

Motivations and Tactics of Militant Islamist Movements

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Abstract-

Radical Islamist terrorism is defined as any terrorist act, set of acts, or campaign committed by groups or individuals who profess Islamist motivations or goals. Islamism is a concept whose meaning has been debated in both public and academic contexts. The term can refer to movements that call for the full implementation of sharia. It is commonly used interchangeably with the terms political Islam or Islamic fundamentalism. In Western media, usage of the term tends to refer to groups who aim to establish a sharia-based Islamic state, often with the implication of violent tactics and human rights violations, and has acquired connotations of political extremism.

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Islamism takes different forms and spans a wide range of strategies and tactics towards the powers in place—"destruction, opposition, collaboration, indifference" that have varied as circumstances have changed, and thus is not a united movement.

Keywords- *Political violence, Islamist Movements, Terrorism.*

I. Introduction

Radical Islamist terrorism is defined as any terrorist act, set of acts, or campaign committed by groups or individuals who profess Islamist motivations or goals. The highest numbers of incidents and fatalities caused by Islamic terrorism occur in Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Syria[1]. The term 'Islamic terrorism' has become a feature of Western political and academic counterterrorism discourse in recent years. It concludes that, for the most part, political and academic discourses of 'Islamic terrorism' are unhelpful, not least because they are highly politicized, intellectually contestable, damaging to community relations, and practically counterproductive[2]. Some commentators assert that extremism within Islam goes back to the old centuries. Some groups developed extreme doctrines from the essentially political position that set them apart

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from both mainstream Sunni and Shi'a Muslims. Islamism is a concept whose meaning has been debated in both public and academic contexts. The term can refer to movements that call for the full implementation of sharia. It is commonly used interchangeably with the terms political Islam or Islamic fundamentalism. In Western media usage, the term refers to groups who aim to establish a sharia-based Islamic state, often with the implication of violent tactics and human rights violations and has acquired connotations of political extremism and the term used to describe an Islamic political or social activist. Coined in preference to the more common term "Islamic fundamentalist." Islamists are committed to the implementation of their ideological vision of Islam in the state or society. Their position is often seen as a critique of the establishment and status quo. Most belong to Islamic organizations or social movements. In a brilliant chapter on the sociology of political Islam, Olivier Roy shows that the recruitment of large numbers of alienated young men without much hope in the future has transformed political Islam into what he calls "neo-fundamentalism. Unlike the Islamists, many of whom were severe intellectuals who tried to adapt to modernity aspects, the neo-fundamentalists do little more than channeling the discontents of urban youth into political opposition. Neo-fundamentalists worry about morals, mixed education, veiling, and the West's corrupting influence, but they have no real political or economic program. If they come to power, they will resemble the repressive, one-party regimes that they are likely to replace and will, in turn, face the opposition of these same disaffected classes [3] Central and prominent modern Islamism figures include Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Abul Ala Maududi, and Ruhollah Khomeini. Some Islamist thinkers emphasize peaceful political processes. Others, Sayyid Qutb, called for violence, and his followers are generally considered Islamic extremists, although Qutb denounced the killing of innocents. Following the Arab Spring, some Islamist currents became heavily involved in politics, while others spawned "the most aggressive and ambitious Islamist militia" to date, like ISIS and others. Islamism takes different forms and spans a wide range of strategies and tactics towards the powers in place—"destruction, opposition, collaboration, indifference" that have varied as "circumstances have changed" [4], and this is not a united movement.

Motivations of Islamist terrorism:

Terrorism, as a highly complex phenomenon, stands at the forefront of national and international agendas. Although terrorism has various forms in terms of its association with various secular and religious groups, Jihadi Terrorism (Jihadism) is considered one of its most dangerous forms threatening the world. Jihadi terrorism is a consequence of integrating Islamist ideology with the idea of jihad in a sense that extreme interpretation of Islamist texts contributes to the rise of violent jihad. The broader consensus in the social sciences about violence: namely, that it is "socially determined," a product of deeper historical, economic, or cultural forces over and above the individual. The modern extremists are, not a new phenomenon, neither to the Islamic world nor to the world. Puritanical sects have existed from ancient times, like fringes, and have even overtaken the mainstream of some world religions, but the strategies took different ways of practicing. Islamists, besides adhering to the primary conception of jihad as armed warfare against infidels, have also adopted as their own Ibn Taymiya's call to target impious Muslims. This approach acquired increased salience through the 20th century as Islamist thinkers. The best way to understand the Islamic State (ISIS) is to see it as the next phase of al-Qaeda. All Islamic jihadi groups—Boko Haram, ISIS, Taliban, al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda, and others—share the same motivations based on resurrecting a caliphate that implements and spreads the totality of Sharia, or Islamic law.

1.1 Ideology

One ideology that plays a role in terrorism by using the name of Islam is Wahabism. Wahabism and its allies, including Salafism (Salafijihadism), support the war against anyone and everyone who is not like them. Transnational Islamist ideology, specifically of the militant Islamists, asserts that Western policies and society are actively anti-Islamic, or as it is sometimes described, waging a "war against Islam." Islamists often identify what they see as a historical struggle between Christianity and Islam, dating back to the Crusades, among other historical conflicts between practitioners of the two respective religions. Radical Islamist movements have altered traditional Islamic concepts to justify their worldview. The Islamic State of Iraq and relevant, al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab (militant group), Boko Haram, Indonesian Mujahedeen Council, Taliban, and other militant groups follow intolerant Wahabi or Salafi ideology, which is opposed by other Muslims. Islamist terrorism is the common term for violence aimed at propagating culture, society, and values in opposition to the political, alleged imperialism. The ideological narrative is considered one of the most critical root causes of jihadi terrorism. In particular, this ideology in the sense of individually motivating and collectively unifying diverse individuals under a standard banner of protecting Islam paves the way for jihadists to employ violence as a legitimate act of achieving their goals. Most fundamentalist movements are united in these goals of Islamizing their societies' total social and political system and establishing a revived original worldwide Islamic state based on Sharia. Islamic fundamentalism offers a radical reinterpretation of traditional Islamic concepts. Its discourse on the subject of battle serves to mobilize believers, warn them against those identified as enemies, and encourage them to train, organize, and actively participate in the battle. Such an extreme interpretation of Islamic texts nonetheless provides the critics of the Islamic ideology with the opportunity to claim that jihadis more presents Islam as a violent and intolerant faith. Islamist fundamentalists stress individual responsibility and the importance of each believer's internal battle against sin and temptation. Many of the violent terrorist groups use the name of jihad to fight against individual Western nations. Terrorist attacks may also be carried out by inspired individuals due to their emotional predisposition, amplified through deliberate incitement, and radicalization. Inattention to the ideological upbringing of terrorists is counterproductive. Although political sciences practical tools are ill-equipped to assess ideology and motivation, difficulty in quantifying these factors does not mean they do not exist [5].

1.2 Religious Motivation

Islamic terrorist organizations use the religious realm, in which the violence first and foremost is portrayed as a sacramental act or divined duty, executed in direct response to some theological demand or imperative. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, in their book, *The Age of Sacred Terror*, argue that Islamic terrorist attacks are purely religious. They are seen as "a sacrament ... intended to restore to the universe a moral order that had been corrupted by the enemies of Islam." It is neither political nor strategic but an "act of redemption" meant to "humiliate and slaughter those who defied the hegemony of God" [6]. The historical narrative as religious motivation in terms of the Muslim world's superiority in the middle ages is considered one of the primary factors behind the rise of jihad terrorism. From the jihadists' perspective, the Islamic world of the middle ages was more advanced in philosophical, scientific, and military achievements than the Christian world and other major civilizations. Besides, Islamic fundamentalists' desire to restore the Caliphate leads to their extreme interpretations of Islamic texts for

justifying the use of violence as a divine duty of all Muslims. Therefore, the historical narrative serves as an underlying root cause, mainly motivating jihadists to violently mobilize Muslims under the banner of defending Islam and jihad. Donald Holbrook, a Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, analyzes a sample of 30 works by jihadist propagandists and finds several passages of the Quran exploited and distorted to suit the objectives of violent jihad [7].

1.3 Sociocultural Motivation

Scott Atran has found the perception that others with whom one feels a common bond is being humiliated can be a powerful driver for action. "Small-group dynamics involving friends and family that form the diaspora cell of brotherhood and camaraderie on which the rising tide of martyrdom actions is based [8] Terrorists, according to Atran, are social beings influenced by social connections and values. Rather than dying "for a cause," they might be said to have died "for each other." Terrorists are social beings influenced by social connections and values familiar to all of us. They are school clubs, sports teams, or community organizations; they are proud fathers and difficult teenagers. They do not, Atran maintains, die for a cause; they die for each other. In terms of defending Islamic cultural values, the socio-cultural narrative serves as a second motivating factor behind the emergence of jihadism. This is a context of social dimensions of culture in the sense of a unique collection of social rules, institutions, values, ideas, and symbols fundamentally condition how members of a culture see the world and respond to its challenges. Islamic terrorist organizations use the cultural realm, which produces social cohesion required for legitimizing religiously-motivated terrorism. All terrorist organizations cannot act effectively if the society surrounding them does not support their activity; there is a need to create a virtual cultural environment in which terrorism, especially a religious-motivated one, can operate. As religion and culture are intertwined, one should explore them together, and put them in the political and socio-economic context to be able to comprehend the real nature of Global Jihad. The jihadists believe that defending their Muslim community against the influential Western values are their divine religious obligations. The Islamist extremists who have turned militant declare war against anyone with a view points contrary to theirs; thus, declaration of war against a government is commonplace. These movements' approach is to infiltrate mosques, Islamic teaching centers, and charitable organizations from where they indoctrinate religiously oriented people with their ideas and methods. They forcefully impose their views on weak societies in hopes of conquering one and establishing a base for further control. They justify their militant acts and illegal means of financing their cause by claiming to wage a "jihad" to preserve Islam. Islamic fundamentalism offers a radical reinterpretation of traditional Islamic concepts. Its discourse on the subject of battle serves to mobilize believers, warn them against those identified as enemies, and encourage them to train, organize, and actively participate in the battle. Tactics differ as some fundamentalists tend to temporarily withdraw from society into isolationist separatism, while others actively engage in socio-political affairs to transform society [9].

1.4 Foreign Policy

According to a graph by the U.S. State Department, terrorist attacks have escalated worldwide since Afghanistan and Iraq. Dame Eliza Manningham Buller, the former head of MI5, told the Iraq inquiry that the security services warned Tony Blair that launching the War on Terror would increase the threat of terrorism [10].

Jihadists primarily blame the Western for destroying the idea and political possibility of reuniting the Muslim world under the rule of a worldwide Caliphate. For jihadists, the presence of Western troops in countries like Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the Muslim world is an obvious example of Western neo-imperialism under the United States' leadership, contributing to the severe political sufferings and injustice in the Islamic world. Decision-makers in countries affected by terrorism tend to make threatening public statements following the occurrence of significant terror attacks, sometimes even declaring war against the terrorist organization that carried out the attack. After the September 11 attacks, the U.S. declared war on al-Qaida, in February 2015, U.S. President Barack Obama requested Congress's approval for a war against Islamic State, and French President François Hollande declared war on Islamic State after the Paris attacks. A definition of the enemy that focuses on one terrorist organization or another may be easier for decision-makers, but it betrays reality. Most terrorist organizations active in the local or international arena – Islamic State, al-Qaida, Jabhat al-Nusra, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, and others – strive to topple the regimes they are working against and build an Islamist caliphate state ruled by Shari'a law. Factors affecting the scope and magnitude of terrorism to determine the objectives of a counterterrorism policy must first identify the factors that influence the scope and magnitude of terrorism. Terrorist organizations do not operate in a vacuum but are influenced by their surroundings. Among the environmental factors that influence the violent activities of a terrorist organization are: The international system: Terrorist organizations acting in order to achieve a political goal are directly or indirectly affected by events and processes in the international arena, such as local conflicts and wars, the rise and fall of great powers, economic crises, diplomatic processes, and political struggles. One of the keys to dealing with militant Islamic groups is understanding how they work with, relate to, and motivate their constituencies.

Moreover, processes of mobilizing the faithful to identify typical forms of support relationships, development patterns, and dynamics of radicalization and restraint. The insights it offers into the crucial relationship between militants and the communities from which they arise are widely applicable to violent insurgencies in the Middle East and around the world. Specific networks from Islamist extremists have flourished in many countries throughout the world. Small but well-financed militant movements arise, coming against their government and the ordinary people, instigating conflict. The danger lies when an outside government supports such extremist movements under some political interests.

II. Tactics of Islamist Terrorism

2.1 Suicide Attacks and Bombings

Suicide attacks are not a new phenomenon, and they have exponentially increased over the past two decades. Many countries all over the world have been forced to contend with the phenomenon of suicide attacks. Radical Islamic activists chose this method for attacking civilian and military targets in various countries. The phenomenon of suicide attacks has attracted many scholars' attention, and many articles and books have recently been written on this subject. In many cases, these scholars' quantitative research and conclusions differ since they

use different definitions for the phenomenon of suicide attacks. An increasingly popular tactic used by terrorists is suicide bombing. The primary Islamist terror tactic has, since the early 1980s, been the suicide bomber.

In contrast to secular terrorists, Islamist suicide terrorists need not escape; their planning focuses instead on how to deliver the perpetrator to the target area. This tactic is used against civilians, soldiers, and government officials of the regimes the terrorists oppose; groups who support its use often refer to such attacks as martyrdom. The bombers and their sympathizers often believe that suicide bombers, as martyrs to the cause of jihad against the enemy, will receive the rewards of paradise for their actions. Sustained or intractable conflicts impact the states of mind of individuals and collectives in other forms that can also facilitate the radicalization process and increase violence, including suicide violence. While there were few, if any, successful suicide attacks anywhere in the world from the end of World War II until 1980, between 1981 and September 2015, a total of 4,814 suicide attacks occurred in over 40 countries, killing over 45,000 people. During this time, the global rate of such attacks grew from an average of three a year in the 1980s to about once a month in the 1990s, to almost one a week from 2001 to 2003 [11]Recent research on the rationale of suicide bombing has identified both religious and sociopolitical motivations. Those who cite religious factors as an important influence note that religion provides the framework because the bombers believe they are acting in Islam's name and will be rewarded as martyrs. Since martyrdom is seen as a step towards paradise, those who commit suicide while discarding their community from a common enemy believe that they will reach an ultimate salvation after they die. Suicide attacks fulfill the obligation of jihad against the "oppressor," "martyrs" will be rewarded with paradise and have the support of (some) Islamic clerics. Anthropologist Scott Atran states that since 2004 the overwhelming majority of bombers have been motivated by Islamist martyrdom's ideology. Several Western and Muslim scholars of Islam have posited that suicide attacks are a clear violation of classical Islamic law and characterized such attacks against civilians as murderous and sinful. In some critical aspects, suicide terrorism is not so different from other social behaviors. Suicide attacks and campaigns share other social behavior to influence people to change their (political) attitudes and behaviors.

2.2 Hijackings

Unlike the typical hijackings of land vehicles or ships, hijackings as a tactic of Islamist terrorism is not usually committed for robbery or theft, usually have used to target particular locations (notably during the September 11, 2001 attacks).On September 11, 2001, 19 al-Qaeda Islamic extremists hijacked American Airlines Flight 11, United Airlines Flight 175, American Airlines Flight 77, and United Airlines Flight 93 and crashed them into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center, the southwestern side of the Pentagon, and Stonycreek Township near Shanksville, Pennsylvania (after passengers acted to stop the hijackers; its intended target was either the White House or the U.S. Capitol) in a terrorist attack. All in all, 2,996 people perished, and more than 6,000 others were injured in the attacks. This casualty toll makes the hijackings the most fatal in history. Islamist terrorism sometimes employs the hijacking of passenger vehicles. The most infamous was the "9/11" attacks. Moreover, Air France Flight 8969 was an Air France flight that was hijacked on December 24, 1994, by the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) at HouariBoumedienne Airport, Algiers, Algeria, where the terrorists murdered three

passengers, to blow up the plane over the Eiffel Tower in Paris. When the aircraft reached Marseille, the GIGN, a counter-terror unit of the French National Gendarmerie, stormed the plane and killed all four hijackers [12].

2.3 Kidnappings And executions

Islamic terrorists have made extensive use of highly publicized kidnappings and executions, often circulating videos of the acts for use as propaganda. A frequent form of execution by these groups is decapitation; another is shooting. During the Iraq War chaos, more than 200 kidnappings of foreign hostages (for various reasons and by various groups, including purely criminal) gained great international notoriety, even as the great majority (thousands) of victims were Iraqis. Islamist militants, including Boko Haram, al-Qaeda, and ISIS, have used kidnapping as a method of fundraising, as a means of bargaining for political concessions, and intimidating potential opponents. Terrorists use the press to further their aims. With the airing of videotapes and repeated carnage scenes, Arab and Western media have granted terrorists a platform. While terrorists once issued press statements from hijacked airliners, the growth of 24-hour satellite television and the Internet has amplified their impact further. Kidnapping can bypass this dynamic by drawing out media attention and allowing reporters to personalize the victim and humanize their Comprehensive story Review of Islamic Terrorist Organizations. Sussex Academic Press "To some extent, terrorists have the power we grant them—if we give them our attention if our political choices are hostage to them," Johns Hopkins University professor and Middle East specialist Fouad Ajami observed [13]. By definition, terrorists manipulate the public, usually with acts of outrage. So, it stands to reason that they seek a high public profile. The French and Italian government's decision to ransom their hostages has encouraged further hostage-taking. In August 2004, the Iraqi Islamic Army seized two French journalists. Contradicting official denials, a high official in the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure, France's secret service, confirmed that ransom had been paid [14]. Hostage-taking has become an incredibly effective tactic. With the spread of terrorism in the late twentieth century, audiences became inured to this kind of violence. Kidnapping has become a tactic of choice among Middle Eastern terrorists. The purpose of terrorism is to strike fear into opponents' hearts to win political concession. As the shock value wears off and the Western world becomes immunized to any particular tactic, terrorists develop new ones to maximize shock and the press reaction upon which they thrive. In the 1970s and 1980s, terrorists hijacked airliners to win headlines. In September 2014, the German Foreign Ministry reported that the Islamist militant group Abu Sayyaf had kidnapped two German nationals and was threatening to kill them unless the German government withdraw its support for the war against ISIS and also pay a large ransom [15]. Moreover, a splinter group that claims links to the militant group Islamic State (Isis) released a French tourist video abducted while on holiday in Algeria in September 2014. The group has threatened to execute him unless France halts airstrikes on Isis's positions in Iraq. The French foreign ministry confirmed the video's authenticity and a splinter group that claims links to the militant group Islamic State (Isis) released a video of a French tourist abducted while on holiday in Algeria in September 2014. The group has threatened to execute him unless France halts airstrikes on Isis's positions in Iraq. The French foreign ministry confirmed the authenticity of the video [16]. On another side, Kidnapping Europeans for ransom has become a global business for Al Qaeda, bankrolling its operations worldwide. While European governments deny paying ransoms, an investigation by The New York Times found that Al Qaeda and its direct affiliates have taken in at

least \$125 million in revenue from kidnappings since 2008 [17]. So landed another cash infusion into the coffers of Boko Haram, the West African jihadist militia that has now gained worldwide infamy through the mass kidnapping of schoolgirls in northern Nigeria. Using the extensive networks, Boko Haram members could smuggle anything from sugar and flour to weapons or even people across international borders. This, plus kidnapping ransoms and donations from abroad, is one of the most important factors keeping them in business [18]. Moreover, in the case of ISIS, holding foreign journalists as hostages are so valuable to them that Rami Jarrah, a Syrian who has acted as a go-between in efforts to ransom foreign hostages, told the Wall Street Journal that ISIS had "made it known" to other militant groups that they "would pay" for kidnapped journalists. ISIS has also kidnapped foreign-aid workers and Syrians who work for foreign-funded groups and reconstruction projects in Syria [19]. Also, ISIS justifies its kidnapping of women as sex slaves citing Islamic theology, an interpretation rejected by the Muslim world at large as a perversion of Islam. ISIS forced tens of thousands of Yazidis to flee their homes when the extremists stormed many of the community's towns and cities in Iraqi Kurdistan. Displaced families and monitoring groups reported jihadists kidnapped hundreds of Yazidi women and girls, and many were sold or given away to militants as "spoils of war" [20].

2.4 Social Media and Internet Recruiting

Due to the convenience, affordability, and broad reach of social media platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter, terrorist groups have increasingly used social media to further their goals and spread their message. Attempts have been made by various governments and agencies to thwart the use of social media by terrorist organizations. The Internet has become an essential factor for radical Islamist terrorists, with official and unofficial Web sites, forums, and chat-rooms that appeal to supporters worldwide. Most Web sites are intended to advance a group's propaganda to increase their supportive audience. At the beginning of the 21st century, emerged a worldwide network of hundreds of web sites that inspire, train, educate and recruit young Muslims to engage in jihad against the United States and other Western countries, taking less prominent roles in mosques and community centers that are under scrutiny. These social networks inspired alienated young Muslims to join the jihad. The relationship between terrorism and the media has long been noted. Terrorist organizations depend on the open media systems of democratic countries to further their message and goals. Al-Qaeda has been noted as being one of the terror groups that use social media the most extensively. Brian Jenkins, the senior advisor for the Rand Corporation, commented on Al-Qaeda's dominant presence on the web: "While almost all terrorist organizations have websites, al Qaeda is the first to exploit the Internet fully. This reflects al Qaeda's unique characteristics. It regards itself as a global movement and depends on a global communications network to reach its perceived constituents. It sees its mission as not simply creating terror among its foes but awakening the Muslim community. Its leaders view communications as 90 percent of the struggle. Despite the risks imposed by intense manhunts, its leaders communicate regularly with video and audio messages posted on its websites and disseminated on the Internet. The number of websites devoted to the al Qaeda-inspired movement has grown from a handful to reportedly thousands, although many of these are ephemeral" [21]. ISIS uses the widespread news over social media to their advantage when releasing threatening videos of beheadings. As of November 16, 2014, following the beheading of former U.S. Army Ranger Peter Kassig, there have now been five recorded executions of

Westerners taken captive in Syria [22]. Some U.S. government officials have urged social media companies to stop hosting content from terror groups. In particular, Joe Lieberman has been incredibly vocal in demanding that social media companies not permit terror groups to use their tools. The Senate homeland security committee, led by Mr. Lieberman, issued a report titled “Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat.” The report identified the Internet as “one of the primary drivers” of the terrorist threat to the United States [23]. Moreover, Western governments have been actively trying to surveil and censor I.S. social media sites. As Jeff Lewis explains, as quickly as platform managers close down accounts, I.S. and its supporters continually create new I.D.s, which they then use to resurge back with new accounts and sites for propaganda. Rather than a centralized master plan or a single person in charge, the Islamic State's social media campaign is networked, reflecting the space's networked nature. The core of ISIS is seasoned veterans of the Iraqi insurgency that followed the 2003 U.S. invasion. Well-versed in the media's power, they have been joined by a new generation of Millennial recruits. The average age of foreign fighters who traveled to join ISIS is 24, meaning tools like Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram are what they have grown up with. In the context of global jihad, this is a dangerous combination. So far, there is only one certainty in this case, that what ISIS has discovered—this very weird, effective new way of war—is not a novelty or a one-time thing. ISIS may have been the best to wield this cross of social media, terror, and war, but it will not be the last [24].

III. Conclusion

The main areas of concern are corruption, education, and poverty, all of which are being exploited by Islamist groups. The Islamist fanatics in the global Salafi jihad (the violent, revivalist social movement of which al Qaeda is a part) target the West, but their operations mercilessly slaughter thousands of people of all races and religions throughout the world. Current manifestations of Islamism include various Islamist movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and others. Although these groups employ different tactics, at their core, they share a common illiberal ideology that will neither respect nor adopt universal values. At the end of the Islamist spectrum are jihadi-Islamists, such as al-Qaeda and ISIL and others, who use violence to spread their message and terrorize populations into submission. Jihadi terrorism is a highly complex phenomenon in terms of its concept and motivations. The Jihadi terrorists are therefore no longer stuck to a single set of motivational factors as they take full advantage of any circumstances or opportunities to justify the use of violence as a means of achieving their political goals.

Although it is often believed that terrorism is a manifestation of religious fanaticism, when looking at today's Global Jihad, it is clear that it cannot be separated from the cultural background and daily events. There is no doubt that religious extremism is a primary factor in the motivation of 'homegrown' Islamic terrorism. Furthermore, there is strong evidence showing that several other variables also contribute to Islamic extremists' motivation. Terrorist groups use, almost without exception, terrorism in conjunction with other tactics, notably guerrilla warfare. Moreover, terrorist groups are becoming more sophisticated political actors, even striving to win over the hearts and minds of local populations. Third, terrorism is rarely a self-standing phenomenon. Instead, most terrorism occurs in the context of broader armed conflict, typically an insurgency and civil war. This is why

the importance of studying the causes, dynamics, characteristics, and consequences of terrorism and related forms of political violence. Therefore, the effective fight against a terrorist organization requires dealing simultaneously with the two variables that make up the "terrorism equation" – the underlying motivation for terrorist activity and the operational capacity that allows for the realization of that motivation. Finding the delicate balance and synergy between these two variables is the most challenging task, but it is necessary for any attempt to achieve an effective counterterrorism strategy.

IV. Data Availability

Data sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analysed during the current study.

Conflicts of Interest

I declare that there is no conflict of interest regarding the publication of this paper.

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