

# Iraq and Turkey Study in political Relations 1980-1988

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## **Abstract**

*Iraq and Turkey are two countries linked by historical, cultural, and economic ties. The two countries have sought to develop their relationship since the Turkish recognition of Iraq in 1927, based on their common interests, especially since these two countries are linked to common borders and common issues, such as water, the Kurds, Turkmen, and finally oil. The existing relations between Iraq and Turkey are governed by a number of historical, economic, and cultural factors arising from the overlap of bilateral interests between the two countries. This study on Iraqi-Turkish political relations from 1980-1988 came with a hierarchical structure from the introduction and preamble and three topics dealing with preparation for the historical successor to Iraqi-Turkish relations, the first topic is the 1980 coup in Turkey led by Canaan Evren and the Iraqi government's position on it and the second topic Turkey's position on the 1980 Iraq-Iran war - 1988 and the third topic: the Kurdish issue in Turkey and Iraq's position on it. The conclusion came to contain a set of study results.*

*Keywords: Political relations, geographical location, Iraq, Turkey, the Kurds, coups, wars, Iran.*

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## **Introduction**

Iraq and Turkey are two neighbors linked by historical, cultural, and economic ties. The two countries have sought to develop their relationship since the Turkish recognition of Iraq in 1927, based on their common interests, especially since these two countries have common borders and common issues such as water, the Kurds, Turkmen, and finally oil. The existing relations between Iraq and Turkey govern a number of factors and historical economic and cultural foundations stemming from the mutual interests between the two countries. The developed relations between Iraq and Turkey have embodied mutual cooperation in many ways. On the political and economic side, the decade of the eighties witnessed the gangs of relations between the two countries, and the two sides reached a contract of the political, military and economic agreement signed in Ankara on November 18, 1980, and relations continued during the period of research with good and good relations. Calm due to the Iraq war, Iran, which lasted eight years, which claimed the lives of more than (million) people, nearly (1.19 loss) trillion US dollars, as we address in this study the political aspect of the relations between them. To clarify all this, this study on Iraqi-Turkish political relations 1980-1988 came with a hierarchical structure in the introduction and introduction and three topics dealing with the introduction to the historical background of Iraqi-Turkish relations, and the first topic was: the 1980 coup in Turkey led by Canaan Evren and the position of the Iraqi government towards it and the second topic Turkey's position on war Iran-Iraq 1980-1988 The third issue is the Kurdish issue in Turkey and the Iraqi position on it. The conclusion came to contain a set of conclusions reached by the study.

## **Historical background of Iraqi-Turkish political relations**

The importance of the geographical location of these countries is highlighted through its website and their sponsorship on the land and air transport routes that connect Europe and Asia, giving them this distinct opportunity to control and control the site and supervise the seaports and old and modern roads, as well as from that proximity and embrace of the oil and water resources that lent to their site with clear privacy. The importance of a very dangerous strategy has implications for regional and international interests.

Turkey is located in an important location between the continents of Asia and Europe in the middle of the Balkan Triangle, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, with an area of 870 thousand square kilometers. Through Turkey, road and rail lines pass from Europe to Asia, in addition to linking Iran and Russia to the Middle East region,

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and recently began projects to transport Caspian oil through Turkey to Europe and the world, in addition to Turkey being the country with the richest waters in the Middle East. The most important rivers and the Euphrates in Syria and Iraq originate from Turkey. As for the social aspect, the Turks descended from pastoral tribes that roam the areas of the Altai Mountains to the east of the plains of Eurasia (Euras and to the south of the Yenisei River Yenisei) and Lake Baikal in the present lands. From the Mongolian steppes (Metwally, Fahmy, 2005, p. 15), where Turkey has played an important role in the Middle East and Arab region since the beginning of the fifties of this century, and this role became clear when Turkey became a party. To the Northern Belt in 1953, and then a member of the Baghdad Pact in 1955, as the Arab states viewed distrust and suspicion due to Turkey being serving Western strategic policy in the Middle East (Al-Naimi, 2010, p. 15).

As for Iraq, its strategic location between East and West was a basic and essential factor in drawing the British attention and determining the paths for their penetration and their influence on it. It is the heart of the Middle East and the seriousness of its location and its oil wealth illustrate aspects of its long struggle with many regional and international powers and the geographical location of Iraq is an important element in shaping foreign policy as it serves as an eastern gateway. The Arab world and the defensive barrier to protect the security of Arab nationalism has resulted in advanced geography that is close to the largest and most dangerous regional powers, namely Turkey and Iran, in archaeological problems for many geographical, human and economic problems that crystallize around them, such as the Mosul problem, minorities, water, Shatt al-Arab, border areas ... Etc. (Al-Tawil, 2008, p. 79).

As for Iraq's relations with Turkey, since the borders between the two countries were settled, the problem was the establishment of good neighborly relations between the two countries. Overview 1. 926 that established the borders of the two neighboring countries and relations are developing. After Turkey announced its recognition of my official status in Iraq in 1927, and since then, countries began to establish diplomatic representation between them in 1929 (Shayal, 2011, p. 175), when Iraq (Saleh Najdat) sent the first Iraqi diplomatic envoy to Ankara on January 16. (January) 1928, and in return Turkey sent (Kaylib) Kayalb (the Chargé d'Affairs to Baghdad on December 21, 1929) and seventy (the treaty between Turkey and Britain on June 5, 1926, under which Turkey ceded Turkey). Mosul, and from the Turkish point of view that the decision to cede Mosul was a difficult decision as long as Mosul was part of the National Agreement (the National Assembly) of 1920, and the right-wing Ataturk did not prosecute Ataturk, who dangers the war with Britain, which decided to give Mosul to Iraq. Turkey needs peace and internal reconstruction after many years (Al-Naimi, 2010.15). The northwestern region of Iraq is important to Turkey because this Kurdish region crosses smugglers to Turkey and thus the bandits attack the lucrative transit routes while separatists and political fugitives from Turkey resort to them. Due to the geostrategic importance of the aforementioned region, the Turkish army carried out a specific military operation with a force that reached 2000 soldiers inside the Iraqi borders as a warning to these groups, and this operation lasted for several days and resulted in some casualties among the Turkish forces (Al-Naimi, 2010, p. 50). Iraq was aware in advance of the operations carried out by the Turkish armed forces in the joint border areas, and Iraq also granted the Turkish authorities at the Iraqi borders for a distance of no more than five kilometers, for a short period of time as necessary (Journal of the Revolution 1983), and Iraqi-Turkish relations remained neutral for periods. Long due to Turkish economic interests.

### **1980 Turkey coup and the Iraqi position**

The Turkish military establishment is one of the strongest and most organized state institutions in Turkey, if not really a supreme authority that lies above the constitution and other state institutions, including elected bodies (Moawad, 1989, pp. 118-119), after the army. The forces succeeded in liberating the country from foreign forces. After its occupation and establishment of modern Turkey, the military establishment turned into a tool for overseeing political power. The Turkish researcher (Sardar Shin) points out that the unequal development in society is the result of the one-party dictatorship imposed by (Mustafa Kemal Ataturk) and his successor (Ismet İnönü) until 1945, the army entered the arena towards a new role that guides society and fills the civil void in control and supervision.

Accordingly, the army was interfering, not only in politics, but in all aspects of society to adjust the balance of power in proportion to its own vision (Nur al-Din, 2001, pp. 82-83), and in view of the Turkish confrontation. A government with a working-class with a highly revolutionary consciousness that defined the existence of the system. The neo-colonial, bourgeois Turkish capitalists could not control through the channels the usual power of politics, therefore, direct control through military force remained the only option to stop the working-class struggle and the growing movement of the masses all over Turkey (Hasnawi, 2010, p. 210).

Therefore, several reasons have combined to implement this coup, including political reasons, that Turkey during the seventies of the last century lived in a state of severe political turmoil, and the occurrence of political violence in the past two years before the coup. The year 1980 reached its climax, according to an unpublished report prepared by the Turkish Army Staff, which said that the death toll exceeded (4,040) people from April 1978 until September 1980 and that more than (230) members of the armed forces. They were killed in violence (p. 48, C. Campanne, 1980). The causes of political violence that Turkey suffers from are the multiplicity of internal political forces and movements, which are characterized by contradictory and contradictory ideas, principles, and practices, as

each of them wants to control and operate the state and society. According to their will, principles, and goals, this led to a clash of these forces using methods of revolutionary violence. In this, the plurality of nationalities, minorities, and religions exacerbated and deepened the violence (Robinson, 1963, p. 10). The one pressure group differed from the other in terms of interests, values, and goals. The trade unions that played a role in spreading propaganda and political and economic rumors in the factories and demonstrations and protest marches carried the character of defiance and disobedience. This led to the cessation of factories, which led to a decrease in production and a scarcity of goods in the market and an increase in their prices (Al-Hassan, 1984, p. 20). Student movements appeared, whose associations diversified and their political activity increased, and universities became under its leadership, becoming a scene of controversy, debate, and clash with weapons among students, which led to the closure and suspension of the study (CHDodd, 1969, pp. 7-9).

Secret and terrorist societies that turned around forty appeared in the early 1970s. These associations receive encouragement, aid, and guidance from abroad. These secret and terrorist associations played an important role in spreading terror, kidnapping citizens, killing foreigners, looting banks, blocking roads, and attacking the headquarters and interests of the state. (Parties, associations, newspapers, cafes, hotels and tourist restaurants) Hawtham. D, 1979, p.63)

There is no doubt that the National Movement Party is the party and political organization most accused of practicing violence and terrorism, as this party and its organizations have committed acts of violence, and this obsession was not an arbitrary measure, but rather evidence of the spread of this party. The practice of violence and its extremist fascist ideology and the formation of armed organizations (Gray Wolves) and (Ideal Youth) who were the most prominent means of the party in achieving its goals. (Hussein, 1967, p. 32) The party practiced violent acts in various cities of Turkey, and the sources indicated that (Turki) issued his personal orders to assassinate (900) people, including prominent politicians, intellectuals, students, journalists, administrators and workers, as the Turkish authorities revealed after the September coup 1980 that the Nationalist Movement Party was planning to assassinate a number of high-ranking military officials, headed by the Chief of the General Staff (Kanan Evren) (Turkey Newsletter, 1986).

In light of the foregoing, Turkey witnessed in 1978 the fiercest sectarian clash between the Sunnis, who make up 80% of the Turkish people, and the Shiites in Kahraman (Kahramanmaraş located in southeastern Turkey, and the National Movement Party played a major role in the escalation of political violence in this city, which resulted in More than 111 people were killed and more than a thousand injured, which prompted the government to declare martial law in thirteen states and dismiss the Minister of Interior (Irfan Ozai Denbali). (Irfan Ozai Denbali from his post) Mackenzie, 1981) formed a coordination committee for the purpose of implementing Martial law, and one of its members was (Bulent Ecevit), along with General (Kanan Evren), Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. The Forces and Major General (Shehab Yard Imoglu) supervise the implementation of these rulings, as it established special military courts to try violators of the provisions of military rulings (Al-Hassan, pp. 23-29). However, these measures were not sufficient, as martial law imposed on (13) areas increased to include (6) Other governorates, due to the escalation of violence, especially in the Kurdish regions that began to demand secession (Al-Hassan, p. 23) The governorates of An, Mardin, Iskenderun, Diyarbakir, Kars, Saar Bin and Urfa, and armed clashes between government forces and Kurds (22) Several Kurdish organizations contributed to the violence, including the (Aboko) organization, (Kawa) organization and (Abu Jalar) (23). The number of deaths in 1978 was estimated at 600 (Al-Dustour Magazine, 1979). It is worth noting that the Turkish officers believed that the time had come to intervene and end the state of decline, but General (Canaan Evren) prevented this (Richard, 1980) and decided to present a message to all parties through the President of the Republic. Republic (Richard, Lipson, 1980, p. 55).

Military commanders did not achieve what the government called for, to restore security and stability. Rather, the circle of violence expanded to include political assassinations at the military and civilian levels. An attempt was made to assassinate General (Sabri Demeryaj), the commander of the Turkish paratroopers in Cyprus in 1974, but he survived after being lightly wounded (as the Turkish Army Lieutenant Omar Kemosh was assassinated in Diyarbakir, southern Turkey. Chief of Staff Kanan Everben spoke about the killing of Shumush, saying: "A bunch of traitors Those who assassinated Gamush must know that there are a thousand Omar Jamsh in the armed forces." (Al-Watan Kuwaiti newspaper 02/29/1980).

The attacks on army officers took two words (hit and run), and the government was unable to arrest any of them, but it attributed these attacks to leftist terrorists and extremists among the Kurds (Al-Azzawi, 1988, p. 158).

In the first week before the coup, there were two incidents that made the military leaders approve of their coup. On September 6, 1980, Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the Peace Party, led a large crowd in the Islamic Center in the city of Konya, south of Ankara, where the number of demonstrators reached nearly (50) thousand demonstrators. Who (Mustafa Kemal Ataturk) was prevented from wearing it in 1923, and declared his non-belief in the principles of Ataturk and the Turkish army, and chanted Islamic slogans and demanded the application of Islamic law, and they prohibited playing the national anthem as evidence of this. Their lack of support for the stable republican system and

the constitution (Mustafa Al-Zein: Previous Source, p. 333). The protest had organized an objection to the Zionist law on Judaizing Jerusalem, and (Erbakan) called on Turkey to sever its relationship with the Zionist entity and appealed to all Muslims to "liberate Jerusalem" and announced the start of the struggle to put an end to the "pseudo-western mentality" that governs Turkey, and the celebration ended with burning flags (the Zionist entity, America and the Soviet Union). (Middle East Bulletin, Spring 1985, London, MBM translation, p. 20) The Jewish community in Turkey was alarmed after hearing that at the Konya meeting, one of the signs saying "Death to the Jews" was rejected. That is why we find that Canaan Evrin sends a message to the Turkish people after the coup, stressing that "our constitution clearly indicates that Turkish citizens cannot be criticized because of their religious beliefs and that whoever forgets this is everyone who lives inside Turkey. The republic and considers themselves Turkish citizens who constitute the Turkish nation." The coup government also made a reciprocal reduction with the Zionist entity from an embassy to a caretaker on December 2, 1980, and declared that the reason was the hardening of the entity in its policy towards the conflict in the Arab East, but the truth was that the matter was due to the Saudis' consent to lend Turkey an amount of (250) million dollars. For a period of (15) years after the visit of (Tarturkman) the Turkish Foreign Minister after the coup of September 1980, the Saudis responded to meet Turkey's oil needs in exchange for severing its relations with the Zionist entity and strengthening its relations with the Zionist entity. Arab neighbors and the influence of basic interests and changing circumstances, and this is contrary to what the days have proven. This made (Canaan Evren) and others believe that the signs of the Islamic revolution in Turkey are about to fall, similar to what happened in Iran (Al-Jalili, 1999). Iran tried to strengthen relations with the National Security Party after the revolution in it and in a speech delivered by (Khomeini) to a delegation of members. The party said: "I ask you to convey my greetings and greetings to Mr. Erbakan, who we are. I consider a dear friend and, God willing, we will see you under his leadership support and strengthen, and we ask God to help you to eliminate the corrupt regime in Ankara, especially since Najmuddin Erbakan visited Iran after the revolution. (33) Each of the aforementioned military intervention on September 12, 1980, by its leaders led by Canaan Evrin, who said four days after the date of the coup, that the goals of the new regime are: - "Preserving national unity, eliminating chaos and terrorism, restoring security and stability to the country, and reforming The democratic situation of corruption and the right to return to the traditions established by Kemal Ataturk, "he also indicated that the system works in defending the republic and protecting and preserving the authority and position of the state. (Peretz, 1994, p. 144).

Thus, the first government headed by (Bulent Olsou) was formed after the coup d'état, which began its work in light of its program, which included reforms to establish political power in the country, social rules, development of work safety, and the achievement of the necessary changes in addition to addressing the main political, administrative, economic, social and cultural issues, and the government (Bulent Ulsu) is the longest-lived government during the last (13 years) of the forty-fourth government in the history of the Turkish Republic, which spent three years, two months and three days as prime minister, and reached the country in the 1983 elections (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 750, p.9).

General Commander (Canaan Evren) Kenan Evren (Evrin, 1986), Chief of the General Staff of the coup, and the army's intervention in Turkish politics was longer and more intense, this time compared to the coups of May 1960 and March 1971, when the parties, politicians, intellectuals, the media, trade unions and others were accused of (failure Those responsible for the internal unrest in the country since the end of the seventies, and the army considered itself "the only institution that escaped corruption and has the ability to save the homeland" (Moawad, 1989, p. 24). B - Counting the leaders who succeeded in a coup seizing power on September 12, 1980 headed by (Canaan Evren) who were very respectable military leaders, and officers who did not discredit any sign of extorting money or corruption (foreign, general Turkey, 9) a group of officers participated in the coup They grew up on the idea of a sacred mission, which is to protect the basic principles of the Turkish Republic as set by Ataturk, and the main principle of that was "Kemalism", as modern Turkey adopted Kemalism as a basic doctrine and faced the dilemma of non-verification, which was consistent with the rigor of the Kemalist state of a dynamic secular character. The Turkish MP has various cultural characteristics that go back to "confirming the belief that the cause of the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the army of its decline was linked to the Arab state with the Islamic Salafists and fatalism." The new Turkey as much as they believe "cannot succeed. Only if it transforms into a modern state with close ties to the Western world." (Hussain, 2011, p. 379)

The armed forces despite the reforms, many countries of the modern European army remained the backbone and backbone of government, and if we look closely, we find that most of the political leaders are descended from the military institution that was built. By (Mustafa Kemal Ataturk) (Foreign Affairs, year 968, pp. 1-2).

The first military statement, broadcast at one o'clock in the afternoon on September 12, 1980 on radio and television from (Canaan Evrin), explained the reasons for this military coup, its nature and objectives, and that "the worst crisis in our country. The state was threatening the survival of the state and the people ..." and called To "adherence to principles. Ataturk waged a struggle against chaos and terrorism" and against "communists, fascists and fanatical religious beliefs". File 96, p. 16) and concluded the statement by saying: "Citizens, for all these reasons .. the armed forces were forced to seize power in order to protect the unity, rights and safety of the homeland, the freedoms of people, ensuring the security of people, their lives, property, happiness and prosperity, and ensuring the

application of law and order. In other words, restoring state sovereignty in a just way. (Ahmed, 1980, p. 406) The second statement included the coup dissolving the government of Suleiman Demirel and the Grand Turkish National Council and lifting the parliamentary immunity of its members. And the immunity was increased with the aim of trying some politicians before customary military courts. Political leaders and party leaders were placed under house arrest in one of the resorts overlooking the Marmara Sea, the village of Jana Qalaa, with them with thirty different political figures, leaders of the left, right and extremist religious parties, as well as Najm. Al-Din Erbakan was sentenced to imprisonment, and Alp Arslan the Turkish was sentenced to life imprisonment and the confiscation of their movable and immovable property in accordance with Article 35 of the Turkish law (Al-Thawra newspaper, 1980) and the third statement included arrest. Among the leaders of political parties (Bulent Ecevit, Suleiman Demirel, Najm al-Din Erbakan, Alp Arslan al-Turki), in addition to a number of parliamentarians and trade union leaders (Foreign Affairs, File 968, pp. 10-11) and the formation of Canaan Evrin and the four leaders of the military coup (Calendar, 1983, p.518 (they) Major General Nur al-Din Arsin, General Nur al-Din Ersin, General Tahseen Shahnakari, Tahseen Shahnakai, Admiral Nashat Tomer: Najat Tomer, and General Sadat S. Elason (Sadat Silason), the National Security Council (NSC) is the authority that ruled Turkey until the general elections on November 19 8 3 (Moawad, 1989, p. 21), in which the council consists of the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic, the Ministers of Defense, Interior and Foreign Affairs, and the leaders of the branches of the main commander of the armed forces and the commander of the security forces (gendarmarie).) Other ministers or others to attend a number of meetings according to the agenda of his council and specialized research matters related to the national security of the state and to submit recommendations in this regard to the Council of Ministers, which must pay attention to what is contained. In the measures necessary to maintain state integrity and national security. Its meetings are held under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic or the Prime Minister in the absence of the former. Commanders of the military regions assumed the duties of civilian rulers in 67 Turkish provinces (Ahmad, p. 407).

The success of the military establishment in controlling the reins of government in Turkey by striking democratic institutions made it in a difficult position in front of Turkish public opinion and its Western allies, and it had to have a constitutional cover to help it impose it. Dominance and control of state affairs. As is the custom after every coup, the new constitution was approved on November 18, 1982, according to which broad powers were granted to the President of the Republic commensurate with the new role that the army assigned to themselves within the new policy structure. The system. As for the most important of these powers, it is represented in not subjecting the decisions of the president, the representative of the army, to objection or review, even by the judicial institutions (Abdel-Jalil, 1987, p. 24).

The position of the Turkish people was widely supported by the third military coup in 1980 by most of the Turkish people because it came as a salvation from the tragic reality that the people are experiencing, and an end to the economic and security chaos. The deterioration, which was largely reflected in Turkish society (Abdul-Hassan, 2015), p. 71)

As for Iraq's position on the coup, Saddam Hussein's message to the Turkish general, Canaan Afrin, received wide attention, especially after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, and Iraq's announcement of the continued pumping of oil to Turkey. (Research and Information Center, p. 63) This indicates that Iraq's new position on the pro-government coup due to the continued unity between Iraq and Iran, the conflict was not a supportive position of the revolutionaries and official recognition of the new Turkish party.

#### Turkey's position on the Iran-Iraq war 1980

Whatever the justifications the Iraqis and Iranians provided for the war between them from 1980 to 1988, they remain flimsy in the face of the horrific repercussions on the two countries and the security of the Gulf, as this war led to the destruction of the two countries. Resources and encouraged Western countries to directly intervene in the security of the Gulf, as well as increase the American military bases in the region, and the vision was that the United States encourage the game of balance between Iraq and Iran, so that some analysts said that the United States does not want war. Iraq, the end of Iran, and it wants Iraq to continue bleeding and not allow the loss of any of the parties (Kamouna, p. 1), the war that broke out between Iraq and Iran in September 1980, and it is one of the most dangerous wars. The problems afflicting the Middle East and its internal, regional, and international consequences and dimensions, as well as the massive damage to the infrastructure of the two countries and the great material and human losses, have affected the world. P in the Middle East region at one or another, and at the political, economic, and military levels, and this war was not a motive for a moment. Rather, it came after a long history of linking Iraq and Iran, which is full of problems and conflicts, and brotherly disagreements in positions and opinions that claim both Iraq and Iran historical rights dating back thousands of years. According to the arrival of Iraq to consider the roots of the countries dating back to the era of the Babylonians and vegetables, including Mesopotamia, where the formation of the first official unit that stopped its continuation began due to the military invasions, including the Persian invasions at certain times, either Iran is fighting for itself - especially in the era of the Shah's empire. Historical periods dating back two thousand five hundred years, when he ran the Persian Empire from the embankment in what he called Mesopotamia in historical periods and confirmed based on this historical vision Iran

and parts of Iraq and most of the Gulf states, especially Bahrain, when the Algiers Agreement between Iraq and Iran was signed in March 1975, it was believed that the dispute between the two countries over the borders on the Shatt al-Arab had found a solution, but the escalating tension between the two countries reached a climax following the overthrow of the Shah's regime in Ir. In 1979 the establishment of the Islamic Republic there. And Iraqi media considered that "what happened in Iran is an internal matter, and Iraq is keen that the change is in the interest of the Iranian people and in the interest of establishing relations." Good and positive between the two neighboring countries, as Iraq was keen to preserve the unity of the Arab Gulf region, and worked seriously and positively with Iran in this field. (Long, 1988, p. 121). But matters began to turn towards tension when each side launched a media attack on the other side, and Iraq considered the Iranian artillery bombing of Iraqi cities on September 4, 1980, such as Khanaqin, Mandali, Zurbatia, and others, and in support of that. The bombardment of the large Iranian military build-up on the Iraqi borders and inside Iraqi lands (Zain Al-Qaws, Saif Saad, Khader, and Al-Haila) as a declaration of war on Iraq (Al-Suwaidani, 2003, p. 23).

On September 17, 1980, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein called the National Council to hold an extraordinary session attended by members of the Revolutionary Command Council and ministers, in which he declared the abolition of the 1975 agreement. Among its elements was a breach of the spirit of the agreement, so they bear full legal responsibility for calculating this agreement by virtue of its expiration (Al-Suwaidani, 2003). 23). Turkey's official position on the Iran-Iraq War in 1980 was a neutral position, and considered this a correct position on it, and indicated that it is doing everything in its power to end the war between the two countries and that Turkey's goal is to build. More advanced relations with Iraq and Iran in the future. Turkey officially announced the necessity to stop the fighting between Iraq and Iran and solve the problems between the two parties by peaceful means. It also announced that it does not support any foreign intervention and that it will not allow the use of its military bases. NATO and the United States of America in the event that these countries take military action against the Iranian regime (Solomon, 2006, p. 342). On November 2, 1980, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement declaring that "Turkey will remain neutral between Iraq and Iran, and will not initiate the sending of weapons or spare parts to either of them, because it does not allow this." The passage of weapons to any of them through its territory or airspace. (Ali, 2009, p. 39). The Turkish position on the Iran-Iraq war, which was characterized by neutrality, came from the foundations and foundations adopted by the Turkish foreign policy, which is the principle of non-interference in conflicts. In their statements about this war, the Turkish officials indicated their neutral position on the ongoing war between Iraq and Iran, and in this regard, the Turkish President (Canaan Evren) announced at the beginning of the outbreak of the war, saying: "We regret the Iran-Iraq war and we are concerned about that and that Turkey has done and is still doing All efforts are being made to end this war by peaceful means. "The Turkish president also stressed that his country intends to continue its continuous efforts to end the war, and said in an interview on Yugoslav TV that Turkey hopes to achieve success in this field, and indicated that his country is following closely and is concerned about its continuation. This war, which began to affect peace in the region and the world at large. . Likewise, (Canaan Evrin) expressed his aspiration to witness the end of the war. This came during his speech at the Fourth Islamic Summit held in Casablanca in January 1984 (Al-Obeidi, 2005, p. 60), in which he confirmed this by saying: "The special interest that Turkey shows towards the Middle East is not only. As a result of its geographical location, that Turkey It has an ancient past in the region based on religious relations and a common heritage that unites it with the Islamic countries in the region, and that Turkey is disturbed by the ongoing war between Iran and Iraq, and it is believed that the two Islamic countries have continued to dispel their resources. This weakens the entire region and makes it vulnerable to external pressures. (Canaan Evren) justified his country's neutrality, and considered this a basic principle in its foreign policy, saying: "Turkey's balanced and friendly relations with its neighbors Iran and Iraq, as well as its efforts to end the war. It accords with its basic principle that guides its foreign policy, which is peace at home and peace abroad (Saeed, 2008, p. 247).

The Turkish President (Canaan Evren) continued his efforts to end the Iran-Iraq war. On November 11, 1983, Evrin sent the Minister of Defense (Khaluk Paulkin) ((Haluk Bajulkin) an official visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Emirates in his capacity as a personal envoy of the Turkish President, and this visit is one of the most extensive diplomatic campaign visits within the framework of the Turkish Gulf contacts to end the war, and after that, he (Canaan Afrin) personally visited Saudi Arabia in February 1984, and during that visit, the Saudi monarch (Fahd bin Abdulaziz) put it in the form of the steps taken by Saudi Arabia to stop the war. In a statement, he made upon his arrival in Doha, the region. In response to a question about the Iran-Iraq war and the role that Turkey could play to end the war by peaceful means, the Turkish president expressed his deep regret for the continuation of the ongoing conflict, stressing that this war threatens peace and security in the region and warned. From the dangers of escalating the war and the possibility of external forces interfering in the region due to the continuing conflict, explaining that Turkey adheres to the principle of neutrality (Al-Qargholi, 2006, pp. 94-95). Sustainable development) in Turkish language on 3/15/1981 in this regard, saying: "We are very sorry for the war between the two friendly countries, and it is my greatest wish that ending the war" and its inclusion. "The Turkish government's position is a sound position on the Iran-Iraq war, and we have good relations with the two countries. : "We did our best to end the fighting, but we were unable to achieve positive results." The President of the Republican People's Party Poland A. Javed in 1986 spoke in the parliamentary bloc and touched on the ongoing war between Iraq and Iran, and said that

Turkey could not remain outside the hot war zone, and indicated outside that by saying: "Our efforts with Iraq and Iran cannot be closed easily" (Al-Obaidi, 2005, p. 29).

Turkish Prime Minister (Türker Özal) affirmed that Turkey attaches great importance to peace and stability in the region, and we hope that Iraq and Iran will reach a just and lasting solution. The Turkish Prime Minister Özal expressed his regret and deep sorrow for the continuation of the Iran-Iraq war, and this came in Özal's statements, where he defined them in the following: "We pursue a neutral policy towards two neighboring countries, and this matter is one of the most difficult things because both countries want Turkey to stand by him. And we must consider this to be a normal matter, and that we have adopted this neutral position, and this matter is not easy even if we think that one of the parties is right, then we will not act in another way, and if we stand by one of the parties, what will Turkey benefit from that, and despite this we have established positive relations with it resulted in an increase in the volume of bilateral dealings. During the same period, good relations were established with Iran as well (Ali (2009, p. 39).

For its part, Turkish newspapers strongly condemned the media campaign launched by the Iranian government against Turkey, describing it as immoral, and the Turkish newspaper (Hurriyet) said that the Iranian radio strongly criticized Turkey and its position on the Iran-Iraq war. Kun Aiden newspaper condemned the attack launched by Iranian media against Turkey, and the Turkish newspaper (Turjuman) described the Iranian government's position on the UN Security Council's decision to stop the Iran-Iraq war as an illogical position (Al-Suwaidani, 2003, p. 32). In an interview with Iranian President Abul-Hassan Bani Sadr (Abdel Nasser, 2008, pp. 4-5) with the Turkish newspaper Turjuman in 1981, he talked about Turkey's neutral role by saying: "If Turkey wants peace, it must stand with the right and it must defend the truth. Against the oppressive state that suffices to demonstrate the peace and neutrality position of Turkey, but there is no doubt that Turkey wants peace. The Turkish government benefits greatly from the continuation of the war, especially in the field of commercial benefits. In the event of peace, Turkish trade will receive a commercial blow from Iran and Iraq (Saeed, 2008, 248) The Turkish Seden Accidents newspaper held the Iranian regime responsible for igniting the last round of urban warfare. Iraq and Iran, Iraq has targeted economic facilities dedicated to feeding the Iranian aggression machine, and this strike was a great surprise to the Iranian regime, and the Republican newspaper of the Turkish army said that the Iranian leadership is in a state of despair after the collapse of the soul The morale of its recent failure on the Iraqi forces in Maysan and Basra (Al-Obeidi, 2005, S66-67)

The Turkish Foreign Minister (alone behind Davutoglu) confirmed that his country is doing everything in its power, whether at the bilateral level or through the Organization of the Islamic Conference to end the war, following the description of his Pacific method, and benefiting from their efforts through friendly. Turkey's relations and good neighborliness with both Iraq and Iran, as well as its membership in the Good Offices Committee (Al-Qargholi, source of the above, S92-94) charged with searching for a solution to this war, but unfortunately it did not succeed (Ali, 2009, p. 39), and from On the other hand, Beyoglu showed a statement by the Turkish newspaper Turjuman, saying: "Iran does not listen to any side except Turkey ... and on this basis that there is no country that can end the war, which is Turkey ... Turkey is waiting for the two countries to accept a ceasefire, but they do not. They intend to defeat either of them and so, when that day comes, Turkey will seek to reconcile them "(Al-Naimi, 2010, pp. 44-45).

(Canaan Evrin) said in an interview with her in the Iraq-Iran war: "In addition to the damage this war has inflicted on it, it has reached dangerous proportions that would implicate some countries in this war. The efforts of Turkey and Pakistan have intensified in this direction, and we support the efforts." Made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations "(Al-Suwaidani, 2003, p. 33).

Three main factors pushed Turkey to take its neutral stance from the Iran-Iraq war, and the economic factor is one of the main factors in taking a neutral position, as Turkey went through as a result of the war a recovery phase for its foreigners. Trade, especially in the field of exporting Turkish goods and goods or in the field of traffic, these goods pass through its territory, as the Turkish road has become one of the famous roads with the large number of commercial cargo carriers passing through it, especially the tanker. Between Turkey and the two parties to the war, and as a result of this trade boom, Turkey has other partners with whom it exchanged import and export operations, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya and Algeria, in addition to the value of economic projects. Investment in Turkey is noticeable, and some of it has contributed to transforming the construction of various industrial and commercial projects and developing the country's infrastructure, and Turkey has also benefited from reducing unemployment rates in Turkey through the great demand for Turkish labor and in various businesses. And industries (Al-Obaidi, a previously mentioned source, p. 69), which confirms the revival of Turkish trade during the war. Turkish exports doubled during the period 1980-1982 to Iraq and Iran, and in Turkey to Iraq exports and E. Liran amounted to 24.3% of total exports, while total exports to the Middle East increased by 44.2%, that is, Turkish exports to Iran and Iraq were more than Half of its exports are to Alao East Street and a quarter of its exports. To the world as a whole, the total Turkish exports to both Iraq and E. Liran in 1985 amounted to 3.9 billion dollars (74), so Turkey's neutral

position in the war helped the war to continue. The volume of economic exports and imports increased from 5.7% billion dollars in 1983 to 11.6% billion dollars in 1988 (Ali, previous source, p. 39).

On the other hand, security interests imposed on Turkey a neutral position to avoid the escalation of violence and instability in southeast Turkey, which is neutral to Iraq and Iran, and that Turkey's bias towards one of the parties to the conflict raises concern. The Kurdish issue in it, which directly affects the Turkish national security, is the Kurdish issue one of the main challenges it faces (Ahmed, 2005, p. 152), as the military bloc in Iraq has led to the mantle of the East parallel to Iran. There is a noticeable security vacuum in northern Iraq, and thus the fortified elements of terrorist organizations are forming their target in northern Iraq and making Turkey a target. Therefore, Turkey decided not to violate its relations with Iraq or Iran alike, and through the agreement concluded between Iraq and Turkey in February 1983, the first operations took place. Military of the Turkish forces in northern Iraq on April 25 of the same year to maintain the security of the region (Yazir, 2004, p1.9). Bach's attempts (Turki Uzal) to stop the urban warfare between Iraq and Iran in March of the year 1988, could have been a turning point in the settlement of the Iran-Iraq war. Point E is not if it did not and the missile launch did not happen. It lasted (53) hours only And the statement of the former Iranian foreign minister (Javad Larijani) during his visit to Turkey, in which he said: "Urban warfare was stopped by efforts that contradict the Turkish Prime Minister's statement with the statement of former Iraqi Foreign Minister (Tariq Aziz) to BBC Radio, in which he said: The temporary suspension of urban warfare did not materialize (Ozal's) efforts, but Iraq rose up and made him want it. "(Al-Naimi, source of the above, p. 236) note that there is a clear Turkish position to stop urban warfare between the two countries.

In sum, the Turkish position on the Iran-Iraq war came after a Turkish vision of a window of regional political imperatives in the Middle East region, and in this regard Ozal says (that this war has caused great sacrifices in lives on both sides without justification, and it must be stopped .. Be more effective In this direction, and even if we do not reach a result, we assume the role and prevent bloodshed.)

Therefore, Turkish diplomacy was with this stopping the war and preventing its development, fearing the arrival of danger inside Turkey itself, and so was Turkey with the establishment of reciprocal relations with the two sides of the war without inclination to anyone. Including its need for Turkey in all fields, especially economic and security. In the same context, Turkey's distinguished role during this war, whether trying to end or a good relationship between the two sides of time, are related to the parties' relations with geographical proximity and historical and religious ties, and this was the circumstances of the Iraq-Iran war and its political and economic problems in the region produced an opportunity that Turkey benefited from in Achieving its interests and strengthening its role in the region, and in light of this, Turkey followed a policy of neutrality towards that. war. In 1988, the last year of the war, assurances were issued from Turkey that it would not become involved in the Iran-Iraq conflict. At the beginning of April 1988, Turkish Prime Minister Ozal ended his three-day official visit to Iraq, and stated before leaving Iraq that "Turkey has no intention of interfering in any way in the Iraqi-Iranian conflict." He added, "There is incorrect news that foreign newspapers reported it. Ironically, Turkey will intervene in the region, as this news is not primarily speculation, as Turkey does not intend at all to mediate in any way in the Iraqi-Iranian conflict, and Turkey's territory is sufficient. We are not." Beyond any adventure. I hope everyone is aware of this matter (Al-Adwaa newspaper, 15, 1988). If the war had weakened the Iranian and Iraqi forces economically and militarily in the years of the war, but on the other hand it paved the way for both countries to build a large military force that is trained and has eight years of experience in defense and attack, as well as developing their capabilities in the field of weapons manufacturing, providing spare parts and even possessing them, And the real incentive to possess weapons of mass destruction, and this is what Turkey, the United States and the West have suffered from the 1990s until today, and if these forces are able to end Iraq during the second and third Gulf War, which ended with its occupation, then they are still continuing to search for ways to bring down the second power. (Said, 2008, pp. 266-267)

### **Kurdish growth and internal conflicts**

The word (Kurdistan) consists of the word (Kurdish) and its suffix (Stan), which corresponds to it in European languages. (State) means (province, region), so the result means (Kurdistan) a Kurdish region, and training has analogs such as (Arabistan, Afghanistan, Turkestan) (Al-Barwari, 2009, p. 27). The Kurds, as most writings confirm, are Aryans who speak a language that has its origins in the Hindu community. European and Arabic letters are used in writing, except in the Soviet Union (formerly), where the Russian alphabet is used, and some attempts in Turkey and Syria to use Latin letters. The number of Kurds is estimated at about (20-25) million people, most of whom live in four Middle Eastern countries: Turkey is inhabited by about (12-14) million, Iran (6) million, Iraq (3.5-4) million. And Syria (one million) in addition to about (100,000 to 150 thousand) live in Armenia and Azerbaijan, and recent reports indicate that (300 thousand to one million) Kurds live in the Russian Federation (Jawad, 1988, p. 5).

The Kurdish question is one of the most exciting issues in Turkey, where the PKK uprising was one of a long series of uprisings throughout modern history. The Kurds have been fighting a bitter struggle since 1984 for national rights in Turkish Kurdistan. The Kurdish question in Turkey, in the neighborhood and in many countries, is a very common issue, and even a feature of Turkish politics. Since most Kurds live in areas bordering eastern, southeastern, and



northeastern Turkey, they have developed a sense of self, social identity, and common land since at least the middle Ages, and this sense of unity of identity has been reinforced with the outbreak. A major uprising during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, which reinforced their sense of social unity. (That is, national affiliation) (idle, p. 11), which ranks Kurdish nationalism second after Turkish nationalism in Turkey and the Kurds, and they represent the vast majority of Turkey's eighteen population, and the population is prepared from the Kurds of Turkey. They are increasing to equip the Kurds from the Kurds of Iraq and Iran, and the Kurds take up a regionally, geographically wider area in what the Kurds of these two countries make up (Al-Naimi, the aforementioned source, p. 211),

The Kurdish region went through stages of division, the first of which was after the famous Battle of Galdiran or (Chaldiran) in August 1514 AD, between Shiite Iran and the Sunni Ottoman Empire during the reign of Sultan (Selim I), and division. It was finally approved by an agreement in 1639 CE concluded between the Shah (Abbas al-Safawi) and the Ottoman Sultan (Murad al-Rab'a).

As for the most important split in the history of the Kurds, it occurred at the beginning of the twentieth century under the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, when the Arab region's share in the division and division was also large. Under this agreement, Britain and France agreed to divide the lands of the Ottoman Empire, and when Russia learned of this agreement, England and France rushed to satisfy them by granting them the northwestern part of the Kurdish regions, and then Russia. Later, it ceded most of it to Turkey under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk 1918 AD, and France ceded Mosul in favor of Britain after World War I, and France ceded the Kurdish Diyarbakir region to Turkey under an agreement. Ankara 1921 (Al-Azzawi 2009, p. 17). On August 15, 1984, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), led by (Abdullah Ocalan), launched its armed movement in Turkey with an attack on the cities of (Chernak, Aruh, Shirvan) in Siirt and (Kasbah Shemd Yinli) in Hakkari province. This attack was the beginning of a long-term war between the forces of that party on the one hand, and the Turkish army, police, institutions and Kurdish militias loyal to the Turkish government, "village guards" on the other side (Al-Duqqi, 2003, p. 297).

Turkey has tried to solve this issue by various means due to its negative impact on its economy and security, as well as on its foreign relations (Al-Ghariri, 2010, p. 154). Among them was what was known as the "Ozal Project" in 1987, according to which the governors of the Kurdish region were granted wide powers and according to which strict security measures were taken to protect some areas, such as laying barbed wires along the road. Borders and support them with early warning devices. The government also declared most of the emergencies in the southeastern region of Turkey 1987 aREA (Tai, 2006, p.4). Turkey's fear of the Iran and Iraq war is the rebellion of the Kurds in these countries and their fear of destabilizing the internal situation as a result of the weakness of the internal front of both Iran and Iraq, and the latter will have a negative echo with respect to Turkey, which does not want the Kurds to separate from any country in the Middle East because as a result it will demand the Kurds. Iran with a similar secession, or at least autonomy in Turkey. The fight against the PKK in the southeastern provinces of the country until the beginning of the 1990s could have been considered an internal issue with only marginal repercussions outside Turkey's borders. However, Turkey's struggle to preserve its national and regional unity by fighting the Kurds seeking to achieve secession has transformed since the end of the Cold War into an international issue that resonates through the country's internal developments (Kramer, 2001, p.75)). Whether with regard to security cooperation between Turkey and Iraq on Kurdish nationalism, and despite the 1984 agreement between Iraq and Turkey on the right of each to pursue Kurdish rebels and security measures against them, Turkey sometimes expresses its concern about the ineffectiveness of the measures taken by Iraq to prevent the infiltration of the Kurds He crossed the border to him, in an interview conducted by the Anadolu News Agency correspondent in 1988 with the First Deputy Prime Minister (Taha Yassin Ramadan) in Baghdad in response to that. In response to a question about whether there is a possibility for security cooperation between Iraq and Turkey in northern Iraq, especially to protect Kirkuk and prevent the infiltration of Kurdish terrorists in the region into Turkish territory, Ramadan said, "The Turkish-Iraqi agreement on border security is not interpreted in this way because the situation in Northern Iraq is stable, and according to this agreement, both countries have methods, means and procedures for dealing with the situation, and in an interview conducted by the Turkish newspaper Sabah with (Jalal Taliban C) (Jalal, 2012) he said: "Unified work and good relations do not exist with all the Kurds present in Turkey, but we have good relations with the Kurdistan Democratic Action Party and the Kurdish Socialist Party, and that an agreement was reached in 1984 between it and Iraq, but Iraq was modified to sign and was the cause of pressure from the Turkish President, and that this agreement recognized for us self-rule and that it includes the Kirkuk region of Iraqi Kurdistan. He also stated in a statement to the Turkish newspaper "Hurriyet" while he was in America that "although Turkey is our ally, we criticize it in terms of preserving human rights. On the basis of that, the US State Department spokesman Charles Edgar Redman declared) (Agdia, p. 92): "Talabani's visit to America was at his request and that the Kurdish leader met with human rights officials in the Middle East Ministry at the US State Department," as well as the US Secretary of State in a statement issued in 1988 regarding the absence of opposition to the rule of the Kurds while they are investigating one day, but as it is and within limits. The list by any means, and that this statement, in turn, angered the President of the Turkish Republic, Canaan Evrin, and during his stay in Washington, he publicly expressed his dissatisfaction with the statement made by the US Secretary of State, etc. in a statement on the Talabani case (a previously mentioned source, pp. 164-165).

## Conclusion

The geographical location of Iraq and its various mineral resources, especially oil, made it the focus of attention of the major countries in the world, especially Iran and Turkey, which has conscious power and a source of water on the other hand, a crossroads between Asia and Europe, a relationship with Russia and a place to export Iraqi oil, all these factors and others were the reason. Behind the rapprochement between Turkey and Iraq and at the same time the competition between them over the interests of each of them. One of them, as was the cause of resolving the tendencies and differences between the two countries, especially the accountability of the borders, the Kurds and the waters.

By noting that all the aforementioned issues, Iraq's position on the coup in Turkey in 1980 was a neutral position during the aftermath, the previous Iraqi government recognized the two coups due to the continued good neighborliness between them.

Ankara's position on the Iran-Iraq war in 1980-1988 was the neutral position prevailing in Turkey, where Turkey made unremitting efforts to stop the blood between the two countries, and the first of them was the victim of the two peoples. Turkey made mediation efforts in the Islamic Mediation Committee to end this grinding war, and Turkey actually agreed to that.

As for the position of Turkey and Iraq on the Kurdish issue, Turkey's fear of the growing Kurdish issue due to the Iraqi-Iranian conflict that lasted eight years was a major reason for the development of Kurdish operations inside Turkish territory due to the weakness of the interior. In front of Iran and Iraq, especially northern Iraq, which is a Kurdish region where the treaty permitted. It was signed between Iraq and Turkey in 1984 to allow Turkish forces to use Iraqi lands in order to pursue the Kurds inside Iraqi lands and they already have Turkish forces, a major operation in which Kurdish militants are attacked.

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