

# Does Audit Fee Moderate Influence of Audit Tenure and Auditor Switching to Acceptance of Going Concern Audit Opinion?

Bambang Leo Handoko, Nathania Astria Prasongko

**Abstract---** *In examining the financial statements the auditor must assess the ability of the company for the survival of its business. If it turns out there is potential for bankruptcy, the auditor will give a going concern audit opinion. The problem is that not all clients want to accept that opinion. Clients who do not want to receive, are disputed, sometimes choose to replace the auditor the following year. Our study tries to provide empirical evidence testing whether audit fees can moderate audit tenure and auditor switching to the going concern audit opinion. Our research is quantitative research, we use secondary data, namely companies going public in the manufacturing sector for the period of 2016 - 2018. Our data analysis method is path analysis. Our results state that audit tenure and auditor switching do not significantly influence the acceptance of going concern audit opinion. While the audit fee does not moderate the audit tenure but moderates the auditor switching of receiving going concern audit opinion*

**Keywords---** *Auditor, Switching, Financial, Distress, Delay, Opinion, ROA*

---

## I. INTRODUCTION

At present mature companies in Indonesia are competing to become companies that excel in their fields. The development of the economic world in Indonesia is now very tight, plus the number of emerging startup tech companies. Compared with these startup tech companies, there is a need for new innovations from other long-standing companies that still have traditional business partners. Nowadays there can be seen a large number of traditional businesses entering the world of technology. This has brought good impact on Indonesia's economy, especially in the digital economy. With that the company's economy will also be better and will attract the attention of investors to take part in these companies by embedding valuable letters or commercial paper.

Investors can only embed commercial paper in certain companies that have already gone public or have done an Initial Public Offering (IPO). By carrying out an IPO, the company will increase its market by entering the world capital market and will increase profits for companies. With this, the thought that being a company going public will raise the company's image, because it gives the impression that the company has been trusted and well known to investors. This reasoning is supported by the evidence of the many superior companies in Indonesia, most of them go public [1]. Spreading wings in the world capital market is one of the big steps for companies to run their businesses.

By carrying out the activities of the IPO the company has committed to provide transparency in reporting to the companies related to the performance of the company. An independent audit has played a role in providing validity to the financial statements of the companies being audited and has provided valid information. With the audited financial statements, the stakeholders can see the company's condition and make it into consideration. Financial reports that have been validated by an independent audit increase the confidence of stakeholders [2].

Audit has a big role because the report issued by an independent audit will coincide with the release of an opinion on the sustainability of the company (Going Concern) [3]. The UNSP case is one example of a case that occurred related to going concern problems. In 2017 it was revealed that UNSP experienced a capital deficit related to corporate liabilities that exceeded the total assets of the company, plus a large amount of loans to 11 Financial Institutions. In addition to capital deficiencies related to these liabilities, investors must also be complicated again related to the problem of existing receivables from related parties, namely the emergence and loss of related parties' receivables from related parties in UNSP's financial statements. The absence of a clear transaction for moving on behalf of or a transaction that explains further about it triggers a further examination of the financial statements of UNSP. This can be detrimental to investors and related parties because they do not get a valid financial report.

Thus the information provided in financial reports must have reliable quality. Therefore, inspection must be carried out as a guarantee that the quality of financial statements and funds can be trusted and valid. More quality information can be improved by transmitting improving audit quality [4]. [5] defines audit quality as the ability of auditors to detect errors in financial reports and report them on financial reports. Audit quality is the probability that an auditor finds and reports on the violations in his client's accounting system. Audit quality is the auditor's ability to detect the interests of reporting accounting accounts in his audit system.

To maintain trust in the use of financial and financial reports, public and public must pay attention to quality audit quality. But this is not comparable to straightforward because in fact there are still many financial and financial reports that occur and involve auditors [6]. Where Arthur Andersen's Public Accounting Firm was supposed to be an independent audit, it was very deviant, because it was found that there was many staff from Enron who used to work at Arthur Andersen's Public Accounting Firm. In addition, Arthur Andersen's Public Accountant Office also agreed to a deviation in the financial report submitted by Enron. This can be done because the dependent of an auditor from KAP Arthur Andersen has audited the duration of Arthur Andersen's KAP auditing Enron's financial reports. As a result, the investigation made two sides, Enron had to admit to its bankruptcy in 2001 and likewise Arthur Andersen's Public Accounting Firm, which in 2002 had to give up its licensing practice as an independent audit.

The importance of independence is seen from the case above. Indonesia also made a statement regarding the change of auditors every 3 years regulated in POJK No.13 / POJK.03 / 2017 concerning "Use of Public Accountant Services and Public Accountant Offices in Financial Services Activities".

## **AI. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT**

### **GOING CONCERN OPINION**

Going concern audit opinion is the opinion that states that the auditor is issued by adding explanatory paragraphs regarding the auditor's judgment that there is an inability or insignificance of the significant survival of the business in operating the future [7]. An audit report that has modified explanatory paragraphs concerning the issue of concern is an indication that in the auditor's judgment there is an effort of business that cannot be compromised in its business. Many studies have stated "after the issuance of SAS 59 about going concern, about 40-50% of companies experiencing bankruptcy have received a going concern audit report on the latest financial and financial reports before bankruptcy".

Although the auditor is expected to have the viability of the life of a company, the auditor is not responsible for predicting the conditions or events that occur in the foreseeable future.

The auditor carries out his duties which are monitoring and controlling over the performance of the radio listening and checking the financial reports produced. The auditor conducts an audit of financial reporting lessons consisting of balance sheets, financial loss reports, capital change reports, and cash flow statements including records of financial statements which will then provide an opinion on the financial work of the audit in the form of the audit chart. SPAP section 341 states that if "the auditor does not doubt the ability of the business unit in maintaining his going concern in the long run, then the auditor gives the opinion on the exceptions". If the auditor doubts the ability of the business unit to maintain the continuity of his life in longevity, the auditor must evaluate the management plan. The auditor will give a fair opinion and exceptions with an explanatory paragraph if the plan of the company's management can be effectively carried out to overcome the effects of the conditions and events that cause the auditor to doubt the continuity of the business. If the auditor considers that the management plan is not effective it can reduce the negative impact or condition of the event, then the auditor declares the opinion not to give opinion. If the auditor doubts the survival of the company and the auditor concludes that the security does not make disclosure and subject to the nature, effects, conditions and events that cause the auditor to doubt the survival of the company, so the auditor declares the opinion with exceptions. If the disclosures in the management plan do not provide disclosures and adjustments are not made, even though the appearance is very material and there is a deviation from the applicable accounting principles, then the auditor will give the opinion not fair.

#### **THE EFFECT OF AUDIT TENURE ON GOING CONCERN OPINION**

A tenure audit is a contractual engagement established between a public accounting firms (KAP) with the same company. The longer the auditor's relationship with the company, the more worrying is the lower the independence and objectivity of the auditor so that it affects the disclosure of the audit concern for going-ahead. When the relationship between the auditor and the firm's Public Accountant Office has been held for years, the client's can be obtained as a source of income that is usually ongoing, which could potentially reduce the independence of the Public Accounting Firm.

In a study conducted by [8] proves that the longer the auditor's relationship with the company, the lower the likelihood that the company will get the going concern audit desk. This is evidence of the results of studies that show that the auditor's dependency is disturbed by the interrelation between the auditor and the client.

H1: Audit tenure has significance influence to acceptance of going concern audit opinion.

#### **THE EFFECT OF AUDITOR SWITCHING ON GOING CONCERN OPINION**

Auditor switching is the replacement of auditors at KAP by the company. Regulations concerning auditor switching have been regulated by Regulation of the Minister of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia Number 17 / PMK.01 / 2008 concerning public services. The amendment that occurred was the provision of a general audit service to be 6 years in a row by the Public Accountant Office and 3 years in a row by the Public Accountant in the same client account. Obligations in the perspective of theory and theory represent the existence of the company. This theory of the company basically aims to answer the questions regarding the existence of the company, the boundaries of the company with the market, the organizational structure of the company, and heterogeneity of the actions of the company in the performance of these companies [9]. [10] found that auditor switching had a positive effect on audit quality. While [11] revealed that auditor switching had no influence on audit quality. The same thing also happens in research conducted by [12] that auditor switching has no influence on audit quality.

H2: Auditor switching has significant influences to acceptance of going concern audit opinion.

#### **AUDIT FEE MODERATE INFLUENCE OF AUDIT TENURE TO GOING CONCERN AUDIT OPINION**

A contract is always passed by contract, the agreement with the agency. The institutional security of the auditor with the auditor is also related to the contract, the fee provided. Offer that is not in accordance with what is desired by management will make management to choose another auditor, but if the offer offered by the auditor is in accordance with the ability and desire of management, then it will be a good commitment. This good bond will create an emotional relationship if it is to

continue and will affect audit quality. Audit quality can be improved if audit tenure can run in accordance with what is determined by the government because within a period of 3 years the new auditor can understand the specifications of the business client [12]. Conversely, if the auditor only checks the business within 1 year, then the auditor is considered not able to understand the specifications of complex client business so that the audit results are of no quality. Auditors with high audit fees have mastery of competence in accounting and financial matters, understanding that they embrace company and audit processes but also need time to make them until they need further time to make audit reports more quality [12]. [13] found that audit fees can moderate the relationship between audit tenure and audit quality. The same thing happened in research conducted by [12] proving that audit fees cannot moderate the relationship between audit tenure on audit quality.

H3: Audit fees moderate influence of audit tenure to acceptance of going concern audit opinion.

### **AUDIT FEE MODERATE INFLUENCE OF AUDITOR SWITCHING TO GOING CONCERN AUDIT OPINION**

The unit of analysis in agency theory is the contract underlying the relationship between the agent and agent so that the focus of this theory is on determining the most efficient contract underlying the relationship. To motivate the intermittent plans of the contractor to be able to accommodate the interests of the parties involved in the agency contract. In institutional relationships, contracts made by auditors can influence the selection and appointment of auditors made by management. Audit fees are things that are not important in the acceptance of assignments [12]. When management is incompatible with the audit fee offered, they will try to replace the auditor with a better offer. In addition, the auditor works to obtain adequate income for the benefit of the financial accounting firm. Therefore the determination of audit fees must be agreed between the client and the auditor. Determination of audit fees performed by KAP based on the calculation of the cost of examination based on the complexity of the company's clients, audit risk, and the time given [12].

[14] find that audit fees can moderate the relationship between auditor switching on audit quality. While research conducted by [12] proves that audit fees cannot moderate the relationship between auditors switching on audit quality.

H4: Audit fees moderate the influence of auditor switching to acceptance of going concern audit opinion.

## **BI. EXPERIMENTAL MATERIAL METHOD**

This research uses quantitative methods. This study aims to separate the relationship between the reality used to explain the influence of independent variables, that is audit tenure and auditor switching to dependent variables, that is the issuance of going concern audit options moderated by audit fees. Based on the type, the research emphasizes on the testing of theorists through the measurement of research variables with the framework and analyzing secondary data with statistical procedures, the object of research is sourced from the reports of financial companies that have been audited from manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange period 2016-2018 by accessing the Indonesia Stock Exchange website.

The selection of samples is carried out based on positive sampling methods, namely the selection of sample companies in manufacturing with certain criteria. The purpose of this method is to get a sample that matches the criteria and the quota that has been determined. The authors determine the samples from this research as follows:

- a. Manufacturing companies that are listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) and do not experience delisting or business transfer.
- b. Manufacturing companies that issue complete financial reports that have been audited during the period of observation, in 2016-2018.
- c. Manufacturing companies that include the audit report in financial reports on the IDX during the period of observation, in 2016-2018.
- d. Manufacturing companies that present financial reports use rupiah currency (Rp).

Here is the operation of variable of this research:

**TABLE 1. OPERATION OF VARIABLE**

No.	Variable	Indicator
1	Going Concern Audit Opinion (Y)	Variable proxy with wheat categorized companies that accept the going-concern audit (number 1) and non-going concern opinion (number 0)
2	<i>Audit tenure</i> (X1)	Number of years of engagement in which the auditor from the same Public Account Office conducted an audit engagement with the financial statements.
3	<i>Auditor switching</i> (X2)	A value of 1 is indicated by the existence of a change in the auditor conducted by the KAP and a value of 0 if there is a change of auditor conducted by the KAP during the engagement period.
4	<i>Fee audit</i> (Z)	Natural logarithms on professional fees or expert fees paid by clients.

#### IV. DATA ANALYSIS

##### MULTICOLLINEARITY TEST

The multicollinearity test is one of the statistical tests performed in a logistic regression test that aims to find out the correlation between the dependent variables in the regression model that will be studied. A good regression model is a regression model that is among the independent variables and has a strong correlation. Multicollinearity testing can be done by using a correlation metric correlation table [15], wherein the paralleling of the signal is more than one of the 0.9, it indicates that it contains a collinear multi co-linear path.

**TABLE 2. MULTICOLLINEARITY TEST**

		Correlation Matrix					
		Constant	AT	AS	FA	AT FA	AS FA
Step 1	Constant	1,000	-,358	-,506	-,998	,377	,511
	AT	-,358	1,000	-,560	,361	-,996	,547
	AS	-,506	-,560	1,000	,496	,551	-,997
	FA	-,998	,361	,496	1,000	-,382	-,503
	AT_FA	,377	-,996	,551	-,382	1,000	-,541
	AS_FA	,511	,547	-,997	-,503	-,541	1,000

The table above shows the results of the metric criteria in the variables of the variables that will be studied. The results of the patriarchal charts do not indicate the significant multicollinearity experience of the dependent variables tested, as observed, the largest correlation that occurs between the independent audit variable variables with switching auditors is 0.66. However, the largest class of occurrence was still lower than 0.9 so that it can be concluded that the significant micro-linearity of multicollinearity among the variables that will be studied.

##### GOODNESS OF FIT MODEL

The feasibility test of the regression model is done by using the Hosmer and Lemeshow Test table with the aim of testing that empirical data is suitable with the model so that it can be declared fit. The null hypothesis (H0) is rejected with a high significance level of Hosmer and Lemeshow Test equal to a measurement of 0.05 which means that there is a significant difference between the regression model and the value of observable so that the regression model cannot predict the value of its observation. Alternatively, the null hypothesis (H0) is accepted by the high level of significance of the Hosmer and Lemeshow Test more than 0.05, meaning that the regression model can predict the value of observable well.

**TABLE 3. GOODNESS OF FIT MODEL**

Step	Chi-square	df	Sig.
1	5,819	8	,668

The table above is the result of the feasibility test of the regression model by using the Hosmer and Lemeshow Test table, it can be seen that the Chi-Square value calculated is 5,819 with an significance value of 0.668. If compared, the significance level of the feasibility test of the model is 0.668 more than the value of  $\alpha$  (0.05). From the comparison results, it can be concluded that H0 is not rejected, which means that the regression model is fit and can be interpreted.

### OVERALL MODEL FIT

The overall model test (Overall Model Fit) was carried out by comparing the value of -2 log likelihood models regression at variable independent dependent not included -2 log likelihood (Block Number = 0) with when the independent variable was added -2 log likelihood (Block Number = 1). If the value of -2 log likelihood decreases or the value of -2 log likelihood (Block Number = 0) is greater than -2 log likelihood (Block Number = 1) then the overall model shows a good fit model.

**TABLE 4. -2 LOG LIKELIHOOD (BLOCK NUMBER = 0)**

Iteration History <sup>a,b,c</sup>			
			Coefficients
Iteration		-2 Log likelihood	Constant
Step 0	1	152,358	-1,679
	2	139,835	-2,259
	3	139,220	-2,426
	4	139,218	-2,438
	5	139,218	-2,438

a. Constant is included in the model.

b. Initial -2 Log Likelihood: 139,218

c. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by less than ,001.

The table above is the result of -2 log likelihood (Block Number = 0). The value of -2 log likelihood in (Block Number = 0) is 139,218 with a coefficient of constant -2,438.

**TABLE 5. -2 LOG LIKELIHOOD (BLOCK NUMBER = 1)**

Iteration History <sup>a,b,c,d</sup>								
			Coefficients					
			Constant	AT	AS	FA	AT FA	AS FA
Iteration		-2 Log likelihood						
Step 1	1	140,818	6,390	-3,075	,909	-,362	,137	-,042
	2	117,677	14,853	-6,548	2,395	-,781	,296	-,111
	3	112,753	20,587	-8,947	4,412	-1,071	,414	-,208
	4	112,247	22,115	-9,850	5,851	-1,152	,461	-,279
	5	112,237	22,133	-9,970	6,193	-1,154	,467	-,296
	6	112,237	22,124	-9,971	6,206	-1,153	,467	-,296
	7	112,237	22,124	-9,971	6,206	-1,153	,467	-,296

a. Method: Enter

b. Constant is included in the model.

c. Initial -2 Log Likelihood: 139,218

d. Estimation terminated at iteration number 7 because parameter estimates changed by less than ,001.

The table above is the result of -2 log likelihood (Block Number = 1). The log 2 likelihood value in (Block Number = 1) is 115,154 with a constant coefficient of 14,027.

### MATRIX CLASSIFICATION

The classification matrix shows the strength of predictions from the regression model to predict the possibility of manufacturing companies accepting the going concern audit. The matrices are presented in the following table:

**TABLE 6. MATRIX CLASSIFICATION**

Classification Table <sup>a</sup>				
		Predicted		Percentage Correct
		GC 0	GC 1	
Step 1	GC 0	229	0	100,0
	GC 1	16	4	20,0
	Overall Percentage			93,6

a. The cut value is ,500

Based on the results of above table, it can be seen that the overall strength of the predictions of the regression model can predict the probability of acceptance of going-concern audit is as much as 93.6%.

### DETERMINATION OF COEFFICIENT

Determined coefficient test is intended to be able to find out how much the proportion of the independent variable is able to explain the dependent variable. In logistic regressions, the magnitude of the efficiency of the determination is indicated by the value of Nagelkerke R Square. The value of Nagelkerke R Square varies between 1 and 0.

The table above is a model summary table. In the table, the value of Nagelkerke R Square shows the value of 0.215. This means the variability of the dependent variable that can be explained by the independent variables in this study is 21.5%. The remaining 78.5% is explained by other independent variables outside the research model, for example company size, company growth, auditor independence, and audit quality and so on.

It can be said that the dependent variable variation in this research is audit tenure and auditor switching is able to explain the dependent variable variation in this research i.e. the going concern audit opinion is 21.5%.

**TABLE 7. DETERMINATION OF COEFFICIENT**

Model Summary		
	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
-2 Log likelihood		
112,237 <sup>a</sup>	,103	,240

### HYPOTHESIS TESTING

Hypothesis testing in this research is to test the effect of audit tenure and auditor switching variables on the dependent variable of acceptance of going-concern audit that uses variable audit fee moderation by using a logistical regression analysis whose results are shown in table 8.

**TABLE 8. HYPOTHESIS TESTING**

Variable	B	P Value	Result	Conclusion
AT	-9,971	0,068	>0,05	Rejected
AS	6,206	0,443	>0,05	Rejected

AT_AF	0,467	0,020	<0,05	Accepted
AS_AF	-0,296	0,067	>0,05	Rejected

Based on the table 8 we can provide analysis regarding our hypothesis as follow:

1. AT variable has p value of 0.068; then  $0.068 > 0.05$  which means that audit tenure do not has significant influence on going concern audit opinion. Our result support previous study by [16], [17]
2. AS variable has p value of 0.443; then  $0.443 > 0.05$  which means that auditor switching has no significant influence on going concern audit opinion. This result is in line with [12]
3. AT\_AF variable has p value of 0.337; then  $0.020 < 0.05$  which means that audit fee able to moderate influence of audit tenure to going concern audit opinion. Our result support previous study by [12]
4. AS\_AF variable has a significance value of 0.067; then  $0.067 > 0.05$  which means that audit fee unable to moderate influence of auditor switching to going concern audit opinion. This result support [12], [13].

Audit tenure has no effect on going concern audit opinion, because it turns out that many companies even though they are going to a going concern audit opinion, but continue with the same auditor. This is because the client also realizes that their liquidity or debt to equity ratio is indeed bad, so whoever the auditors will certainly provides substantial doubt about going concern.

Auditor switching has no effect on going concern audit opinion, because the change of auditor who decides is the shareholder in the general meeting of shareholders, not management. Although management does not like auditors who give a going concern opinion, shareholders are actually happy with auditors who honestly want to express going concern, so they continue to use the auditor. The party that determines which auditor will be used in next year is not management but shareholders, where the selection of auditors is one of the mandatory agenda in the general meeting of shareholders

Audit fees moderate the effect of audit tenure to going concern audit opinion. Companies that extend contracts with their auditors usually already know the estimated amount of the audit fee that will be offered by the auditor or public accounting firm for an engagement in the following year. The fee is usually not much different from last year's fee, as long as the scope of audit work is similar. This makes it easier for companies to prepare budgets for audit fees, compared to when changing auditors

Audit fees do not moderate influence of auditor switching to going concern audit opinion. Many go public companies still choose expensive auditors even though many other auditors offer lower fees, because if client hired a branded auditor from reputable public accounting firm, it will increase client's brand image.

## SUGGESTION

The world of industry and public accounting firms can conclude that the amount of audit fees that can be predicted, makes the company more happy to continue with the existing auditor. That is because the company feels no need to negotiate audit fees with the new auditor.

Future researchers in the future will be able to conduct similar research and use the results and methods that we use as references or preliminary research. Subsequent researchers can use different moderator variables, such as funding strategies, earnings management, or restructuring strategies. Then the next researcher can compare the results of his research with ours, so that continuous scientific updates are obtained.

## REFERENCES

- [1] X. Tian, G. F. Udell, and X. Yu, "Disciplining delegated monitors: When venture capitalists fail to prevent fraud by their IPO firms," *J. Account. Econ.*, vol. 61, no. 2–3, pp. 526–544, 2016.
- [2] C. K. Lau and K. W. Ooi, "A case study on fraudulent financial reporting: Evidence from Malaysia," *Account. Res. J.*, 2016.
- [3] B. L. Handoko, E. Hendra, and Sanjwi, "The Influence of Rentability , Current Ratio , Solvency on Bankruptcy



- Audit Risk in Manufacture Sector,” *Test Eng. Manag.*, vol. 83, pp. 2828–2835, 2020.
- [4] S. Choi, Y. S. Choi, F. A. Gul, and W. J. Lee, “The impact of mandatory versus voluntary auditor switches on stock liquidity: Some Korean evidence,” *Br. Account. Rev.*, vol. 47, no. 1, pp. 100–116, 2015.
  - [5] L. E. DeAngelo, “Auditor size and audit quality,” *J. Account. Econ.*, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 183–199, 1981.
  - [6] L. S. Bhaskar, P. E. Hopkins, and J. H. Schroeder, “An Investigation of Auditors’ Judgments When Companies Release Earnings Before Audit Completion,” *J. Account. Res.*, vol. 57, no. 2, pp. 355–390, 2019.
  - [7] H. Kim, H. Lee, and J. E. Lee, “Mandatory audit firm rotation and audit quality,” *J. Appl. Bus. Res.*, 2015.
  - [8] D. Lianto, “Determinan Voluntary Auditor Switching : Studi Empiris Pada Perusahaan Manufaktur Di Bursa Efek Indonesia,” *Parsimonia*, 2017.
  - [9] A. A. Chadegani, Z. M. Mohamed, and A. Jari, “The Determinant Factors of auditor switch among companies listed on Tehran Stock Exchange,” *Int. Res. J. Financ. Econ.*, 2011.
  - [10] R. Fontaine, S. Ben Letaifa, and D. Herda, “An interview study to understand the reasons clients change audit firms and the client’s perceived value of the audit service,” *Curr. Issues Audit.*, vol. 7, no. 1, 2013.
  - [11] E. K. Muliawan, “Pengaruh Ukuran Kantor Akuntan Publik, Auditor Switching Dan Audit Tenure Pada Kualitas Audit,” *E-Jurnal Akunt.*, vol. 21, pp. 534–561, 2017.
  - [12] D. Lee and I. M. Sukartha, “Fee Audit Sebagai Pemoderasi Pengaruh Auditor Switching Dan Audit Tenure Pada Kualitas Audit,” *E-Jurnal Akunt. Univ. Udayana*, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 1455–1484, 2017.
  - [13] Fierda, H. Gunawan, and P. Purnamasari, “Pengaruh Audit Rotation dan Audit Tenur terhadap Kualitas Audit dengan Fee Audit Sebagai Variabel Pemoderasi,” *Prosding Ilmu Ekon.*, pp. 1–10, 2015.
  - [14] K. Ciptana Putri and N. Rasmini, “Fee Audit Sebagai Pemoderasi Pengaruh Auditor Switching Pada Kualitas Audit,” *E-Jurnal Akunt.*, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 2017–2043, 2016.
  - [15] I. Ghazali, “Moderated Structural Equation Modeling,” in *Model persamaan struktural. Konsep dan aplikasi dengan program AMOS 19.0*, 2011.
  - [16] L. Y. Rahmina and S. Agoes, “Influence of Auditor Independence, Audit Tenure, and Audit Fee on Audit Quality of Members of Capital Market Accountant Forum in Indonesia,” *Procedia - Soc. Behav. Sci.*, 2014.
  - [17] C. S. Lennox, X. Wu, and T. Zhang, “Does mandatory rotation of audit partners improve audit quality?,” *Account. Rev.*, 2014.