

An Analytical Study of Avicenna's Hierarchical Metaphysical Structure of Soul

¹Assistant professor: Ayad Kareem Al-Salahi

Abstract

Avicenna's was very interested in psychology, therefore, he was one of the pioneers of this field in the ancient and medieval history. It is obvious that he adopted the traditional classification of philosophical sciences which is originated to Aristotle; sciences were classified into practical and theoretical. Soul is one of the topics which are dealt with in the theoretical sciences, (Al-Musawi, 1982 : 137).

That is not surprising because Ibn Sina believes that human beings consist of soul and body, so he was interested in them both; his law was a search of satisfaction concerning body, and his philosophy, concerning logic, nature, and Divine concepts was based on the human soul. In logic, he asserts the existence of priorities, their instinctiveness in mind, and they are the essence of every intellection. In natural matters, he classifies creatures into; inanimate, growing and sensitive souls, and talking souls and their destination, (Nadir,1959: 232). Ibn Sina is considered the representative of the doctrine that believes in the spiritual resurrection. Thus, Al-Ghazali and some others, who adopt physical resurrection, argue, criticize, and try to defeat this doctrine through defeating Ibn Sina's views. Since Ibn Sina classifies souls into two major types; the first includes the natural matters; plant, animal, human, in addition to different senses, mutual feelings, imagination, and reasonableness. The second type is closer to metaphysics; its search in the field of soul is based on the reality of soul and its destination after death,(Al-Iraqi,1975 : 144). The present study is within the metaphysical scope which is concerned with the concept of the external structure of soul; its definition, existence, and nature. Then, the body- soul relationship is discussed. The study ends with discussing the problem of soul immortality and return, (Aal Yasseen,1984 : 171), due to significant introductions.

Keywords: Avicenna, Metaphysical, Soul

The reality of man.

Avicenna's agrees with Plato in the concept of duality of man: it is a spiritual material essence, body is its matter, and soul is its image. The fixed reality is the soul. While, body and what forms its physical structure is neither included in the reality of man nor is it included in the considerable significance of man.

Here are some important texts of Ibn Sina;

He says, (Aasi,1984: 127-131);

The fixed essence of man.

¹ Dpartment of Eslamic Education – College of Basic Education / University of Wasit.

If man realizes the reality of situations, for which "he" is used, and he uses "I", he concludes that it is his body. Then, if he thinks deeply, he discovers that his hands, legs, ribs, and all his external organs are related to his body, but they are not as considerable as brain, liver, and heart, which may remain for a considerable duration after leaving body.

Brain or part of it may depart, which is a fixed fact. But, that is not possible with heart. Man may know that his "I", which he uses, is existent, but man may not know that his heart is there, what it is, where it is, and how it is. Many people, who didn't see heart, admit that they have a heart and they think that it is the stomach, (this refers to what was thought at his time, but, by no means, refers to present time beliefs).

It is impossible that an object is one, known, and unknown at the same time, or, it is unknown although it is a part of a known object. Hence, body is not within the considerable part of man, but it may be a container of human features. It is hard for man to have body away from him because of the strong relationship between them.

To investigate this idea, man, or any considerable part of man, for which it is possible for him to use "I", is his real essence; the soul. Having asserted in this text that the reality of man, his fixed essence, and the considerable part of him is the soul, he clarifies that good, evil, pleasure, and pain are not for soul, but because of its relationship with body. Loosing such feelings makes man loose pleasure and pain. Pleasures and pains of soul are those real ones which return with man, but the control of body over soul made man forget soul and imagine that his body is his soul. Avisenna's refers to this fact when he says, " If man suspects that his essence has been stripped from these physical functions and lost the types of pleasure and pain that he has in common with the body, it is like someone who has lost the pleasure and pain, which exist in his brothers and his companions. But, if he has own pains and pleasures,(ibid) , he will be the real one to feel pleasure or pain. The body control over soul made man suspect that the other, (his body), , is his real identity, its good and evil deeds are his own. Therefore, man will suspect that pain and pleasure are physical, which Ibn Sina refers to as a suspicion which must be removed from all human souls; "Religious authorities depicted pain and pleasure as sensory concepts to motivate people to get rid of illusions.

He ends the chapter by saying; " if we admit that we are ourselves, and our souls will remain after our bodies, it becomes clear that we will not be converted into other things in the second life, but we will be purified from whatever was attached to us in this life. So, we are ourselves, (in this life and the second life), and not converted, (the same human essences).

All these texts indicate that Ibn Sina sees that the reality of man is the soul.

Definition of soul.

Ibn Sina says; " who wants to describe an object without proving its essence is considered so far from fact", (Al-Amercani, no date : 20, and Al-Ahwani, 1952: 150). The essence of soul means " a basic integrity of a mechanical natural object", (Kanawati and Zide, 1975: 10, Al-Aasam: 241, Fandik, no date: 26, and Al-Ahwani, 1952: 51.)

. Integrity is of two types; basic and secondary. Basic integrity is the one, by which, species becomes real species, like the sword's shape. Secondary integrity concerns whatever affiliates the species of any object; deeds and reactions; e.g. the sword's ability of cutting, distinction, vision, sensation, and movement of man, (Kanawati and Zide, 1975: 10 and Al/Ahwani, 1952: 52). All these integrities are for natural objects whose secondary integrities; feeding and growing, (ibid: 10).

For Ibn Sina, soul is one species that comprises three subtypes; plant soul, is a basic integrity of a mechanical natural object that feeds and grows, Animal soul is a basic integrity of a mechanical natural object that realizes and moves willingly, and Human soul is a basic integrity of a mechanical natural object that performs actions willingly and realizes, (Dunia, 1992: 197, and Ats, 1953: 10-20).

It is obvious from his definition of soul that Ibn Sina adopts the Aristotelian trend, except that Aristotle uses the term of integrity accompanied by image and believes that last integrity results in the final image, (Badawi, 1964: 176). While, Ibn Sina believes that each image is an integrity and not the reverse; the king is the integrity of a city and the captain is the integrity of the ship and not the reverse, (Kanawati and Zide, 1975: 7). Integrity is by which a plant becomes a real plant, and an animal becomes a real animal,

(ibid: 8). A careful reading of Ibn Sina's views about integrity, (ibid: 7), shows that he differs from Aristotle in the fact that soul is the image of body, and meets with Plato in the idea of essentiality of soul. Human soul is an essence which is non-mixing with matter and individual in its structure and mind, (Badawi,1980: 46, Aasi,1984: 132, Badawi,1973: 176, Al-Jabiri et al,2002: 25, Dunia,1972: 252, Al-Ghazali,no date: 21, Al-Ghazali, 2003: 225-226, and Sura of Fajr: 28)

. He did so to avoid the embarrassment that he would have fallen in if he had adopted Aristotle's view in this matter, which would inevitably lead him to reject the soul immortality after death in the individual sense, which religions called for, and adopted by Ibn Sina, (Aal Yasseen,1984: 75), who did not have any other choice but to address this issue in order to reconcile between religion and philosophy because he lived in a Muslim community, in which the language of Koran is explicit in proving the resurrection. Denying this idea means denying an origin of religion and the idea of judgment, (Madkooor,1983:173), The interesting thing here is that Ibn Sina used the ideas of Aristotle to prove what Aristotle does not admit..

Ibn Sina proves the essentiality of soul in many ways, here are two of which:

First, if matter is the essence of soul, soul is weakened when matter is weakened and aging will weaken the power of talking as it does with power of sensation and power of moving, but what happens is that the power of talking and realizing increases after the age of forty in almost each old person, which proves that it has nothing to do with body, (Aasi,1984: 141)..).

The second; The strength of mental power strips the reasonable matters from limited quantum, essence, and everything. So, the abstract image Should be looked at as stripped from the status, how it is stripped from it, is it compared to the thing taken from, or in relation to the thing taking, is that in the external or mental existence, Since it is existent in the mind, so it can neither be divided nor can it exist in the body, (Fakhri,: 216). This proof is based on the fact that body can neither imagine nor realize the reasonable matters. Therefore, animal bodies can realize through certain powers. Whatever can be described in this way is an essence, (Al/Ahwani, 1952: 174). Then, he states that these powers, by themselves, imagine the reasonable matters without having anything in common with the body because each power related to the body is weakened when the body becomes weak. Thus, the power of visibility is weakened when concentrating on the sun for a long time and so on the power of hearing when hearing loud noises. These powers can work without needing for an instrument. He states that each perceiving power by itself is an essence, (ibid). He tried to prove the spirituality of soul and the distinction between it and the body through the ideas that are contained in the book of the soul for Aristotle; The senses are impaired or weakened by the impact of strong sensations. But, it is clear that this conciliation is contradictory, because if soul is intrinsically independent, it can't be an image of the body. Hence, senses become weak when the body is so, (Badawi, 1980: 73). So, for Ibn Sina, soul is both; an essence and an image at the same time. It is an essence by itself, and an image for its relationship with the body, (Kanawati and Zide, 1975: 22....) Then, at his last days, he stated that soul is an essence only. He never stated that it is an image, (Dunia,1992: chapters 5 and 22).

Proving soul existence.

Ibn Sina was the pioneer to prove the soul existence through using evidences. There is no exaggeration when saying that he founded the bases of mental approach in proving the soul existence. Farabi, whose undeniable efforts in establishing psychology in the Islamic philosophy, did not try to prove the soul existence. It should be noted that Al-Kindi, the first Arab Muslim philosopher, hadn't elaborated on the idea of the soul existence, as Ibn Sina did.

That interest was due to objective and methodic motivations; The objective motivations were due to the presence of some prior and contemporary materialistic doctrines. " It is similar to all other physical supplements ,said: Abu Al-Huthail Al-Alaf". A group of scholars said that it is the ingoing and outgoing breeze. Al-Baqillani and his Ash'Aari followers adopted, (Ibn Hazm ,1999: 74, Al-Ahwani,1952: 183, and Madkooor: 146). Since soul is a supplement, so body perishes; which contradicts with Ibn Sina's Islamic beliefs.

Methodic motivations were due to Ibn Sina's keenness to follow the evidential approach, therefore, he gave it a great deal of interest and considered it the very beginning of his goals, (Madkooor,1983:137). All these motivations led Ibn Sina to present many evidences, in different forms, though they were not equally strong, acceptable, or complicated, (Aal Yasseen,1984,137).

Evidences for soul existence.

Ibn Sina proves the soul existence through various evidences:

1- Awareness evidence; Ibn Sina presented this evidence, which made him the pioneer in this field and he even exceeded Aristotle, who elaborated on psychology, (Al-Khudhairi ,1986: 145). Ibn Sina says, " Self-awareness is a spiritual feeling; it is not acquired from the outside. The presence of the essence leads to feeling it. It is not felt by an instrument, but by itself. It is an absolute feeling; it can be felt all the time", (Badawi,1978:160). He also states that " Self-awareness is instinctive, in the essence; it is its real existence, so there is no need for an external object to realize it, since it can feel itself. It is illogical to have it existent without feeling it. What feels it must be it, itself, and not anything else, (ibid:161).

The above texts show that man feels his essence instinctively, without the need for an instrument. Thus, Ibn Sina emphasizes that the realization of the essence for itself is direct because soul always feels itself; Realizing myself is something for me and not the result of something else, so, if I say " I did so...", so, I express my realization of myself, otherwise, how come I know I did it if I don't realize myself first? (ibid).

Ibn Sina analyzes this evidence; " Feeling is that you feel your identity and not some of your powers which make you not feel your essence, but some of your essence. Feeling your essence makes you the one who feels, (ibid:134). So, Ibn Sina shows the unity of soul and harmony of its identity, therefore, he denies the idea of mediation between the essence and feeling. Then, he wonders, " With what do you realize your essence now, before, and after?, what is the part of your essence that realizes? is it your mind or something else? by or without a means? I don't think you lack the means with which you feel. So, you feel your essence by yourself, (Dunia,1985: 345-346). In this way, Ibn Sina sheds light on a very important aspect of human soul; feeling.

2- The evidence of the flying man; It is one of Ibn Sina's evidences that soul is existent. It comprises the literary, imaginary, and evidential philosophical proof. Due to the researcher's knowledge, Ibn Sina didn't quote it from the previous philosophers, but it is the result of his own considerations and originality, (Huwaidi,1967: 203).

Ibn Sina imagines that man was created, all in one, hung in the space, unable to see, his organs do not touch each, and he could neither realize his senses nor the world around him. Whatever long time, man could not realize his senses and the world around him, he would never forget that his essence is a fact. It seems that Ibn Sina depends, in this imaginary proof, on self-introspection. Dr. Atif Muhammad Al-Iraqi asserts this idea and says, " Ibn Sina tries to prove the soul existence through the internal experiment; We realize the soul existence away from any other action, so soul realizes itself before realizing the body with which it is united and even the other existent objects, (Al-Iraqi ,1975: 174).

It should be stated here that what Ibn Sina really says is said in a very rich language; " Get back to yourself and wonder if you were right, be fully aware of what is around you, do you ignore the existence of your essence? drunks and asleep even realize the existence of their essences, soul can ignore everything except its essence, (Dunia,1985: 343-345). It is obvious that distinctive realizations require distinctive facts. Man can be stripped from everything except his soul; his identity, (Madkooor,1983: 142).

3- The evidence of continuity.

This is a deep evidence that indicates the significance of Ibn Sina's intellection. It indicates that " man holds past, present, and , in some cases, future inside him, continuously and without any changes in the essence of man. Ibn Sina proves the existence of soul through this evidence and interprets its nature at the same time, (Qassim,1949:83). He says; " oh, Wiseman, remember that you, who exist today, were the one who existed and will exist all your lifetime, thus, you remember most of the past events, so you are, no doubt, consistent and continuant, but your body is neither continuant nor consistent, but it is in a continuous decomposition and decrease processes. If man was prevented from having food, for a short period of time, he would approximately lose a quarter his weight. You realize that in a matter of twenty years, nothing of your body remains though your soul is still there because it is different from the body and its internal and external parts, (Al-Ahwani,1952:1952,Al-Iraqi,1975,176Abu Rayan,1973:311- 312,and Al-Fakhoori ,1966,450-451). This means that man believes that all his acts, in the past, present, or even future are due to one concept; he realizes that he is himself despite changes. The reason behind this past present relationship is due to recall and not remembrance, because recall is an intellect action, but the second is a brain action. So, if the soul identity is due to its past present relationship, that is then due to recall not remembrance because

remembrance is a mutual action between man and animals while recall is an intellectual action to get back the forgotten events, which cannot be done, but by man, (Sulaiba,1951:241).

4- The natural evidence.

Ibn Sina derives this evidence from some man's actions, e.g. movement and realization, which cannot be interpreted away from believing that there is a managing soul arranging the body. It seems that he is influenced by Aristotle, to a great extent, specially, his book " soul and its nature", (Madkooor,1983: 183). Ibn Sina distinguishes two types of movement; natural and arbitrary. The arbitrary movement is that which happens because of an external motivation, whereas, natural movement happens as a response to nature, like a stone falling from up to down, or against nature, like, a man walking on earth while his heavy weight assumes that he should stay consistent, or a bird flying in the sky, while its light weight assumes that it should fall down. This natural movement requires a special motivation, beside the mobile body elements. That motivation is the soul, (Al-Ahwani,1952:151). In another text, Ibn Sina says; " we may see some bodies realize and move willingly, and some bodies feed, grow, and give birth, which are all not out of their physicality, so there should be something in their essences producing these actions, (Kanawati,1975: 5).

So, human soul is not physicality, mood, heat of organs, blood, and breezes, but soul is the base of actions and movements. Ibn Sina proves the soul existence through movements and actions it produces like how we prove cause through the existence of effect.

This evidence leads to the conclusion that realization of soul as the base for movements and actions, not a realizing essence, because the first is by evidence while the second is by intuition, (Sulaiba,1951:103).

The evidence of soul unity.

Ibn Sina bases this evidence on an essential idea; the unity of human essence, which remains one despite its variations. It is an unusual idea of Ibn Sina; as close it gets us to present, as far it takes us from past since narcissism or personality became the topics of modern psychology. Although soul has various powers; sensual, anger, and aware, but soul remains one. These powers should be related to each other non-physically; the soul When man refers to himself as the doer of actions and the realizing power, so, he refers to an existent beyond body and different from all its parts; the essence, (Abu Rayann,1973:312). So, soul is one essence whose various powers, each of which has a particular function; the sensual power does not function as a power of anger nor vice versa, (, (Fakhri: 228,). In another text, Ibn Sina states that " If one were busy doing something, he would say, " I did so", talking about his essence and forgetting about all his body parts, (Al-Ahwani,1952:184). So, soul is neither biased nor located in biased because it is undividable. What is referred to as "I" remains in all its states; asleep, or awake. Feeling the human essence does not require an external fact nor feeling the physical organs, (Al-Aqad,1946:98). Whatever man says" I saw by my eye, or I walked by my foot, there must be a certain power comprising them all; the human soul.

Soul is an independent spiritual essence.

This is the adopted definition, which Ibn Sina concluded in his own books and made great efforts to prove it through various evidences, some mathematical concepts, medical information, and some notes which are based on some psychological phenomena since saying that soul is an essence does not distinguish it from essences. So, something that distinguishes it must be added to its definition; its spirituality. Ibn Sina says, " The human essence is neither a body nor physical, but it is a spiritual essence granted to heart to grant it life and take heart as a means to acquire knowledge and sciences with which man has his complete essence, becomes aware of his Lord, knows the reality of his information, to get ready to return to him, and becomes one of his angels in an everlasting pleasure. This is the belief of Divine Wiseman and scholars. This belief can be proved through two evidences, (Al-Ahwani,1952:183);

The first can be called the evidence of soul unity;

" Man says "I saw something and I wanted it, or I become agree with. And so he says, I took by my hand, I walked by my foot, I talked by my tongue, I heard by my ear, I thought by...etc. So, since man does not really do these things through the refereed to parts of his body, there must be something beyond the body and physicality that comprises them all; it is the Divine light shed on heart due to its readiness for human

mood. The glorious Quran refers to this fact in this Ayah, " If I complete him and inspired him from my spirit", (ibid).

The second evidence is the comprehensive realization of reasonable matters and meanings. The essence that realizes all these matters and involves them can neither be a body nor can it be involved in a body as that realization is not related to body. Mental images cannot be divided, therefore, they cannot be involved in a body, (Fakhri, :216).

To clarify this idea, if soul were a material object, a material place should involve what it realizes. That is impossible because it occupied a space, which is one of either; it is either dividable or not.

The second probability is invalid; soul is then only an undividable object; an individual essence that is similar to the geometric point, which is undividable, not essentially existent, and can not occupy a space. So, if soul were an undividable body, it wouldn't be a location for reasonable matters.

Then, reasonable matters should occupy a dividable object, but this requires that reasonable matters or the total meanings are dividable according to the space they occupy. They become geometrical figures or numerous entities instead of a mental images; that is incorrect. If we adopt the idea that what occupies the space is dividable; it either consists of repeated similar or variant parts. But, both assumptions are impossible; the first assumption requires that the various feature whole should consist of one repeated part; that is incorrect. The second assumption requires that the whole should be dividable like an object containing it. Whole are dividable to an end into species and types for example. But, mentally, according to the space they occupy, they are endlessly dividable. This contradiction is incorrect. How can simple reasonable matters, which are impossibly dividable, occupy a dividable space?

Having all the above assumptions prove incorrect, so, the essence that includes the mental image is a spiritual essence which cannot be given physical features is the talking soul, (Al-Ahwani,1952:174, Dunia,1992:404 , Fakhri , : 216 , and Taiseer,1962:272). This is the strongest evidence that Ibn Sina presented in his psychological books to prove the spirituality of soul and gave it a great interest, (Madkoor,1983:161) .

The occurrence of soul.

For Ibn Sina, soul occurs whenever there is a valid body to involve it. Since body is the kingdom and instrument of soul, (Fakhri: 222 and Al-Razi, 2006: 397), so, soul does not occur before it, (Caradovo,1970 :299). The evidence of its occurrence is that " it is prior to the body". Soul is merely an essence. Essences are not variant in number. This is a general rule since essences of things are only ideas, whose increase in species is due to formability of bodies and the reactivity between body and soul. If soul were abstract before being included in the body, it would be impossible to increase in number. The researcher believes that soul cannot be one in number, (Aasi, 1984: 124).

In this way, souls keep being produced by the active mind and contained in the embryos when the body, to which soul will return then, is ready for that. The process of soul production by the active mind is infinite for Ibn Sina, (Al-Aqad ,1946:99).

The following text may sum up the body- soul relationship as for Ibn Sina; " human soul is an independent essence which does not mix with matter. Its need for the body is due to the fact that the possibility of its existence is restricted to the body to integrate with. If soul were not concurrent, it would not need the body, (Badawi,1973:176)

Soul-body relationship.

First of all, the relationship, as Ibn Sina views, should be defined, then soul-body relationship will be due to that definition. "Any type of relationship between two things is either; existentially equivalent, prior to, or behind, essentially not due to time. (Fakhri, :223). Ibn Sina chose the existential equivalence between soul and body; each body requires a soul, as for soul, whose relationship with body, not as mixing with, but to be involved in, so they react to each other, (ibid:227, Al-Razi,2006:383 , and Aasi,1984:124) To prove that, thinking of Almighty Allah makes one shake, (Dunia,1985:358). So, Ibn Sina admits that as concurrent is mood, as concurrent soul must be, (Aasi,1984: 124). So, each soul is particular for one body only for the specific relationship between them, otherwise, it would be a soul of everything, (Musa,1960 :4087).

The return in Ibn Sina's philosophy.

It has been stated above that Ibn Sina gave the idea of soul a great interest; its nature, proving its existence, essentiality, and spirituality, therefore, he is known as the greatest representative of his era in this field as well as Plato was the greatest thinker. The purpose of their efforts was to achieve a noble goal; proving the idea of immortality which is a religious and philosophical requirement to gain the spiritual pleasure. Yet, there is a contradiction between Ibn Sina's views of the return. He believes that soul is as occurring as bodies and proves that through the Ayah, " O' calm soul, get back to your Lord, pleasant and pleased", (Al-Fajr: 27-28), and says that it should be a return, (Aasi,1984: 90). But, earlier, he adopted the idea that " souls existed before bodies, and their return is either to paradise, or to hell, (ibid: 89, Aal Yasseen,1984: 187, and Madkoor,1983: 164).

Ibn Sina sums up the various views about the idea of the return and states that there are two groups; the first, the minority, deny it, and the second group, the majority, admit it and these are three groups; the first believe that the return is spiritual only, the second believe that the return is physical only, and the third believe that the return is both spiritual and physical, (Aasi,1984: 91).

Ibn Sina's efforts to identify which view to adopt start from proving the fixed essence of man, " man, or any significant part of man, for which " I" refers, is his real essence; the soul", (ibid: 128, and Al-Saqa,1994: 169-170).

Ibn Sina defeats the opposition of some people who wonder about the significance of the return if people lose their bodies and transformed into other things in the other life and they will neither be rewarded nor punished. He answers; " what returns is our essence in all cases, (ibid: 130-131).

As shown previously, Ibn Sina's interest in proving the existence, spirituality, and essentiality of soul, and how he asserted that it is an abstract, simple, and spiritual essence directing the body, next researches will show how he was interested in proving its immortality, its fate after death, and its spiritual sorrow or pleasure. Therefore, he is considered the greatest philosopher representing the spiritual doctrine.

Proving the immortality of soul.

Ibn Sina's view of soul, as a spiritual essence, is closer to the Platonic view than the walkers' philosophy. He tried his best to establish for a view which is close to Divine laws, (Sidobi,2000 : 230). For Ibn Sina, belief is prior to philosophy. Philosophy should surrender to logic. All approaches should not contradict with belief. Ibn Sina didn't face a difficulty conciliating between knowledge and belief, (Caradovo,1970:230).

The first evidence:

It may be called the evidence of separation because soul is an independent essence and the body-soul relationship is incidental not essential. It is his longest evidence, thus it will be discussed thoroughly here. He starts his proving by emphasizing that if soul exists, it does not die when body does because; if whatever is ruined when something else does, so, there is a relationship between them. That relationship is either; existentially equivalent, prior to, or behind, in time not in the essence, (Fakhri: 223, and Al-Ahwani,1952: 99).

Since soul is entirely independent from body, it cannot be related to it equivalently because they are separated essences with no incidental relation, so, none of them is ruined when the other does.

Also, it cannot be related to body as something behind, so it would be a result and body is the cause.

Causes are four; agent, recipient, material, imagery, and integrative. Ibn Sina stated that it is impossible that body is the cause of soul in any of these meanings.

So, body is impossibly;

An agentive cause because body does not act by independently from its powers, which are either purposes or material images that can impossibly produce an abstract essence; the soul,

A recipient cause, because soul does not mix with body, which cannot be imagined as a soul neither simply nor complexly, and

An imagery or integrative cause.

So, soul-body relationship is not a cause effect relationship.

Moreover, the final probability; soul is existentially prior to body is also incorrect because; that priority may be due to time and that is impossible, or it may be an essential priority which cannot be compared.

He, then, shows that if soul is essentially prior to body in existence, the prior cause is incident in the essence of soul, which ruins the body. But, body is ruined because physical reasons like mood change or structure.

So, soul is not related to body, but to other non-transformed and non-ruined concepts, (Fakhri: 225, Al-Ahwani,1952: 102, and Sulaiba,1951: 120...). Then, there is another object that motivates mood. It can be called soul. It is the essence that controls the physical elements and then all the body, (Dunia,1985: 353-355, and Al-Turaihi, 1949:152).

It is important to refer here to Ibn Sina's emphasis on the immortality of soul and its incidental relationship with the body. But, believing that it is occurring made it be strong related to the body; if body is valid to involve the soul. It seems that he tried to avoid adopting the idea of soul timelessness because the eternal is Almighty Allah only. When he emphasized its immortality, he emphasized its independence from the body due to the difference of their natures. Since soul requires the existence of body when it occurs, Ibn Sina's ideas of soul occurrence, its independence from the body, and its immortality were contradictory, but he didn't want to give up any of them. Yet, adopting its timelessness is rejected because Almighty Allah is the only eternal. Besides, he ought to admit its independence from the body for the difference of their essential natures, because soul and body are distinctive essences, and to emphasize its immortality in the other life. So, according to Ibn Sina, soul is related to the body in occurrence, but it is independent from it in its immortality. He admits that it is only private to body, then, he states that it is independent, (Madkour,1983: 182, and Dunia,1972: 275).

The second evidence; The simplicity evidence.

Since the first evidence rejects that perishing is the result of the death of body, why does soul not perish for other reasons? (Al-Najjar, 1982: 165). This question forced Ibn Sina to present another evidence that soul is never ruined for any reason; Whatever is ruined because of any reason, that is due to a certain power, prior to being ruined, there is an act of remaining, and it is impossible for the two to gather, therefore, complex objects can comprise both the power of being ruined and the act of remaining. While, simple objects are impossible to gather them both, (Fakhri: 225-226, and Al-Ahwani,1952: 103).

Soul remains after death and it is not influenced by the body which perishes, (Qassim,1949: 166).

Although this may be Ibn Sina's most acceptable views for those who came after him, (Al-Ghazali ,no date : 99), those who believe that soul is the source of life, motion, feelings, and intellection, but nowadays, this psychological doctrine is no longer there and soul is interpreted instrumentally, away from whether soul is there or not, (Madkour,1983: 182).

The third evidence; the evidence of similarity.

This evidence may be called "the metaphysical". Ibn Sina mentioned it individually in one of his letters, " the essence, which is man in fact, neither perishes after death nor is it ruined after departing the body, but it remains since its creator is eternal. This essence is stronger than the body and controls it. The body is apart from that essence, so the essence is not affected by the body being apart. Since that essence is the soul, so it cannot be compared to the body because the body is the supplement. Independent essences are not ruined when weak supplements are. For instance, an owner of something; if the object is ruined, the owner is not. When man sleeps, all his senses stop working like a dead body, (Al-Ahwani,1952: 186).

It seems that Ibn Sina was trying to assert the immortality of soul and emphasizes its being apart from the body in the other life. It is possible to notice that in this text, " since talking soul, which is the subject matter of the reasonable matters, does not mix with the body, so it is impossible that the body becomes an

instrument for the soul and their relationship is not affected by death, (Dunia,1985: 242-243). Ibn Sina's influence by Plato and his attempt is so evident here. Dr. Ibraheem Madkoo criticized this evidence because its value is taken from metaphysics, which is based on the ten minds theory, which neither astronomy nor nature recognize it. Ibn Sina classifies human souls as lower than astronomic souls, so their immortality is not the same, (Madkoo,1983: 183).

Ibn Sina's criticism of the physical return.

In two chapters of his book " Al-Adhawia, (Aasi,1984: 97...),Ibn Sina tries to indicate weaknesses of the theory of the physical return; " those who adopt the physical return depend on Sharia'ah. They believe that the considerable part of man is the body. They deny the existence of soul or spirit. They think that life is an incident. All Divine laws address all people, (ibid:97). The creator is the one that is not described by quantity, quality, where, when, how, and change. The Divine essence is the one which is not similar to any other, neither quantitative nor qualitative, neither outside nor inside the world, and impossible to be likened, (Ibid, and Al-Iraqi,1975: 133).

Hence, there are many indications of comparisons in the Heavenly laws," There are many indications of comparisons in the Bible while that is null in the Glorious Quran.What is indicated in the Glorious Quran is neither specification nor interpretation, (Ibid: 98).

He explains that as because the Heavenly laws are for addressing all people in the way they understand, through comparisons and exemplifications. If the Heavenly matters were spiritual not physical and far from being understood by all people, the Heavenly laws would not refer directly, but implicitly express them through using comparisons and examples. So, Heavenly laws should not only explicitly be taken as evidences, (Aasi1984: 103, and Dunia,1949: 50-51).

Ibn Sina then talks about the absolute reasonable matters and says; " man is not by his material, but by his image, which exists in his material. All his human acts are due to his image. If his image departs his material and his material becomes dust or anything else, that man is not there at all. If another human image is created from that material, the result is a different man sharing with the first man the material only. Man is neither punished nor rewarded due to his material, but due to his image, (Ibid: 104-105), so, the the belief of physical return is so far from fact.

Ibn Sina's criticism of the idea of the physical spiritual return.

After he had criticized the idea of the physical return, he criticized the idea of physical spiritual return. Those who adopt the idea of soul continuity should relate punishment and reward to it. The relationship between soul and body renewability is like the relationship between incidents and an independent essence. He states that;

The existent materials do not fit the images of recent creatures when resurrected,

The Divine acts do not change,

Real pleasure of man contradicts with having the soul in the body because real pleasures are not like physical pleasures.

The existence of soul in the body is a punishment for the body, and

If matters are explicitly considered, that leads to ugly and impossible matters, (Aasi,1984: 104-105).

Ibn Sina argues with those who adopt the idea that soul returns either to the same material or to another; This is either the material at death or the material which accompanied the soul all lifetime; Adopting the first idea results in resurrecting whose back is broken, whose skin taken away, and whose hand is cut in jihad on the same images at death, which is ugly for them, (ibid: 106-107). His strongest oppositions may be; " if you check soil, you'll discover that it consists of the dead's corps, which become the food of other corps, so, it is impossible to resurrect a material containing the image of two persons in two times; the first time, totally. He

continued; a body from any soil agreeing with air, dust, and fire is resurrected for the soul, which is exactly the reincarnation, (ibid: 108-109). Ibn Sina ends that chapter by saying; " This is enough to defeat believing that the return is only physical or physical spiritual, (ibid: 114), and he adds that soul is not possible to return to the body after death, ((ibid:122). Finally, he states that if it is not correct that the return is only physical, only for soul through reincarnation, nor both, so, the return is only spiritual, (ibid: 126).

It is evident that Ibn Sina totally denies the idea of physical return whether body only or soul and body. He also denies religious texts which discuss the return regarding them as only for exemplifying. Moreover, he states many rational evidences to prove his belief in the spiritual return.

Yet, there is one thing left; if Ibn Sina declares his real opinion in his book "Al-Adhawia", how can his other ideas, in his other books be interpreted? He states that the return is either mentioned in the Heavenly laws and can only be proved through Shari'a. The Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him and his household, simplified physical pleasure or torture. Or, what is rationally realized and prophetically approved. Pleasures are either physical, which is not given that interest, or spiritual; following the Divine laws, (Madkour,1960: 432, Dunia,1992: 326-327, and Al-Ahwani,1952: 127-128).

So, did Ibn Sina vacillate between the two contradicting views though he did not discuss the idea of the return in his book " Al-Esharat and Al-Tanbeehat" or, was he contradictory or he had his own approach, which required him to adopt two opinions; one for himself and philosophers, and the other for public in order not to be misguided?

The researcher humbly sees that the second was what Ibn Sina adopted. Ibn Sina divided people into;

the public, who cannot understand a lot of facts, and

the private, the minority, whose pure souls, smart minds, and they can easily understand all facts. Ibn Sina believes that this is not a contradiction, but it is a methodic requirement due to human nature. There are many Ibn Sina's texts proving this tendency; " our vim led us to collect what the researchers differed in, and what we stated in our books, which we wrote for philosophers. Since scholars are closer to the walkers' than the Greek philosophy, we did not want to confuse the situation. Therefore, we sided to the walkers and we did not contradict with them except when impossible. So, the book, which we wrote for ourselves; those who are so close to ourselves. While, the public can find in our book " Al-Shifa" what they need and more, (Al-Najjar,1982:19-22).

In another text, he says; " these are references for origins and notifications for ideas, which are easy to understand for some and hard for others. I repeat my recommendations and begging that these references are taken as for those to whom they were issued, (Dunia,1985: 147).

He stated these conditions elsewhere and said; " O' brother, I summed you up the best of the best and I fed you with varieties of knowledge, so keep it away from ignorant people who do not have the required experience. If you meet someone to whom you may give this precious knowledge, so, you can make use of it wholly or partly. But, if you waste it, Almighty Allah is the witness and the judge between us, (Dunia,1985: 161-164). In another book, he states; " The idea of the return should be presented to them in a way which is understandable. Pleasure and torture should be given to them exemplified from what they can understand because they cannot understand the deep reality. Always, Almighty Allah's knowledge is prior to everything, therefore, all should surrender to that knowledge, (Fakhri: 34).

The above texts indicate clearly that Ibn Sina has his own approach and he is not contradictory. He wrote two types of books in which he presented two types of information for two types of people; the private, for him he presented his real opinions that the return is only spiritual, and the public, for whom he presented what they could understand.

In this way, it is clear that there is no contradiction in Ibn Sina's views. He gives spiritual pleasure more value than physical pleasure, (Al-Iraqi,1975: 124).

The contradiction that occurs in the same chapter of the same book of Ibn Sina, like; Al-Shifa, Al-Najat, and The status of soul may be due to the fact that Ibn Sina's real character cannot hide behind his borrowed character. That may either be due to the fact that he cannot hide his real opinions or he tries to make the reader gradually realize the essential meanings, (Dunia,1949: 23-24).

The researcher humbly believes that the second probability is what he tried to do in order not to ruin the public beliefs.

The spiritual return, pleasures, and tortures in the resurrection day.

This is the most important research among Ibn Sina's. Due to the significance of this topic, clarity of its meanings which do not even need comments, and its effects, Ibn Sina's opinion in the spiritual return, which he mentioned clearly in his book *Al-Adhawia*, will be discussed in this section.

Ibn Sina devotes chapter six of his book to show the inevitability of the return. He proves there the immortality of human soul and mind. He believes that the return leads to pleasure or torture of soul not body; " human soul and mind do not rot after death, so they are fixed. Each fixed that realizes the essence is either comfortable, pleased, or tortured. In the other life, soul is either comfortable, pleased, or tortured.

Each comfortable is either essentially happy or sad; that is the soul when comfortable, which is impossibly sad because sadness is against comfort, so, soul is then happy when it is comfortable. It is not a division of three by two; torture and pleasure. Torture and pleasure are timeless, so, after death, soul is either pleased or tortured and that is the return, (Aasi,1984: 143-144).

In chapter four from the same book, in the fixed essence of man, he states that the real considerable part of man is the soul. Pleasures and tortures of the body are not really for man while those of the soul are for man. Then, he tells that it is the return; " if man suspects that his essence is stripped from the physically related objects which leads to losing some types of pleasure and torture man had them shared with the body, man will lose feeling the tortures of his brothers. If man personally feels pleasure and torture, that is his own. But the physical control over the soul made man forget his real essence. Man believes, due to that, that pleasure and torture are totally physical, (Ibid: 129-130).

Then, he states that this should be removed from peoples' minds. Thus, religious authorities depicted pleasure and torture sensorial, (ibid: 130).

He believes that religious authorities were forced to depict pleasure and torture in this way. While, he claims, the reality of pleasure and torture in the other life are only for souls; " the purpose of this chapter is to purify wise souls from being ruined. They may think that they may be transformed into other things in the other life and they will not be themselves punished or rewarded. Loosing sensory pleasures and tortures assumes that we will not be ourselves punished or rewarded; parts of our bodies, i.e. a hand or a leg, is that a punishment or a reward for us? (ibid: 130-131). This is a satiric question because it is misleading. Therefore, he states; " this is a misleading idea; if we admit that we are our souls, which we believe that they are immortal, we would not be transformed into other objects in the other life, but we will be stripped from the additional materials. So, we are the same except the additional materials, (ibid: 131).

Beside asserting that the return, according to Ibn Sina, is spiritual and pleasure and torture are also spiritual, the above texts show that he denies sensory pleasure and torture.

In the same book, he devotes a chapter for identifying ranks of people after death and the second creation in which he shows that not all pleasures and tortures are sensory, but there are harder ones for realizing talking souls. He states that the essence of soul, its realizations, and its integrations are better than the other powers' essences, realizations, and integrations, but we do not feel these sensory pleasures and tortures in this life because soul is controlled by the body which prevents such realization. He says; " you should know that not all pleasures and tortures are sensory, but there are some of them which are no way sensory. The pleasure is the suitable realization which is involved in the integration of the essence of objects and complementation of its act; The good suitable is what integrates the essence of the sense and its act. The anger, desire, imaginary, and intellectual suitable is due to each. In brief, each realizing power is either for an act or non-act. What makes that power do that purpose is the suitable, (ibid: 145).

Having stated types of sensory pleasures, Ibn Sina says; " It is obvious that pleasures are by realizing the suitable, which is the essential integration. The talking soul realizes, its essence is better than other essences because is absolutely simple and it does not mix with matter, its realization is better than the others' because the realization of soul is certain, holistic, necessary, swirly, timeless, and pleasant. While, the others' realization is superficial, partial, and evanescent. What soul realizes is better than what others realize because what soul realizes are; the fixed meanings, spiritual images, that the founder of this existence, the angels, the reality of orbs, and the elements is Almighty Allah. The integrations of soul are better than the

others' because its integrations are purified from changes, containing the image of every existent stripped from matter since they are parallel with the rational world except the difference in their structures; Theirs is Divine and the other worlds are physical, (ibid: 148-149). He adds; " Pleasure is then for the human essence, soul, not only pleasures of our present world, (ibid: 140).

He goes on to show that Heavenly happiness results from separating soul from the body and the effects of nature. This is a rational realization that Almighty Allah is the greatest lord of the world. The real pleasure results from being able to have the integration of every good thing while sadness and sorrow result from whatever is against this integration, (ibid: 150-151).

All the above texts assert each other in indicating that;

For Ibn Sina, the return is spiritual,

In the resurrection day, life is rational and spiritual,

Happiness and sadness are spiritual when soul gets away from the body which ruins the pleasure of the soul, (Ibn Sina, 1942: 12),

Soul only needs body to be located in,

Real pleasure of man contradicts with having the soul in the body, and

Physical pleasure is not the real pleasure, (Aasi,1984: 105).

Ranks of people after death.

Ibn Sina classifies the ranks of souls after death in many of his books, (Al-Shifa, Al-Najat, Status of soul, Al-Adhawia, The second creation, and The message of happiness), in which he describes pleasure and torture and happiness and sadness in different expressions.

Ibn Sina classifies souls into:

1- Integrative pure souls; the souls of the knowledgeable, pure, whose full practical and theoretical powers, who gathered true knowledge with good deeds, and the absolutely happy people. They always have the tendency of getting closer to the Divine matters, (Dunia,1985: 32).

Ibn Sina describes the pleasures of these souls and says; " the top pleasure these souls have there is that they do not need any mediators through which others can only communicate with the absolute beloved of all existents; Almighty Allah. So, what an opportunity! what a pleasure! what an ownership! and what a blessing, so, one must do whatever is possible to gain this pleasure, (Ibn Sina, 1942: 16).

According to Ibn Sina, this can only be achieved through combining knowledge; true belief, and good deeds.

2- Integrative non-pure souls; those which committed some minor sins, which are not essential, and they are permanent, thus, they get rid of them later and gain the pleasure, (Aasi,1984: 152).

3- Pure non-integrative souls; they are divided into;

A group that know, during their lifetime, that there is an integrity, but they do not try to achieve it and those will be the eternally tortured souls.

Other two groups are those souls which do not realize the integrity. They are the kids' and foolish peoples' souls. They are neither eternally pleased nor tortured.

About these two groups of souls, Ibn Sina says; " these two groups of souls do not remain neither absolutely happy nor absolutely sad because they do not realize integrity so as to try to achieve it or feel sad for lacking it as hunger hurts the hungry person. They are not affected by the anti essence structures because they are pure.

The more the first group evaluate principles, the happiest they become, (Aasi,1984: 153), therefore, these souls are stripped from pain. Thus, kids' souls are between paradise and hell, (Ibn Sina,1942: 16).

4- Imperfect non-pure souls;

If they realize their integration, lacking it causes them pain which results from nature, (Aasi: 154). He says about these souls; " if they come apart from the body and they are stripped from all beliefs, their instinctive love motivates them to get those beliefs back because they are its integrations. Soul always tries to have the integration as stated in the glorious quran " o' lord, send me back to life to work good, (Ibn Sina, 1942: 16-17).

Ibn Sina believes that naive always need help from a Heavenly object or something similar to it to obtain a pleasant contact of knowledgeable people, (Dunia,1985: 35-36).

Avicenna's conclusions:

1- Ibn Sina is considered the head of the doctrine that believes in spiritual resurrection only ;this is why al-Ghazali has argued and attacked him severely attempting to refute the mentioned doctrine .

2- Ibn Sina is the first to divide psychological fields into two main parts: one that is classified within the natural field where different types of self , senses , common sense, imagination and reason are studied . The second type is closer to metaphysical fields such as the truth of self , its creation and destiny after death.

3- Avicenna pursues Plato in the duality of human truth in matter and spirit, and man is nothing but his own self .

4- Self is an independent substance.

5- Self occurs whenever a body that is fit for its use occurs, so self does not exist before the body, and here Plato contradicts the theory of remembering.

6 - Ibn Sina adheres to the principle of spiritual restoration only and divides souls after separating body into types, and each type has a special status: complete honest selves, complete dishonest selves , incomplete dishonest selves , incomplete dishonest selves .

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