

Stages from the contemporary Iraqi history (1963-1968) in the secret press; Tareek Alshaab as a modal

¹ Saif Adnan Irhayyim Qays

Abstract: *The sixties decade of the twentieth century is the most prominent decade in the political conflicts and coups led by the leaders of that institution belonging to the relevant political ideologies of a national dimension. Those political conflicts led by the military personnel's affected the Iraqi political situation. The secret newspaper Tareek Alshaab is The mouthpiece of the secret Iraqi Communist Party. It represents the opposition, which is considered a negative stance. The significance of the present study stems from the fact that it deals with the political issues of that stage according to the Communist Party's vision of the events in Iraq. That vision may coincide or contradict according to its reading of the political stage or its attempt to undermine the policy of the anti-Communist ruling regimes as a destructive principle. The secret newspaper Tareek Alshaab represents the only example in the Iraqi political scene after the closure and leaving of many of the Iraqi press in light of the policy of closure and follow-up by the successive Iraqi governments. Many may differ in trying to criticize the newspaper's positions, as they are often contradictory to political reality or they are far from the real vision of the public events. But, it deals with these events as an opponent of the regime in many cases. This can be explained in the positions that are more strict in interpreting the political facts that always contradict the party's philosophy. Tareek Alshaab always explained the negative aspects of the events as being from the reality of the regimes that It is always called a military "dictatorship", which has become an attribute associated with the history of Iraq since the July 14, 1958 revolution, which was later followed by a long series of bloody coups because they began to abuse their political opponents who are against their approach. In turn, this goes beyond the style of peaceful opposition. Tareek Alshaab was considered a model for the Iraqi opposition press, which bears the slogan "correcting the situation" in light of the presence of the military at the head of the authority, described on its pages of conditions that are far from the spirit of civilization based on Bringing a constitutional and democratic life away from the individual spirit that has become an attribute inherent to the ruling regimes in Iraq since the fall of the monarchy until the period under discussion.*

Keywords: *Iraqi History, Tareek Alshaab as a Model*

Introduction

The Iraqi press was not in isolation from the developments of the Iraqi internal and external political scene since the founding of the Iraqi state in 1921. The press was in the process of being established as newspapers loyal to the Iraqi governments and opposition newspapers that represented some opposition political parties.

Tareek Alshaab addressed the political issues of that stage according to the Communist Party's vision of the events in Iraq. That vision may coincide or contradict according to its reading of the political stage or its attempt to undermine the policy of the anti-Communist ruling regimes as a destructive principle.

The secret newspaper Tareek Alshaab represents the only example in the Iraqi political scene after the closure and leaving of many of the Iraqi press in light of the policy of closure and follow-up by the successive Iraqi governments.

¹ College of Arts, Al-Iraqi University- Iraq

Many may differ in trying to criticize the newspaper's positions, as they are often contradictory to political reality or they are far from the real vision of the public events. But, it deals with these events as an opponent of the regime in many cases. This can be explained in the positions that are more strict in interpreting the political facts that always contradict the party's philosophy.

Tareek Alshaab always explained the negative aspects of the events as being from the reality of the regimes that It is always called a military "dictatorship", which has become an attribute associated with the history of Iraq since the July 14, 1958 revolution, which was later followed by a long series of bloody coups because they began to abuse their political opponents who are against their approach. In turn, this goes beyond the style of peaceful opposition.

Tareek Alshaab was considered a model for the Iraqi opposition press, which bears the slogan of correcting the situation in light of the presence of the military at the head of the authority, described on its pages of conditions that are far from the spirit of civilization based on Bringing a constitutional and democratic life away from the individual spirit that has become an attribute inherent to the ruling regimes in Iraq since the fall of the monarchy until the period under discussion.

The problem of study

The newspaper represents the Iraqi Communist Party after losing its battle with the army that is dominated by the nationalist powers opposing the Iraqi Communist Party. This prompted the researcher to study The orientations and attitudes which the Communist Party expressed in its banned newspaper. Another issue is concerned with whether those attitudes were because the party totally opposes the regime. In fact, almost all versions of the newspaper are almost lost in Iraq after the loss and burning of most documents after 2003.

The aims of study

The present study aims at emphasizing the position of Tareek Al-shaab newspaper from the political developments in Iraq 1963-1968 as representing the only media opposing the military regimes that assumed rule of Iraq and its role in correcting the course of government by identifying glitches.

The significance of study

The present study is an attempt to confirm an important fact that this history cannot be ignored without referring to it for the purpose of identifying the causes of success and the failures of the political positions in question, to meet the various challenges in the future. Hence, it sheds light on that era. The period in question (1963-1968) is full of contradictions and military coups. That stage represented a critical stage for Iraq, which is divided into two important stages. The first stage is the Abd al-Salam coup on November 18, 1963-13 April 1966. The second stage is the rule of Abdul Rahman Arif April 16, 1963-17 July 1968.

First; The position regarding Abdelsalam Aref's coup, November 18, 1963 - April 13, 1966

After the eighth of February 1963 coup and after the strikes it suffered as a result of the protests and executions that affected it, the position of the Iraqi Communist Party became limited to addressing the crackdowns and preparations for future developmentsⁱ.

The Baath Party was busy in its early days in liquidating the Communist Party leaders. Many of them were assassinated here and there as a matter of taking revengeⁱⁱ. After the series of military led coups, the position of the Communists may make them discover the opposition and organize the demonstrations without access to power with a military coup Like the nationalist opponents. On November 18, 1963, Abd al-Salam Aref seized the opportunity and led a military coup against the Ba'ath and arrested the patriotic and national leadersⁱⁱⁱ. The division that the Ba'th Party suffered from after the extraordinary patriotic conference on 11-11-1963 and the transformation into two disputing wings. The right-wing included Hazim Jawad and Talib Shabib representing the civil trend. The left bloc included Ali Salih Al-Saadi

who was expelled to Spain. The National Guard factions supported Ali Saleh Al-Saadi's team, which prompted Aref and Hardan al-Tikriti; the commander of the Air Force and Saeed Salibi; the commander of the Baghdad site to control the situation in Baghdad^{iv}.

With this, Abd al-Salam Aref achieved his ambition to reach power relying on the military to remain the force that would be his dream. The Communists call it the power of the bourgeoisie in the coup of November 18, 1963 after the collapse of Ba'ath regime^v. Arif tried to clarify the disadvantages of the February leaders to issue a single statement confirming resolving National Guard formations. This force contributed to defeating the Communists and requiring them to surrender and handover their weapons. Those who violate the instructions are considered traitors who deserve the death penalty immediately^{vi}.

Despite Arif's contribution to the coup, he was known for his hostile stance towards the Communists. Trying to distance himself from the actions taken by the Baath, he worked to cancel the headquarters used by the National Guard for the purposes of torture and killing. He released some of the arrested and detained Communists. He issued a booklet condemning the actions of the National Guard. That booklet was entitled the delinquents^{vii}.

Whatever the case, the Communist Party, in turn, issued a statement on the events of the November 18 coup stating that the reason for the coup is the rush of some military leaders who contributed to the fascist coup to carry out a coup movement on the 18th of November after they felt the nightmare of losing power^{viii}. This position is primarily due to the hostility of the Communists to Arif because he is a partner of February 8 coup^{ix}. The hard-line stance adopted by the Communists from the Baath Party changed slightly with the arrival of Arif who showed flexibility towards the Communists in order to reassure world public opinion after the events of February 8 and justify his coup. But, it was reflected on the status of the Communists by enabling them to restructure their party and gradually restore the Communists' confidence in the party center in Baghdad. This was clearly reflected by the party's issuance of its party bulletins, which define the position of party staffs and members who were arrested in the pursuit campaign in February 1963 and beyond, and set limits to the possibility of returning to party ranks^x.

Despite the reluctant position adopted by the newspaper, which reflects the Communist Party, which was in different circumstances in the days of Arif, some relaxing measures were taken like forming small cells for the party and issuing the newspaper periodically in hand writing distributed inside the party only^{xi}.

The Tahir Yahia government^{xiii} initiated releasing the detainees and resolving their cases. It also lifted the custody of many of those whose movable and immovable properties were seized^{xiii}. The first pages of the newspaper stressed the necessity of forming the National Front as the key to facing the problems and the way to reach a rule that represents the will and interests of all the popular anti-colonial classes. The party appreciated the role of the November coup in eliminating The National Guard. It stressed that among the urgent tasks facing the national movement is to end the conditions leading to the military rule, and to launch democratic freedoms, at the forefront of which is the freedom of partisan organization of other patriots and freedom of the press and trade union organizations^{xiv}.

The concept of socialism and the position of political parties

The essential idea is that the regime is based on the men of the army. Abd al-Salam Aref worked to consolidate his existing system as was Abdul Karim Qasim in relying on the national forces. Whereas, Qasim relied on a group of officers^{xv}.

After the failure of the national forces to form a front including the national forces due to the contradictions, personal purposes, and partisan maneuvers. Some of the reasons for the failure of the front are the maneuvers of President Abdel Salam Arif, who became fearful of the national forces, so his intention was to form the Socialist Union as a political force as an alternative to the front^{xvi} which political forces were trying to form in order to get rid of political parties that may constitute an obstacle to its domination in the future.

It was a result of highlighting his rule and his adherence to unity as a slogan that enables him to strengthen his hold on the model of the socialist union that Jamal Abdunnassir put to the United Arab Republic on January 17, 1962 to announce on his part the Socialist Union to emphasize (freedom, socialism, and unity). The union included the various political movements that sought independence by the adoption of bureaucratic methods used in the administration of the state^{xvii}. To approve the statute of the Socialist Union announced by Abd al-Salam Aref on July 14, 1964, he gave a full summary of the principles of work, as it came in the chapter on introduction and goals as follows:

1. The Arab Socialist Union is the socialist vanguard that leads the masses, expresses its will, guides national action, and actively monitors its progress in its proper course under the principles of the Charter.
2. The Arab Socialist Union, as a popular political organization, includes the working forces of the people and the alliance of these forces is represented in the framework of national unity.

The most important goals are:

A. Achieving peaceful democracy for the people so that the revolution will be the people in their style and the people in its goal.

B. Achieving the socialist revolution, which is the revolution of the working people.

C. Pushing the possibilities of revolutionary progress for the benefit of the masses. The most important principle on which the union is based is that the Arab Union represents the poles of comprehensive political action for national action, and its organizations extend to all the forces of the people, including farmers and workers of national capitalism^{xviii}.

For its part, Tareek Alshaab discussed the new developments that adopted the Socialist Union, which was reflected in the orientations of the Iraqi Communist Party, which was known as the August 1964 line, and which emphasized that "petty bourgeois regimes, such as the regime of Jamal Abdel Nasser and those of its kind, can be transformed under the influence of the international socialist system into Socialist systems, including the Arif System^{xix}.

Although the Communists agreed to adopt socialism, they began making several proposals to be taken to complement the socialist approach that monopolizing the right to political activity of a particular group and stifling public freedoms is incompatible with the special circumstances of Iraq or with the serious preparation for the transition to constitutional parliamentary life. The transitional rule is the formation of a coalition government that includes various national forces and figures^{xx}. But, it seems that the Communists had another goal which is to infiltrate it on a mass level through a purely ideological character focused on socialism and its concepts^{xxi}.

The statement issued by the leaders of the interior, represented by Baqir Ibrahim and Omar Ali Al-Sheikh, exaggerated the evaluation of the nationalization procedures for some national projects, and considered this a renewal of the July 14 revolution, which raised the partisan base and its anger^{xxii}.

One of the leaders of the Communist Party notes the controversy between the organizations of the interior and the outside. The internal communists opposed the nationalization decisions that later became a disaster for the Iraqi economy, which was planned by Prime Minister Taher Yahya, who does not believe in socialism, as well as Khair al-Din Haseeb and others, and described the position of the outside as it reached the extent of "calling for the union" With the government of Aref. At home, the scattered communist groups operate under the banner of armed resistance. The conflict has remained raging between them^{xxiii}.

The newspaper quickly criticized Abd al-Salam Aref's deviation from the application of the Socialist Union, stating that "the Iraqi government was not serious in implementing socialism as an approach to government reform and retracted it from the application of socialism. The newspaper explained the role of "official media outlets in its efforts to show the existing system as if it was a socialist system built on The hand of the current government, or if Iraq was already in the transition from capitalism to socialism. Communists wished that these allegations were true that the working masses really yearn for socialism and support every step that is passed towards it, but unfortunately, it does not find anything that unites The socialist system and the present system of governance process and policy^{xxiv}.

But, it appears that Abd al-Salam Aref did not believe in the Socialist Union. He began attacking it whenever he met with a peasant delegation and was not satisfied with that^{xxv}. But, he attacked the union and refuted the views of the unionists^{xxvi}.

The newspaper, in turn, discussed the justification for the government's adherence to the Socialist Union through which it became "fighting the current rule of democracy and the adherence to rule by the socialist system"^{xxvii}.

At the same time, the Communists in favor of the idea of union had changed after Abd al-Salam Aref changed the true approach to socialism, which resulted in the resumption of a violent struggle in accordance with the Communist term against the regime at the meeting of the Communist Party in April 1965, for the party factions to revive again^{xxviii}.

The second cabinet of Tahir Yahya

The Iraqi new government was to support the Socialist Union after feeling the necessity of introducing new elements in support of the Arab Socialist Union. So, President Abdel-Rahman Aref asked Taher Yahya again to form his second cabinet on June 18, 1964^{xxix}.

The newspaper described the reshuffle as a year has passed since the age of the military government that replaced the collapsed Ba'athist rule during which this ruling took a number of positive steps, and concrete changes occurred in its features, but it remained a rule that is isolated from the people and unable to achieve its interests And gain confidence^{xxx}.

In the same context, the newspaper called for the regime to change its approach towards political powers, including the Communists^{xxxi}.

The Civil cabinet and the Government's Program

After the escape of Prime Minister Aref Abdel Razzaq on September 21, 1965, after the failure of his first coup attempt to Egypt, Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz was assigned to form the cabinet on the same day. Al-Bazzaz was the first civilian to hold the position of prime minister since the July 14 revolution of 1958. His cabinet included a number of civilian ministers. Al-Bazzaz assured the importance of political stability, the rule of law, respect for the rights of the people, and guaranteeing freedom of expression of political views. He mentioned that the country is fed up with military coups, and promised to restore parliamentary life and work to achieve constitutional legitimacy and a law for elections. In the field of economic policy, Al-Bazzaz declared that socialism suits Iraq and the nationalization of banks and major industries is necessary to strengthen the public sector^{xxxii}.

Tareek Alshaab questioned the cabinet of Al-Bazzaz because, according to its description, it will not be able to save the government from its crisis, which he described as sharp and its deteriorating isolation. On the contrary, it increased its isolation and led to the expansion of the opposition front against it because the cabinet did not change the nature of the dictatorial rule. The military, which is contrary to the direction of Al-Bazzaz who is known to represent the civil political trend, and the government program announced by Al-Bazzaz identified rational Arab socialism as a slogan and an approach to the government's economic policy, and took a path to this socialism by giving way to the leakage of foreign capital and its control over the economy of the country by advocating the use of loans and foreign investment^{xxxiii}.

The rule of Abdel Rahman Aref 16 April 1963 - 17 July 1968

The plane of President Abdel-Rahman Aref was subjected to a storm during his visit to Basra, which led to destroying it and killing him on April 13, 1966. The controversy over the accident was described by a team as not more than a technical defect. The other team considered the accident to be masterminded and that it was arranged by his opponents; the Ba'athists mainly.

Opinions differed and there were many directions for choosing the appropriate person for this position. Contacts were held between a number of prominent figures in the regime at the time. These views were limited between two directions, the first trend represented by the military who demanded that the President of the Republic be one of them and the choice was

Abdel Rahman Aref. The other direction was represented by civilians who demanded that the President of the Republic be a civilian and their candidate was Prime Minister Abdel-Rahman Al-Bazzaz. A meeting was held to select the President. Voting took place on April 16, 1966, and Abdul-Rahman Aref got (13) out of a total of (28) votes. Abdul Rahman Al-Bazzaz got (14) votes. Whereas, Abdulaziz Al-Aqili got (1) vote. However, under pressure from the military, Al-Bazzaz abdicated in favor of Aref, to announce the President of the Republic, who began his reign by issuing a general amnesty for political prisoners without exception, closing all political prisons, and easing restrictions on political powers.^{xxxiv}.

It seems that the arrival of Abdel-Rahman Aref and the issuance of the General Amnesty Law was not lost on the "path of the people" that discussed the events of Abd al-Salam Aref. According to the form narrated by official statements, which evoked various interpretations about this incident, which occurred in circumstances of the exacerbation of the struggle between the ruling powers to seize the ruling that this conflict acquired the character of challenges and corresponding threats between the conflicting blocs, as it has been associated with behind-the-scenes intrigues and activities with interventions from certain quarters to impose Marshal's brother as President of the Republic^{xxxv}.

As soon as Aref was inaugurated as President of the Republic, Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz formed his second cabinet on the eighteenth of April 1966. Al-Bazzaz stressed that he would follow the path of his previous cabinet in reform^{xxxvi}.

In light of the new transformations that accompanied the death of President Aref and the formation of the second cabinet of Al-Bazzaz, Tareek Alshaab wrote an article entitled (Beyond the Evil and Misleading) in which the government of Al-Bazzaz program was discussed. The newspaper showed that Al-Bazzaz has a style and a plan. His style was to talk so much on the constitution and parliament, on stability and prosperity, and from time to time, he gives incomprehensible talk about the national rights of the Kurds and his inclination for peace and understanding^{xxxvii}.

In light of the promises made by Al-Bazzaz in his government program, the newspaper called for abolishing the Socialist Union because it, as the statement indicates, is not suitable for the country. Besides, its establishment under the existing system is only a cover to deprive the main national powers of working, public organization of parties, and continue The policy of persecution^{xxxviii}.

It seems that the relative freedom that the Communists gained after November 18, 1963 was not open to them but rather that the ruling regime soon consolidated its foundations until the wave of arrests began to reach the Communists again. Tareek Alshaab wrote an article in which it said that combating Communism is the slogan of the fascist terrorists and colonialists. The regime was likened to terrorism after the arrests of many of its staffs, which the statement affirmed that this approach resulted in the arrest of hundreds of citizens, the impact of police raids on housing, markets, factories and institutions^{xxxix}.

Muneer Rova's incident

Iraq was not far from Zionist activity since the beginning of the fifties. Those activities included encouraging Jewish immigration to Palestine and spying on the activities of the government and the Iraqi army whose socialist system financing since the July 14 revolution in 1958 due the escalation of Western anxiety when the Soviet Union equipped Iraq with the MiG plane 21 as one of the first countries to acquire it outside the Warsaw states^{xl}.

It was a source of concern for the specialized western military centers because of its distinct combat capabilities, to occupy the military circles, including Zionism, with the necessity of obtaining this plane in any way and to form a cell under the leadership of the Mossad chief General Meirarnit and called it (007). The first attempts to accomplish the goal took place in 1965 With Iraqi officers who attend a three-month training course in Texas in the United States of America^{xli}. One of the officers recruited by the Israeli intelligence was Muneer Rova^{xlii}. He was an officer in the Iraqi Air Force. Rova fled with a MiG-21 plane.) To (Israel) on August 16, 1966. He was flying his plane with another plane on a training mission when he turned fleeing towards Jordan, Palestine, and then to Israel. The United States made an effort to make the plane reach (Israel). Mossad considered this intelligence operation one of the most successful operations of the Mossad. It loaned the hijacked plane temporarily to the CIA for the purpose of conducting technical analyzes related to Aviation Theories of Aircraft Design^{xliii}.

Tareek Alshaab wrote that the escape of Munir Rova was not surprising. The accident caused a strong shock to the Iraqi people and the Arab nation". The newspaper continued that Jalal Al-Awqati ordered the Iraqi Air Force (1958-1963) to refuse to accept Muneer Rova as a college member due to his knowledge of his connections with foreign intelligence. But, he was accepted as a result of the endeavors of Saleh Mahdi Ammash and Jasim Al-Azzawi Ibrahim Al-Dawood and Mohsen Al-Rafai'i to Abdul Karim Qassem when they claimed that Jalal Al-Awqati refused to accept him because he studied in America. After his graduation, he was sent 1964 to the Soviet Union to be trained on the MiG plane (21). After his return, he worked at the military base in Kirkuk. He had links with foreign oil companies^{xliv}.

Naji Talib's cabinet

During the reign of Abdel-Rahman Aref, no prime minister was able to remain in power long. Fluctuating wings fluctuations worked against any long-term government^{xlv}. Generally, following the resignation of Al-Bazzaz on the sixth of August 1966, Naji Talib formed the cabinet on the ninth of August. The cabinet consisted of independent nationalists. Its program included the internal release of freedoms of work for professional organizations and returning life to the socialist sector, and the consolidation of peace throughout the north^{xlvi}.

Tareek Alshaab described the assignment of Naji Talib^{xlvii} and the exclusion of Al-Bazzaz from the ruling as done by interrelated factors and circumstances, which can be classified into the objective circumstance arising from the policy of Al-Bazzaz himself and the position of the people and national Opposition powers. The subjective factor arised from the intensification of the conflict between Al-Bazzaz and the influential military group. As for the objective aspect, it can be emphasized that Al-Bazzaz, despite stopping the fighting in Kurdistan, and his amputated or superficial solutions to some problems, he did not tend to solve the main contradiction. What is common between the ruling and the people is that looking into the Ministerial Commissioning Book shows that it ignored the biggest problem In the current crisis between the government and the people, which is democracy, democratic rule, the issue of liberating national prisoners, and the democratic solution to the Kurdish issue^{xlviii}.

The newspaper in turn discussed the new political developments and the formation of Talib's cabinet and the government curriculum proposed by Naji Talib that the application and practical policy is at the test of intentions and the criterion of programs^{xlix}.

The newspaper did not only criticize the ministerial program, but it also went beyond that by criticizing the arrest of hundreds of citizens, the impact of police raids on housing, markets, factories, institutions, planting checkpoints to intercept passers-by, parking cars, and money from arbitrary measures^l.

Cabinet of the President of the Republic

It seems that the state of Naji Talib's government is like the case of his predecessors from previous governments with the conflict of the various factions. They caused confusion to his cabinet. They did whatever they could to hinder his cabinet. They pushed him to submit his resignation on May 1967. They continued to demand government positions. They pushed President Aref to form the government on May 10, 1967^{li}.

In turn, Tareek Alshaab confronted the government program announced by Abdul Rahman Aref and demanded at the same time through an appeal made to their members bearing the slogan Strengthen the struggle to issue amnesty for the national prisoners," noting that the Naqrat Salman Prison still receives new prisoners and detainees, especially during the era of the Naji Talib government, where no convicted or accused was freed. Since February 8, 1963, the prison received (4039) accused citizens; (2268) prisoners, (1671) arrested, and detained. There are those who are about to spend their fifth year of being arrested^{lii}.

The oil crisis between foreign oil companies in Iraq and Syria

The crisis was mainly due to political and economic reasons. The agreement between the two sides dates back to 1955. It was signed between the two sides. In accordance with the agreement, Syria would get half of the national profit from transportation expenses by pumping it through pipelines from Iraq to the Mediterranean. In early September 1966, new

negotiations began Between the two sides to determine a new estimate for transportation. The company agreed to the revised amendment between the two sides. The Syrian government insisted that the amendment be since 1955. That led to the cessation of pumping oil through pipelines passing through the Syrian territories and in turn led to damage to the oil economy^{liii}. Despite negotiations between the Syrian government and the company in the beginning of September 1966, which lasted ten weeks, Syria wanted to obtain obligations from the company to respond to its demands, but the company neglected and resorted to procrastination. But, the Syrian government wanted to show the Iraqi government that taking a firm position on the company would achieve better results than the flimsy position taken by the previous Iraqi regimes. The company was seeking to expose both Iraq and Syria to a relationship crisis to show Iraq the demands of Syria that would harm the interests of Iraq^{liv}.

It is worth noting that the decision of the Syrian government badly affected the Iraqi government. The Iraqi government became unable to prepare the salaries of state employees due to stopping the flow of the Iraqi oil^{lv}.

The Iraqi Communist Party seems that it took a nationalistic curve in favor of Iraq. It considers foreign oil companies in Iraq to represent the interests of foreign monopolies. In a statement, the communist party stated that negotiations between oil companies and the Syrian government stumbled, in response to the intrigues of oil monopolies and their intransigence towards Syria's demands. Numerous demonstrations broke out in Baghdad, including various activities, such as distributing mass statements and slogans on the walls and organizing seminars and lectures, and Forming committees and delegations to support Syria^{lvi}.

Tareek Alshaab wrote about the new developments by saying: "The oil monopoly intends from the colonial countries to take aggressive action only, when it initiated to cut the flow of Iraqi oil passing through the Syrian territories and thus expanded the scope of the battle to include Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon in one xiii" .

The June 5th setback

In the aftermath of the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries, a difficult period characterized by the Anglo-American Zionist aggression against the Arab countries aimed at overthrowing the progressive political systems in both Syria and the United Arab Emirates and undermining the progressive social gains obtained by the Arab masses in these two countries, and imposing the political systems wanted by Western countries, which serve their interests.

During the war of the fifth of June 1967, the political bureau of the Iraqi Communist Party met in Baghdad and determined the position on the war, which is the condemnation of the aggressor Zionism and the call for a united Arab struggle against it and its support against colonialism^{lvii}.

In the wake of the Zionist aggression, Tareek Alshaab made an appeal under the title Everything to the Front. This appeal was widely distributed, and the most important thing in the appeal was "They sought to defeat the Israeli-colonial aggression against Egypt and other Arab countries. They came to support the Palestinian Arab people, a victim of colonialism and Zionism." And he called for the formation of a national defense government, and for the release of political prisoners and detainees. The communists did Communists not only put up this slogan but they rather actively contributed to the attack on the American embassy. The newspaper became more convinced that this ruling is the main obstacle that deprives the people from contributing seriously to the rescue of Syria and Egypt^{lviii}.

Due to the initiative of the Iraqi Communists, the American embassy was attacked, the police, security and discipline responded to a number of these demonstrations. The newspaper criticized the Iraqi government. The newspaper stated, "Tahir Yahya who was known as the thief of Baghdad, stated that the Communists are more dangerous than Israel, just as the Ministry of Interior circulated a secret cable on 5/6 to all police and security directorates demanding that the masses be prevented from expressing their feelings^{lix}.

The newspaper wrote on the ninth of June about the meeting held by the Central Committee, which it described as emergency and issued an appeal saying, "The treacherous aggressive attack on the Arab nation is aimed at eliminating the liberal regimes in Egypt and Syria^{lx}. The newspaper described the role of the Soviet Union during the aggression, as its position at the beginning of the aggression was clear and explicit, as stated in the Soviet government's statement on the

aggression^{lxii}. The newspaper criticized the Arab summit conference that was held in Morocco to discuss the developments of the aggression. The newspaper explained the significance of holding the summit as it aimed at strengthening the struggle of the Arab peoples against colonialism and Zionism. On the contrary, they are working in various ways to exploit these meetings in order to get some Arab national leaders to Backing away from their positions in favor of the right-wing^{lxiii}.

A month after the events of the fifth of June, the newspaper stated that the Zionist colonial aggression against Arab countries and the rapid military development that accompanied it shook the depths of the Arab people. There is a wide debate today about the circumstances that led to the setback To extract the measures that must be taken to pass them. The main reason lies first of all in the wrong policies pursued by liberal Arab governments over the past years, the reason is political before being military, because the liberal Arab regimes did not pursue the policy that would mobilize the militant energies For people Behold, and prepare it for such a battle. Egypt, which is the largest Arab country whose population are more than ten times larger than Israel and occupies a prominent place in the third world. An objective person cannot forget the great role that Egypt played under the leadership of President Nasser in the struggle against colonial influence inside Egypt^{lxiii}.

The second cabinet of Taher Yahya

President Abdel-Rahman Aref announced that he cannot manage being a president and a prime minister at the same time. The Republican Palace conference held on the twelfth of June demonstrated the desire to form an efficient cabinet that can handle the setback. Thus, the last days of June witnessed political contacts to determine the shape of the next government. President Abd al-Rahman Aref entrusted General Tahir Yahya to form the cabinet. He formed it on July 10, 1967^{lxiv}. In the midst of Taher Yahya's attempts to form the cabinet, the newspaper wrote that Taher Yahya rose again to the prime minister's chair. Taher Yahya is not new in terms of his participation in the government. He did not change anything in the nature of this ruling. He moved from the position of Deputy Prime Minister to the position of the President. The Communists' statement did not only criticize the cabinet of Taher Yahya, but it urged the political powers to struggle to overthrow the dictatorship and establish a coalition government of national defense emanating from the will of the people and able to eliminate the remnants of the dictatorship^{lxv}.

The newspaper criticized the government's policy, especially the platform that imposed the policy of austerity^{lxvi}. In the midst of these circumstances, the Communists blew the cabinet of Taher Yahya; forty communist prisoners escaped from Hilla prison on November 7, 1967. After that, the government closed the Hilla prison and transferred the prisoners to Naqrat al-Salman^{lxvii}.

Tareek Alshaab criticized the government's policy on the pretext of performing military service, which it described as a new cover for abuse and extortion criticizing the role of the government in distorting the army from its real tasks to turn it into a tool for war and aggression against the Kurdish people in Iraq and evading pedestrians instead of repelling the Zionist-imperialist aggression in June 1967^{lxviii}.

The Euphrates River overflows

The flood of the Tigris River was a prominent feature of modern and contemporary history of Iraq, but this time the flood moved to the Euphrates in April-May. It overwhelmed Baghdad's houses and streets despite the measures taken to reduce it, which were primitive. The end of April 1967 witnessed a remarkable increase in the levels of the Euphrates River, which the Iraqi government was unable to control. This increase in 14 May led to several breakages north of the city of Ramadi displacing more than a thousand families and submerging more than (23) dunums. The city of Ramadi became threatened with drowning, which pushed the government to hold an emergency session to discuss the current situation and issued an order that all transport vehicles and motorized cranes in Baghdad should be used and utilized for the purposes of flood control^{lxix}.

The flood of the Euphrates River in April 1967 was not different from its predecessor in terms of the severe damage it caused. The government resorted to imposing a series of taxes under the pretext of dealing with the disasters caused by the flood. Tareek Alshaab described the government measures as heavy taxes on consumers, toilers, and small

employees. The taxes that were recently imposed on the masses of the people did not affect the income tax, the inheritance tax, the profits of the capitalists, the owners of high estates, the privileges and fortunes of the feudal lords and the great owners, nor the budget of the palace and the entourage of its president^{lxx}.

1. The flood of the Euphrates River occupied the largest part of Tareek Alshaab which demanded that a solution be found to the problem of the flood of most of the areas along the sides of the river. The country was exposed a year ago to a similar flood and the masses of the people were still suffering from its dire consequences. There is strong evidence indicating the possibility of staving off the flood or mitigating its damages if the government took a number of necessary measures at an early date. But, Habbaniya Lake was not emptied before the flood^{lxxi}. The only measure taken by the government was the issuance of Law No. (5) for 1967, which was known as the Law of Relief of Victims of Flood 1967^{lxxii}.

The Iraqi-French oil agreement

After the tension that prevailed between the Iraqi government and foreign oil companies as a result of the Oil Law No. (80) which was initiated in 1960 which led to the nationalization of (99.5) of the lands from the oil companies. That decision affected oil production and marketing. The issue became more complicated after the Israeli aggression in June 5. A preliminary agreement was reached in 23 November 1967. That agreement allowed the French company to prospect for oil in an area of not more than 11000 km, part of which is located in Iraq's territorial waters and the other is in the marshes^{lxxiii}.

The newspaper criticized a new oil agreement with foreign oil companies that adds new fields to their control, including the Rumaila field, and imposing a new concession on other areas by establishing the Baghdad Oil Police. The newspaper accused Ghanem Al-Aqili, general manager of the National Oil Company and Abdul Aziz Al-Aqili, who stated that the National Company is seeking to invest all lands, which are defined as (93%) of all lands. The interesting question arises from where Al-Aqili came with this number while Law No. (80) returned to Iraq (99.5) of all Iraqi lands^{lxxiv}.

Following the announcement of the agreement concluded by the government of Taher Yahya with the French company^{lxxv}, the newspaper denounced the agreement and indicated on its front page that "in early February this year the government announced the conclusion of an oil agreement between it and the French company in isolation from the people and its national powers. The national oil policy advocated by all the national powers in the country aims to take a direct investment method for oil resources freed from foreign monopolies according to Law No. (80) and to build an oil sector that is independent from monopolies. The newspaper described the agreement as:

1. The new agreement has concession and contradiction with Law No. (97). Erap Company undertakes excavation and excavation activities at a great distance 10.800 km² from the southern lands of Iraq for a period of 6 years and dominates the management of development of the discovered fields 20 years, which is a long time.
2. The company is not obligated to solve the problem of marketing produced oil.
3. The areas within the new agreement are considered to be among the oil-rich regions, so EIRP will not bear any risky ventures from the process of investigation and exploration conducted in those areas.
4. The price at which Erap buys the oil is 30% of the oil is a very low price compared to the declared prices and the low prices in the global market. Therefore, the new oil agreement is incompatible with the country's interest and is a step towards the new dependency^{lxxvi}.

Naturally, this policy deepened the isolation of the pro-Western rule, particularly by concluding two contracts similar to the French company agreement with Yugoslavia and the second contract to develop sulfur deposits in Iraq. An American group headed by former Assistant Secretary of State Robert Anderson was eager to obtain this contract, which awarded the contract to that company^{lxxvii}. The newspaper described what the government did under the title Dictatorship haggling monopolies over our sulfur wealth^{lxxviii}. The newspaper warned of the possibilities of "the ruling dictatorship resorting to circumventing the decision to invest in the northern Rumaila field to invest Passing directly through the conclusion of certain contracts with foreign monopolies^{lxxix}. The Communist Party undertook to expose the policy of the

Iraqi government through its statements and press, trying to stir public opinion against the government, which is perhaps a policy pursued by political parties opposing the regime.

On the other hand, the Communists demanded the assistance of the socialist countries, thinking that countries like Poland are ready to provide Any tactical assistance, just as extracting sulfur is not a difficult way, as tactical experts assert^{lxxx}.

College of Education strike

There was a widespread feeling in the country during the era of Abd al-Salam Aref (1963-1966) and Abd al-Rahman Aref (1966-1968) of discontent as a result of poor economic conditions and the dominance of the men of the military establishment over the reins of government. As a result of these conditions, a widespread grumbling was generated among the national powers^{lxxxi}.

It is worth noting that the political crisis besieged the regime, especially after the June 1967 events. The student activities during that period were escalating rapidly and the (General Student Union) of the Communist Party controlled prominently over the student scene. In that period, the student strike exploded in the fall 1967 starting from the College of Agriculture, then the College of Education soon announced its support for the parties demanding free student elections, increasing the percentage of admission, launching democratic freedom, and modifying the examination system^{lxxxii}.

With this step, the Communists tried to recover their lost positions after the strikes they had received on February 8, 1963, despite the fragmentation of the national movement and the multiplicity of political organizations that weakened the student movement. These organizations formed student offices that began competing with each other for activity in student circles. Those strikes were led by students affiliated to the Communist Party and the Baath right-wing^{lxxxiii}.

The conflict was reflected this time in the student elections in April 1967 when the Communist Party began to re-dominate the union within its social activities and called in a statement on the circumstances that accompanied the election process and the government rapprochement with the Baath. A group of the Kurdistan Democratic Party also joined the supporters of the old political bureau in an alliance with it. As for the opposite front, the democratic comrades and supporters of the Banner of Workers and the Left Baath Party turned around. The supporters of the Arab Socialist Movement took an independent position. They rejected the offers in cooperation and blocked them with unreasonable requests. The National Democratic Party and others had little weight. The comrades made their efforts to achieve cooperation with the passive, hesitant, and obstructive socialist movement on the issue of cooperation^{lxxxiv}.

The attempts of those powers were to achieve the following goals:

1. Working to unify the student movement and struggle against any attempt to dismantle it.
2. Holding free student elections, supervised by the elected students themselves, without the interference of the security services.
3. Immediately releasing prisoners and detainees without resorting to empty committees and studies.
4. Bringing back the dismissed professors and students and allowing the deported to return to their homeland to benefit from them^{lxxxv}.

In light of the Communists' attempts to establish their presence in colleges, they began the strikes that appeared to be an attempt to prove their strengths, as happened in the strike of the College of Education because of the interference of security and intelligence forces in the affairs of colleges and arrests among students. On January 9, 1968, the Dean of the College of Education came out in the college square and asked the students to end their strike and return to study. The Communist student (Sadiq Mahdi) (interrupted him with the following chant, "The will of the students is necessary to win." He walked in the college square and behind him a large group of students in the form of a demonstration chanting the same chanting. A military force stormed the College of Education and shot the striking students. A number of them were wounded and taken to hospital^{lxxxvi}.

Tareek Alshaab wrote about these events and described how the government reacted to the students of the universities who were demanding reforms^{lxxxvii}.

Conclusions

The Communist press had a prominent role in highlighting the political, economic and social conditions of contemporary history of Iraq. Since the establishment of the Iraqi Communist Party in 1934, its press contributed to restoring the Communists' confidence in their party after they lost many of its leaders or subjected to arrest or exile.

Tareek Alshaab newspaper focused on successive Iraqi government policies after the military coups that became a feature inherent in Iraq's contemporary history.

The internal situation occupied the largest share of the newspaper. Tareek Alshaab dealt extensively with the political situation, government attitudes towards the people, the concerns of workers and peasants, and the disadvantages to which they are exposed. It is not surprising that the people's interest in the internal affairs was direct, but the Arab and international conditions were equally important, even superficially, because the newspaper wanted in its publication to restore the Communists' confidence in their party and continue its political work.

Endnotes

ⁱ Baqir Ibrahim, Diary of Baqir Ibrahim, Dar Al-Tale'ah, Beirut, 2002, p. 104.

ⁱⁱ Ahmed al-Haboubi's notes, Letter of Apology to the Iraqi People, Dar al-Hikma, London, 2018, p. 126.

ⁱⁱⁱ Ali Nasser Alwan Al-Waeli, Abdul Salam Aref and his political and military role until 1966, unpublished Master Thesis, Higher Institute for Higher Political Studies, Al-Mustansiriya University, 2005, p. 102.

^{iv} Ahmad Al-Haboubi, Previous Source, pp. 130-131.

^v Zaki Khairi and Souad Khairi, Studies in the History of the Iraqi Communist Party, issued the Golden Jubilee, 1984, p. 363.

^{vi} Ja'far Abbas Hamidi and Nuri Abd al-Hamid al-Ani, History of Iraqi cabinets in the Republic, 10 volumes, Publications of Bayt al-Hikma, Baghdad, 1988, c. 7, pp. 5-11.

^{vii} Jassem Al-Helaiwi, Important Stations in the History of the Iraqi Communist Party, The Prosperous Dar al-Rowad for Printing and Publishing, Baghdad, 2009, p. 298.

^{viii} Data and Publications of the Iraqi Communist Party, (Limited circulation), (Archives of 1983), Statement of the Iraqi Communist Party, 11/19/1963.

^{ix} Ali Nassir Alwan Alwa'eli, previous source: p. 103.

^x Baqir Ibrahim, previous source, p. 129.

^{xi} Hanna Batato, Iraq, 3 parts, The Arab Publishing Foundation, Beirut, 1992, Vol. 2, p. 349.

^{xii} President Abd al-Salam Aref commissioned Chief of Staff of the Army Taher Yahya to form his first cabinet on November 21, 1963. It included 21 ministers. The cabinet placed its curriculum in a medium-sized booklet with a page

number of (115), of which little has been done. See more: Ja'far Abbas Hamidi, Contemporary History of Iraq 1914-1968, Adnan Library, Baghdad, 2015, p. 296.

^{xiii} Saif Al-Din Al-Douri, General Tahir Yahya, Victim of Political and Military Conflicts in Iraq, The Arab House of Sciences Publishers, Beirut, 2008, p. 39.

^{xiv} Ministry of Interior - Public Security Directorate, (Communist Publications), Iraqi Communist Party Interpreters Statement May 1964.

^{xv} Ali Khion, February 8, 1963 Revolution in Iraq, Conflict and Transitions, House of Cultural Affairs, Baghdad, 1990, p. 208.

^{xvi} Memoirs of retired Colonel Hadi Khamas (former director of military intelligence, a man from the time of the revolutionaries, Dar al-Farahidi, Baghdad, 2011, pp. 126- 127.

^{xvii} Saad Mahdi Shalash, The Arab Nationalists Movement and Its Role in Political Developments in Iraq 1958-1966, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 2004, p. 181.

^{xviii} The Arab Socialist Union, the Path to Unity, Publications of the National Organization for Authorship, Translation and Publishing, Baghdad, 1964, pp. 53-54.

^{xix} Saif Adnan Rahim Al-Qaisi, The Iraqi Communist Party during the Reign of Al-Bakr 1968-1979, Dar Al-Hikma, London, 2014, p. 128.

^{xx} Tareek Alshaab, No. 4, 1964.

^{xxi} Hanna Batato, previous source, p. 352.

^{xxii} Zaki Khairy, Echo of the Years in the Memory of a Veteran Communist, Sweden, 1994, p. 260.

^{xxiii} Sadiq Jaafar Al-Falahi, Facts of Years of Embersment, Prepared and Presented: Basem Al-Durrah, Dar Al-Rafidain Printing and Publishing, Beirut, 2015, pp. 190-191.

^{xxiv} Tareek Alshaab, No. 5, Mid-March 1965.

^{xxv} Sadiq Jaafar Al-Falahi, Facts of Years of Embersment, Prepared and Presented: Basem Al-Durrah, Dar Al-Rafidain Printing and Publishing, Beirut, 2015, pp. 133- 134.

^{xxvi} Tareek Alshaab, no.3 September, 1966.

^{xxvii} Tareek Alshaab, no. 4, November, 1966.

^{xxviii} Safwat Kamil Fahim, The fair president, p. 100, Hanna Batato, [previous source, p. 93.

^{xxix} Tareek Alshaab, no. 4, November, 1966.

^{xxx} The revolution of Nasseef Jassim Alrubae, previous source, pp. 127- 128.

^{xxxi} Tareek Alshaab, no. 5, February, 1967.

^{xxxii} Safwat Kamil Fahim, previous source, p. 98.

-
- xxxiii Ahmed Sajir Aldulaimi, previous source, p. 198.
- xxxiv Public archive, the communist party calls for struggling and opposing colonialism and oil companies, January, 1966.
- xxxv Baha Aldeen Noori, previous source, p. 365.
- xxxvi The statement of the Iraqi communist party, everything to the front, June, 5th, 1967.
- xxxvii Public archive, the Iraqi communist party, news, June, 5th, 1967.
- xxxviii Tareek Alshaab, the communist party, the central committee meeting, June, 9th, 1967.
- xxxix Tareek Alshaab, no. 4, July, 1967.
- xl The Iraqi communist party, the party's statement about the Arab summit, September, 3rd, 1967.
- xli Tareek Alshaab, no. 5, September, 1967.
- xlii Ja'afar Abbas Humaidi, history of cabinets, part 10, pp. 70- 79.
- xliii Tareek Alshaab, no. 4, July, 1967.
- xliv Saiff Aldeen Alduri, Tahir Yahya, previous source, p. 132.
- xlv Tareek Alshaab, no.4, May, 1968.
- xlvi Safwat Kamil Fahim, previous source, p. 104.
- xlvii Tareek Alshaab, no. 4, July, 1967.
- xlviii Tareek Alshaab, no. 4, May, 1968.
- xlix Safwat Kamil Fahim, previous source, p. 105.
- ¹ Ahmed Sajir Jassim Aldulaimi, Iraq's oil policy 1963- 1968, cultural affairs house, Baghdad, 2002, p. 162.
- ⁱⁱ Ja'afar Abbas Humaidi, History of cabinets, pp. 170- 175.
- ⁱⁱⁱ Tareek Alshaab, no. 1, February, 1968.
- ⁱⁱⁱⁱ Fibimar, Iraq's contemporary history- the republican era, Translated by: Mustafa Nu'man Ahmed, contemporary library, 2006, p. 106.
- ^{liv} Tareek Alshaab, no. 2, March, 1968.
- ^{lv} Tareek Alshaab, no. 4, May, 1968.
- ^{lvi} Tareek Alshaab, no. 2, March, 1968.
- ^{lvii} Majeed Khaduri, Socialist Iraq, pp. 33- 35.
- ^{lviii} Mahdi AlSaeed and Isam AlSaffar, From the history of students' public union in the republic of Iraq, bulletins of the students' union, Baghdad, no date, p. 80.
- ^{lix} Ja'afar Abbas Humaidi, previous source, p. 320.
- ^{lx} The Iraqi communist party, April, 1967.
- ^{lxi} Students' secret struggle, no. 1, November, 1967.
- ^{lxii} Ja'afar Abbas Humaidi, part 10, pp. 303- 308.
- ^{lxiii} Tareek Alshaab, no. 5, April, 1968.
- ^{lxiv} Tareek Alshaab, no. 5, September, 1967.
- ^{lxv} Ja'afar Abbas Humaidi, History of cabinets, pp. 70- 79.
- ^{lxvi} Tareek Alshaab, year 24, no. 4, July, 1967.
- ^{lxvii} Tareek Alshaab, September, 1967.
- ^{lxviii} Saif Aldin Alduri, General Tahir Yahya, previous source, p. 132.

lxi Tareek Alshaab, no. 4, May, 1968.

lxx Safwat Kamil Fahim, previous source, p. 104.

lxxi Tareek Alshaab, no. 4, July, 1967.

lxxii Tareek Alshaab, no. 4, May, 1968.

lxxiii Safwat Kamil Fahim, previous source, p. 105.

lxxiv Ahmed Sajir Jassim Aldulaimi, Iraq's oil policy 1963- 1968, cultural affairs house, Baghdad, 2002, p. 162.

lxxv Ja'afar Abbas Humaidi, History of cabinets, pp. 70- 79.

lxxvi Tareek Alshaab, no. 1, year 25, February, 1968.

lxxvii Fibimar, Iraq's contemporary history- the republican era, Translated by: Mustafa Nu'man Ahmed, contemporary library, 2006, p. 106.

lxxviii Tareek Alshaab, no. 2, year 25, March, 1968.

lxxix Tareek Alshaab, no. 4, year 25, May, 1968.

lxxx Tareek Alshaab, no. 2, year 25, March, 1968.

lxxxi Majeed Kadduri, Socialist Iraq, pp. 32- 33.

lxxxii Mahdi AlSaeed and Isam AlSaffar, From the history of students' public union in the republic of Iraq, bulletins of the students' union, Baghdad, no date, p. 80.

lxxxiii Ja'afar Abbas Humaidi, previous source, p. 320.

lxxxiv The Iraqi communist party, Students' union elections, April, 1967.

lxxxv Students' secret struggle, no. 1, November, 1967.

lxxxvi Ja'afar Abbas Humaidi, previous source, pp. 304- 308.

lxxxvii Tareek Alshaab, no. 5, April, 1968.