political party elite, located in Yogyakarta and Bantul, on Sunday, September 8, 2019.
2. Direct interview with I. C, a former member of Joxzin and GPK, located in Yogyakarta, on Tuesday, May 29, 2018