Transformation of the Political Regime in Modern Russia: Forecasting and Management in the Paradigm of Sovereign Transit

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Abstract--- The article is devoted to summarizing the results of a comprehensive study by the author of the political regime transformation in modern Russia. It is based on the assumption that for planning and managing the political regime transformation in modern Russia, it should be considered in the paradigm of sovereign (rather than democratic) transit. The study proved for the first time the conditionality of the crisis of the democratic transit paradigm by erosion of the democratic institutions of economically developed countries of the West; the ideological component of the transformation of political regimes is investigated; the complex of subject-object relations of the Russia political regime transformation is considered. The assessment of the prospects of gaining by Russia the national subjectivity of the political regime; the concept of “sovereign transit paradigm” is introduced into scientific circulation. The international experience of changing ideologies as a tool for transforming the political regime is analyzed. The basic elements of the planning system and the management of the transformation of the political regime of modern Russia in the sovereign transit paradigm are described; the choice of the ideology that is most relevant for Russia at the present stage of the transformation of the political regime is substantiated.

Keywords--- Political Regime, Transformation, Political Subjectivity, Ideology, Ideologem, Ideological Construction, Sovereign Transit Paradigm.

I. INTRODUCTION

The new world order, which the US President solemnly declared in his message to Congress in 1990, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, still has a huge margin of safety - because it is provided by three independent systems described by J. Attali in the book “On the threshold of a new millennium”[1]:

- “sacred” (basic values),
- “forces” (international institutions and organizations that carry out their legitimation)
- “money” (“the liberal world order”[2] - The order which compliance is ensured by the largest transnational banks).

However, back in 2015, the United States had to admit, “overstrain in consolidating a unipolar world” [3] (this phrase was repeated three times in the US National Security Strategy; it is mainly a question of a lack of human resources).

Western Europe and the United States were faced with the flagrant inefficiency of the system for selecting and training their elites, their qualitative changes [4] - the political establishment that had planned and controlled the transformation of political regimes in most countries of the world for more than half a century has been degraded. Its
representatives very simply imagine the world around them as “terrible, incomprehensible, frightening jungles that constantly continue to grow after they were once cut down - and which someone will have to uproot again‖ [5].

“Democracy promotion”[6,7,8] is interpreted as a set of routine technologies that do not require any creative approach at all: all that needs to be done is to ”increase pressure on the object of democratization”[9,10].

According to T. Engelhardt, “the arrogant confidence in excellence, the dizziness of success and the unbridled pursuit of global domination very quickly led the US to a foreign policy crisis”[11]. “More and more states are perplexedly looking toward Washington: why did they suddenly decide to dictate so categorically to the whole world what they can and cannot do”[12]; the USA no longer have global power sufficient to subjugate everyone, but the establishment refuses to accept this new reality.

For several decades in Russia, the subject and driving force behind the transformation of the political regime has been the consolidated political establishment of the United States and leading countries of Western Europe. However, the leaders of the new generation of the establishment do not have the necessary qualities, moral authority and adequate political reputation to take on the role of the subject of transformation of the political regime, as their predecessors did.

Russia found itself in a situation where, with all its desire to avoid conflict, it is forced to fight for political subjectivity, developing its own approaches to forecasting and managing the transformation of the political regime.

For the first time, the concept of transitology was crushingly criticized back in the 90s: many models of democratic transit developed by then, including ideas regarding the laws of the “third wave of democratization”[13], were repeatedly disputed and refuted.

In 1996, L. Diamond's article “Is the Third Wave Over?”[14] was published; in 2001. S. King designated the political regimes of 85 out of 100 states of the “third wave” with the malicious term “Potemkin Democracy”[15]; in 2002 T. Carothers proved “the non-obviousness of the basic assumptions of the transit paradigm and the loss of predictive power by this theory”[16].

Adherents of transitology stubbornly continue to postulate that democratic transit is the only possible paradigm for the transformation of political regimes (see, for example,[17,18]).

At the same time, according to such researchers as M. Mommsen, I.V. Chaiko and V.A. Achkasov

“Even a cursory review of the views on Russian politics, as well as the definitions and typologies applied to its analysis, perplexes / ... / we can assume that we are dealing with a system that is also oligarchic, plutocratic, authoritarian, plebiscite, traditional, bureaucratic pseudo-democratic and patrimonial”[19];

“the main problem of studying the transformation of political regimes in the modern world is the lack of a universally recognized scientific theory capable of formulating the basic concepts and principles of such a study”[20];

The concepts of democratic transit are by no means a scientific theory, but an “ideological construct” based on the political myth of the “exclusivity” of the United States; the reason for the crisis or the “end” of the
transitionological paradigm is not only that the theory is not able to convincingly explain the reasons for the failure of democratic transformations in dozens of countries, but also that its fundamental foundations related to the declared prospect of achieving democracy for all turned out to be false”[21].

Modern experience in the transformation of political regimes refutes the basic principles of transitology: gradual consolidation of democratic institutions (such as separation of powers, suffrage, constitution) does not occur. The transformation is subject to complex unwritten rules of patron-client relations, rooted in national culture and mentality; in one form or another - unlike democratic institutions - they are observed all over the world.

In the history of Russia, the community structure of society prevailed; in a specific Russian model of an ideal political regime, the leader will certainly protect his people from the arbitrariness of the boyars/nomenclature/oligarchs. In Byzantium, this model of the political regime has been successfully used by the rulers for a millennium. Today, Russia, at the slightest opportunity, seeks to live in a community that, endowing power with sacredness, wants and seeks to gain a charismatic leader - because “only he can restore order in the country and tame the clans of modern “boyars”- oligarchs and officials”.

In Russia, the value-normative system dominates, the core of which is the special role of the state. This does not mean a massive need for an authoritarian regime, and even more so in a totalitarian system; we are talking about Russia's characteristic perception of society as a certain hypostasis of power. The embodiment of the sovereign model in the eyes of the Russians suggests universal solidarity towards citizens and assistance to those who did not succeed or were in trouble[22].

The carrier of a sovereign understanding of society and a sovereign version of patriotism is the vast majority of the Russian population, and not any specific social groups. Behind the feeling of power among Russians is a sense of community with each other as representatives of a single whole, the existence of which is based on common views on fundamental norms and values[23].

During the study, we substantiated the following conclusions:

1. The transformation of the Russia political regime is not unidirectional (progressive, from "authoritarianism" to "democracy"), but a cyclical (reciprocating) process of growth and decline of political subjectivity.

2. The level/degree of political subjectivity of Russia depends, first of all, on the prevalence/rootedness in the national culture of political myth and ideology of national exclusivity, the “highest mission”, “special mission” of the nation;

3. The upcoming reform of public administration as building a stable power vertical “center-regions” in the context of enlargement of the subjects of the federation will require reinforcement “from below” - the legitimization of the institution of local self-government traditional in Russia

4. In the paradigm of sovereign transit, the transformation of the political regime is controlled by ideological construction — the development process and the timely change of ideologies;

5. For modern Russia, community is at the same time an institution of local self-government rooted in national identity and the most promising ideology of the upcoming transformation of the political regime.
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