

The United States of America and Political Alliances in the Middle East 1935-1950

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Abstract

The period between 1935 and 1950 witnessed the period of the emergence of alliances and international treaties that some historians described as an epidemic fever, and these alliances became a concern of its governments and divisions, which led to the Arab world is preoccupied with caring for its internal affairs, especially since the Middle East after World War II was in the process of being established And with a dire need for work, construction, reconstruction, and progress, but the alliances that Western countries sought to drag the region into, whether through persuasion or through imposition and threats, all were military alliances under the pretext that they do so because they are between them and the general Middle East region and the Arab region, especially a lot of traditional relations, interests and civilization. Therefore, it is their duty to defend and preserve them

Keywords: Alliances, the United States of America, the Middle East, foreign interference.

Introduction

Pact in international law and international relations is a contractual relationship between two or more states whereby the parties concerned undertake mutual assistance in the event of war. The policy of alliances is an alternative to the policy of isolation that rejects any responsibility for the security of other countries, and it is also distinguished from the collective security policy that generalizes, in principle, the principle of alliance in order to make it global so as to deter aggression and confront it when necessary when the cold war between the United States of America and the Union began After the end of World War II, each of them pursued a policy of military alliances and covenants, so the United States concluded the Rio Pact with Latin American and NATO countries with a group of European countries and the Southeast Asia Alliance after the failure of the Middle East defense project, the common defense issue, the Truman principle, and the Saadabad Pact, which He aimed to encircle the Soviet Union with a series of military alliances in which the countries surrounding its southern borders shared, and these alliances had inflated the Cold War and increased it violence. In order to clarify all this, this study came (the United States of America and the political alliances in the Middle East 1935-1950) with a hierarchical structure of an introduction and three topics that the first topic deals with the Saadabad Charter, and the second topic deals with the Truman principle and US aid to the countries of the Middle East, and the third topic deals with To the Middle East Leadership Project, the conclusion came to contain a set of conclusions that the study brought.

Saad-Abad Charter 1937.

Regional factors have contributed to the idea of the Saadabad Pact, especially since the four countries (Turkey - Iran - Iraq - Afghanistan) share common borders with the three countries. Therefore, some international parties with strategic interests in the region have played different roles in mapping their orientations within a decade. The thirties of the last century from those sides.

In the context of the historical context, it is necessary to refer to some of the parties that adopted the idea of launching the Saad-Abad project. The Soviet Union was at the forefront of those parties, especially since its government was considering forming an eastern bloc to support it, which would play a role in the forefront of facing British influence or any other capitalist power in the region (Al-Sayegh: p.97)

The idea of putting forward the charter may not be devoid of British trends. Rather, it may be a catalyst for the resurrection and establishment of a front in the Middle East that would work for the safety and stability of the region that would be at the same time facing the Soviet Union, while working to prevent the spread of communist ideas and principles in its known area of influence, but the question Why did Britain not join this charter after it was announced later? Perhaps the answer to this question is that it may be within the limits of its participation, it may throw itself into problems with other countries, especially the Soviet Union, and it may lead to military confrontations and widespread political crises, in addition to that, such a project costs it huge sums and sums of money, and thus it is satisfied that Be a party encouraging this project (Al-Sayegh: p. 99).

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of modern Turkey in 1923 marked the beginning of a new phase of Turkish-Persian relations that alleviated the tension and instability that existed between them previously and brought

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them closer to each other due to multiple factors, chiefly their preoccupation with their internal problems and the nature of the challenges and international circumstances surrounding them (Judy: p. 15).

The government of Reza Shah, which is closer to the Turkish Kemalism, tried to establish new relations between the two countries, turning the page on past excesses and laying foundations for joint cooperation between them, thus ending a long series of wars and border problems are those few. In the history of relations between the two countries (Roderic H-Division P11)

Shares diplomatic and political activity at the beginning of the thirties of the last century between the three countries (Turkey, Iran, and Iraq) in bringing their views closer and speeding up the conclusion of their alliance. On June 2, 1934, Reza Shah visited Turkey and met with Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, and the visit was very important in the course of Iranian-Turkish relations, which received widespread and influential attention at the regional level, and it appears that it was an important step on the road. To establish the (Saad-Abad Pact). This is what was reported by the Daily Telegraph newspaper (London) in its June 19, 1934 issue of the talks between Reza Shah and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. The talks between them dealt with the importance of concluding a pact for the countries of the Middle East, and (Mustafa Kemal Ataturk) showed in establishing parallel relations with the countries of the region, especially (Iran and Iraq) because the basis of their decision means stability (Turkey), thus becoming the regional actor in the events and realities of the region. She expressed her interest in signing the (Saad-Abad) Charter later (Ramid, page 8).

In fact, it is true what I expected from London because they were expressing what works in British politics, which was the cause of British politics before and the newspapers. The subsequent years witnessed an attempt to forge a frantic agreement between the countries of the Middle East standing in the way of the communist tide (FO, 371/2010, E.851, p335) and you find a bloc moving in the orbit of Western politics on the other hand (Fadl Hussein: p. 136).

The British-Iranian rapprochement in the mid-fourth decade is among the factors that helped create a kind of understanding between (Iraq and Iran) on border issues, mediated by Turkey, that is, the July 4 Treaty, 1937 (the Treaty of July 4, 1937: which provides for Iraq's concession to Iran in accordance with its provisions part of the Shatt al-Arab off against (Abadan) for a distance of 7.75 km, which aroused widespread popular discontent among the Iraqi people. (Al-Najjar: 37) who provided a means for the (Saad Abad) Charter (the Saad Abad Charter contract) on June 8, 1937, and consists of ten Articles and an introduction confirming the desire of the contracting parties to participate in all their means to preserve the bonds of friendship and good understanding between them while securing peace and security in the Near East, with additional guarantees within the scope of the League of Nations Charter, and to assist in this way in securing public peace and security. Countries with each other for the primary purpose of implementing British policy at the local level for those countries and at the international level in general according to British visions see (Al-Hasani p. 352-359), which was held in (Saadabad) Palace on the outskirts of (Tehran) on July 8, 1937, for five years between both (Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan) under the auspices of the Afghan king (Muhammad Zahir Shah), while Iran (Reza Shah) and Turkey (Mustafa Kemal Ataturk) signed it on behalf of Iraq (for King Ghazi) and was deposited with the (League of Nations) on July 19, 1938, by the treaty. Renewed every five years (Aqrawi, p. 58).

After the exchange of credentials between the heads of the delegations, the charter containing more than ten articles was signed (Al-Hasani, pp. 322-323).

The treaty is realistic (the Treaty of Non-Aggression). If we take into account that the three signatory countries were British colonies, it becomes clear to us who is the aggressor ... and who is the aggressor, sometimes known as the (Near East Alliance) (Salman, p. 30).

The Charter focused its foreign policy on absolute abstaining from interfering in the internal affairs of the Allied countries, and pledged to respect the common borders between them, and not to allow the formation of armed groups aiming to undermine the internal security of any of the signatory countries. (Al-Jaafari, page 89)

The member states signed a protocol that provided for the formation of a joint council consisting of the foreign ministers of the merged countries, provided that it meets at least once a year. And to have a permanent secretariat. The council met for the first and last time in the days of the charter. Its members discussed the issue of coordinating the efforts of the four countries in the League of Nations (Salman, p. 31).

Sources differ widely in their evaluation of the (Saad-Abad) charter and in determining the party or parties behind its contract. Some assure them of the Italian emergence of danger in Africa (the Ethiopian war in 1935), especially in the Mediterranean, and Turkey's concerns about Britain's desire and efforts to find a front to confront the aforementioned danger while allowing others to come (Hitler) to power in Germany in 1933 is a direct reason for a decade The agreement, which had no objective greater than fighting national movements in the region, and according to the estimation of many Soviet historians, the (Saadabad) Pact was only aimed at creating reactionary anti-socialist blocs knowing that this is important to the topic we are dealing with (Al-Mubarak, p. 256).

Turkey initially wanted to withdraw the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom to the charter, and made some efforts in this direction in 1934 (Agave, p. 298), but to no avail, because Britain did not agree to enter such pacts to avoid the expected collision that might occur with the Soviet Union and the states. Others with interests. An economist in the countries of the Middle East (Al-Sayegh, p. 99).

In fact, all the above-mentioned factors played roles in different proportions in holding the (Saadabad) charter, which did not play any significant role in the history of international relations, but this does not negate its political importance as the first regional organization in the modern era. Among an important group of Middle Eastern countries. The role of Iran was so great in his conclusion that many Iranian historians made the government of (Reza Shah) the main body that inspired his decade. Because it was in his claim that the purpose of concluding the

(Saadabad) Pact was to form a strong eastern front that stood in the direction of colonial ambitions, and it has a lot of exaggeration and justification, but he does not deny that. He wanted to strengthen his country's international position, just as the Soviets had inevitably not escaped his mind. When he made his efforts to make a covenant (Salman, p.33) Although the term of the charter was automatically extended in 1943 for a further five years, as none of the contracting parties objected to this, it was in fact just a dead piece of paper (Salman, p.33). As for the position of Iran and Turkey on the charter, (Reza Shah) said within the Iranian National Consultative Assembly that the charter is a turning point in the history of Iranian relations with neighboring countries. It is a shining page on the outside scene in a world dominated by conflict (Papeati, p. 268). As Atatürk stated before the Grand National Assembly, the charter recently signed with our Afghan friends, Iraq and Iran, deserves it. He mentioned ... and confirmed that he is absolutely sure of the cooperation of these governments that gathered on this charter, wanting to preserve peace in the near future (dk and p / o / 8/7)

The US ambassador to Iraq (B. Nebshub. Nebsho) also stated that Turkey is ready to hold a meeting of the Charter countries to discuss the situation and international coordination of their positions and possible developments, but to accelerate and take events. Each country has its positions, with the exception of the other Charter countries, to make (the Saad-Abad Charter) just a dead paper that was not able to achieve its goals or the principles and foundations on which it was established were implemented, so the outbreak of World War II soon ended its role in international relations, and pushed all of Turkey And Iran to announce their official position by declaring neutrality in World War II and not joining either side of the fighting (Confidential p.1486).

The failure of the Youth Alliance to restore the countries incompatible with the priority countries Z in NATO (Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan) with each other good neighborly relations throughout their history, as Iraq recently developed complaints about the Ottoman rule and the year of occupation. As for (Turkey) it has lost I forgot the so-called (Arab Revolution) against (the Ottoman Empire) that paved the way for the liberation of (Mesopotamia) and many countries of the Arab world from it. ... the same thing between (Turkey and Iran), as the latter remained in problems with the Ottomans throughout the centuries until the early twentieth century, and problems related to borders, minorities, etc. ... while the Afghan-Iranian relations were full of contradictions that were only resolved by the urgent Turkish arbitration in (1937). While the border dilemmas were not solved even temporarily between (Iran and Iraq) except a few days before the signing of this charter ... and so on. The (Iranian - Afghan) and (Iranian - Iraqi) border treaties did not put a decisive limit to the differences between the member states, but rather remained latent in the souls that might be pushed into existence from time to time after a minor or flimsy incident. The reason as long as the intentions are not sincere. When they were concluded in 1937, what unites the countries of the Charter was nothing but fear of the Soviet threat. Therefore, when there is Schart (Turkey) without it, whether by relying on the military capabilities deployed on the edge of its adjacent (Soviet) lands, or secured by that country constantly, especially after it was added to the one that signed the tripartite treaty of mutual defense cooperation and was combined with (Britain and France) (The year 1939) (Salman, p.33)

When it turned its back toward the charter, (Iraq) felt some security from the Soviets, not only by relying on its military might that could open up in its relatively impregnable north, but also expecting strong British support and substantial political and military support on its part, not for the sake of the unity of Iraq. And the sovereignty of his lands, but for the sake of the interests of the English oil company in his lands (Ahmed, p. 123).

As we can see, (Afghanistan) has relied on a mountain forest in the direction of any invasion by the Soviet hand, and not expecting another darkness because its wasteland and continental countries do not tempt any foreign greed.

Its geographical location was not of strategic importance to other countries at that time.

Therefore, we see (Iran) become alone in fear of the Soviet threat, as the other three countries were not really ready to stand by it by exposing their homelands and peoples to destruction (Salman, p.33).

The preoccupation (of Great Britain), which was pushing to secure its strategic benefits and pacify the region, to conclude this agreement in expediting the assistance of its allies and achieving its most important strategic commitments on the European scene during the years (1938-1939), Where the danger (German) escalated and the (Poland) was subjected to the sweeping attack (Germany), and the subsequent declaration of war by (Britain and France) against it. This did not leave (Britain) room to think about the issue of marginal influence on the European scene, such as what was represented by (the Saad-Abad Pact), especially after it ensured that (Turkey) stood by it and secured its neutrality towards (the Germans and the Soviets) together, not to mention the alliance of (Iraq). With (Britain) in terms of funding, and therefore no longer interested in arranging (Afghanistan), the final position (Iran) was doubtful until 1941 as long as its strategic and oil interests continued in an acceptable way (Nazem 75).

In short, the charter did not play an important role in international relations and did not achieve its desired goals, despite the fact that Article Three of the Charter stipulated that the highest contracting parties agree to inform each other of all matters related to developments in the state. The international situation related to their common interests. The Charter countries followed their own foreign policy without consulting other affiliated states. The Charter states were unable to hold a single important meeting at the level of foreign ministers to determine their position on the looming developments represented in the outbreak of World War II (Confidential p1485)

The Truman Doctrine

The Soviet Union emerged from World War II and took control of the northern half of the Korean Peninsula, where it obtained land in China, fought in Indochina against French forces and controlled eastern Iran, and across Greece, and occupied the regions of Eastern Europe and the Balkans, where these areas became, The latter was under the direct rule of the Soviet Union. The goal of the Soviets was complete control of defeated Germany, and they also gained

influence, indirectly, to cause concern in Western Europe from the inside, as a result of Soviet control over all of Eastern Europe, and during this period (the Kremlin pressured (Turkey) in order to achieve some privileges Regional. And the establishment of military bases on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to reach the warm waters (Al-Nuaimi, p. 78).

And the great losses suffered by Britain during the Second World War contributed to a significant decline in the British economy like other European economies, so Britain was not able to meet the Turkish demands and the Greek and military economy was repeated to face their economic crisis, and stand against what was prepared by the Soviet threats (Kuwaiti dinars and 44). As a result, some developments occurred at the beginning of 1947 that led to a change in the American foreign policy towards the countries of the Middle East. These developments lie in two main points:

The first: Britain's economic collapse as a result of its complete exhaustion in World War II, and it tried to leave the theater of politics for the United States to revive its collapsing economy. It abandoned its economic commitment, leaving the protection of Greece and Turkey against the Soviet threats to the United States (Al-Nuaimi, p. 78) in addition to the inheritance of its influence from the entire Middle East and the world as well.

The second: the collapse of the internal situation in Greece as a result of the civil war ignited by the Greek Communist Party (Al-Nuaimi, p. 78), which required the intervention of the United States of America to fill it. The British vacuum in this field, as President (Truman), said in his speech to Congress in early January 1947, said: "There is no doubt that the Soviet Union is trying to invade Turkey and seize the Black Strait of Bahrain and the Mediterranean. If you did not confront the Soviets with an iron fist and strong language. Another war will break out. We will not accept reconciliation or reconciliation anymore, and we must reach by force the decision on what we owe with the Soviets according to the Lending and Leasing Act (Al-Sabki, pp. 105-106).

This strongly-worded statement revealed two facts: First: ending the state of hesitation to take a decisive stand on the issue of ending the principle of American isolation and strongly engaging in international politics (Chapter 354).

Second: The official announcement of the start of a new phase in the nature of a new conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union that is not based on direct military confrontation, but rather depends on the containment policy that we referred to above (Al-Twarah, p. 152)

The economic situation was not alone threatening the stability of Iran, Turkey, and Greece. Instead, the latter was experiencing a civil war during the years (1944-1949) due to the presence of communist groups that were threatening the Greek government. Therefore, the latter sought to obtain military and economic assistance from Britain to face the risks it was witnessing. But the weakness of the British economy after World War II led to the suspension of that aid, which prompted the Greek government to refer its case to the United Nations, which was also unable to provide the required assistance to Greece (William Hardy p24 (After the previous Greek attempts failed, Greece and Turkey requested, Encouraged by Britain, with help from the USA, which felt the magnitude of the Soviet threat threatening Greece at the time) (William Hardy, p. 26)

As for Turkey and Iran, it is also under increasing Soviet pressure, which was indicated by the American ambassador to Ankara (Stuart Dob Stuart Dobb) in his report to the US State Department on February 15, 1947, when he stated that the maximum period can the Turks have With an opportunity to generally attack Soviet capabilities that will not exceed six months and the continuation of the Turkish army remains on alert, leading Turkey to fall into great financial chaos (Barnett, p.57)

The first (Truman) administration (1945-1948) was keen to follow up on the affairs of Turkey, Iran, and Greece carefully, and reports of the American political and intelligence circles indicated that Greece was on the verge of collapse unless necessary measures were taken. Help him quickly. So the Secretary of State (George Marshall George Marshall and his assistant (Dean Gooderham Atchison Dean Jewerham Atchison) informed the President (Truman) about this critical situation that was going through Greece, Turkey, and Iran. Accordingly, the President supported providing support to these countries to maintain stability in their horses, ports. Dubai, p. 29)

Since Congress was controlled by the Republicans, it was necessary for the (Truman) Democratic administration to count on bipartisan support to pass a request for funds and economic and military aid to Turkey, Iran, and Greece. So President (Truman) held a meeting on March 7, 1947, at the White House with leaders (Postdorf, p. 29).

Congress to discuss the situations in Turkey, Iran, and Greece. During the meeting, the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Arthur Vandenberg, told J. Arthur Vandenberg (President (Truman) that the Soviet pressure on the Middle East region had reached a dangerous point, and that any further breakthrough could open up three continents to the Soviets, and if Turkey, Iran, and Greece were On their way to falling into the hands of Communist influence, it will affect Iran and the entire Middle East and then take over Europe and Asia " (Postdorf, p. 33)

The leaders of Congress focused their questions with a tribute meeting in three main directions: First: The size of the role Britain played in the international arena after this economic deterioration, which was reflected in the performance of the level of foreign policy. Second: It focused on the interest that would accrue to the United States of America if it accepted to take the lead in resolving the crises of Greece and Turkey. And third, they: He has expressed the concerns of congressional leaders about the amount of money that will be required for this (Dean Acheson p. 219)

These questions prompted Deputy Secretary of State (Acheson), who was present at the meeting, to answer them, pointing out to him that a number of these leaders need to clarify the situation as much as possible. Therefore (Acheson) emphasized the Soviet threat to the eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans, which might lead to

communism to invade the entire region, and the door will open with the sacrifice to storm other regions in the world (Postdorf, p. 221)

It is worth noting that the US administration, especially President (Truman), was stressing a lot on the idea based on foreign aid in order to expand the opportunities of the United States to extend its influence around the world. And since the approval of that aid is the prerogative of Congress, the American president was eager to establish good relations with the leaders of the Congress that was controlled by Republicans at that time (Postdorf, p.33, in the face of objections from Republicans and a number of Democrats in Congress regarding the provision of financial aid, Senator (Vandenberg) urged President (Truman) to deliver a strong speech to Congress that would make it easier for him to obtain congressional approval to provide needed outside assistance (Richard Stepins, p. 211)

Therefore, President (Truman) asked (Acheson) to present the necessary proposals for a financial aid program for Turkey and Greece, provided that the Foreign Aid Committee in the US House of Representatives (Richard Stepins, p. 211) would help him, and he (Truman) indicated that in his memoirs, saying, "The group was informed that I am I have decided that the hand of aid and assistance will be given to Greece, Turkey and Iran, and what must be done is to ask Congress to provide such assistance (Truman, p.87).

Acheson met with the Parliamentary Committee to draft the program, which based its major plans on ideas presented by (Acheson), as well as on estimates by the Congressional Foreign Aid Committee on the size of the proposed aid. To Greece, Turkey, and Iran. The draft provided for governments to formally request US assistance (Stebbins P.211).

President (Truman) also delivered his speech at the special session of the US Congress on March 12, 1947. In it, he stressed the Soviet threat to the Middle East and the danger of communism on it, especially Turkey, Iran, and Greece, and the dangers that might result from the Communists 'control of those countries' capabilities and their impact on security. And the stability of Europe and the world (KD 13, p. 24).

The positions of the American press came in support of the speech (Truman) in Congress, where the results of the public opinion poll showed that the majority of Americans support the principle of (Truman), (the aid program to Turkey, Iran, and Greece). However, the president has not escaped criticism, either inside or outside the United States. At home, counting some of this initial American interference in the affairs of other countries by providing assistance to unstable governments, others indicated that such assistance would enable British "colonialism" to continue its influence and presence in the Middle East and to burden the United States with the economic burden for that (Sweet p. 123).

In addition, there was strong opposition to members of Congress, with its conservative and moderate wing, represented by some Democrats, most notably Senator (Claude Peppercloud W. Pepper) (Glenn Hastett, p. 332) who denounced this principle and called a "hard task" that the United States would bear after it failed before Britain, described the president's proposal as a clear declaration of conflict between East and West, such as telling the Soviets that "we are preparing for it. Possible war is against you" (CRS, p. 2197).

The conservative Republican Senator (Geoffrey James Jeffrey James) who criticized the principle of the presidency of the United States of America will push for the possibilities of armed confrontation with the Soviets that would pose a threat to the security of the country. Thus, in their view, this leads to empowering owners of capital (Henry Smith, p. 28 (Americans will have control over the life of American society if war breaks out) Henry Smith, p. 2202)

On the external level, the socialist countries, led by the Soviet Union, criticized the new US policy, which was considered by the Soviets as an American attempt to consolidate American influence in the eastern Mediterranean region (Muglad, p. 7).

The Soviet Union made harsh criticism of American policy in a letter to the Soviet government to the United Nations dated March 14, 1947, read by its representative in the international organization (Andrei Kromyko Andrei Gromyko, in which it condemned the interference of the United States of America. In the internal affairs (Iran, Turkey, and Greece) (Muglad, p. 12).

Historical sources indicate that the strength of the objections to the "Truman Doctrine" forced the president to adopt a policy aimed at misleading the Congress and the American people by exaggerating the Soviet threat to extract the support of Congress to aid Greece and Turkey first and Europe second. There was no other way to channel foreign financial aid through the Republican-dominated Congress (Mansour, p. 11). That is why American advisors always brandished the threat of the communist regent (Ajizy p. 132)

The American writer (Donald Stoker, Donald Stocker) tries to mislead the American administration with political lies when he says: "These advisors chose to use the idea of the Soviet threat to control the world, but in reality, they did not see the coming of this attack and were not ready for war, except that they saw the Soviets as an expansionist people .. Especially in Turkey and Greece, which are living in ruins (New York 1989, p. 122)

As well as the ambassador (Kennan's) defense of the positive impact of the "Truman doctrine" on US foreign policy (Postdorf, p. 51), and (Dean Acheson), and in his testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee. On March 11, 1947, he tried to give a push to a stronger principle for President (Truman) when debating in Congress, when the latter said that if this program fails to help the United States of America, it will not have alternative plans to stop the expansion of Communism in (Turkey, Iran, and Greece) (CR S p. 1935) and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee also heard Secretary of War (Patterson), who in turn defended the (Truman) Doctrine when focusing on the need to provide military assistance to both (Turkey and Greece) to counter the Communist threat (CR 2109). S p)

Then the Senate and House of Representatives Joint Foreign Relations Committee cooperated with the Federal Mutual Security Agency (MSA) (Mark A. Peterson, pp. 169-170, in a detailed study of the memorandum of several to Turkey and Greece, the Truman Doctrine, many amendments to it were proposed, the most important of which is the

amendment which Determine) the Vandenberg Amendment (the proposition of Senator (Arthur Vandenberg), who expressed the intention of the United States to implement its commitment to the United States and to preserve the power of this international organization, and to impose this amendment on the President of the Republic to stop aid to any country, if the United Nations deems it not This country needs such help, or to harm its international relations ((Thomas M., p. 77

The documents of the Foreign Relations Committee in Congress indicate that this committee prepared a memorandum in which it defined the principles and conditions under which the assistance would be provided in consultation between the United States of America on the one hand and Turkey and Greece on the other hand. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of these two countries (Legislative Principles of the Truman Doctrine, p. 36)

It should be noted that President (Truman) used to hold private meetings during those sessions with the most prominent members of Congress, especially in the Senate, to persuade them to approve the aid program, taking advantage of his parliamentary experience in the US Senate and his long-standing relations with these members. And it seems to have succeeded (Weistband, p. 130).

The last step was taken by Congress to endorse the presidential doctrine came when the bill was put up for debate on April 13, 1947, Potsdorf p. 112) (After numerous discussions on the bill, and after adding amendments to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate approved the bill by sixty-seven votes, twenty-three votes against, and six absentees. (CRS, op: 234) While the House of Representatives approved the principle of two hundred seventy-eight votes to one hundred and seven votes against it (CRH, Op p.1233).

On the twenty-second of May 1947, under the name of "The Aid Leave Me Act," a law to provide aid to Turkey and Greece, according to which an amount of one million dollars was allocated from Orbamai to help Turkey and Greece by Thelaosmai, one million dollars for Greece and one hundred million dollars for Turkey with Iran and West Pond. 131

The American aid provided to (Greece and Turkey) in accordance with the (Truman) principle has stabilized the political, military, and economic conditions of these two countries. Greece has become better able to face the internal chaos and pursue the economic recovery program it had previously started. Meanwhile, Turkey is becoming better able to face internal challenges and the pressure of the great Soviet neighbor, Potsdorf, *ibid.* P. 114)). In light of the foregoing, (Muhammad Reza Pahlavi) warmly welcomed the (Truman) principle in 1947. This name was given to the policy adopted by the United States of America to confront the expansion of communist influence through economic support to countries close to the Soviet Union that might be affected by the communist call. The US Congress appropriated \$ 400 million to support and assist Iran, Turkey, and Greece (New York, pp. 60-62 (1956), making the defense of Turkey and Greece an essential part of US national security (Akkad, p. 269).

The American President (Harry Truman (Harry Truman (1945-1953)), counted that Iran (Heikal p.74)

Together with Turkey and Greece, it represented the first dangerous line of defense in the face of the Soviet penetration of the Middle East. Accordingly, the US government included Iran (Truman) principle and increased its assistance to the Iranian army, and the US government encouraged Iran to join the forces of other allies of the United States of America in the region to form a military alliance against it. Soviet Union (Michael Claire, p. 269)

Although it was not mentioned (Iran) by name in (Truman's) political statement, policymakers have already promised that the (Truman) doctrine applies to (Iran), and the families of American diplomats to Iranians that their country is of equal strategic importance to the United States of America (Greece) Turkey), especially after the (Truman) principle was actually expanded after the October 1947 Agreement (Haddad, p. 21).

Where the Acting Head of the Department of (Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs) wrote to (George Alan) George Alan the letter of the Ambassador to the United States on December 9, 1949, in which he said, "I think we can say in the Foreign Office, affairs at least appear (Iran) are completely equal to (Turkey and Greece) regarding its importance to the United States, and in my opinion, these are the same ministries and powers. Our senior leaders stand in the ministry. We saw, and I do. I do not know how the army and the fleet think about the relative strategic importance of the Persian Gulf and the Turkish strait, but my own opinion is that the oil fields have on them. Less as important as the straits, the important question is what can we do and what to do in this regard and what are the best methods used to try to protect (Iran) (Michael Palmer, p.66).

Although the principle came as a response to the Soviet policy of intervention in (Iran, Turkey, and Greece) after the end of World War II, and that the real reasons appeared in (Truman's) desire to expand US aid to countries previously threatened. The Soviet Union, starting from (Iran), but it was applied primarily for defense (Greece and Turkey) and extended to include other regions as well, (Iran) was one of them, and although (Iran) was the focus of the March crisis in 1946 after the Soviet Union refused Withdrawing from it, American diplomats and strategists were more concerned about Turkey, and (Greece and Turkey) under the (Truman) principle received the largest share of that aid, while limited military equipment was sent to (Iran) (Michael Palmer, p. 55)

The US Secretary of State (George Markle) explained this in a telegram dated July 1947, to what the Iranians considered a policy lacking balance, namely that the huge aid (to Greece and Turkey) aims to replace British aid with the provision of a huge army and economic aid package to Iran that does not face any A threat. Likewise, it could make Iranian-Soviet relations worse than they are, and that might create the same situation that we seek to avoid, and it would not be in the interest of (Iran) or (American countries) or international. Security in General (Michael Palmer, p.67)

Anyone who follows the stages of the process of passing the (Truman) principle and approving it in Congress believes that he was often influenced by the reality of international relations prevailing at that time, especially in light

of the acute conflict with the Soviet Union. The American administration succeeded in using these conditions to pass its bill in Congress and obtain its support in light of the domination of its Republican competitors over the legislative institution. Nevertheless, Congress continued to play its role, by introducing amendments to the Assistance Program Act, which, after its approval, encouraged President (Truman) to provide American aid to other regions of the world after that.

The Middle East Leadership Project:

After the end of World War II, the Arab world witnessed a major change in the form of the conflict that was taking place in the Arab region, as the number of Arab countries decreased, the power of Germany and Italy collapsed, and the status of Britain and France weakened and became called the old colonialism, while the Soviet Union and the United States appeared America as a New Power. On the scene of events, as the latter's policy was based on reducing the influence of the Russians in the region and supporting (Israel, in addition to their pursuit of Arab oil at reduced prices, and thus Arab countries were exposed to various forms of pressure and threats from Western countries (Hamad, June 2013, p. 76), While the term Near East is a term that Europe initially used in the late nineteenth century and for an indefinite period, to this part of southeastern Europe that was still under Ottoman rule, the United States borrowed it and added it to its Arab East, and the term became more specific to the region. Located between the Arabian Gulf to the east, the borders of North Africa to the west, upper parts of Asia Minor, the upper Mesopotamia, to the north, and the coasts of the Arabian Sea (Indian Ocean) to the south. Workers until the end of World War II, when the British government established a military zone extending from Iran To Libya and called it the Middle East (Ali, 1999, p. 3) Since the beginning of the fifties of the last century, the United States has sought to establish regional defense arrangements, in implementation of its policy to achieve its goals in the (Middle East) region. Through its support for the project to defend the Middle East to extend its influence. Despite the fact that the United States initially took a stand against the Middle East Defense Project, as John Foster Dulles, US Secretary of State, suggested the concept of the Northern Belt (overemphasizing the defense project) Middle East) Pearson, Lund University Press, 1998), p. 120).

However, developments in the Korean War, and the increasing Communist challenge in Asia, called on the United States to re-evaluate the defense systems of the West in the Middle East region. With the help of Turkey, Britain, and France - Turkey became an advocate of the idea of establishing an active defense arrangement (regional from the Middle East) and presented itself as a natural link between NATO and the Middle East (Haider, 1986, p. 156)).

After Turkey joined NATO, the Turkish government is ready to form an urgent defense front and will take first place in this defense. Turkish President Celal Bayar said in the opening speech of the Council, as well as Prime Minister Adnan Menderes on the occasion of the Republic Day (National Day), that Turkey has (400) thousand fully armed and equipped soldiers, and that this is the largest. A force in the Middle East that can be relied upon, as Turkey seeks and tries to take the lead in this region (Tawfiq, December 2, 1951, Document 28, p.95).

As for Britain, which considered the project a means of compensation, due to its political influence that diminished after World War II, especially after Egypt canceled the Treaty of Alliance and Joint Defense signed between it and Britain in 1936 (Haydar, *ibid.*), Pp. 165-157). Indeed, Egypt refused the invitation of Britain, the United States, France, and Turkey on October 13, 1951, to enter into a proposed leadership for the Middle East, and Egypt stipulated that Britain vacate the Canal area before entering into negotiations with Britain (New York, 1966). (P. 162).

In fact, (the Middle East) was a real test for the US-Turkish alliance in the first decade of Turkey's membership in NATO, as Turkey played an effective role in preparing for the Middle East leadership (Harris, P. 54), which negatively affected the role of Arab-Turkish relations. In 1951, Abd al-Rahman Azzam, Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, was created to visit Ankara with the purpose of discussing the defense of the Middle East project.

It seems that Azzam opposed the project altogether, as he called on the Turkish foreign minister to defend the project, saying: "The defense of the Middle East is an inevitable issue in the strategic and economic defense of the European continent." (Carpath, Lind, 1975, p.115). Egypt also accused Turkey of favoring ((imperialist) powers) and that the Turkish project was a traitorous act directed against "the Middle East in general and Islam in particular," while the Egyptian press attacked the Turkish government (Louis, p. 162).

At the same time, there were attempts to draw Iraq into the Middle East project, as the United States viewed with great importance the role that Iraq and Turkey could play in achieving coalition projects in the Middle East region. In March 1951, a meeting took place in Ankara between Turkish Foreign Minister Fuad Koperlo and George McCovey, Assistant Secretary of State for Middle East Affairs, who said: "The United States believes that Iraq must be fully assisted in the manner of assistance." Provided by the United States government to some other countries. It is aware of the importance of Iraq in world politics and the prestigious position it enjoys among the countries of the Middle East (Al-Sabawi, 1986, p. 158).

The United States decided to reward Turkey for its role in withdrawing the countries of the Middle East to Western policy, so the United States provided military aid to Turkey worth \$ 100 million to buy warplanes, and work to expand seven airports in Turkey. To make them fit to receive these aircraft, and to train Turkish pilots and technicians to pilot and maintain them (Al-Sabawi, 1986, p. 158).

It is worth noting that the US military aid to Turkey between 1949 and 1953 amounted to 733 million dollars. In any case, the American policy towards defending the Middle East project was aborted, and on the other hand, Turkey's attempts to join NATO was facing opposition from the member states (Al-Sabawi, 1986, p. 159).

In fact, the Middle East Defense Project was born dead. The Arab states opposed the project, with the exception of Iraq, which showed some interest, but with further discussions with Egypt (Magnus, 1998, p.91). After the visit of Adnan Menderes and his foreign minister to Britain in October 1952, to consult in the formation of an (Islamic) alliance in which Islamic countries would intervene with the countries of the Arab League, while the United States urged Turkey to consolidate its relations with the Arab countries to get it to improve its relations with the Zionist entity, through Turkish mediation between the Arab countries and the Zionist entity, the United States can achieve peace in the Middle East (Karat, p. 15). In this way, the United States could form a Middle Eastern League that would stand up to the Soviet threat.

The differences over joining the Zionist entity to the Middle East defense project were not limited to the Arab countries that opposed it on the one hand. However, the competition between British and American influence in the Middle East was one of the most dangerous aspects of the project, which made the project's success unlikely (Al-Wandawi, 1990, 38). At the same time, Egypt witnessed the revolution of July 23, 1952, as Egypt would have accepted the project. The dismissal of al-Nahas and the coming of Ali Maher (Al-Wandawi, 1990, p. 38), but the course of events became unfavorable to the project after the July Revolution in Egypt, so Gamal Abdel Nasser attacked the project and announced. (That Egypt could not enter into an alliance in which the Zionist entity is a member, and he explained its indifference to the alleged Soviet threat and the Cold War, and indicated that these risks cannot be measured by the Zionist threat () Karat, p. 16).

Indeed, the efforts of the United States and Turkey to organize a military alliance in the Middle East region failed (Primakov, (Damascus, 1979, p. 233)), but the Turkish-American efforts succeeded in withdrawing Pakistan to its camp after that. The capture of Muhammad Ali Khan (2) (Khan). (1968, p. 392) the Pakistani prime minister who was his country's ambassador in Washington, so that in January 1953 Pakistan officially announced its participation in Middle East projects, and then in November of the same year announced the Pakistani-American negotiations on establishing American military bases in Pakistan along the lines of the bases The US military in Turkey, which led to an American-Turkish-Pakistani rapprochement with the signing of the Turkish-Pakistani alliance on April 2, 1954 (Al-Wandawi, former source, p. 43), which is a precursor to the accession of other countries in the region.

Conclusion

In sum, from the foregoing, the United States 'position on military alliances and agreements during the period from 1935-1950 may be reflected in the following points:

1. The idea of the United States is to find the only solution to the political agreements and the economic and military aid promised to the countries of the Middle East that respond to the aspirations of the United States of America.
2. The aim of the Truman project was to reform the American influence and interests from the danger of the spread of communism and its control in the world, especially the southern European regions, so the goal was to strike the interests of the Soviet Union in the Middle East.
3. The United States preferred collective measures to counter the Soviet influence, so it called for the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 and called for resolving disputes over colonial countries through negotiations in the United Nations to determine their fate. The United States also adopted a policy of forming alliances with countries in the Middle East, such as the Baghdad Pact and then establishing the Central Treaty (Sento) in order to keep the Middle East away from the Soviet sphere of influence, but also to direct pressure tools to weaken and reduce the ability of the core region in which Russia is the center of gravity. And control it.
4. The American policy has tended to establish friendly relations with all Middle Eastern countries that have an interest them in establishing a defense organization in this region, and preventing political or economic relations between these countries and the Soviet Union.
5. The primary goal of establishing political alliances in the Middle East is to fill the void left by Britain in the period of World War II and its aftermath.

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