How Social Capital Works: The Role of Social Capital in Acts of Corruption

[1] Abdul Nadjib, [2] Oemar Madri Bafadhal

Abstract--This study aims to provide an alternative perspective in seeing corruption in Indonesia. In addition to individual and organizational factors of psychological, technical, and systemic aspects that have been massively discussed, cultural aspects such as social capital also contribute to corrupt behaviors, particularly at the local level. We use a critical perspective to enrich the analysis of corruption in relation to and with social capital. This research found that corruption occurs because of clientelism habitus, which encourages people to user their social capital in order to get the desired feedback. Clientelism habitus also prevents some people from accessing social capital. It is related to the common practice of corruption in Indonesia, which is bribery. The practical implication of this study is that social capital needs to be well distributed by performing political reform movements that can connect people's access to an arena so as to increase the capital they have. When everyone has the same social capital, access to other capital can be opened so that it can minimize corrupt behavior.

Key words-- Social Capital, Corruption, Habitus, Clientelism, Bribery

I. INTRODUCTION

Contemporary research on corruption often focuses on the psychological, technical and systemic aspects that urge corruption [1], [2]. It diminishes the dynamics and complexity of these actions. As a result, anti-corruption policies are even counterproductive to investment policies and are considered to obstruct a country's economic growth. Therefore, research on corruption requires a multidisciplinary approach and cannot be isolated from the social and cultural context where the action took place.

The lack of discussion on culture and sociology is an interesting view to study. Culture is an immanent thing that determines the actions and mindset of an individual and even particular communities. Bozovic [3] argued that corruption is a problem between the government and individuals who act as clients. Both refer to the culture that exists in a particular location. Therefore, understanding the cultural and social contexts that shape society's values and norms is essential to discuss.

One social-cultural dimension that has a close connection with corruption is social capital. It is often seen as a determinant of one's economic growth and a contributor to society and even the nation itself. Saharuddin [4] defined social capital as information, trust, and reciprocal norms attached in a social networking system. Meanwhile, Syahra [5] conveyed that social capital plays a role in every aspect of development: politics, economy, human, and

[1]*Department of Public Administration, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Sriwijaya, Palembang, Indonesia. Email: anadjib.salatti@gmail.com*
[2]*Department of Communication Science, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Sriwijaya, Palembang, Indonesia. Email: madribafadhal@gmail.com*

culture. It is because social capital emphasizes the importance of maintaining good relations and trust between people.

In the context of social life, the concept of social capital can explain how relations and social norms in a community structure encourage development in society [6]–[8]. Hence, it is expected to allow the creation of economic prosperity related to development issues in a country, especially developing countries. The role of social capital is perceived to be very powerful in the administration and development in Indonesia so far. The significance of social capital in development has begun to produce an extraordinary consensus on the role and importance of institutions and society in development globally. Studies conducted by [9]–[11] in education, [14] about community participation and [26] institutional performance. Thus, the studies conducted have inspired the study of social capital, that consists of nine main areas in the study of social capital proposed by [14], including (1) family and adolescent behavior problems, (2) school and education, (3) community life, (4) employment and organization, (5) democracy and governance, (6) general cases of social problems, (7) health and environment, (8)) crime and violence, (9) and economic development.

In Indonesia, a country that has a high social capital index, which reaches 68.8 [15], social capital is often associated with successful development. Yet, in a country that has a high *clientelism* culture, like in Indonesia, this good social capital can backfire because mutualism behavior actually encourages bribery, collusion, and nepotism.

Therefore, to enrich the analysis of corruption, social capital needs to be examine with a critical perspective. On the other word, it should not only be seen from the developmentalists point of view. So far, corruption has always been examined from a systemic perspective, such as Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell [16], Herath, Lindberg, and Orjuela [17], psychological view like Jamaluddin, Habbe, and Aprilianti [18], economic point of view [19]. From sociological perspective, this research argues that in Indonesia, social capital also encourages and facilitates corruption. Therefore, this study seeks to analyze corruption through social capital concept and sharpen the analysis with the cultural concept of habitus clientelism. In addition, an essential aspect that needs to be sharpened is how social capital in particular cultures can support the occurrence of acts of corruption as well as the perception of these acts of corruption in the community. This research aims to prove theoretically the relationship between social capital and acts of corruption and the implications for anti-corruption policies in Indonesia.

II. METHODOLOGY

This study used a literature review method to collect a number of scientific articles discussing social capital in relation to corruption [20]. This method aimed to provide a literature description of how social capital is used to support corrupt behaviors. The authors used the Scopus database and Google Scholar to collect articles that discuss the topic. Specifically, the authors conducted a literature review through several stages of determining inclusion and exclusion for more relevant findings.

The Scopus database and Google Scholar were chosen because they both specialize in providing articles in various fields, including social science [21]. Keywords used in this study include "Social Capital" and "corruption".

Due to the limited articles discussing social capital in relation to corruption, this research used various publications such as peer-reviewed journal articles, books, book chapters, and conference articles.

The final step was data analysis, which in this study was carried out using qualitative content analysis. This was intended to provide a relatively systematic and comprehensive summary or overview of the dataset as a whole. Particularly, this study searched about how social capital is employed to support corrupt behaviors.

III. WHAT IS SOCIAL CAPITAL?

In general, social capital is neutral; but in academic concept, it is problematic. There is no single definition of what social capital is. Some considered it a structure of social relations [11], [22], while others considered it a norm, value, and trust that builds capacity for community involvement [12]. Generally, we recognize several forms of social capital as revealed by Pantoja [23] as follows: (1) family and kinship relations, including household, extended family, or clients based on strong blood ties and affinity; (2) social networking or associational life, including networks owned by individuals, groups, and organizations that connect individuals from different families, or groups that have similar activities for a variety of goals; (3) cross-sector linkages, including networks that connect organizations from various sectors in the society (NGOs, grassroots organizations, government representatives, private corporates) that allow different combinations of resources and types of knowledge to find solutions to complex problems. This form of social capital provides the articulation of horizontal and vertical communication between associations and organizations; (4) social norms and values, including broad cultural beliefs and influences.

However, Bordieu provided a different and in-depth description of social capital. He put social capital in a social and cultural context, so that it can be a sharp tool for analysis to understand the phenomenon of corruption. Bourdieu's [24] conceptualization of social capital is based on the idea that capital is not merely about economic and that social transactions are not solely self-interested and must include the power and profit in all its forms. Bourdieu described social capital as the accumulated individual or virtual resources acquired by individuals or groups by providing more or less institutionalized bonds of mutual association and recognition [25]. Therefore, social capital remains inside the person as a result of his or her investment [26].

Bourdieu said that social capital owned by a person depends on the network of connections mobilized with the help of other capital such as economic capital (economic and financial means), cultural capital (knowledge), and symbolic capital (prestige, reconciliation, and dependence on particular cultures) owned by people who are connected. Therefore, social capital consists of two elements: social relationships that allow individuals to claim resources owned collectively and the quantity and quality of these resources. Hence Bourdieu viewed social capital as an investment from the dominant class to maintain and reproduce group solidarity and preserve a dominant position within a certain group [10], [24], [27]. By using the logic of Marxist capital accumulation, capital owners will trade their commodity and convert the bulk of profit he receives back into capital. But, in social capital the process of accumulation of social capital needs to be reciprocal to be effectively accumulated. Thus, the *habitus* that underlies the development of capital must be constructed and supported by knowledge and rules in an arena. This *habitus* is often missed in the analysis of acts of corruption in Indonesia.

Habitus is a collection of rules where agents are inclined to act and respond in certain ways. Dispositions generate behaviors, expectations and attitudes that are "considered normal at last" without "laws" being actively orchestrated or regulated. Disposition that is a habitus is firmly embedded, organized, permanent, generative, and moving. Thus, through imitation (mimesis), the habitus is formed and individuals are socialized, which includes their individual experiences and opportunities. Thus, the habitus reflects the manner in which collective culture and personal history form an individual's body and mind; as a result, it forms present individual social actions [28] [29].

Clientelism in most of province in Indonesia has become habitus. Clientelism is the trade, either implicit or explicit, of goods and items for political support. Clientelism means an asymmetrical relationship between groups of actors identified as employers, brokers and customers. Political clientelism provides personal benefits in exchange for electorally funded services, such as employment, contracts, healthcare, funding, money etc. Consolidation of power over economic activities encourages clientelism, because it suppresses the public sphere and prevents efficient oversight and distribution of government business elites. Deprivation then also associated with clientelism [30] [31] [32] [33].

Referring to Bozovic [3], social networks and relationships offer resources that might not be found with the help of capital or cultural capital. It indicates that the provision of social capital can give benefits economically, socially, and politically. Alternatively stated, the network that has been created can help spread information, that can be used by individuals to decide to participate in relationships or actions collectively.

One component of the social capital builder is good social relationships between two actors [34]. Good social relationships imply a mutual obligation and interpersonal trust that has been developed through previous interactions [13]. This perspective is used to analyze the relationship between social capital and corruption, mainly because corruption also implies the exchange of valuable resources among more than one partiy (persons, groups, organizations) working outside of the law. [35].

Referring to Field [36], the accumulation of social capital can lead to imbalances in social capital. Although in its terminology, social capital is a neutral term, Coleman and Field [10][36]did not refuse that it reproduces a particular social class so that not all people can access that capital. In this position, particular arenas and *habitus* will tend to cause uneven distribution of social capital. Consequently, the process of disseminating information and social networking is reciprocal so that it is prone to be misused for corruption, collusion, and nepotism.

IV.   RESULTS

To understand how social networks can encourage corruption, it is essential to understand that social networks in social capital are informal networks. Unlike formal networks that have responsibilities and aspects of legality, social capital relations do not have legal aspects and responsibilities, but rather are collective organizations that consist of conglomerates or capital owners [37]. Subsequently, the social network consists of major figures who go side by side because they have the same characteristics, arenas, and *habitus.* They then determine the main goal of the network and form the identity of the network. This collective action can cause damage such as corruption

because informal collective structures are reducing professional roles if there are shared interests that intersect with generalized reciprocity (past, present, and future desires for the network).

In this study we describe agents as persons or groups who are directly or indirectly engaged in corrupt transactions. The most common transactions of corruption occur between government officials and private actors, in which government officials take bribes and private players as providers of bribes [38]. Such behavior obviously involves the exchange of power with resources. In the transaction, one of the actors involved must hold power [39]. This study has found that corruption networks can be formed within public servants who have private advantages without private sector engagement.

Further, a hierarchical bureaucratic relationship between top and bottom level officials contributes to the emergence of conditions that facilitate corruption when the leader exploits this hierarchical relationship in association with a patron-client network [40]. It is also supported by the formal ties between the actors involved, which further creates a conducive situation of corruption [39]. In particular, powerful links like parenthood and fellowship may be used to endorse corrupt actions [38]. It is also in line with the characteristics of informal ties that are symmetrical, horizontal, personal, and demands long-lasting reciprocity [41].

In consequence, using the perspective of social capital, two things must be considered in order for corruption to occur [11], social structure between actors involved in a reciprocal relationship and social capital, which facilitates particular actions of social structures so that some actions limited. In other words, corruption reflects the characteristics of social capital because the agent uses its authority to offer an option for the client, while the client needs other capital to be able to access it. It is supported by the norms and beliefs of the community, which is a part of the *habitus*.

According to Christophe [42], *habitus* can normalize and legitimize acts of corruption. It socializes the effects of subordination and shows the ways in which reciprocal politics works at the constitutive level. It occurs through a feedback scheme where the political way of feedback is the only way to organize political actions, ultimately the way for people to get access to health, food, work, and welfare, only through social capital.

Meanwhile, the reproduction of the ruling classes constantly increases discrepancy between the owners of social capital and those who do not. Therefore, to get high social capital, inevitably, the behavior of *clientelism* becomes one of the resources for ordinary people to get the attention of the ruling class. It is done so that they can take part in the distribution of social capital and receive their objectives. Alternatively stated, the common interests of the owners of social capital are not merely one objective; it is more supple depending on the situation and conditions. Hence, in this condition, corruption is a social means that carries the individual interests of each network.

As shown in Figure 1, social capital is supported by *habitus* consisting of trust and feedback relationships. Considerable social capital coupled with *habitus clientelism* based on client (society) and patron (government) relations ultimately drive acts of corruption. Finally, the repeated interactions in this social network form an attitude of interdependence so as to create opportunities to punish or reward others' behavior [43]. According to Christophe

[42], the cultural values of *clientelism* isolate helpless individuals, making them participate in corrupt transactions. Thus, *habitus* encourages society to interact and actually facilitate corrupt habits, particularly in the field of bribery. In the end, this culture can justify and even make people adapt to these habits to make them survive in social life.


Figure 1. Mechanism of Social Capital in a Corruption

As explained earlier, social capital is a neutral term. With social capital, one can intervene in the policies of the stakeholders. However, this capital does not distributed properly. With the habitus clientelism model, social capital revolves only on client and patron relationships that are mutually beneficial to one another. Workers, progressive activists, and marginal communities cannot access patrons because there is no concept of mutual trust and the expected feedback that should be arise in social capital relations. Thus, what happens is the interaction of the conglomerates and the government as patrons who benefit from each other.

Case Study in Indonesia: Bribery

The growth of Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism (CCN) in the local regions is in conjunction with the implementation of regional autonomy and the direct local elections in the provinces, districts, and cities. The emergence of small kings in the local regions who have the authority and great power in leading the regions allegedly can move the CCN that has been broadly occurred in the central area to the regions. One of the CCNs that emerged is in the regional election with 'material investment' to the community to win the elections. In addition, it occurs in the implementation of physical development activities called 'commitment fee', in the management of licenses called 'cost of acceleration of licensing', as well as on the appointment of officials in the area called 'buying and selling positions'. Certainly, CCN can be the cause of the weakening of social capital in the region. CCN even can split or break the cohesion of social capital because of the conflicts occurred either intentionally or unintentionally.

The consequence of a decentralized democratic regime is that it creates more levels of government. The more bureaucracy formed, the more bureaucratic officials are corrupt [44]. Decentralization allows in greater policy-making and resource management at the local scale because state officials take stronger action on certain issues than national action [45]. The decentralization of control and constitutional authority given in relation to social capital

enables local authorities to create networks inside and outside the organization. These bodies will determine who is participating, who should have faith and who should ask for details [40]. Consequently, local politicians will be able to create networks of corruption as they have more freedom to monitor such networks [46] and encourage their subordinates to take on corrupt business.

It generally occurs in campaigns or elections, where patrons, through their agents, distribute goods and services exchanged for support and votes. The society then turned into a political client, whose voices are traded and supported by the *habitus* of Indonesian people. However, because of a lack of social capital to access, when elected candidates cannot deliver on their promises, political clients leave the relationship because reciprocal activities become unbalanced, making them easier to leave the relationship.

Besides dealing with campaigns, *habitus* makes people consider that corruption is far from themselves. According to LSI (2018) most people feel that corruption occurs mostly in the central government and then decreases to the least at the village level. Conversely, the closer to citizens, it is perceived as less corrupt. Quoted from CNN [49], ICW in 2019 released a survey that found that corruption of village funds from 2015 to 2018 increased to a total of 252 cases. It indicates that the social capital feedback in the village along with a high *clientelism* culture assumes that corruption does not exist in the village, as long as the feedback is performed properly. Meanwhile, corruption is considered greater at the national level because of the influence of the media that constructs the reality that it only occurs in the national sphere.

Corruption does not only occur in the cognitive realm through perception but also in daily activities. The survey of LSI [47] revealed that 61% of respondents bribed officers when asked to get their business done quickly, while 31% gave money when they were not asked. The reason for the majority of respondents to give money is service. It is closely related to the *habitus* of the community. They consider the bribery is the price they have to pay as feedback to get things they want.

According to Verhezen [50], as with reciprocal gifts, social capital can turn sharing and solidarity into a game of power struggle aimed at superiority and hierarchy. While social capital can accumulate in a virtuous cycle still externally linked to the dynamics of power, certain communities can be trapped in a vicious cycle of social capital. Same thing happened in context of Indonesia.

It also reveals the argument that the client or the community is not passive in corruption; they actively contribute to the culture and participate in reproducing the powerless class that does not own social capital. In the end, this gap reproduces corruption which ultimately continues to be done by the community. *Clientelism* as a culture is a *habitus* that is difficult to change in society. Finally, it becomes an action, a routine behavior.

V. CONCLUSION

This study tries to provide an alternative perspective in seeing corruption in Indonesia that in addition to individual and organizational factors in the form of psychological, technical and systemic aspects [1], [2] which has been widely discussed on a massive scale, cultural aspect such as social capital is also able to encourage corrupt behaviors, especially at the local level. Local democracy may have a positive impact on the reduction of corruption

as discovered by Lambsdorff [51]. However, without government transparency and comprehensive bureaucratic reform efforts such as by choosing fair and transparent leaders, increasing competence, honesty and dedication to combat corruption, rising the legitimacy, improving the justice structure of the anti-corruption agencies, and allowing strong control by the public, controlling corruption in a democratic regime at the local level will be difficult to carry out.

According to Bourdieu, one of the changes occurred when the condition of *habitus* is not in accordance with the conditions to be achieved is a change called denaturalization. However, the denaturalization conditions related to violations of campaign promises are not achieved because of social capital to access information, canalize votes, and reach the social capital owner's agent. In the end, social capital of particular individual cannot accumulate well.

Therefore, social capital needs to be well distributed by performing political reform movements that can bridge people's access to an arena. Networking among communities and individuals is important for a community's social change. The role of Networks and the connection between networking, social capital growth and social change is illustrated by recent research focused on social capital and community development in low-income communities [52] [53] [54]. Then the clientelism habitus must also be changed. Habitus is continuously rebuilt, transformed in its composition by the pressure of the objective system, social interactions between different social interactions in everyday life between different social groups and social contacts with non-total institutions can be a key source of habitus transformation [55].

As a consequence, the strength of negative social capital will experience distraction, creating a strong bond of social capital in each sector. It is needed especially in the era of regional autonomy that requires social capital from a strong community to support, strengthen, and accelerate the implementation of development in the regions, which will lead to accelerating the achievement of people's welfare. It is a negative excess that needs to be improved continuously.

This research shows that social capital and clientelism habitus can more easily explain why corruption occurred, especially in areas with a greater clientelism culture. This supports the findings of research on "why people tend to consider bribery in Indonesia as normal" [18], [56], [57]. This research also provides a new perspective related to social capital, that social capital is not only directly proportional to the level of development [58]–[60]. Academically, this research contributed to building new perspectives on dealing with corruption in Indonesia.

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