

# POLITICAL CULTURE STRATEGY IN CONFIGURATION OF ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL ELITES

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**ABSTRACT---** *This article aims to describe the political phenomenon clan-based politics with an imbalanced contestation process and the right strategy of political culture to issue alternative of political elites in Polewali Mandar which is not clan oriented. The research method used was qualitative phenomenology with epoche and eidetic. Epoche in phenomenology is a conceptualized assessment which must be postponed or given brackets until that phenomenon talks for itself while eidetic is the understanding of meaning always obtained and only through the understanding of expressions. The cultural strategy in the political arena of Polewali Mandar is a sequence of efforts done by politicians as alternatives for decreasing clan political power. Data in the field show there are two cultural strategies being able to reduce 3M Clan political power. Those two strategies are the reinforcement of medium intellectual group networks and strengthening the cohesiveness of alternative politicians. This research gives a contribution towards the implication of sociology theory with characteristics such as deterministic-dualism and the relation of this research finding towards bourdieau's sociology theory, and the implication towards the development of sociology knowledge. This research gives a new perspective about the phenomenon of elite political configuration especially in the field of sociology and strategy of political culture.*

**Keywords---** *politics, political culture strategy, political elites*

## I. INTRODUCTION

One interesting phenomenon of political elite configuration observed is the anomaly of democracy by utilizing democratic instruments where this is the growth of dynastic political trends. Bathoro (2011: 117) states that "Political dynasties in the modern political world are known as political elites based on blood ties or marriages so that some political observers call them political oligarchs. In the Indonesian context, an elite group is a group that can influence the political decision-making process. Therefore they are sometimes relatively easy to reach power or fight for power. Before the emergence of symptoms of political dynasties, the elite was associated with political party elites, military, and police elites, businessmen or financiers, religious elites, thugs or mafia elites, artist elites, and activist elites. The ruling elite managed to consolidate its power by distributing "power" to their clan.

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The emergence of clan politics or dynastic politics is not a new phenomenon. This phenomenon is seen in several places in Indonesia, for example, in Banten Province, where Ratu Atut Chosyiah's clan controls almost all political resources in Banten. It can be seen that the Atut family must lead one by one the regencies or cities in Banten. Furthermore, for example, Khaerul Jaman, who was the mayor of Serang, Tatu Chasanah, who became Deputy Regent of Serang and followed Airin who was elected Mayor of South Tangerang and Heryani, stepmother of Atut as Deputy Regent of Pandeglang. In addition to the local elections, the 2009 legislative election event is also a means of placing families in political power. Atut's husband, Hikmat Tomet, became a member of the DPR from the Golkar Party. Also, Andika Hazrumy, her eldest child, was chosen as a candidate for DPD members. Andika's wife, Atut's daughter-in-law, Ade Rossi Chaerunnisa, was elected as a member of the Serang City DPRD, while Tatu Chasanah was elected as a Banten DPRD member and then elected as a Serang Deputy Regent.

Of course, there are many kinds of political sociology theories that can be used in explaining elite configurations in Polewali Mandar. Therefore elite configuration becomes a big concept in this study and can be mapped using Bourdieu (1990) theory about habitus (capital and realm). Habitus can simply be interpreted as a system of disposition that lasts long and changeable (durable, transposable disposition), which functions as a generative basis for practices that are structured and objectively integrated (Harker et al, 2009). Habitus becomes a place where behavior is produced. Bourdieu's theory is a bridge between subjectivity and objectivity as well as theory and practice. Bourdieu's theory can explain the political behavior of the elite and the public in Polewali Mandar which still tends to rely on traditional aspects. The formation of a clan political system or dynastic politics is part of political behavior formed in the habitus that plays in the cultural space of the Polewali Mandar community. Bourdieu's formula of practice, which is the accumulation of habitus, capital, and the realm, can significantly explain why only certain clans can control political resources in Polewali Mandar.

The most visible political practice is elections, both at the national level (presidential elections, national legislative elections) and the regional level (governor elections, regent/mayor elections, and provincial and district/city parliamentary elections). If you follow the theory of Pierre Bourdieu then the election is a domain (politics) where habitus and capital work to shape political action (choosing candidates). The configuration of the local elite in Polewali Mandar illustrates a map of the practice of political tendencies that are understood and the political practices carried out by all the political actors or local elites involved. These political actors include candidates, success teams, election organizers (members of the KPU, Panwaslu, and KPPS), and voters. Initial assumptions show that political patterns oriented to certain dynasties were the result of political work that succeeded in forming a model of leadership habitus in Polewali Mandar, namely habitus of dynastic leadership.

The political arena of the Polewali Mandar regional election illustrates the configuration of the political elite, especially the three political clans in Polewali Mandar, namely the Mengga, Masdar, and Manggabari clans. These political clans have accumulated capital with different capacities. These capitals are of course the formers of habitus and how habitus is played in the public domain. Habitus is formed and forms the society. It is indicated by the back and forth arrows indicating the mutual influence between the actor and his social structure. The process of playing habitus is an attempt to change public reasoning to re-establish the political power of the clan. The process of playing habitus, of course, is mediated or involves regional election institutions. However, in essence, the habitus process was carried out so that the clan's political power remained strong. Configuring Local Elites in Polewali Mandar in political contestation is to use Bourdieu's theory of habitus, capital, and arenas that shape

political practice. The elite configuration begins by observing the habitus of the political elite which is the main object of this research. The intended capital is political capital (for example, electability), economic capital (wealth), social capital (aristocratic derivatives), and cultural capital (part of a particular cultural community). The stronger the capital of a politician, the greater the chance to play in the political arena (*pilkada*).

The configuration of the political elite that produced dynastic politics is unique and problematic at the Polewali Mandar. The configuration of the political elite is intended to explain political contestation in Bourdieu's perspective. Political power for three decades was controlled by the Mengga, Manggranian, and Masdar clans. This model is less than ideal because it prevents the consolidation of democracy. The kinship network which has social, cultural and symbolic economic capital certainly has a great opportunity in the abuse of power in the interest of strengthening the dynastic political power network. In the case of corruption, the internal control system becomes very weak because all power resources are controlled by a network of certain relatives or cronies. The inhibition of the consolidation of democracy is a result of the strengthening of dynastic politics, which causes leadership to revolve only in certain clans. The fact that the configuration map of the political elite in Polewali Mandar shows flawed political culture and unbalanced contestation. Various ideal justifications lay behind the project to strengthen dynastic politics that were socialized at the lowest base of society. It means that there is a cultural and political system that is "playing" in the public mind of Polewali Mandar, both at the elite level and the public level, which influences the formation of the political system of the clan itself. There is certain habitus who are working in the public who carry out what is called Bourdieu symbolic violence.

The focus of this research is on the configuration of the local political elite within the framework of the Pierre Bourdieu Theory of Practice which currently exists in the land of Mandar. The cultural strategy in question is the value and configuration system of the political elite that exists in the history of Mandar politics and which is thought by the public about alternative political elite systems. For reasons of democracy, this makes certain social groups have a large capital in creating political clans. In this case, all political, economic, and other resources are owned and driven by one particular clan. The limitation on the duration of regional leadership for two periods serves as a space for 'dividing' power to existing clan members. In other words, only for democratic reasons, the cohesiveness of clan politicians is allowed to rotate. Democracy is only used as a procedure for creating and perpetuating clan power. This can be said as a form of deviation from the fundamental values of democracy. That thing then becomes the question in this research, namely, what is the style of the political culture in the configuration of the political elite in Polewali Mandar.

The word "habitus" in the title section of the dissertation is very close to understanding political habitus or political culture. Bourdieu in Lizardo (2004: 378) provides a complete picture of the definition of habitus, which is as follows: "Systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them. Objectively "regulated" and "regular" without being in any way the product of obedience to rules, they can be collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organizing action of a conductor." Habitus serves as an instrument of internalization for actors in feeling, understanding, realizing and valuing the social world (Ritzer & Goodman, 522). It is through this process that actors shape and assess each of their actions. Habitus is a social structure that is internalized by the actor and then manifested in the

form of action. Bordieau defines Habitus as a long-lasting, transposable disposition system that functions as a generative basis for structured and objectively integrated practices (Harker et al. 2009: 13). In cultural studies, the term *encoding-decoding* is known (Barker, 2009: 284). Individuals receive a 'code' (encoding), which is then processed, interpreted, and reproduced into new code (decoding). The new code might be biased from the original code. Habitus is tasked with processing the code, which is from the *encoding* to the *decoding* process.

Culture is not a noun but a verb. Culture is the work of man himself and his own human responsibility (Puersen, 1975). Puersen (1975) further revealed that the three stages of social strategy are Myth, Ontological and Functional. The ideal strategy contains a general policy that gives direction to where and how something will be handled. The strategy includes a vision and basic assumptions that are implemented based on stages, determining the target of each stage, and the steps to achieve it. But the problem is, culture is not an area that can easily be strategized. However, for example, we can see the ethical paradigm of the early twentieth century in the Dutch East Indies as a cultural strategy of the colonial government to produce educated but benign civil servants. In the practice of daily life, there is no sharp separation between mental and physical matters, between cultural and political, social and economic matters. This division is merely an academic division.

In daily life, cultural moments cannot be separated from economic, socio-geographical, political, legal, and so on. Therefore, various discussions which emphasize that "culture must be commander in the administration of the state" should be interpreted as returning culture to our political, economic, and social habits. (Supelli, 2015) states that the Local Elite Configuration in Polewali Mandar in political contestation is to use Bourdieu's theory of habitus, capital, and arenas that shape political practice. It starts by observing the habitus of the political elite which is the main object of this study. The intended capital is political capital (for example, electability), economic capital (wealth), social capital (aristocratic derivatives), and cultural capital (part of a particular cultural community). The stronger the capital of a politician the higher his chance to play in the political arena (pilkada).

## II. METHODOLOGY

The research method used in this study is the qualitative method of phenomenology. The phenomenological method, as stated by Dhavamony (tt: 34-35), is that to obtain objective truth according to the subjects studied (objective-subjectivity), it is necessary to apply what is referred to as *epoche* and *eidetic*.

### 1) *Location of Research*

The location where this research was carried out is in Polewali Mandar Regency. The determination of the research location is based on that 1). Polewali Mandar Regency is the most populous area in West Sulawesi (455,572 inhabitants). 2). Polewali Mandar Regency is also the primary reference for West Sulawesi political figures, where many influential political figures were born in this place. 3). Polewali Mandar is one of the central kingdom bases in Mandar namely the Balanipa kingdom which is expected to make it easier to see changes in the configuration of local political elites from time to time. 4). Polewali Mandar Regency is a place of dynastic political practices during the last few decades.

### 2) *Focus of Research*

This research focuses on the configuration of the local political elite within the framework of the Pierre Bourdieu Practice Theory currently in the land of Mandar. The cultural strategy in question is the value and configuration system of the political elite in the history of Mandar politics and what the public thinks about alternative political elite systems.

### **3) *Techniques of Data Collection***

Qualitative research requires that researchers are the main instrument of research. The ability of researchers to influence significantly the data obtained. To obtain data holistically and integratively in answer to this research problem is a set of primary and secondary data needed. To capture primary data in the field as a strategic step to obtain the expected results using field research methods, which include interview and observation techniques. While secondary data collected through documentation techniques. Operationally, the three data collection techniques will be adjusted to the focus of the main problem in this research, which is to understand the process, meaning, and strategy of political culture. Therefore, researchers will act as key instruments and several other complementary instruments such as interview guidelines, tape recorders, and cameras. In addition to determining the main sample (main research subjects), several secondary subjects can also be planned at the beginning of the study, including; Mandar academics and culture which are considered to understand the political history in Polewali Mandar, as well as other elements that can provide information and data sources. In testing the validity of the data, it can be seen from the results of in-depth interviews with the main subjects.

### **4) *Techniques of Data Analysis***

As mentioned earlier that the paradigmatic reasoning of this research is based on a qualitative approach to phenomenology, then in the process of data analysis will follow the path of abstractive inductive logic, which is logic that originates from special to general. The process of description, categorization, and conceptualization is developed based on the reality found in the field. Therefore, data collection and data analysis activities become a unified process that is inseparable from one another. The process of collecting and analyzing follows a cyclical, interactive, and ongoing process until it is complete so that the data becomes saturated, as explained by Miles and Huberman (1992), which includes data reduction, data display, and conclusions: drawing / verifying. Data analysis is done by describing the complete process of interpreting the symbolic meaning behind the gestures of the informants, interpreting the meaning of certain statements of the informants, processing field notes in disaggregated groups according to the themes written. The political culture strategy gave rise to an alternative configuration of the political elite in Polewali Mandar, a field notes that researchers could describe when interviewing informants about the cultural strategies of the three clans.

### **5) *Techniques of Data Validation***

The data validation technique used in this study is the credibility test. Nasution (2002) explains that the credibility test is carried out as a "credibility check of the data needed to prove whether the research report is following what is actually happening and occurs naturally in the field. This degree of trust is intended to fulfill the emic truth criteria, both for the reader and the subject under study. The credibility test will be carried out through

perseverance in data collection, triangulation of techniques and data sources, peer discussions, and negative case analysis for comparison".

### III. RESULTS OF CULTURAL EFFORTS AND STRATEGIES IN THE POLEWALI MANDAR POLITICAL ARENA

The issue of leadership culture in the Mandar Tribe has its own uniqueness. From the Mandar kingdom, the researchers concluded that this kingdom was characterized by a union of kingdoms that could be classified into two, namely Pitu Ulunna Salu (Seven Hulu Rivers) and Pitu Ba'Bana Binanga (Seven Estuaries of the River). These fourteen kingdoms form a single kingdom called Mandar. Mandar itself comes from the word mandaq or sipamandaq which means mutually reinforcing. Local wisdom about leadership in the Mandar Land is basically incompatible with clan politics. Therefore we need a cultural strategy to revitalize the principles of leadership in the Mandar Land. The next problem concerns the typology of the cultural practices of each clan in which each candidate has a relationship with the family related to mara'dia in Mandar. The practice of cultural politics is also very much influenced by the social strata of each 3M clan. Specifically the linkage of each clan to the royal lineage in Mandar. The relationship between heredity and mara'dia and the king besides Mandar influenced the practice of the culture of the 3 Clans. Mengga inherited two cultural forces namely as descendants of the Messenger of Allah and also included the religion of Mara'dia. Likewise, the Masdar clan belonged to the descendants of Mara'dia and Manggabarai, who also had a migratory relationship with Mandar, namely in Binuang. The following will be displayed clans' genealogies related to mara'dia status in their genealogical chains. The practice of cultural politics has a significant war in political contestation in Polewali Mandar. The Mengga clan emphasizes more devotion than the Mara'dia Mandar breed. Masdar emphasizes more on the connection with the Ma'radia breed while Manggempuani is more representative of the Binuang Talking breed. The Manggranian divergence is actually stronger in the kingdom of Gowa and Luwu. Of course, the political practices of the Kelgaga Mengga and Masdar had power in the Mandar Kingdom, which entered the Pitu Ba'bana Binanga while Manggabarani in the Pitu Ulunna Salu.

Various views of non-political clan informants indicate that political obsession wants a change in political leadership trends to remain prominent. Here are some field notes that researchers can describe when interviewing informants about cultural strategies are as follows

**Table 1:** Field Notes Results of Interviews about cultural strategies

No	Respondent	Field Notes
1	AA.	When interviewing the informant, the face of concern was apparent when this informant gave his views on cultural strategies to end the domination of political clans in Polewali Mandar District. Informant refers to the concept of "political patrol" as something that shows that power has passed down through power over the Polewali Mandar Regency.

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2	SS	The informant showed a more convincing facial gesture when he explained that political changes in Polewali Mandar could occur. However, when explaining the emergence of alternative leaders, signs of concern appear on his face. SS explained that the main concept is "good governance," which is a prerequisite for the emergence of alternative leaders in the future. Good governance is interpreted as the cause of the emergence of alternative leaders who will end the domination of political clans in Polewali Mandar Regency.
3	MN	MN showed a gesture that was almost similar to the previous informant who expressed concern about the dominance of political clans in the Polewali Mandar Regency. It even tends to be more apathetic to see the emergence of alternative dreamer figures substitute for political clans. MN's description shows the strength of the political network possessed by political clans. "Political Network" is a neutral concept that is believed by MN as an extraordinary power that perpetuates the power of political clans in the Polewali Mandar Regency.
4	NM	Unlike the previous informant, NM showed more acceptance of the political dominance of the clan as long as it was pursued in a democratic and ethical manner. It seems that NM is much calmer and doesn't show concern. The central concepts obtained in the NM statement are "democratization" and "political ethics". As long as political power is obtained democratically and ethically, political clans are not problematic.

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Clan politics is a problem related to the revolving of power around political clans that use the foundations of democracy. For example, every citizen has the right to be elected and to vote if they meet administrative requirements. The issue of the right to elect and vote is a political claim played by political clans in maintaining their power. The diversity of views on the political validity of the clans implies a crucially crucial issue about the meaning of democracy. When viewed from the perspective of the consolidation of democracy that emphasizes the equitable distribution of power and the change of political power that is not concentrated in one clan, then clan politics is a problem. The case in Polewali Mandar shows a centralized distribution of power. AA describes precisely the configuration of the political clan elite on the distribution of power in Polewali Mandar as follows:

"In my opinion, Pak Masdar's family has a good political quality in which there is Andi Ibrahim, and Pak Masdar's two children are in the executive network becomes the head of the office and the head of the KMPI and also to be the office secretary. In addition, there are his grandchildren, who are members of the DPR and his daughter-in-law, who are members of the DPRD RI. It means that under the dynastic rule, in my opinion, Pak Masdar was able to consolidate a good political communication system in his family. But in my opinion, in maintaining his strong political clan, Mr. Mengga is rather tidy in consolidating himself to build good political structures and strata from the district to the province. For example, in my view, the governor should now be Pak Mengga's family. He has the strongest political base in which the son of Pak Mengga has become the Deputy Governor for five years. The consolidation process could have been carried out if the process of political

communication and political understanding between younger siblings and siblings could be maintained, but it was not so different from Pak Masdar's family where Pak Masdar's family was making space, political space. Andi Ibrahim is willing to get out of GOLKAR. The important thing is that another party still nominates his brother and he is put in charge to look after his brother, unlike the family consolidation system of Mr. Mengga. In my prediction, in the future the only people who can survive in Polewali Mandar for the 3M category are Pak Masdar. That is because he can build a political communication pattern in the family in a tiered, neat, orderly and consolidated manner compared to the others. My feeling that can last for the next 20 years is only Pak Masdar's family. While others, in my opinion, cannot defend their political clans. Political clans are not wrong anywhere in the world because political clans are common. "

The distribution of clan members in all lines of power made it difficult to overthrow the political power of the clan. The spread of the clan's political power naturally strengthened their political, economic, social, and symbolic capital. This is the basis why alternative leaders have difficulty developing in Polewali Mandar. Furthermore, some informants' information points to the fact that the politics of the clan have strengthened.

**Table 2:** Results of interviews with the informants

No	Respondent	Statement
1	AA.	My view is still dominant regarding political patrol (traditional politics), political patrol is a political power that is a hereditary map of power, where a very strong political line determines the battle map in Polewali Mandar, new ideas about development governance seem not to be very effective become an offer for a new political line in Polewali Mandar ".
2	SS	"My hope remains that if the progress of society that has desired change, progress, and the implementation of a government system that has led to good governance is increasingly developing, then alternative leaders will emerge and succeed. Until now, political organizations, other social organizations have not yet socialized alternative leaders and the impact if we are stagnant on the three figures mentioned above ".
3	MN	"It could be, but we see that they do not stop (3M Clan) to run their regeneration with their supporters are not separated, so they are still the dominant we see."
4	NM	This means that if we return to democracy, it is fine, but Dynasty in the ethical sense and not forced by scrambling through all means, in ways that are incompetent like that ".

Maintaining cohesiveness among supporters in the grassroots is one of the clans' political ways of managing their power. Another factor that is a determinant of why the political power of the Cenderug clan is getting stronger is the superiority of the heredity aspect. The Masdar Clan tends to strengthen compared to the Mengga Clan because of the hereditary aspects of the multi-tribal Masdar Clan while the Mengga Clan does not.

Informant S states interesting fact about Puang Masdar politically he is only the party leader, but he is not yet one of authority, but his influence was quite widespread since heredity Puang Masdar is not Mandar people, not native, but he adapts and can embrace. Therefore today if Andi Ibrahim become Mr. Alibal Masdar because it is inseparable from the greatness of his parents because he has two things such as relation and culture, the culture I mean here is different from Mr. Salim, (Mr. Mengga) both are having fanatical ideology, what differentiate them is when talking about Mandar people is in Mr. Salim, but when talking about Bugis, Toraja, Makassar, there is in Mr. Masdar, but these Mandar people are not all in Mr. Salim, there are also in Mr. Masdar, but when talking the dominant Bugis is in Mr. Masdar .

The difference in heredity impact on political implications that affect the public. Yet for researchers, the aspect of heredity, although influential, it has less impact. The aspects of the power distribution in each line of bureaucratic impact on social services are one of the most important aspects especially Masdar tribe to bind the public. Informant AA explained about the distribution of political power at the bureaucratic level:

" Supposing that for politics it divides itself into several political parties, so there are Golkar party, Nasdem party, and Gerindra party, then another thing is the modial rank of power in Andi Ibrahim who becomes regent that means he is consolidating, he regulating eight hundred billion annually. It means he can create, and he gives a business license, which means he can interfere who wants to be given permission and who is given permission. Moreover, he is a bureaucratic model as a service symbol when someone becomes a sub-district head and provide a good service, and the community will be obliged to the sub-district head step, head of the office, siblings, cousins, nobody will prohibit him if he gives the head office position to his brother, right?. He just said that these requirements according to the AMC law, the law cannot be denied. The one who becomes headman can be interfered with. I don't think it can be interfered by campus only. Then the social part, especially about social capital, social issues can be drawn, such as giving to religious leaders, helping social assistance to religious community groups, the priest, Islamic society, it is much easier for us.

The distribution of political power in family clans enables political clans to accumulate capital, especially financial. The overarching political power network is definitely intended to strengthen its power. The accumulation of capital is a vital matter that must be fought by clan politics. Masdar clan, as one of authority, has budget control. Controlling budgets strengthen clan in politics. AA describes how politics in Polewali Mandar budget.

"According to Law 23, out of the 12 names drawn by the province, all are the responsibility of the regent to provide support to make the media, facilitate anyone who wants to be an entrepreneur. Therefore, regent has the start of capital, and then the other is who wants to be a contractor in Polman, I read projects budget of every year nearly 400 billion physically. Yet there are 400 billion that the regent can manage. Even if the regent said that all the auction was 5.4, although it was tempere, but the regent still regulated it. Therefore, he still has economic capital that is consolidated by entrepreneurs to have entrepreneurs".

The great political power can be controlled through the media. If the mass media favor the redistribution of political power, so clan political power can gradually be minimized. Meanwhile, what happened in Polewali Mandar shows the following: The strategy played by the political elite focuses on the media to highlight their capacity. Media has low or uncritical supervision, a factor due to media displaying fraud, but people are not overreacting because they are afraid of being news so that media supervision is lacking the political elite and makes it easy for political elites to play configurations the handicapped. Talking about alternative leaders having a narrow

space is caused by the employer not giving policies as a good place. The entrepreneurs are free to manage their cultural capital so there is cultural discrimination (lineage, ordinary people/nobles) that has impact on alternative leaders who are not given the space to have role in their political strategy, because the opinion of scholars who deserve to be leaders who have the financial or extensive social networks, so that alternative leaders have narrow space.

The uncritical media and the lack of massive public attention on politics makes the clan's political power even stronger. It is naturally very difficult to bring up alternative leaders in Polewali Mandar. It is a crucial problem facing the ongoing democratic process in Polewali Mandar. Definitely a cultural strategy is needed to strengthen the redistribution of power that is not concentrated in clan politics. In Bourdieu's perspective, an arena is a place where the conflict process takes place. Social practice that occurs is a battle of two forces in society. Capriati (2013: 39) says that: "Practice is concepts of relative autonomy, personal and class trajectories, and especially the nature of strategy and the struggle for position in a realm. In his theory, Bourdieu tried to link his theoretical ideas with empirical research based on everyday life. The theory offered by Bourdieu is a practical theory. Practices in Bourdieu's understanding are formulated: (Habitus x Capital) + Domain = Practice. This formula replaces each of the simple relations among individuals and structures with relations between habitus and the domain that involve capital.

#### **IV. DISCUSSION**

The cultural strategies are social practices designed to win the political conflict. The culture strategy is the way of individual or group on responding to the power around them. The relationships based on the struggle for political influence are common in societies that are contesting for power. The cultural strategy concerning political clans in Polewali Mandar is a comprehensive formulation of the distribution of power that is not centered on one family that dominates political power in Polewali Mandar. Mapping the domain of political conflict raises two groups who conflict with each other named 3M clan politic with the alternative leader. For researchers, a political alliance strategy is needed to decline the political power of the 3M clan. The alliance strategy as a statement of Dicken in Lataruva (2004: 4) is an alliance strategy is an activity where the interested parties have an interest in the future then by donating resources, and competitive advantages that are owned by new things will produce a new value. In other words, the alliance is a collaboration among economic subjects, both in national and international, among companies or among groups or groups of companies. The main objective of this strategy is to enable a company/group to achieve particular goals that cannot be achieved by their own efforts.

The conflict between potential alternative leaders can be used by clan politicians to use the weaknesses of each alternative leader. Theoretically, the alliance strategy is hard to do if the political culture of alternative leaders is not yet strong. Political culture by John L Duffies in Lantis (2002: 90) describes the notion of political culture is "Political culture may include a commitment to value like democratic principle and institution, idea of morality and the use of force, the rights of individuals or collectivities, or predisposition toward the role of country in global politics. According to proponents of the theory, political culture becomes manifest on at least three levels: the cognitive, which includes empirical and causal beliefs; the evaluative, which consist of values, norms and moral

judgment; and the expressive or affective, which encompasses emotional attachments, patterns of identity and loyalty, and feelings of affinity, aversions, indifference".

Political culture commits to the democratic principles and institutions' values, ideas of morality and the use of power, individual and group rights, strengthening the role of state globally. According to the supporter of this theory, a political culture will happen through three levels, such as cognitive, including empirical and causal beliefs; evaluative, which is related to moral values, norms and judgments; and expressive or affective including emotional attachment, identity, and loyalty patterns, feeling attractiveness, reluctance and indifference. The alliance strategy requires at least a change in people's perceptions (cognitive domain) about the negative impacts that could be caused by political clans whose power is centered on them. The changes in community perceptions are expected to lead people conducting moral judgments on political clans and alternative leaders make people emotionally attached to them in the future — the reluctance to political behavior that affirms political clan.

The changes in political culture are urgently needed in societies that have strong political power of the clan. Changing the political culture requires a cultural strategy. It is definitely to change the culture of public politics which is not easy. Changing the cognitive, evaluative and public affective domains related to political clans becomes very difficult because in the arena of political clan conflict has mastered all capital according to Bourdieu. The change in political culture through cultural strategies is an effort to create habitus. Public habitus needs to change in the perspective of political clans' influence on democracy consolidation. Habitus changes are expected to change the perception, evaluative and affective of the public towards political clans. Changes in public habitus are very important in power conflict in the political arena of Polewali Mandar. Bourdieu in Sulistyningtyas, Jaelani & Waskita (2012: 165) states that body memory has an essential role in shaping character in cultural actions. Habitus is a set of the tendency that created and reformulated by structure and individual history.

The history of clan politics can be ended by reformulating habitus that creates public cultural action in Polewali Mandar based on democracy principles but enlarges political consolidation marked by the spread of political power that not only around family. The change of habitus definitely has an impact on action. Robet and Rozak (2011: 84) state that the action connects between habitus and objective social life and the other hand habitus is created through action. Therefore, both of habitus, individual mental schemes, and objective social structures are basically actions. It can be formulated that the actions in society have an essential role in self-formation.

Community awareness by changing their habitus is urgently needed. Featherstone in Zulfikar (2008: 146) states that Bourdieau concept on habitus is useful to make an explanation of different tastes and disposition establishes that characterizes this stratum. Bordieu refers to habitus as a variety of unconscious dispositions, classification schemes, choices that are considered to be true in someone's perspective in the accuracy and validity of his taste in various cultural objects and practices. It is important to emphasize that habitus only exists at the level of daily knowledge but is implemented in the body, expressed in size, volume, shape, body posture, how to walk, sit, eat, drink, and others. These are all expressions of someone's habitus origin.

The changes in public habitus that actually represent democracy will make the conflict in justice. Pierre Bourdieu describes the process of competition and conflict in Polewali Polman as political arena, which actually not only describe the conflict between clan politics as elections Polewali 3 years ago but also conflict between political clans with the alternative leader. This conflict creates social turmoil at both the elite and lower levels of society. Bourdieu stated that the structure of conflict between political contestants is nothing but a form of social

conflict where there is a struggle between social groups that fight the capital, such as economic capital, social capital, cultural capital, and symbolic capital. Social practice, which Bourdieu called a practice defined by Capriati (2013: 39) as follows: "Practice is the concepts of relative autonomy, personal and class trajectories, and especially the nature of strategy and the struggle for position in a domain. In his theory, Bourdieu tried to link his theoretical ideas with empirical research based on daily life. The theory of Bourdieu is a practical theory. Practices of Bourdieu's theory are formulated: **(Habitus x Capital) + Domain = Practice**. This formula replaces any simple relations between individuals and structures with relations between habitus and the domain involving capital. "Social conflict in domains occurs due to the process of social reproduction. Social reproduction is a concept that describes how the social position of a person or group of people is achieved and confirmed. Kaufman (2005: 246) states: "Research on social reproduction rejects the premise of widespread social mobility and attempts instead to explain the persistence of social-class position".

Social reproduction is a social relationship between social groups that determined by the extent to which group controls resources in the form of social capital, cultural capital, economic capital and symbolic capital. Social reproduction is the same as on how the 3M clan occupies a high structural position above other groups, but it does not mean have a high social investment. Lareau in Kaufmann (2005: 245) states that possession of high-status cultural resources does not automatically lead to social investment. Instead, these cultural resources must be effectively activated by individuals, in and through their own actions and decisions.

The resources such as social status do not make the owner has a social investment. Basically, cultural resources can be effective by individual actions and decisions. What has been done by 3M when implementing its power is effective, so that the Polewali Mandar society still is difficult to choose an alternative leader. Moreover, the cohesiveness of alternative leaders weakens their position. Conflict is an inevitable relationship between groups of political. Foucault in Hidayat (2008: 25) states that conflict is the relationship between competition and struggle in relationships or interaction to have a winner. Klinken in Permana (2010: 66) mentions five key processes of conflict, especially in the political field, as follows: Firstly, identity formation, namely how a shared identity can be formed in a group to create collective action? Secondly, scale shift (escalation) is how the small initial conflict escalate to involve far more actors? Thirdly, polarization is how the political space between opposing parties extends when they move away towards the two extreme points and no party is in a moderate position? Fourthly, mobilization is how people usually apathetic (no respect) can be mobilized to participate in the movement? Fifthly, the constitution actor (formation of actors), such as how does a group that was previously unorganized or apolitical turn into a single political actor?. The results of the conflict rise social system that the winner would have a structural advantage in power struggling which strengthened the clan position. Yet in the conflict it is possible for a social reproduction process to have negotiations and construction which naturally dynamizes the social system so that it transforms an ideal point. Definitely the realization of democracy consolidation to have ideal point of political actors' conflict in Polewali Mandar.

The conflict involves parties. Fisher in Zainuddin, Soetarto, Adiwibowo & Pandjaitan (2012: 148) explains the stages of the conflict that can occur in the process of conflict, such as 1) Pre-Conflict, Pre-Conflict: is a period where there is a mismatch of targets between two or more parties that arise conflict. Conflict is hidden from public view, even though one or more parties may know the potential for confrontation. There may be a tense relationship between several parties and/or a desire to avoid contact with each other. 2) Confrontation: at this time, the conflict

is more open. If only one party thought there is a problem, maybe their supporters start doing demonstrations or other confrontational behavior, 3) Crisis: this is the peak of the conflict when tension and/or violence occurs most severely. In a large scale of conflicts, this is a period of war, when people from both sides are killed. Regular communication between the two parties may break, public statements tend to accuse and oppose the other party. 4) Consequences: both parties may agree to negotiate with or without an intermediary. A party that has the authority or a more powerful third party might force both parties to stop the conflict and 5) Post-Conflict: In the end, the situation is resolved by ending violent confrontations, tension is reduced and relations are more normal between the two parties. However, if the issues and problems that arise because of their aims are different, this stage often returns to the pre-conflict situation.

Hoping the intellectual middle class makes perfect sense giving the intellectual ability to see the problem of the democratic process. Due to the phenomenon of clan politics or kinship, politics has become problematic. Harjanto (2011: 139) describes the correlation of kinship politics with the worsening of institutionalization of political parties as follows: "The stronger of kinship politics is an indication of the worsening of party institutionalization in its membership, and the weaken of the recruitment and the regeneration of political parties in particular. In the middle of the individualistic conflict system, the role of political parties has become gradually diminished, and the individual strength of candidates has become one of the deterrents of authority in the struggle for political positions. Kinship politics become an interesting choice for political parties to winning political positions due to the real electoral advantages of these people, such as popularity, financially, and the ability to mobilize the masses through the influence of political figures. Political parties appear to be more concerned with victory, and less thought about the effectiveness of power in the medium-long term, so that the abnormality and absurdity of political support is often taken by large parties to ensure the victory of elections, for example, the infiltration of clan 3M, especially in dominant political party in Polewali Mandar, in fact, strengthens clan politically. A paradigm shift is needed in political parties. If political parties not only thinking about winning the election, the process of consolidating democracy will happen earlier. However, clan politics are relatively worsening democracy if political clans getting improve and have more power to manage the public. Harjanto (2011: 154) states the worst aspects of clan politics in democracy: "In Indonesia, kinship politics is the same with power center in political families or relatives. The strengthening of kinship politics is definitely worrying. If this trend improves day by day, it is possible that in the near future, Indonesian politics resemble with the Philippines, where territorial-based bossism controls politics. A group of elites runs the country from several powerful families, clans, or political dynasties in certain regions, and it is very difficult to expect an expansion of power access and a good and substantial democratic process. Democracy was finally used as a mechanism to legitimize and strengthen the political power base of these local bosses, who with the power of money, the masses, and government networks could always defeat their competitors. In their worse, they did not hesitate to make local governance become their subordinate so that the development program was not run optimally "politic conflict in Polewali Mandar to achieve political consolidation and prevent bossism as the duty for of the real democracy supporter.

## V. CONCLUSION

Polewali Mandar society has to realize that the clan politic does not create good governance that is very important to solving lag in the development and prosperity of Polewali Mandar. The changes in public habitus actually represent the democracy to have justice conflict. Pierre Bourdieu describes the process of competition and conflict that occurred in Polewali Polman that not only show conflict among political clans such as the Polewali Mandar Election 3 years ago but also the conflict between political clans and alternative leaders. The cultural strategy in Polewali Mandar is a set of efforts by alternative politicians to decline the clan's political power. The data shows there are 2 cultural strategies that can decline the political power of the 3M clan. The two strategies are:

1) Strengthening the network of middle intellectual groups

Strengthening the power of the intellectual middle class is considered an effective strategy because intellectuals have adequate knowledge in breaking down the habitus in society. The intellectual middle class is expected to provide awareness to society. The intellectual middle class in the social configuration is a class to make people aware of the domination that influences them.

2) Strengthen the cohesiveness of alternative politicians

Nonadhesive of alternative politicians is a fact in Polewali Mandar regional elections of Regent and Deputy Regent Candidates against the Mandar Clan who are the most dominant Klan forces at the moment. The divided favor became a factor that smoothed the way of the Masdar Clan to lead Polewali Mandar again. The political area controlled by Clan 3M requires the participants to unite against the strength of 3M Clan. The socio-political cohesiveness of alternative politicians makes it possible to create large capital accumulations to counter the dominance of 3M Clan.

Out of these two cultural strategies that can reduce the Clan's political power, it is expected that further research will try to implement the recommendations of the strategy described previously to prove whether the strategy is appropriate or not.

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