

The Political Games of Media Investors and the Effects of Democracy Health

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Abstract--- *This article examines research on investors, power, and the media, to understand the political practices of media investors in political contestation in Indonesia, and the health problems of democracy that occur as a result of using the media as a tool for a power struggle. Using a qualitative text analysis method with a discourse analysis of social cognition, the analysis of the findings of this research includes two levels, namely the level of the text and the social context. The findings of this study showed that the presence of media investors in the political arena threatens the health problem of democracy. 1). As a media person, media investors want a top-down model of the narrative of democracy applied through authoritarian authorities. 2). Media financiers intervene in ownership of media affiliated with ownership, and economic interventions on competitors' media so that the narrative of democracy matches their tastes. 3). Ownership affiliated media are trapped in the flow of game and investor solidarity, while the media is a pragmatic competitor to achieve financial profit targets. The latest aspect of this research is that investors in achieving power not only use and control their media, but also more than that, they also intervene in the competitors' media. The inter-media ownership interventions became a new model when media investors in Indonesia expanded in the political arena.*

Keywords: *Media, Intervention, Democracy Health, Contestation, Political Games*

I. INTRODUCTION

Media investors in Indonesia have enlivened political contestation since political liberalization took effect in 1999. The change in the role of media investors is very extreme. When the national power was under the control of the authoritarian New Order regime (1966-1998), the role of the financiers of the media focused on vertical control or controlling media management for the interests of the authorities. Conditions turned 350 degrees, when political reform in 1998-1999, media investors and their institutions were "born" again as a new political force in the democratic power system. At such a time, media investors emerged from the cages of the authoritarian regime, rising to actualize their political desires (Jurdi, 2016)

Media investors who are involved in political power from the background of barons media or the media bourgeoisie are career journalists who have succeeded in developing the media business, and press conglomerates or non-media entrepreneurs who have developed the media business wing. The information business has developed into

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a multi-platform media network (Haryanto, 2014, p. 65).⁶ To Actualize their political role in various levels of political contestation, at the regional level, media investors participate in the contestation of regional head candidates (regents/mayors, governors, district/city/provincial legislative candidates). Meanwhile, for political contestation at the national level, They manage political parties, serve as a minister, nominate as central legislative members and regional representative councils.

Substantial issue becoming the concern to this article is media investors, in this case, M. Idham Samawi, and his wife, Sri Surya Widati, who practice politics by taking part in local political contestation in the 2005 and 2010 district head elections in Bantul and use their own and competitor media as a medium of communication in politics, and program socialization during the campaign. Thus, the source of the research is the media that has ownership affiliation with the media financier, *Kedaulatan Rakyat* (KR), and the media that does not have an ownership relationship, *Radar Jogja* (RJ). News text released on KR media related to political contestation of the President Commissioner of PT KR Publishing Agency (PB), M. Idham Samawi, in the regional election contestation in Bantul Regency in 1999 and 2005, and his wife, Sri Surya Widati, the contestant in the 2010 elections.⁷ RJ's text choice is being compared because this media does not have ownership affiliation with M. Idham Samawi, and the community places this media as a KR competitor.

In both conventional and modern democracies, political contestation participants use the media as a medium of political communication or political mediation, which becomes a normal habit (Rivers William, Jansen Jay, 2015). When the media investors themselves are practicing politics, their political nuances are different from those of non-media politicians who carry out political mediation through the media. Like previous research, when politicians and public officials not from the media owners use the media as an instrument of political and policy campaigns, they implement a strategy of "buying the media" with advertising spending and paid news. They are not involved in the editorial political process in the internal media. The target of using the media is limited in accordance with the deed of a transaction agreed between politicians and public officials with the media. Or, previous researchers focused more on instant, transactional political mediation strategies, and ignored political processes in internal media (Sulhan, 2006; Hardiman, 2009a; Tapsell, 2015; Hill, 2017).⁸

Kutseva (Kutseva, 2011, p. 147) expressed the interaction of media investors, power and media as political convergence. In Indonesia's historical trajectory, political convergence occurred in several periods: 1). Episodes of the movement (1920-1950): the era of media financiers poured out the role of a warrior and the media as a medium of movement, 2). Episode 1950-1956 as the authoritarian press period. 3). Episode 1956-1959 or civil emergency episodes, the military period limited freedom of expression even though this era was labeled as a period of liberal democracy. 4). Entering the period 1959-1965, the media entered into an episode of a new role as the apparatus of state ideology / President Sukarno, the media was a medium of the government's Political Manipol (Gani, 1978; Harahap, 2000, pp. 122-30; Lubis, 2018; Suwarta, 2008; Said, 2009). 5). The authoritarian press episode (1966-1998) was a time of replication of the authoritarian press system under the control of President Soeharto. Media financiers may engage in politics as long as their aspirations used Golkar's political vehicles (Hill, 2011). 6). The episode of political financiers began in 1999 when elements of democracy agreed to implement political liberalization. Investors are obsessed with integrating politics and the media, namely political interests, business interests, and the public interest (Guriev and Rachinsky, 2005; Syahputra, 2013, pp. 150-3). How is the health of democracy in the hands of media oligarchs? (Putra, 2008).

When media investors practice politics and use the media as a political instrument, obviously, there is investor involvement in the production process and intervention on editorial politics. This view is based on the results of the Ekayanti survey (Ekayanti, 2017) of journalists in Jakarta who work in a media environment that has practical politics, and how they affect the process of news production. As a result, journalists feel the intervention in the newsroom of the media financiers where they work. The intensity of investor intervention in the newsroom is higher when investors are involved in practical politics. This latest research confirms Altschull's hypothesis as quoted by McQuail that media content reflects the interests of those who finance it (Mcquail, 2011, p. 254). Therefore, it needs to be studied on: how is the narrative taste orientation of the political democracy investors in political mediation in his media and competitors' media, and how does media ideology narrate the practical political activities of media owners?

⁶ Christian Wibisono and K. Chalaby developed the term press barone as media owners of career journalists. When the company develops into a media octopus is called a conglomerate of press, while professional entrepreneurs who set up a media company are called a press conglomerate

⁷ The local political contestation is Law Number 22 of 1999 concerning Regional Government (updated to Law Number 32 of 2004 concerning Regional Government, Law Number 32 of 2004 concerning Regional Government). Media owners in the regions (provinces and districts / municipalities) - in Sidel's terminology - appear as a line of "local strongmen" from the environment of civil society, and they seize the niche market of local power through the contestation of regional head elections (Pilkada), election of legislative candidates in local and regional and national level, and other arenas of power (Eka Suaib 2015; Van Klinken 2016; Sidel 2005b; Sidel 2005a, 71).

⁸ Publicist is a term used by Habermas to refer to media accessors and controllers.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

In the traditional democratic system, Rivers, Jansen, Petersen (2015, p. 118) argued that public officials (presidents) are media financiers as well such as the case of a number of presidents of the United States (US) in the early period, Thomas Jefferson (1801-1809), Andrew Jackson (1829- 1837), Abraham Lincoln (1861 - 1865). While President Theodore Roosevelt refused to publish the media, his strategy was to control the media by opening a "White House Press Room", holding periodic press conferences, and contracting reporters with influential writings in the mainstream media.

In the era of modern democracy, leaders and public officials in 18 Western European and North American countries did not establish the media, but they controlled the media with economic and policy intervention. There are three models of intervention according to Hallin and Mancini (2004; 2012). In countries of the Mediterranean model - Pluralist Model of Polarization (France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain), public officials intervened in policies and subsidies to the media. The leaders of European countries in the Balkans such as Russia, Latin America (Argentina) followed the Medierania-Pluralist Model of Polarization in controlling the media (Roudakova, 2008; Rafael, Tella and Franceschelli, 2011, p. 119,131,149). Similar models occur in Indonesia. In the case of Latin America and Indonesia, the advertising spending approach by politicians and public officials was a favorite model (Hill, 2007, pp. 5–28; Tapsell, 2015, pp. 319–334). As for public officials in the countries of the North European-Democratic Democratic Model (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland) and the North Atlantic-Liberal Model (Britain, America, Canada, Ireland), they do not intervene and subsidize the media because the media work professionally and the public market grows optimally.

Table 1: Media Control Model

Privat Ownership	Government Subsidies	Cooperation and Ads	Private-Government ownership	Political Party Ownership
US in early Period	France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain	Argentina, Indonesia	Singapore	Malaysia
Research Method				
qualitative	quantitative	Quantitative-Qualitative	Qualitative	Qualitative
Effect				
Media as a presidential mouthpiece	Content intervention by the dominant elite and government	-Reducing negative coverage (corruption) - Imaging of the dominant elite and government	No Critical News	- Following party political policies - No criticizing the ruling party elite

The research studies above used the scalpel theory of party-press and political parallelism with positivistic paradigms and quantitative methods as the basis of knowledge in research. It is based on the theory of political parallelism by Collin Seymore-Ure as an expert in Political Communication science. In its concept, the structure of political parties is reflected in media organizations. The functions of the parties are very compatible with media capabilities. Then this theory was developed further by Hallin and Mancini (2004; 2012). According to them, political parallelism determines variables of power and media relations by considering: 1) media content as an indicator of the direction of social media relations with other political forces; 2) organizational relationship orientation between the media and political parties as well as various other types of organizations such as trade organizations, civil society organizations, religious institutions, etc .

3) the tendency of personal media to be active in activities or political life or the tendency for problems in media organizations and personal political activities in the environment of parties or other organizations; 4) partisanship of media audiences or audience tendencies towards the same party or party that is different from the newspaper or other media that the audience reads or watches; and 5) the orientation of roles and practices of journalism or journalists have a choice or being neutral towards politics and political parties. Like its predecessors, positivistic paradigms and quantitative research models form the scientific basis of Hallin's and Mancini's thinking. Although the orientation is not entirely positivistic, research on political parallelism emphasizes the interaction of structure or the role of institutions and models of mathematical and quantitative approaches for popular issues such as the impact of non-media institutions on the media and the impact of the media on the audience or the public (Antoni, 2004; Pas, Brug and Vliegenthart, 2017).

Table 2: Models of Political and Media Relations in America and Europe

Reference	The Substance of Thought	Theory Basis
Rivers, Jansen, Petersen (Rivers William, Jansen Jay, 2015, p. 118) (Mass Media and Modern Society)	The president needs media, so he publishes media.	-party-press parallelism by Collin Seymore-Ure (Seymour-Ure, 1974, p. 159) -political parallelism by Hallin dan Mancini (2004; 2012)
Study on Media Ownership (Erik Gustafsson, 2006, pp. 14-21; Bruns and Himmler, 2011, pp. 470-92; Ekström, Johansson and Larsson, 2016, pp. 239-311; Djankov <i>et al.</i> , 2017, pp. 341-382; Ottosen and Hovden, 2017)	The model of media ownership (private, government or public, party, government and private) determines who controls the media.	
Power Intervention to media (Hallin dan Mancini, 2004; 2012), Roudakova, 2008; (Tella dan Franceschelli.(2011,p.119,131,149)	Political power intervenes in the media when the economic basis of the media is weak	

In line with the development of political theories and the media, research methods have shifted from quantitative to a qualitative method. In terms of paradigm, it also shifted from positivistic to a critical paradigm. Such research orientation applies to Indonesia. Among them was research on the construction of political news by Ibnu Hamad (2004, p. 1), which applies a critical paradigm and discourse analysis method. In relation to text research, discourse, and ideological orientation of texts, the epistemology is in accordance with the critical paradigm, which has the tools to read the corpus of cultural texts in various forms, such as media texts. Critical theory and having the ability to read texts or discourse are needed as a scalpel in the analysis of the results of this study, in this case theories about language and power discourse (orthodox and heterodox models), capital intervention, social relations structures (autonomous, heteronomous, and homologous) in Pierre Bourdieu's thoughts (Bourdieu, 1991, 1996b; Ningtyas, 2015). The perspective developed in reading texts with the theory that text in the form of printed media news is not a single product of journalists, news is a result of dialogical or dialectical interaction between agents (journalists, editors) and the structure of power and media institutions (Richard Harker, Cheelen Mahar, 2009, p. 4; Ritzer, George; Goodman, 2009, p. 519).

The narrative of democratic texts is determined by the orientation of media ideology: 1). orthodox capital or text orientation supports and legitimizes the power of investors, and the heterodox model or orientation of text is critical to investors. The ideological orientation is influenced by the power of Investors, in the form of 1) capital intervention by investors in the form of media ownership, and economic intervention, monopoly on information sourced from financiers, and financiers controlling the media coverage agenda (Strentz, 1993, p. 126; Schultz, 2007, p. 196; Hardiman, 2009a, p. 141; Ningtyas, 2015, p. 156) 2). The taste buds for the text are: 1) legitimate taste (upper-class tastes such as classical music, opera) or good taste, 2). Middle-brow taste (middle class tastes like rock music) or cultural goodwill or the habit of maintaining an image of respect for educating pop culture. 3). Popular tastes (light music) or tastes that refer to benefits or functions, override the aesthetics (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 16).

Table 3: Theory Mapping and Research Approaches

Theory	Figure	Approach	Knowledge Method	Theory	Figure	Approach	Knowledge Method
Politic-media Parallelism	Collin Seymor Ure	-Deduktic Empiric	Possitivistic-Empiric Analitic	1.Orthodox vs. Heterodok text	Bourdieu	-Participatory -Discourse	Post Structuralist

Parallelisme Politic	Hallin-Mancini	-Structural (Subjectivism) - Phenomenology (Objectivism)		model, Relationship Model, Autonomous-Heteronomous -Homologous Model 2. Controlling the media (Propaganda)	Herman & Chomsky		constructivist & Critical.
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The orientation of the media ideology is in the form of intervention, and the tastes of the investor determine the structure of the relation of the investor's power and the media. There are three relationship models formulated in this study: 1). Autonomous models occur when financiers or dominant elites and their powers are open to public information and sympathy for the content of media publications, including accommodating critical reports (heterodox) (Warren Francke, 1995; Mcnair, 2000; McNair, 2015). 2). The heteronomous model occurs when investors and their power with the media are transactional as part of expanding institutional (media) autonomy. Steiner & Steward asserted heteronomous model as an interactive relationship that is reciprocal, and this strategy in social relations to get new energy or power (Steiner and Stewart, 2009, pp. 529–531). 3). Homologous models or relationships are analogous (Ghiselin, 2016), or refer to differences in tastes (Silva, 2006), and the nature of relationships tends to be close (relatives) (<https://kbbi.web.id/homologi>).

Homologues occur when agents who occupy certain positions in different social spaces through mediating their habitus tend to produce parallel representations in the structure of symbolic spaces (Bourdieu, 1996a, pp. 175–76). When there is a gap in relationship structure, arenas of cultural products such as media that are economically dominated and dominant in terms of symbolic capital carry out solidarity with the political arena or power that is politically and economically dominant, but symbolically dominated in political mediation (Bourdieu, 2012, pp. 25–6). Such interventions give rise to homologous relations structures, both homologous in the category of the ubiquitous homologue or actor, and hence the exchange of positions and roles), or formal homologues (actors and their arenas have similarities in principles and roles) or there are certain common interests (Greeg, 2015, p. 39).

Although the original tastes of investors and the media differ, each agent and his institution always struggle to maintain the exclusivity of the tastes by creating the effect of differentiating tastes and cultures (Codd, 2009, p. 69). According to Peterson and Simkus (Peterson *et al.*, 2010; Eijck, 2017) in the critique of Distinction, experience in a cultural shift is called as omnivorous or the exchange of tastes of consumption: 1) elite tastes (highbrow) who have high tastes (snob) shifted to low tastes (slob) in response to social dynamics, 2) changes in tastes exclusive (snob) to open tastes or inclusions (slob). There is a meeting point or similarity between the tastes of the actors and institutions that have different spaces and dispositions (Bourdieu, 1996a).

Media Control

Media control theory or using media as political propaganda instruments help explain the results of this study. There are two basic principles of power and media interaction in political communication according to Herman and Chomsky which refer to two things: 1) media publications refer to the consensus of the dominant elite and the media; 2) the two parties' consensus effect, the media mechanism works in the interests of the dominant elite (Edward S Herman, 1988; Papers, 2009).

In Mullen's interview with Herman and Chomsky (Mullen, 2009), elite and media consensus are for sectoral interests (owner, class, power). Therefore, the mechanism of media work is encouraged to support the power of the elite rather than support the interests of the public / the masses. Although the media industry has developed from a limited platform (print and electronic media) to multi-platform media (online, digital and social media), media control in practical political activities and other arenas remains as long as the dominant elite must justify (roles and programs their own power). Media control refers to the premise that the media serves the movement towards the anti-democratic poles, rather than democratizing power. In this context, the media in the power radar reflects the gap (discourse) of the dominant versus the dominant elite.

Mainstream media frame the news and allow debate or discourse only within the parameters of the perspective of the dominant elite, and the elite does not realize there is a problem behind their interests (Herman 2000). The process of propaganda work in the media reflects the failure of the media to maintain media professionalism and objectivity (see Mahrus Irsyam, 2003; Chomsky, 2008). Filtering the content of media reports (news) in the newsroom and media politics is institutionalized in the habitus of objective and professional processes (Meenakshi Gigi Durham 2006), and subjective tastes to strengthen the audience's

emotions so that the public continues to support the interests of the dominant elite framing of mind methods in the language of Manuel Castells. (Schechter, 2007, p. 79; Castells, 2009a, p. 153)


III. METHODS

Analysis of the results of this study is based on a corpus of data in the form of news texts in the print media of KR and RJ about the preparation, campaigning, results of regional head elections, and post regional head elections. The data was collected manually in the two media libraries, and other library locations (Monument Pers, Solo). Data collection used a three-step method from Gerline Mautner (Wodak, Ruth, Krzyzanowski 2008, 30-51), namely the selection of initial text (select texts for preliminary corpus), analysis of initial text data (analyzing preliminary corpus), and detailed text selection (select more texts added to corpus). In reading and interpreting data, researchers used interviews with selected regents, editors and journalists KR and RJ, and other respondents who supported the completeness of the study. (Stefan Titscher, Michael Mayer, Ruth Wodak 2009,245; Hood 2014) the process of triangulation was done by integrating various data and other material using various qualitative and analytical methods (Wimmer and Dominick, 2011, p. 144; Kohlbacher, 2006).

Qualitative analysis of texts becomes a method of reading texts and social contexts. It was done by getting reading using the analysis approach of Van Dijk's social cognition discourse (Dijk, 1995, pp. 32–3) .This method has three levels of analysis such as Fairclough discourse analysis. Fairclough model divides three levels of analysis, namely text analysis or micro level, analysis of text consumption or messo level, and analysis of discourse practices or text and social context or macro level. Similarly, in van Dijk's discourse analysis, there is text analysis which can be categorized in micro level analysis, social cognition analysis or messo level , and social analysis or macro level (Dijk, 1988, p. 24; Fairclough, 1995, pp. 53–68; Eriyanto, 2009, p. 226).

The implementation of social cognition analysis was done because Van Dijk combined the perspective of the discourse of the dominant elite (financiers) and the perspective of the media / journalist, which was not shared by other analytical models. There are two main components of this analysis, namely a textual and a contextual component and text production (Dijk, 1988, pp. 175–80). The textual component systematically analyzes the various structures of news discourse at a level. The contextual component analyzes cognitive and social factors, conditions, constraints, or consequences of the textual structure and, indirectly, economic, cultural, and historical inculcation. The text production process explains how the text is constructed and produced. In the discourse analysis, there is an important note referring to Van Dijk's thought that the news texts analyzed in the discourse of this study not only display the meaning of words and sentences (micro level / text analysis), but also various forms of political world knowledge, frame and memory representation of political contestants' struggles in regional elections to compel audiences to understand a piece of news discourse coherently (messo level / cognitive process of discourse), and the dominant element influencing the access of the dominant elite to the media (macro level / social analysis).

Table 4: Cross-section of Three Levels Social Cognition Discourse Analysis



If it can capture the meaning behind discourse, events and political knowledge that develops and is mediated by mass communication instruments, in this case the media, it has been arranged by dominant actors and media journalists called Habermas as publicists. This condition shows that the text is constructed from the event of non-neutral political contestation, there is a partiality of the contestants who control the events and political narratives (see Hardiman 2009, 142-43).

IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Democratic Narration of Investor

In the 2005 Bantul regent candidate election contestation, there were three pairs of regent candidates. The same number also happened in the selection of Bantul regent candidates in 2010. Of the three pairs of candidates for regent in 2005, there was M. Idham Samawi who was an investor or KR media owner, while three pairs of 2010 regent candidates were Sri Surya Widati as a family of KR media owners because she is M. Idham Samawi's wife. The position of the owner and family of the media owner determines the orientation of the media text about the coverage of the Bantul regent candidate.

Table 5: Profile of Candidate Pairs and Results of the 2005 Bantul Regency Election
(Nugroho, 2005, pp. 511–2; Komara, 2016, p. 29)

Contestant Profiles					
1		2		3	
Kol (TNI-AU) Totok Sudarto	Drh. Riswanto	Drs. M. Idham Samawi	Drs. Sumarno, Prs	Drs. GBPH. Yudhaningrat, M.M.	K.H. Aziz Umar, B.A.
Vice Regent of Bantul 1999-2004). Resign from position in 2002	Bureaucrats, Vice Regent Candidate in 1999	Owner of KR, PDIP Politician, Incumbent Regent (1999- 2004)	1 st Secretary Assistant Bantul	Son of Sri Sultan HB IX, Bureaucrat/Civil Servant of DIY, Manggalayudha- Soldiers Commander of the palace	Member of Legelsaltive of Bantul 1999- 2004, NU Figure/ Sanden Ilamic Bording House
Party					
Koalisi Sejahtera Bersama (PAN, PPP, PBB, PNBK, PPDI, PPNU, PBR, PPD)		Koalisi Projotamansari (PDIP, Golkar, PKB, PNI Marhaen, PDS, PD)		PKS dan PKPB	
Votes					
25521 (5,37%)		347214 (73,06%)		102501 (21,57%)	

The position of the media owner in the context of the prospective regent has been phenomenal in media reporting. In the context of Special Region of Yogyakarta, the expansion of media owners into the political arena became an opening to history. In the previous district head officials in the Bantul Regency case, most of them were priyayi regents who had noble titles from the Yogyakarta Palace.

In media reporting, media owners and owners' families tend to get a more dominant place, both in the KR and RJ media. This happened because of two things: 1; In relation to KR, investors and the families of media owners have the exclusive right to receive news coverage. 2. In the competitor's media, RJ, M. Idham Samawi and Sri Surya Widati have economic potential (advertising spending) so that the space and opportunity for publication of every political maneuver and campaign program socialization receive special attention. Moreover, M. Idham Samawi's position as incumbent in the 2005 election of district head candidates made his name relatively more popular because the ideas of the district head of Bantul 1999-2004 tended to be as controversial as the idea of prohibiting entrepreneurs from building modern shopping centers in Bantul.

Table 6: Profile of Candidate Pairs and Results of the 2010 Bantul Regency Election
(Nugroho, 2005, p. 512; Komara, 2016, p. 29))

Contestants Profile					
1		2		3	
Drs. Kardono,	Ibnu Kadarmanto,ST, MT	Hj. Sri Surya Widati	Drs. Sumarno Prs	H.Sukardi yono, SH	Darmawan, SH.

	Gapensi (Association of Indonesian National Construction Executors) of Bantul	Politician, Wife of M. Idham Samawi	1 st secretary assistant of Bantul	Ex-3 rd Assitant of Bantul Regent	Head of the Environment Agency (BLH) Bantul
Party					
.PDIP		Coalition of PAN, Golkar, and PKPB		PKS, PPP, PD and PKB	
Vote					
19,374 (3.97%)		330,615 (67.77 %)		137,888 (28.26 %)	

While Sri Surya Widati in the selection of the Bantul regent candidate in 2010 got an adequate place on the basis of considerations: KR positioned her at the level of her husband, M. Idham Samawi, while RJ gave a better place during the campaign period for the 2010-2015 regents' brokers because of the potential for advertising spending. In addition, her nomination tended to be controversial because PDI-P Bantul nominated a "pair of puppets", Kardono-Ibnu Kadarman. When a real political opponent emerged, Sukardiyono-Darmawan, then PDIP Bantul revoked the mandate to nominate Kardono-Ibnu Kadarman.

Table 7: Text Sample of KR in Election of Candidates for Regent in 2005 and 2010.

Text Sample of KR					
2005 Election			2010 Election		
Period	Candidates	Text Sample	Period	Candidates	Text Sample
Nomination Text 2004- 2005	M.Idham Samawi	-People Kidnaped Idham to Support for Regent 2005-2010 -Idham is ready to Mobilize the masses to prevent the HABIS (<i>Harus Bukan Idham</i>) movement	Nomination Text	Sri Surya Widati	- Support for Idaman, Karib takes role in Strategy - <i>Paser Bumi</i> to Support <i>Gila Bola</i> Candidate
Campaign Text 9-22Juni 2005	Totok Sudarto- Riswanto	-Totok to Present Amien Rais -Amien Rais to Support Totok	Campaign Text 6-19 Mei 2010	Kardono-Ibnu Kadarman	-Karib No Campaign, Supervisory Committee (<i>Panwas</i>) No Problem
	M. Idham Samawi- Sumarno	-Idham's Highest Campaign Fund IDR 1 Billion -Idham Versus Empty Chair		Sri Surya Widati- Sumarno	-Idham is Ready to Reprimand Idaman Ida -Commitment is needed for Teacher Quality Improvement
	Yudhaningrat -Azis Umar	-Gusti Yudha Holds Pasemuan Ageng -Gusti Yudha Cheers the Citizens		Sukardiyoo- Darmawan	-Not Support Sukadarma, Head Village of Baturetno Threatens to Expel the Citizens -Sukardarma admits Ida's Winning
	Inaguration of the winner	-Rakyat Cerdas dan Rasional -Merangkak 17 Km Selama Delapan Jam		Inaguration of the winner	- Idaman's Supporters to Have Mass Bald -Citizens refuse Frontal Change
Post-Elected Regent	Regent Work Period 2005- 2010	- Sultan to Take Over High Voltage Electricity Affairs - Idham Harvesting Corn and Tilapia	Post-Elected Regent	Regent Work Period 2010- 2015	- 100-Day Program of Regent to visit Schools - Hug to Overcome Stress for Civil Servants

There are two text situations from two media as sources of this research:

1). KR develops the narrative of political texts in two blocks, namely the owner's block or the representation of the symbol of power, and the people's block or the opponent's symbol like a political division in capitalist society. The owner block is like a dominant alliance that is expressed, actualizes his powerful message in political mediation in the media and forces its own media (KR) and competitor media (RJ) to articulate its political interests in top-down information formats or disciplinary information patterns, hide objectivity behind text discipline, or hide repression under rhetoric to guarantee the power of the dominant elite who have capital power affiliations (see John Storey 2010, 96). Conversely, when KR narrated the politics of political opponents, M. Idham Samawi and Sri Surya Widati in the 2005 and 2010 local election text followed the bottom-up flow, patterned of indiscipline information or prioritizing objectivity, to hide the potential power of political opponents of the media investors and the potential interference with established power structures. They are narrated like a people's block, which was sufficiently narrated subordinately, just to fulfill formal political mediation.

2). RJ tried to narrate the politics of the elections in an ambivalent narrative structure. When political contestation enters the preparatory process for the nomination (M. Idham Samawi and Sri Surya Widati), they showed it as a sterile political mediation space from the co-optation of the incumbent dominant power elite. Then the political narrative about the incumbent's political repression whose passion to break through the incumbent's power structure becomes information that the people should know, helping political openness and fairness contestation. The negotiation process and the reasons for objectivity, as well as the plurality of political narratives, RJ's public mandate began to be disrupted, and began to accommodate negotiated texts with the dominant elites from incumbents and incumbent challengers. The process of media neutralizing the effects of political power began to catch a cold because RJ had to accommodate publicists from political contestants. Because of this situation, (Dijk, 1988, p. 177) concluded that the structure of the text (news) could betray a large number of assumptions about the social or political world.

Manipulation of ideology in narrative texts reflects something else about the process of producing messages or texts. The political mediation process in the field is like a negotiation process in the arena of free and open trade. Important and interesting political news is not limited to the logic of market-driven journalism or market-oriented journalism (Puji Rianto in Putra, 2008, pp. 61–78), bourgeois journalism that is based on the mechanism of agreement under the table for the publication of political events and clientelistic relations between journalists and media institutions (Roudakova, 2008). In Van Dijk's view, the structure of the text is strongly influenced or controlled by the external forces of the media (the dominant elite and the accessors of the media), the reconstruction and reproduction of events in the news writing process which is very complex. Then there are mental representations from various sources of texts and journalists themselves in constructing texts at certain situation models, namely, episodic (subjective) knowledge structures about events and the dominant elites involved in them (Dijk, 1988, p. 178).

KR and the media crew in the field and in the newsroom produce top-down narrative models as a strategy to produce and supply narrative products that are tailored to the expectations of various media ownership relations positions that exist in the arena of contestation and the arena of power (incumbent), both in awareness or controlled or unaware or not controlled by editorial management or business management. There is a social situation that creates KR to experience dependence in a relatively long period of time and continues to the elite who prioritize the interests of his own power, and journalists and their media help perpetuate the status quo of journalism. The elite dominant and journalists compete with each other to control the news. Each party peddles something that the other party needs. In addition, continued Entman, competition in the political market enforces the requirement that the elite manage the news; competition in the economic market imposes media cost minimization and profit maximization, which means news organizations must rely on the elite and make news interesting to a large number of consumers (constituents) in the sight of the dominant elite (see Entman, 1989, p. 19).

While RJ and his media workers tried to play a binary role, between actualizing the role of mandate holder as a control of the dominance of the power of the dominant elite in the commercial public space and playing the situation in political dynamics for financial gain, this situation, as Entman described, became a journalism dilemma that prevents movement along an endless road to the ideal. The "idea market" which was explored for public information in the media is not supported by the economic condition of the media market, even though the public chose topic ideas in media publications that illustrated reality or advance social good, whereas the dominant parties involved in political contestation disagreed about ideas politics that narrated the truth. Therefore, RJ chose to be in the safest position and situation by holding on to "objectivity," which limits the ability of journalists to offer hearings an explicit assessment of the truth, distortion, and falseness of the dominant elite in seizing and defending power (see Entman, 1989, pp. 22–3).

The Orientation of Text Ideology and Power Relations

There are two ideological narrative text models i) dominant discourse or orthodox or discourse co-opted by power, conventional news, its connotation protects and promotes news sources, news sources and cooperation journalists, and ii) alternative discourse or heterodox or opposition discourse (Umar, 2006; Siti Rohmah, 2016)

Based on the narration, the orientation of the KR news text tends to be orthodox. The narration has the tendency to promote and protect media owners and families (M. Idham Samawi and Sri Surya Widati). Editors and journalists avoid critical news. Moreover, news of the case of M. Idham Samawi, a suspect of corruption, was not included in the news category in this media. In terms of access to media, the orthodox model was accessed with a regular strategy, could also be paid access points or the practice of paid news (Örnebring, 1899; Banerjee, 2011). In the case of M. Idham Samawi and Sri Surya Widati, their main access status was as owners and family owners. This media text orientation was categorized as partisan news or news from a single perspective of the media owner (Wojcieszak *et al.*, 2016, p. 242) because the main source of information was always the media owner who was doing political practice (M. Idham Samawi). These are identical factors of ownership, monopolizing information sources, controlling the media agenda by resource persons (Philipse, 1998, p. 669; compared to Castells, 2009b, p. 137; Bourdieu, 2012, p. 28; Sulhan, 2006; Nugroho, Yanuar, Dinita Andirani Putri, 2011, p. 15) entered the KR editor and journalist tool in producing news.

While the RJ text orientation swings between heterodoxa and orthodoxa. The narrative text of the selection process for Bantul district head candidates based on conventional (contestant) and non-conventional news sources such as activists, experts/scientists. There is an objective and substantive narrative side. Then the dedication of the practice of journalism and media content leads to a process of deliberation of democracy or information that enlightens citizens/audiences in political participation, watchdog-oriented, and advocacy of the public interest (Hanitzsch, 2009; Koçak, 2017). Thus critical news, accommodating anti-status quo voices, became part of this media. But this critical attitude is balanced by orthodox attitudes or narratives of heterodoxa modified with orthodoxa to safeguard market interests. RJ practiced Patrick Champagne's trajectory, double dependency. The media may not always express its idealistic attitude, the media can develop with a synergy strategy between idealists, and dependence on politics and the market (Champagne in Rodney Benson, 2005, p. 49), then the media may become a critic of the dominant elite or power (heterodoxa), at other times become the mouthpiece of the dominant elite or power.

The orientation of the two media texts indirectly indicated the formation of power relations structures that were not ideal. The ideal structure on the autonomous axis between the dominant elite (media financiers) and the success team was open to public information and sympathy for media publication content that was not in their taste, while the media maintains independence or values of information independence (autonomous) by prioritizing reports critical (heterodox) to encourage the creation of public spaces (media) that are free from the co-optation of power (Warren Francke, 1995; McNair, 2000; Hardiman, 2009b; McNair, 2015).

Media and KR financiers tend to form homologous or inverse relations of autonomy. KR media reports must meet the demands of the investors' commodity value and its political constituents (Last 2004; Mosco 2009), while KR cannot move out of the scenario of a practical politician investor.

"I was called Pak Idham or bu Idham (Sri Surya Widati) when there was news deemed inappropriate and needed to be corrected by them. This scheme was not in the form of instructions, editors and journalists understood that they had to back up the politics of M. Idham Samawi and Sri Surya Widati given their capacity as owners and the owner's family," said respondent.

In this position, the relation between the power of investors and editors and journalists in the editorial or editorial division produces an equal representation (duality) in the symbolic space structure (Bourdieu 1996a). The editorial division experienced domination from the owner, and this situation is a part of solidarity and cooperation (Bourdieu 1998, 2012; Mancini 2012).

The structure of the homolog is strengthened by the tastes of the financiers and KR towards the narrative of the text. KR used the success story narrative approach, and the status quo story or low taste (popular taste), while KR news construction tastes at the middle level (middle-bro taste) with an orientation to maintain the image or image of the investor (cultural goodwill). The intersection of these two different tastes occurred when KR does an omnivore by lowering or exchanging consumption tastes or middle-class news to popular tastes, while investors adjust their media tastes (univorous). This integration is through the process of governmentality in the form of investment and capital intervention. The form of ownership capital is the key to accessing investors to control and manipulate KR news content, in this case, M. Idham Samawi as the main commissioner, and the largest shareholder of the Samawi family. Ownership capital was combined with political intervention strategies through information monopolies.

The strategy was that in every political process in the political contestation of Bantul regent candidates in 2005 and 2010, the main news source that would become a reference is M. Idham Samawi. Sri Surya Widati and his partner, Sumarno, as the 2010 regent candidate contestants "did not get a place" proportionally compared to M. Idham Samawi, as a KR news source in political dynamics so that the regent candidate was sterilized from political conflicts that emerged during the election process. The monopoly process of news sources coincides with the strategy of controlling the media agenda. Every event and the dynamics of the political process, financiers direct or direct orders through "extension of the financiers" such as the KR editor, so that every political activity is covered by journalists, and published by KR. In Bourdieu's language, investors in actualizing their politics carry out over domination using the power of ownership capital against KR because investors do not have symbolic power in the form of message mediation, while the media as producers of political messages from financiers were dominated by the strength of ownership status, and intervene in their power, then KR carried out solidarity politics towards financiers. This situation illustrated the effects of interests through homology games, between investors who form political structures as arenas of struggle and use the media as an extension of their political mediation, the role of KR in building political solidarity through the publication of financiers' political activities and activities to structure the political arena of financiers, and his power.

While the relationship structure of RJ and financiers tends to be heteronomous or financiers and competitor media understand each other, media opinion is always dynamic, one time media news is informative and promotive (orthodox), at other times dominant elites and media editors are at odds with their views so that open media space conveys control and criticism of power (heterodox). This situation can be categorized as heteronomous, the media approaches the market, but at other times the media has space to partially enforce its independence because the media negotiates for economic benefits (advertising, subsidies) and political relations and exclusive information. But media autonomy or independence is very low in such structures. The financial profit factor and control of information by the dominant elite make the media have to think twice before releasing money in plain sight. The media becomes dependent on heteronomous poles, in this case media investors who practice politics (Rodney Benson, 2005).

Media Investors and Problem of Democracy

Disposition of investors and the media in the constellation of power in Indonesia raises the health problem of democracy. Learning from the case of practical media investors at the level of local power in Bantul, media investors always demand an ideal representation of democracy in their media narratives. When they are power actors, "media people" tend to oppose democratic values. This situation can be noted in several ways.

First, media investors in politics have energy resources to force the dominance of discourse using media ownership capital, and economic capital, on the other hand, the investor's media and competitors' media have influence, but both do not optimize their autonomy. Second, financiers tend to force the media to implement democracy in accordance with their tastes, whereas the media offer power support on the grounds of ownership relations (KR), and financial benefits from advertising (RJ).

Bourdieu synthesizes, the disparity in disposition between power and the media does not automatically make these two worlds antagonistic. In his view, power is stuffed by very ambitious (hyper-ambitious) people, but the politicians actually do not have the confidence to win in political competition because they experience limitations in political communication such as distributing ideas to influence voters and respond to and counter the ideas of political opponents. When the confidence of politicians reaches a nadir, the media gets persuasion from them and their political consultants to fill the space for political mediation and help political mediation to build a viral opinion or attract public attention. When the media is trapped in the current flow of financiers, the role of media control over elegant democratic practices is pawned by reasons of ownership relations and short-term economic gains (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 4). When media investors have exclusive trajectory and habitus in practicing politics and managing their power through the media, their political pathways manipulate political discourse in their own media and competitors' media interventions so that the narratives of media democracy adjust the tastes and political orientations of investors. In this hegemonic position, media investors actually actualize the tradition of authoritarian rule practices, which are clad in "formalistic democratic systems."

V. CONCLUSION

KR tends to produce top-down models or narratives perpetuating the status quo of media financiers (M Idham Samawi). With the reason that political market competition is very hard and complicated, media investors manage and control the news; and news organizations must rely on financiers. While RJ plays a binary role, between actualizing the role of holding the mandate of dominating control over the power of the dominant elite and playing the situation in political dynamics for financial gain. One time this media accommodates bottom-up

news narratives, another time applies a top-down narrative model to accommodate the dominant elite and financial benefits.

The text orientation influences the investor relations structure, political activities, and the media. Investors as politicians and KR media tend to be homologous, parallel and blurred. Investors in politics still practically represent "KR people", while KR represents "media of Idham Samawi's". While RJ chose to be in the safest position and situation by holding on to objectivity, at one-time offering readers or audiences the truth, distortion, and political falsehood, but at other times they came to play as part of the status quo to maintain elite power dominant (competitor media investors).

Political patterns of media investors tend to replicate the traditions of the authoritarian rulers of the past, force the narrative of democracy to be in accordance with their tastes, and close the opportunity for media control over the political process of the financiers. In such a context, they make democracy as a cover for seizing power, and they are actually replicating the authoritarian values in their power.

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