

# IBN SINA about the structure and Types of Logical Reasoning

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**Abstract---** *This article is written about the teachings of Ibn Sina on the epistemological and ontological foundations of truth. The number of his writings on questions of logic, metaphysics and psychology exceeded 60. Most of them have been lost, many are just waiting for publication. The deist spiritualist, a student of the Neoplatonists and Aristotle, Avicenna did not give an independent philosophical system. He was interested in abstract questions only to the extent that this was demanded by the currents of Muslim religious thought. The loss of his most important works, which one has to get to know only second-hand, through translators or bad commentators, does not allow an accurate picture of the most important stages of Avicenna's philosophical life. The article includes analysis and review of available materials, comparative data analysis and conclusions.*

**Keywords---** *Truth, Ibn Sina (Avicenna), Epistemological and Ontological Foundations of Truth, Logical Reasoning.*

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Development genuine knowledge achievement and trust is one of the important tools to formulate trust. Confidence it is the view and imagination that determines the behavior and behavior of people. Trust- religion is often formed as a result of the voluntary change of opinion of the recipient under the influence of rational means. Convincing proof advice in this process, from the proposal to the appearance of complex logical proof can be. Also, the formation of trust is influenced by both moral and pragmatic factors, moral upbringing of the individual, social status, individual characteristics and habits.

Reasoning proofing is a complex logical process in which two or more systems of interrelated discussions are used. When you say a review in a broad sense, it is understood to determine the existence of reliable and sufficient grounds that confirm the authenticity of the same review. Proofing finding a broad understanding of the size, the proof is a view of it. The structure of the argument consists of thesis, argument and demonstrative.

Demonstrative argumentation, that is, logical proof, plays an important role in the formation of new knowledge. According to Aristotle, a person "finds new knowledge in the tool of proof". He gives a high assessment to the knowledge gained through proof-of-stake. It is believed that this is the connection of knowledge to the method of proof, the basis – the veracity of evidence.

## II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Several researchers studied about the theme, such as Abu-I Fazl Bejhaki [1], Asimov M.S. [2], Ahmedov B.[3], Bartol'd V.V.[4], Bakhodirov R.M. [5], Boboev Zh. [6], Boltaev M.N. [7, 8, 9], Vahabova B.[12], Grigorjan S.I. [13, 14, 15], Dzhabbehdari Mar'jam [16], Dinorshoev M. [17-24], Zhuraev Sh.[26, 27], Zavadovskij Ju.N [28], Zakuev

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### III. THEORY AND DISCUSSION

Some logical scientists believe that the demonstrative, that is, the deductive proofing is formed from the intonation, object, which can be checked. Everyone can examine these reasoning on the basis of the laws of deductive logic, be sure of the reliability of the conclusion, be sincerely accepted by all for the necessary origin of the basis of the conclusion and used as an independent argument.

In the case of demonstrative evidence, it is based on general, sincere, unchangeable reasoning. But in the current era where globalization and information technology are rapidly evolving, the demand for new information is growing, with the help of other forms of thinking, not limited to the transformation of existing information and the preservation of its intrinsic value. The non-deductive Euro Science proofing corresponds to the determination of truth, with its orientation, to the demand of today. The basis of the eristic argument is inherent in the fact that the reasoning is close to the truth and the conclusion is of a probabilistic, predictive nature. In eristic branching, induction and analogy techniques are used. In the inductive method, as a result of the study of a part of the elements that make up a certain set, the unexplored parts of the elements of the same set are drawn to the conclusion. In analogy, it is concluded that the sign in one is also inherent in another, based on the similar signs of the two objects. For example, when proving that envy is evil, we make it like a fire, and we say that "Envy will devour human qualities, as the fire has finished eating firewood."

The Thinker examined the conduct of a rhetorical discussion, and the audience, the oppositionists, determined what each of the judges expects from this discussion, the requirements for which they are imposed. For example: the judge(judge) must be able to distinguish reliable information in the opinion of opponents. The words of the judge differ from the words of the opponents in relation to each other. If the judge does not follow the rules established by the previous judges, that is, is not impartial, then he can become an opposition. If from what he said, opponents use each other to reproach, then such arbitrators cannot be used. If the evidence that one of the opponents has brought about the issue under consideration is not reliable and the judge's evidence about it is sufficient and uses this evidence, then the service of the arbitrator will also be challenged in that case. In this case, the judge must act not on the basis of certain facts, but on the basis of the words of opponents. If the judge should approach this issue with a view to the benefit of the entire population of the city, then he can use his arguments. The above views of The Thinker were important not only in the art of public speaking, but also in solving legal issues. They argue that it is necessary to use antimema and example(analogy) in making sure of the idea.

Intuition really exists as a time to know reality as the power of the mind to know quickly what is being sought for and the problem under study. The recognition of intuitive aptitude and intuitive cognition fact by Ibn Sina does not contradict modern philosophical and psychological sciences.

Intuition-mystical as the ability to higher cognition, except for nature, is not an extra-human power. He-the Supreme human ability, develops on the basis of the previous stages of the mind, more precisely, relying on the material mind and habit (skill). There is also no mysticism in the attribution of the higher forms of intuition to the prophets, because the prophets, in his view, are the people of earlier, but their hearts are extremely clean, strong and the forces are the sharpest and knowing.

The Thinker's thesis that intuition is characteristic of development due to observation and labor is also correct from a scientific point of view. But this scientific idea he asserts with caution, without prejudice, without exaggeration.

Even in the thesis that people's intuitive abilities are different, there is no opinion against social existence and sociability. The fact that people's thinking abilities, including intuitive abilities, are different, the same truth, modern science does not deny it either.

As already mentioned above, intuition is the supreme form of rational cognition with its second significance. What does Ibn Sina see in it? The answer to this question is reflected in the descriptions given to intuitive cognition in the works of The Thinker. In the work "Mabda and Maad" ("Genesis and return"), intuitive cognition is described as follows: "intuition is a quick find of the middle term of syllogism without learning anything."

In the work "Al-ishat va-Tanbehat", we read: "either as a result of intuition, or as a result of strong desire and strong passion, or as a result of involuntary or involuntary and immobilization, in the mind is a reflection of the middle term syllogism from Aries. In this is a medium term and something like it (information) is inevitably reflected in the mind." Let's look at the definitions that coincide with Aristotle's rule that "ingenuity (mind, perception) is the ability to find the middle term in this work."

For this purpose, we study the following syllogism:

Each Science (M) has its own research subject (R).

Logic (S) - Science (M).

Logic (S) has its own research subject (R).

As can be seen, the middle term (M) connects the small and large Terms of syllogism with each other. They are also called the most extreme terms, perform the role of the subject (S) and the predicate (R) in making a rational conclusion. The attitude of the most extreme terms is determined by their attitude to the middle term. We learn the relationship of a large term (R) from a large direction to a medium term (M), the relationship of a small term (S) from a small pathlanm to a medium term (s). Knowing the relationship of the most extreme terms, we can also define the relationship between the most extreme terms. Hence, to conclude from the roads it is possible, therefore, that the middle term serves as a link between the most extreme terms of syllogism. He is an argument of authenticity as a new judgment of the conclusion of the reindeer. This is-logically. And in ontological terms, the middle term is manifested as an argument of unity and interaction of things. Ibn Sina writes in the "wisdom" that this is exactly how he understood the issue: "all the proofs are proof of "reason" (if the reason is said to be sure and the reason for confirmation is understood), because the middle term serves as a reason for confidence in the conclusion in all syllogisms. But here we are referring to the fact that it is not the cause, but the "cause" of the state of things, the

attitude to the existence of its (reason), that is, why it is the "reason" that something is not in its own right, you by the way. Often it happens that you understand why you say so, and we know that what you say exists, but we do not know why it is so. For example, if someone says "in such a place the fire is burning", you ask him, " why do you say that?"if you ask, he says," because smoke is rising from there." With that, he said, "Why are you saying that?"he answered the question, noted that there was a fire, but did not specify and explained why there was a fire, what was the reason. So, there should be smoke-the middle term and the reason that you have knowledge about the existence of smoke, but not the fact that it is such a cause of existence that you can find out the reason for the occurrence of fire due to it.

If someone says that something like this is burning in such a place, then you can say "Why do you say that?"if you ask him, he will answer:" because there is a fire, something burns in the place where there is a fire, ""then we will get an answer both to the question of the reason of the sentence and to the question of the reason of the being."

The "Lima" terms of causal proof do not correspond to the idea that the middle term, accepted among the logicians, must always be the cause of the Great term. For example, in the above example, fire is the cause of burning. The middle term should be the reason for the existence of a large term in a small term, although a small term is not a reason for a large term, on the contrary, it itself depends on it, although it came from the reason for the existence of a medium term. This large term becomes the cause of being in the diminutive term because of the middle term. For example, you say" man is an animal, every animal is a body". Although, the reason for being physically alive is not the reason for being physically alive, but the reason for the fact that a person is physically, because physical possession is first inherent in life, having the cause of living – inherent in man."

Thus, Ibn Sina describes induction as the knowledge of the middle term of syllogism, while the middle term refers to the new knowledge from the data of the transfer, the condition is the presence of what is being judged and the argument of authenticity of the judgment. Intuitive cognition, including when cognition is, according to Ibn Sina, a close understanding of reality or the existence of things is a judgment about the reason for their character and relationship.

What is the reflection of the middle term of syllogism in the mind, except for any action or reluctance and as a result of inaction, because of the strong desire and strong passion mentioned in the descriptions given to the above intuitive cognition? The point is that Ibn Sina discursive (reasoning), which proves, when considering the issue of the essence of knowledge spread, discursive cognition is a comprehensive reasoning (reasoning) and quote; the action of the soul in concepts, reaching the middle term of syllogism and the like, to know something unknown with the help of them. In most cases, the soul relies on imagination and with its help seeks to know what (information)is stored in the internal senses . Proceeding from this, the above quote; What does it mean?"the thought that is said can only express one thing: intuitive cognition is the free choice of truth directly, without any analysis and synthesis, without any combination of concepts and judgments that lead to the arrival of new knowledge from the available knowledge. The fact that the above-mentioned idea has such a meaning is explained by The Thinker's instructions that in his work "mabda and Maad" he finds direct, intuitive cognition – the middle term of syllogism quickly, without any study and without knowledge. We think that in his teachings about Ibn Sina intuitively this place is not

justified: it is impossible to learn something directly and quickly, if before that the mind did not work long, carefully meticulously, even in the most intense desire (especially if there was no desire). But it is close to the fact that people with strong intuition know things through observation and through Labor, and in the event that their intuition is strong, they do not strike themselves hard labor.

Many great scientists who intuitively, even in a dream, discovered some truths, including Ibn Sina, confirmed the experience of scientific activity that they had long abandoned themselves before these discoveries and worked on the problem. It is necessary to understand the following words of Ibn Sina, when looking at their external form, exactly like this: "every time I could not find a solution to some kind of problem or determine the middle term of syllogism, I went to the mosque and prayed and asked Allah to open something hidden from me and lick it until he made my When it was late, I would go home and put the batter near of me, read and write. Sleep me head down or if I felt fatigue, I would drink a glass of may to restore my strength. Then I would be given to study again. I would dream of these issues in moments that outweighed me again, while my eyes were open, and the essence of many of them would be obvious." A.Puankere, G.Geligols, D.Scientists like Mendeleev say that before the real ones, which they discovered by way of intuition, they studied the problem for a long time, intensely. Reporter " Dmitri Ivanovich, Davriy how did your system come to your dreams? to my question (davriy sistema was invented intuitively, on February 17, 1869), Mendeleev answered like this: "after all, I thought about it for twenty years, if you are, you can sit down and put it ready at the bottom." In this regard, the following rule of Ibn Sina also evokes reverence: "if a person perceives reason, he understands that all his knowledge is caused by intuition: a person somehow intuitively the body, the second person assimilates knowledge and intuitively the object with himself. Knowledge will continue to do so until it makes the necessary and similar leap. So any problem can be learned in an intuitive way." The experience of scientific knowledge of the problem of intuition and modern research shows that knowledge is the result of a discursive (reasoning) and comprehensive study of the object under study with its own background. And intuitive cognition is one aspect of discursive cognition, momentum, private status and attachment to it.

Despite the obvious shortcomings, Ibn Sina has correctly composed some important aspects of intuitive cognition. These are the speed of intuition, its winding and its infidelity (in the course of the perceived leap) and logic. Another aspect of the doctrine of the scientist about intuition is that his theory of intuition is the theory of mental intuition. Other thinkers (Democritus, Leibniz, Spinoza and b.) the difference from a similar theory is that it is not the theory of direct definition of truth by reason at all, but the theory of direct definition of truth by the help of the higher ability intuition. This type of view of Ibn Sino is realistic, but mystical from the ghoborsolimas. Mystic dew is also three in his other views. For example, intuitive cognition (especially in the prophets) tried to prove that the human mind is realized when the image of all truths is combined with a sealed active mind. In this case, immediately all the images of justice are known, fur. Nevertheless, he believes that intuitive cognition is a logical cognition based on finding the middle term of syllogism (that is, the existence of items and the reasons for their functioning, not blind and traditional (religious) cognition based on Prophecy), even in this form (the form in which the images of the active mind reflect in the human mind in a momentary or almost momentary way). Ibn Sina's theory of intuition differs from other such theories, in particular, from the same aspect of Muhammad's intuition

given to the decisive prophecy and the illumination of the soul. The reverse proof method is used in bringing the modules to the first figure module, in which one of the bases of the conclusion is the verdict of Giuseppe denial. About the essence of this method of proof, Ibn Sina writes: "among complex syllogisms there is such a syllogism, it is called syllogism ("Kxulf (XULF)", which is through conflict. The difference between him and the previous (correct) syllogisms is that the conflict is caused by the fact that the syllogism cannot be proved by the error of an opinion that is opposed to an opinion that cannot be proved (that is, by the indication that the opposite opinion cannot be true) to the absurd (nonsense) M.A prove. It consists of two syllogisms. The first one I opened, the less common is additive syllogism, the second is an exceptional syllogism."

The Thinker interprets his idea as follows: If someone wants to prove "all A-B" and says "not at all A-B", then if we know that all V-B (obviously), then it is necessary that "not all A-V" comes up. But this is nonsense, our opponent will also admit it. So the idea of "all A-B" will be true.

According to the scientist, people spent a lot of time to form this discussion. Aristotle also showed that the conflict was conditional on syllogism, but did not reveal its essence. Ibn Sina in his work "wisdom" gives the following insight into the essence of the Sufi syllogism: "the first (according to the conflict) syllogism is a conditional addition and consists of strict syllogism. For example, "If everybody become A, if there is an error, then some A-B, and not chin". If at the same time it is known that "all V-B" comes from this the following conditional conclusion: "If all A-B is a mistake, then there will be "some A-V not". Taking this conclusion as a basis, we can say that "If everybody become A-B is a mistake, then "some A-V is not." But we were recognized that it was "all A-V", which is an exception. If there is no mistake that it is "Everybody-B", then it is concluded that it is true".

This conclusion can also be made in a different way. If someone takes a conclusion that contradicts the recognized result of tempering, adding it to the basis of the chin and forming a syllogism, then he will come to the correct conclusion without proof through contradiction. For Example, "All A-V", "All B-V". So, "All-B". But the Thinker believes that it is appropriate to prove by means of contradiction that the discussion is reduced.

#### IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSES

A comparison of the views of Ibn Sina with his views on this matter by Farabi and Aristotle shows that he analyzed this issue in depth and extensively with respect to his Masters. In general, when the conclusion is proved by "show that it is impossible" or "bring nonsense", the opinion that contradicts the thesis (conclusion) is taken as a basis, with the addition of another chin on the basis of which syllogism is formed. Before the error of the conclusion of a new syllogism, the veracity of the conclusion (thesis) of syllogism comes out.

Another logical way to bring the modules of imperfect syllogisms to the first figure modules is separation. In Farabi, this method is called conducting or making conclusions, passing from a certain thing to an unknown thing. And Ibn Sina calls it hypothesis. The essence of this method is as follows:

Let's say there are cases of A and V Be Some Kind S similarity between them. In one of these cases, for example, let there be some kind of item D in A. In this case, we will conclude that A and V are similar according to the sign C, and if D is present in A, then from this we will conclude that D is co-exist in V.

The above discussion corresponds to the conclusion made by analogy. But it is considered in the form of syllogism by Farabi and Ibn Sina as a method of expressing the method of separation. We clarify our thoughts through the following examples in Ibn Sina's work "wisdom". He uses the method of separating the fourth modus of the second figure (AOO) on the basis of the first figure, that is, its conclusion.

As you know, according to the second figure AOO MOD, "some are nonsense, but" V-B", which means "some are not A-V". When it is said not "some A-B", if we define some A with X then the following syllogism is formed: "there is no X-B, but" V-B is", which means "there is no X-V". Now we can bring to the first figure: "some A-X", but "not X-V", which means "some A-V".

In the above discussion, the method of separation is carried out in the form of syllogism, when it is based on the fineness of the conclusion of the second figure, that is, when bringing it to the first figure.

Ibn Sina points out that the conclusion of the third figure OAO mod is proved both by methods of conflict and hypothesis.

If "all B-A" and "some are not B-V", then proving the authenticity of the conclusion "some are not A-V" by the method of contradiction, we can conclude that the sentence "some are not A-V", which requires proof, is a mistake, we can honestly say the sentence "all A-V", which contradicts it. If "all B-A" and "all A-V", then the conclusion follows that "all B-V". But we first recognized that the sentence "not some B-V" is true, hence the conclusion that "all B-V" is a mistake, and earlier is true.

In proving the authenticity of the conclusion by the hypothetical method "we define some non-V B's with X. In it is known that the "nothing is not an X-V" League, syllogism is formed as follows: "all B-A", "some B-X". So, "Some A-X". But there will be "not some A-V" for "not any X-V" is. That is, the conclusion is confirmed.

When bringing the same modus to the first figure, Aristotle uses the method of "bringing nonsense". The above discussion clearly confirms that Farabi and Ibn Sina did not copy from Aristotle's teaching and took a creative approach to each issue.

They determined that there are two types of syllogisms that prove (draw the necessary conclusion from the necessary grounds). These are:

One of them. Real proof or proof of the cause (in Arabic it is called "Lima") syllogism.

Two. Proof of existence (in Arabic it is called "Inna") syllogism.

Thinkers argue that it is necessary to distinguish four different reasons in apodictic proof:

One of them. Material cause-to know the basis, the basis of something;

Two. Formative reason-to know what something expresses in terms of its form;

The three. Current reason-to know the quality of the thing;

The four. The exact purpose is the task of the thing, knowledge of the purpose.

According to Ibn Sina, "in general, all proof is considered to be causal proof, because the medium term serves as the reason for confidence in the conclusion in all syllogisms." In the first round of proven syllogism, it becomes clear why the item exists. And in the second type it is determined why it is so. For example, if someone says "

somewhere the fire is burning, because the smoke is visible, " the presence of the flame will be proved by the presence of smoke, but the fire will not be able to understand why it appeared. The presence of smoke in the above discussion is a medium term, which is the reason for our knowledge of this. This discussion is expressed as follows:

Where there is smoke, there is fire.

From afar, smoke is visible.

So there's a fire there.

If someone says that something is burning somewhere, and there is a fire in the question "Why did you say this", then there will be something burning, then he will answer both the question of the reason of the sentence and the question of the reason for existence. The first of these is proof (Lima) by indicating the reason, the second is proof (Inna) by indicating the existence.

In proof of the reason, the state of the middle term does not coincide with the idea that "the middle term should always be the cause of the Great term", which is accepted among the logicians. For example, in the example above, fire is the cause of burning. In this medium term should be the reason for the presence of a large term in a small term, but it is not the reason for a large term, on the contrary, it is conditional on the side.

In his work, Ibn Sina "sign and reproach", he touches on the proof of cause and existence. According to The Thinker, "if there is a reason for the existence of a sentence according to the essence of the middle term, if there is a relationship of one part to the other part, then such proof is proof of the reason, because the middle term allows to confirm the sentence and its existence, to understand the absolute reason." If this is not the case, and the middle term is only a reason for confirmation, if it determines that existence is justified, then such proof is called proof of existence, since it in its essence indicates the existence, and not the reason for the sentence.

From the above idea, we know that the medium term can be of different appearance, either according to the reason, either according to its existence, that is, according to what it confirms, according to how it connects the two foreign terms. For example: if the moon is eclipsed, then the Earth will be between the sun and the moon. The moon is eclipsed. So the earth stands between the sun and the moon. This is a proven syllogism from existence. In it, the middle term will be the result in relation to the Foreign terms of the conclusion, but the cause cannot be. Therefore, the middle term is often called argument. In the above example, the eclipse of the moon – the cause, the place of the Earth – eventually pushes.

In proving the reason, the eclipse of the moon is explained by the fact that the Earth is in the middle of the luminaries. In it, the lunar eclipse is the result of the fact that the Earth is in the middle of the flashes.

## V. CONCLUSION

According to Ibn Sina, from both proof it is possible to conclude a strict syllogism with the same terms. In this, thoughts will not be equal among themselves, because with proof of existence, proof of the reason will give another knowledge. The difference between knowledge will depend on the state of the medium term. If the medium term is the absolute reason for the existence of a large term or its absolute consequence, such knowledge is the result of knowing the cause. If the middle term is the cause or consequence of the existence of a large term in a small term,



then such knowledge will be the result of knowledge from existence. Proof of the reason is a view of apodictic proof.

Thinkers have noted the need to pay attention to the following in apodictic proof:

1. Proof syllogism must necessarily be formed from the foundations on which it is true all the time.
2. It is necessary to take the proof on the basis of the initial knowledge inherent in the subject, which is proved.
3. In proof, the middle term plays an important role, because without a middle term, there will be no proof either.
4. The more the middle term, the more elements of proof will also be.
5. If the middle term is necessary, then the conclusion will also be necessary.
6. If the conclusion is necessary, then the medium term may not be necessary (sometimes it is possible to deduce from the fact that the necessary is not necessary, as the false theoretical basis really came to the conclusion).
7. Proof of the generality is preferable to the particularity, since it also knows the particularity that is known to the generality.
8. Proof-of-stake is better than proof-of-stake, since the denial is known by confirmation.

In addition to analyzing the basics of apodictic proof, Farabi and Ibn Sina will also touch on its practical application. They have also widely used apodictic proof to address ontological issues. Thinkers have proved the uniqueness of the Creator, the first reason and the necessary essence, the existence of attributes inherent in him by the same method.

By completing the above points, it is necessary to note the following:

- To be honest, a real cognitive proof is an apodictic proof that draws the necessary conclusion from the necessary grounds;
- Apodeyctic proof is made through the first figurehead of syllogism;
- Proof of cause and existence are types of apodosis proof.
- Deep and comprehensive development of Aristotle's teaching in analyzing issues related to apodosis proof of Farabi and Ibn Sina, enriched it with new ideas.

Forabi and Ibn Sina gave a high assessment to dialectics over rhetoric and Sufism, from non-apodeic proof methods, describing it as a tool, a method for determining the truth.

It is known that in the Middle Ages there was a wide picture of discussions on various religious, legal, social issues. Perfect knowledge of the rules of betting was a guarantee of winning in the bet. Farabi and Ibn Sina described in detail the logical issues related to the art of arguing in their works called "Kitab al-jadal".

The basis is similar to the thesis and is an assertive opinion. He cannot contradict the thesis and change it. According to Ibn Sina, for each thesis, when confirming or denying something, one must basically be cleared. After finding the grounds, it is possible to search for a solution to the issue. Dialectical bases are views that are known to all and are accepted by many.

Farabi and Ibn Sina show that dialectical syllogisms are in the form of antimemas, in which the part indicating the generality and causing the conclusion is dropped. In their opinion, dialectic entimems in the form of the first

figure give a clear conclusion. A.Imamkhodjaeva Ibn Sina's thoughts that dialectics are based on syllogism and induction, therefore, dialectics first determine, and then prove, come to pass in her own study.

Ibn Sina touches on the power of the influence of poetry and writes: "in a word, a person is disturbed by such a thing, but this anxiety is not consciously, but as a result of lustful – spiritual influences. Whether those words that are said to this are right or wrong – it will not matter."

Thinkers claim that poetic (poetic) proof is in the form of syllogism and consists of imaginary (tissue) and false basis (judgment).

It is also incredibly important to identify errors that are associated with the content of thought in the rejection of sophistic discussions. The occurrence of this type of error, according to Ibn Sina, "the reverse is the result of the perception of the potential as a reality, as well as the ignorance of the consequence of predictability, as a consequence of the fact that the error is the result of the perception of the object of the second degree of its sign as its own, the

In order not to make the above mistakes, Ibn Sina emphasizes the need to comply with certain requirements. It is necessary to determine whether the discussion is in reality a syllogism. When syllogism is obtained, it is necessary to know what it looks like, it is necessary to divide syllogism into components and pay attention to the fact that the middle term exists on both bases unchanged. Between the term big and small and between both parts of the conclusion (subject and predicate) there should not be a conflict. It is also necessary to pay attention to the fact that the concepts that represent the terms have one meaning. Not relying on vague thoughts and making sure that the foundations of syllogism consist of genuine judgments, not accepting approximate, intuitive thoughts as genuine thoughts can also prevent various mistakes. Ibn Sina argued that even when the question itself is taken as a basis and a turnover error is made in the proof, the discussion will be misconstrued.

Ibn Sina asserts that the proof, knowledge of the errors associated with syllogism, is important in exposing various sophisms, in determining the confusion in thought and in avoiding confusing thoughts.

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