TWITTER AND POLITICAL PROPAGANDA IN THE 2019 ELECTIONS IN INDONESIA

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Abstract--- *Indonesia, as the world's largest Muslim country, made the 2019 Elections as the starting point of the rise of Muslims in the national political scene. This paper aims to analyze the strategy of Islamic political party campaigns on Twitter in the 2019 Elections. This study employed a qualitative method. Nvivo 12 Plus Software was utilized for data analysis. The Ncapture feature was used to explore Twitter's accounts @Official_PAN, @DPPP_PKB, @PKSejahtra, and @DPP_PPP for four months (January-April). This paper reveals that issues built-in political party propaganda were quite diverse. Parties supporting the government (PKB and PPP) tended to uncover the issues of successful development implemented by the government. Meanwhile, those opposing the government, such as PAN, highlighted the issues related to women and gender. PKS, as an opposition party, discussed the issues of the Bill on the protection of religious leaders, the abolition of motorcycle tax, and lifelong drivers' license to counter government policies.*

Keywords--- *Twitter, Islamic political party, campaign strategy, contemporary issues, 2019 Elections*

I. INTRODUCTION

Emotional As a country with the largest Muslim population in the world, Islam is not a democratic barrier in Indonesia. The interests of Muslims can be realized through political parties with political pathways in the era of modern civilization (Ali, 2016; Saputra, 2017) Having the largest Muslim population, the existence of Islamic parties in Indonesia should be a place of political aspirations. The condition of Islamic political parties from 1999 to 2014 had a decrease in the number of voters affecting the number of seats in parliament, and interestingly this decrease in the number of Islamic parties occurred in the majority Muslim society (Romli, 2016).

The weakening of the Islamic parties' position is inversely proportional to the strengthening of the new powers of Muslims. Economic factors generate the growing Islamic populism in various countries, including in the Arab countries, such as Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria known as "Arab Spring".

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It also reinforces the post-reformation Islamic populism in Indonesia (2012) using the symbol of religion as a unifier of Muslims, as in the case of the former Governor of DKI Jakarta considered "blaspheming Islam and the Holy Qur'an", causing this event triggered the gathering of hundreds of thousands of people (Budiasa, 2017). This phenomenon becomes attractive due to the group expression demographically in the majority but feeling marginalized (Fajriyah, 2019; Fata, 2019; Hadiz, 2018; Jati, 2013). Another growing phenomenon is the presence of middle-class groups making *cyberactivism* model a more *cyber* activity to participants or volunteers and work processes based on *by issue* and *by figure* (Jati, 2016) The strengthening of the Islamic populism group from various classes and participants or volunteers from the middle class is the influence of globalization accompanied by the development of information and technology through social media as they play an essential role in providing or reporting information. Therefore, social media can be easily utilized to disseminate information with a variety of functions. The success of social media can also be used to strengthen democracy or vice versa.

The 2014 Elections were the initial momentum of the Islamic political parties using social media through *Facebook* and *Twitter* (Ardha, 2014), although the results have not been able to bring changes to the domination position of the nationalist parties having mastered all media including TV (Herpamudji, 2015). Towards the 2019 Elections, social media are increasingly becoming the primary source of news, media interaction in cyberspace, participation, and decentralization of information from the government (Haryati, 2014) Previous election experience conducted by the Islamic parties from 2004 to 2014 resulted in the formation of a coalition based on political pragmatism, in which a cadre-based on the social background is no longer pays attention to ideology on the process of cadence. The convention was held as a political strategy to gain votes by utilizing the power of the mass base of figures participating in the convention (Ekawati, 2015; Purwati, 2015; Saepulloh, 2015). Therefore, to face the 2019 Elections, Islamic parties employed social media in developing political strategies, which will undoubtedly be different from the previous elections (Azhar, 2017).

The implementation of Indonesian elections since the reformation of 1999 to 2014 were conducted separately, known as the mechanism of the *majority runoff* Presidential Election. However, in the 2019 Elections, both the Legislative and the Presidential Elections were carried out simultaneously in one round or termed as the *plurality* Presidential Election (Hanan, 2016). The implementation of simultaneous elections for the first time in 2019 positively affects the strategy employed by each political party. First, 14 political parties incorporated in the coalition sought to win the Presidential Elections since they had determined who would be nominated to be presidential and vice-presidential candidates from the beginning before the registration. Second, political parties will also focus on Legislative Elections due to the requirement of the parliamentary threshold of 4%.

Prior studies have investigated election campaign strategies on social media: politicians, audiences, and political communications mediation on Facebook and Twitter (Stier & et al, 2018) based on content analysis on Facebook and Twitter. Candidate pair of the regional head receiving support from Islamic populism in the regional election in West Java in 2018 (Djuyandi, 2019) employed an analytic triangulation theory as the campaign strategy. Meanwhile, in the 2018 Regional Election in East Java, the candidates used a descriptive analysis as the political marketing strategy (Sari,

2019) Hate speech and hoax political communication patterns in the 2019 Presidential Election through social media employed literature studies and social media analysis in the form of photos and videos as virtual democracy strategies (Fajriyah, 2019). A number of previous studies have been directed at the study of topics divided by segmentating, targeting, and positioning. In terms of presentation, some were carried out directly (traditional campaigns), some others employed mass and print media, volunteers and party machines, the power of figures and *Kyai*, the emergence of identity politics, and social media as a tool to spread hoaxes and hate speeches.

Previous studies have not reviewed the strategy of Islamic political parties on Twitter in the 2019 Elections in Indonesia. Therefore, this paper is crucial to be published as it will be the first reference discussing the campaign strategy carried out by Islamic political parties using Twitter to win the Presidential and Regional Elections. In addition, this paper will also be the first reference to use the *Nvivo 12 Plus* Software analysis to analyze the *Ncapture* Features of each party's Twitter to discover the most dominant strategy used during the four-month campaign (January-April). The concept of this paper is a political campaign strategy consisting of segmentating, targeting, and positioning.

II.   LITERATURE REVIEW
1)   *Islamic political party in Indonesia*
Several factors caused the presence of Islamic-based political parties (Partai Islam) in the reform era. First, the theological factor indicating that religion, politics, and the state that cannot are inseparable. Second, sociological factors regarding the largest Muslim population in Indonesia requiring a forum. Third, the historical factor of the existence of an Islamic party is inseparable from history contributing to the struggle of the Indonesian nation. Fourth, the reform factor initiating the freedom and democratization where each group was allowed to form/establish a political party (Romli, 2016) In its development, the parties making Islam as an ideology and are listed in the AD/ART are PKS and PPP, and those that do not include Islam as an ideology but the party's identity is inseparable from Islamic symbols are PAN and PKB (Nurhasim, 2016) The existence of Islamic parties in the midst of the largest Muslim population in the world does not at all provide a guarantee that the votes of Islamic parties bring victory in the democratic parties or elections held every five years after the reformation. Current developments indicate that Islamic parties are in a difficult position in the 2014 elections (Yumitro, 2013).

The weaknesses existing in post-reform Islamic political parties prove that the parties still rely on Kyai or Ulama figures in open campaigns, limited information to get strategic issues, and have not been able to compete with nationalist parties utilizing digital campaigns or social media (Bariroh, 2014; Fanani, 2014; Herdiansah, 2017) Islamic parties experiencing a crisis of leadership at the national level, unpreparedness to be a place of creation, innovation for young people or Islamic millennial whose numbers are very potential as beginner voters, are still attached to "identity politics", division among Islamic groups, as well as the inclusion of Islamic parties in government, are more representative of pragmatic Islamic parties (Iwansyah, 2015; Nurhasim, 2016; Yumitro, 2013) Comparison of votes for Islamic parties with nationalist parties in the elections of reform era:

Table. 2.1.1

Vote Acquisition between Islamic and Nationalist Parties in the Elections of the Reformation Era

ELECTIONS OF REFORMATION ERA	NON-ISLAMIC PARTY		NON-ISLAMIC PARTY	
	Number of election participants	Number of votes (%)	Number of votes	Number of votes (%)
1999	19	37.59	29	62.41
2004	7	38.54	17	61.46
2009	9	25.94	35	74.06
2014	5	31.39	7	68.61

Source: (Nurhasim, 2016)

Ahead of the 2019 Elections, the twelfth election since 1955, there was an expression of the existence of growing populism within the Muslim population in Indonesia after the independence, namely the strengthening of Islamic identity politics, or the-so-called Islamic populism or contemporary Islamic populism. Contemporary Islamic populism is currently developing in Indonesia due to the government's nonpartisanship towards Muslims. Instead, the government sides with minority groups, in which various policies made by the government are considered detrimental to Muslims (Hadiz, 2018). The rise of populism is now a global phenomenon occurring in various countries (Margiansyah, 2019) as is the case in America, Germany, France, and England. The uniqueness of populism appearing before the election becomes a momentum to move the spirit of populism to get attention towards the majority (Basya, 2019).

2) Campaign Strategies of Islamic Political Parties

Islamic political parties with Islamic symbols and constituents create an identity as well as political capital in the democracy competition (Herdiansah, 2017) although the popularity and electability of Islamic parties are currently under national political parties. However, their participation in elections has always been considered (Rifa'i, 2015). The evaluation results reveal that some Islamic parties employed an ideological approach and internal and external figures as their campaign strategies (Fauziah, 2015) indicating that the Islamic parties tend to be populist in developing issues compared to nationalist parties. These findings imply that the influence of *Kyai* remains to dominate the campaigns carried out by Islamic parties. Campaigns, in their perspectives, have similarities with *da'wah*, as they convey information to the public, and they are also part of the political strategy (Fanani, 2014).

Both *Ulama* or *Kyai* figures are unique as *Ulama* has an essential role not only in terms of religion but also of social, political, and cultural (Setiawan, 2014). The *Ulama* hold a significant role and influence due to their presence in the internal Islamic parties having informal power within their structure. Moreover, their views have always been considered in the direction of the Islamic parties' policies, indicating their role as the ruler with such knowledge to provide insight in the midst of changing times (Iswanto, 2013) They can also play a role in the campaign strategy undertaken by the Islamic parties (Herdiansah, 2017) with the majority Muslim population being the potential and power of the period to be reckoned with. In addition, the existence of Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah

and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), as well as other Islamic organizations developing currently, also has a role in Muslim society and democratization in Indonesia (Sholikin, 2018)

Islamic parties began to build a political image to increase their electability by not only focusing on placing religious issues as campaigns but also contemporary issues in developing campaign strategies and programs (Sutarso, 2011) which would later be socialized through various media (Nurussa'dah, 2018) The strategies, according to Peter Schroder, aim to actualize a political ideal. Political strategy is essential as it is a grand design having the ultimate goal with all the components of power to achieve the objectives Schorder inside (Ardipandanto, 2017) In carrying out the strategy, political parties should understand contemporary issues (Fanani, 2014) developing in society and utilizing the media as a party communication tool (Ardha, 2014)

The political strategy consists of the stages of segmentating, targeting, and positioning (Ardipandanto, 2017). In the Indonesian context, gender segmentation, religion, and voter behavior are crucial issues in developing campaign strategies and programs. In terms of religious segmentation, statistically, not less than 85% of the population of Indonesia are Muslims; however, Islam in this country is not homogeneous and can be mapped based on culture, social, economic, and demographic strata (Sutarso, 2011). It also led to the emergence of Islamic parties, as most of Indonesia's population embraces Islam (Ali, 2016) Religious segmentation has always been a magnet for political parties in playing ethical issues to get attention. In targeting political parties, they choose targets from the segmentation and serve as marketing targets (Ardipandanto, 2017; Ramadhany, 2016) Positioning regarding political products offered, political messages to be conveyed, party work programs during the campaign and the image or political branding raised (Sandra, 2013) will create a political identity for the parties. Negative or positive impressions of the party and its members depend on how proper the positioning is (Azhar, 2017) A positioning strategy is essential and should be done by political parties since it will help voters in deciding which party to vote, shaping the identity of the party, and formulating a political campaign strategy (Ardipandanto, 2017)

3) Political Campaigns *Using* Social Media

The journey of democracy in various countries has been divided into four phases having their own historical records, namely the party's golden era, television era, digital era, and the social media era (Enli, 2017) The era of social media has changed communication patterns with communication styles no longer one-way but more interactive when compared to previous phases. Creativity in conveying more inspiring messages is a guide for politicians and political parties in using social media as a campaign tool (Chadwick, 2014) In the era of the development of information and technology continuing to deal with significant data-based information (Housley et al., 2014), social media can function as the primary source of news having an essential role to develop communication and information, as a promotional media, media for political campaigns, and media for revolution (Baumgartner, 2010; Haryati, 2014; Umar & et al, 2014).

Nowadays, social media has become the most effective tool for a political campaign, and the most used in many countries are Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube (Abdillah, 2014; Salman & Mustaffa, 2016) Like in the United States, the 2016 Presidential Election campaign utilized social media, one of which was Twitter as the leading political campaign media used by Hillary Clinton and Trump (Enli, 2017; Persily, 2018) The development of social media also occurs in Sweden and Norway, in which the most popular ones are Facebook and Twitter. Campaigns using

social media have lower operational costs than using websites. In addition, Facebook and Twitter users can also directly introduce their profile on social media, and they are widely used for politicians and political parties (Larsson & Kalsnes, 2014) In the Czech Republic and Poland, Facebook is still used as a campaign medium communication supporting mobilization. The opposition parties in the Czech Republic are more active in using Facebook to mobilize voters, while Facebook users in Poland are dominated by big parties aiming to disseminate information related to the campaign (Stetka, 2018) In India, the first Prime Minister Election employing social media campaigns occurred in 2014. BJP and AAP were two political parties in India using Twitter as a campaign tool (Dwivedi & Kapoor, 2015). The development of social media also occurs in Malaysia, in which their use has increased, in 2008 there were 800,000 Facebook users and 3,429 Twitter users. In 2013 these user numbers had risen to 13,220,000 for Facebook and 2,000,000 for Twitter. In the context of Malaysian politics, where the power of social media remains there, but there is influence from the power structure, the ruling coalition, and the incumbent have more access to resources through the government (Gomez, 2014).

Internet users in Indonesia reach 171,17 million of the total population of Indonesia of 264,16 million people (Apji, 2018) This amount is one of the potentials for election participants, both institutionally and individually, to capture their masses through the internet. Around 170 million (64.8%) internet users would be the targets of political parties, legislative candidates, presidential and vice-presidential candidates, and regional head candidates who would compete in the elections (Rustandi, 2013). Internet usage is currently the most common in Indonesia, among young people or millennials occupying 30% of total voters (Rahmawati, 2014) It shows that the position of young people can be a determinant of the direction of democracy, causing various efforts by political parties on social media such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube to form a far more interesting public opinion (Salman & Mustaffa, 2016)

Twitter users in Indonesia are the highest in the world, and social media in this country has taken on a more prominent role as a political campaign media today (Sandra, 2013) The 2014 Elections evidenced for the first time that the power of using Twitter is not only as social media for friendship (Buntoro, 2017) but can also be a tool for political campaigns (Ahmed, 2016) Twitter can provide direct access to followers. Therefore, if used in political campaigns, it is easy for political parties and candidates to influence followers through interesting tweets that can even become trending or popular news on Twitter (Fatanti, 2014)

III.   RESEARCH METHODS

This study employed a descriptive qualitative approach to analyze the campaign strategy of the Islamic political parties on Twitter in the 2019 Elections. The descriptive analysis utilized the *NVivo 12 plus* software. Research data were obtained from each political party's official Twitter account; @Official_PAN, @DPPP_PKB, @PKSejahtra, and @DPP_PPP for four months (January to April). Moreover, data were collected using the *Ncapture* feature in *Nvivo 12 plus*, where the *Ncapture* feature was a web browser extension developed to capture web content in the form of the website content, social media, and other document content. The *Nvivo 12 plus* analysis employed the features of cluster analysis, hierarchy chart of cases, and text research analysis (Brandão, 2015). Cluster analysis was used to see the pattern and network of party accounts to various other statements from the news posted. This paper looks for Pearson's similarities and correlations between Islamic political parties and variables. A hierarchy chart of cases was applied for the analysis of figures from each party. Research text analysis was utilized to look for meaning, words, and context related to research issues within the scope of the campaign strategy of Islamic political parties. The analysis of Islamic

political parties participating in the 2019 Elections since joining Twitter has a number of followers and tweets as diverse as the data in the following table:

Table. 3.1
Twitter Account of PAN, PKB, PPP, and PKS

No	Party	Twitters	Followers	Following	Tweets	Likes
1	Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)	@official_PAN	58,000	237	18,000	7,802
2	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)	@DPP_PKB	76,000	868	76,000	11,000
3	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan Party (PPP)	@DPP_PPP	41,000	410	19,000	1,024
4	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)	@PKSejahtera	341,000	306	47,000	1,837

Source: Researchers processed secondary data

This study aims to analyze the campaign strategy of Islamic political parties on Twitter in the 2019 Elections including Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), by looking at tweets from their Twitter account for four months. The tweets were then analyzed using a political strategy consisting of three stages of segmentating, targeting, and positioning. The four political parties, PAN, PKB, PPP, PKS, were used as the objects of this study to answer the question of how the campaign strategies used by Islamic parties through Twitter.

IV. FINDINGS
a. The Strategy of Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) in Using Social Media Twitter

An open campaign is a crucial stage for all political parties to get people's attention. Thereefore, a party machine able to work during the campaign is required. One of the campaign strategies carried out by Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) in the 2019 Elections was Twitter. It was such a huge challenge since there was a parliamentary threshold of 4% to qualify for parliament. Electability (public interest) towards PAN is the keyword to be able to pass the parliamentary threshold. In this case, the use of social media is the party's primary campaign tool.

The importance of Twitter to improve PAN's electability was also determined by how PAN was able to create a political campaign strategy by developing interesting opinions or issues to get the attention, support, and response back from Twitter users, especially PAN followers through tweets or topics posted during the four months campaign period (1 January-13 April 2019). Of the four months, the strategies used by PAN were:

Figure 4.1.1

Campaign Strategy of Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) in January–April

Source: Processed using *Nvivo 12 +*

Figure 4.1.1 indicates that during the four months campaign period, from January to April, PAN used more segmentating and targeting strategies in utilizing Twitter. The tweets were related to gender, age, and religion segmentation, as presented in the following figure:

Figure 4.1.2

Segmentating Strategy of Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) in January−April

Source: Processed using *Nvivo 12 +*

The recapitulation results of the 2019 Indonesian Legislative Assembly (DPR) show that PAN received 6.48% votes and was ranked eighth in national votes. When viewed from the four-month campaign strategy trend, PAN issued more news (tweets) on gender issues being campaigned in various regions along with several party and non-party figures. The results of segmentation analysis presented in Figure 4.1.2 depict that PAN was serious in addressing issues related to justice and gender inequity, fighting for political and government representation, living cost and affordability of staples, mothers and children welfare, creating jobs for women, improving the quality of health services for mothers and children, of which these are the top priorities of its work program, as depicted in the following figure:

Figure 4.1.3

Analysis of Campaign Gender Segmentation News of Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) in   January–April


Source: Processed using *Nvivo 12 +*

Gender segmentation, the main news of PAN during the four months campaign, had succeeded in bringing the party passing the parliamentary threshold of 4%. In addition, other news becoming the focus of PAN is regarding religious segmentation. As a party holding the ideology of religious nationalism in the 2019 Elections, it received

support from the Persaudaraan *Alumni (PA) 212* since this party remained consistent in defending *Ulama*, such as the image it built during the campaign period, i.e., #BelaRakyat (Defend the people) #BelaUmat (Defend Muslims). Support for PAN also came from several figures as they helped PAN during the campaign period in various regions, as shown below:

Figure 4.1.4

Analysis of Party and Non-Party Figure Domination of Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)

January–April Campaign


Source: Processed using *Nvivo 12+*

The analysis of the dominance of party and non-party figure shown in Figure 4.1.4 reveals that in the 2019 campaign, PAN had been dominated by its chairman, Zulkifli Hasan. He was the one who functioned as a national campaigner of PAN. Aside from being the general chairman of the party, Zulkifli Hasan was also the chairperson of the 2014-2019 Period of People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). Under his command, PAN in the 2019 Elections had succeeded in building an image of a party being in the line of *Ulama* and defending women or (mother-daughter). These reasons underlay PAN in receiving support at the beginning of the campaign in January by party leaders as well public figures such as H. Roma Irama having an essential role during the PAN's campaign in various regions as he had fans or fanatical supporters called the *sonata group*. Besides, the other attraction it has when campaigning in multiple regions was the presence of Rocky Gerung as a political observer and also an influential academician for millennials. In this political year, his presence on various TV stations or Twitter can be a reference or new political education for young people or millennials due to his comments and criticism of the government, making the 2019 Elections interesting to follow its development.

b. **The Strategy of Partai *Kebangkitan* Bangsa (PKB) in Using Social Media Twitter**

PKB as a party with an Islamic ideology in which most cadres are the members of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) who, in the 2019 Elections, proposed one of the PKB founders, namely K.H. Maruf Amin as a vice-presidential candidate who accompanied Joko Widodo as a presidential candidate. PKB, as a party supporting the government in

the 2014-2019 period, in the current elections is also the coalition of Joko Widodo's government. Together with the coalition parties supporting Joko Widodo, PKB also had the political responsibility to win the presidential and vice-presidential candidates and secure the party's vote to pass parliamentary thresholds. One of the strategies used by PKB in the 2019 Elections was utilizing Twitter, in which it began to join Twitter since August 2012, and the number of its followers to date was ± 70,000 followers. With the number of followers reaching ± 70,000 people. PKB should be able to maximize the campaign strategy via Twitter to increase the electability of the party in the 2019 Legislative Elections. During the campaign period, which lasted for four months from January to April, the strategies used by PKB through Twitter were more tweets concerning:

Figure 4.2.1
Campaign Strategy of Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) in January–April


Source: Processed using *Nvivo 12+*

Figure 4.2.1 depicts that during the campaign period, PKB made more news on Twitter using the targeting and segmenting strategies. The targeting strategy was carried out through talking over the figures, more than the campaign. It can be seen from the following figure:

Figure 4.2.2

Targeting Strategy of Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) in January–April

Source: Processed using *Nvivo 12+*

The analysis results from Figure 4.2.2 explain that the tweets posted via Twitter @DPP_PKB during the four-month campaign (January to April) reported more about the PKB figure rather than the campaign. News related to figures on PKB's Twitter was more about the chairperson of the party, Muhaimin Iskandar, compared to other party figures, such as the nominee for vice president K. Maruf Amin. Analysis of the news about Muhaimin Iskandar can be seen from the following figure:

Figure 4.2.3

Analysis of Figure News of Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)

January-April

Source: Processed using *Nvivo 12+*

Figure 4.2.3 shows that aside from being the party chairperson, Muhaimin Iskandar also became a santri commander because he had contributed to the development of Islamic boarding schools. It can be seen from the news on Twitter regarding the agenda of his activities to various boarding schools in different regions of the archipelago. He has taken part in the chairman election of the Indonesian Football Association (PSSI) and the vice president's exchange, which accompanied President Jokowi. During Legislative and Presidential Elections in 2019, he became the campaigner of PKB and Presidential Elections, having a great responsibility to win both elections simultaneously. Being a political party leader, santri commander, deputy chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), part of the Jokowi-Maruf success team at the 2019 Presidential Elections, made him appeared more on the Twitter @DPP_PKB, aiming to grasp Twitter users' attention regarding the messages conveyed through tweets. The following figure presents the location and geographical segmentation as the main news of the party:

Figure 4.2.4

Segmentating Strategy of Muhaimin Iskandar in January-April

Source: Processed using *Nvivo 12+*

Figure 4.2.4 indicates that the activities or visits carried out by party chairman to various regions during open campaigns, together with party figures as well as presidential and vice-presidential candidates or coalition parties, became the main news on Twitter. In addition, tweets from PKB emphasized more on the achievement of the government felt by society, such as about village funds. During the campaign, they also linked village funds with government programs or policies and improvement of the program for the next period. This effort was one of the strategies PKB used to improve the electability of the party as its followers on Twitter originated from various regions covering Java, Sulawesi, Kalimantan, and several others.

c. The Strategy of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) in Using Social Media Twitter

Since 2010 PPP has had a Twitter account, @DPP_PPP. However, the number of its followers compared to other parties was lesser. It had ± 41,000 followers until recently. PPP, as a party having Islamic ideology and a participant in the 2019 Elections, had the same campaign strategies as other parties, that was using Twitter. As a party

that for one period joined the government or formed a coalition with the Jokowi-JK government, in the 2019 Elections, it rejoined the coalition by proposing the presidential and vice-presidential candidates, Joko Widodo and K.H. Maruf Amin. Therefore, the tweets that would be posted on the @DPP_PPP Twitter timeline were related to the success of the government in terms of regulations or programs having been implemented for five years. The campaign strategies of PPP on Twitter are:

Figure 4.3.1

Campaign Strategy of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) in January–April

Source: Processed using *Nvivo 12+*

Figure 4.3.1 shows that during the four months campaign period, PPP employed both segmentating and targeting strategies more on their Twitter posts. The segmentating strategy focused on religion and then behavior, as presented in the following figure.

Figure 4.3.2

Segmentating Strategy of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) in January-April


Source: Processed using *Nvivo 12+*

The analysis results of Figure 4.3.2 explain that the tweets of religious segmentation posted on @DPP_PPP during the four-month campaign was more related to the support of several *Kyai* or *Ulama* and Islamic boarding schools to the presidential and vice-presidential candidates, Joko Widodo and KH Maruf Amin. PPP, as an incumbent coalition party, is more likely to tweet about these two candidates on its Twitter account, as depicted in the following figure:

Figure 4.3.3

News (Tweets) Analysis of Religious Segmentation of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)


Source: Processed using *Nvivo 12+*

The analysis results of Figure 4.3.3 explain that PPP involved *Kyai* and *santri* as structural, cultural, and figure as the party's power base. In the 2019 Elections, the consolidation carried out by PPP towards several senior party figures and outside the party such as the *Kyai* was a form of commitment to avoid distribution of the votes it received, aiming to be consistent in supporting the presidential and vice-presidential candidates, Joko Widodo and KH Maruf Amin. It can be seen from the tweets during the January-April campaign posted by PPP on Twitter @DPP_PPP reporting K.H Maemoun Zubair as a key figure of traditional voters and also of the *Kyai*.

In addition to maintaining the base of traditional voter support, PPP also made some posts regarding the target figure strategy spearheading or relying upon the party during national campaigns in various regions, Joko Widodo, as a presidential candidate had electability that could strengthen each other with its supporting political parties. It can be seen from the following figure:

6865

Figure 4.3.4

Analysis of Party and Non-Party Figure Domination of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) in January-

April

Source: Processed using *Nvivo 12+*

From the analysis of figure 4.3.4, it can be seen that each figure had a different role and function but is complementary. One of which is Jokowi, although not as an internal figure of PPP. His role and function were huge in the four-month campaign process when compared to the internal figures of the party. The positive impact of Jokowi's figure had become a magnet for PPP followers due to the lacking popularity of party figures on Twitter. Jokowi's news was aligned with the big *Ulama* and became a role model for the PPP. Moreover, K.H. Maemoun Zubair was also influential on party news on Twitter @DPP_PPP. The news indicated K.H. Maemoun Zubair's support for Jokowi in several party agendas. It showed that *Ulama* also supported Jokowi to be re-nominated as the next president. The news also explained that Jokowi had implemented government programs for five years, together with PPP through programs related to the Program Keluarga Harapan or PKH (Family Hope Program), the completed construction of toll road infrastructure that could be used by the community, as well as village funds. These programs dominated the tweets of PPP on Twitter.

d. The Strategy of Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) in Using Social Media Twitter

The function of political parties using social media is to disseminate campaign material to the public. PKS is an election participant that since March 2009 has been using Twitter as the campaign media with total followers of ± 340,000 people recently. It is a party having been joining Twitter for quite a long time, and the increasing number of votes in the 2019 Elections is the real form of PKS in utilizing communication technology, especially social media. The current strategy of PKS aims to get closer to young people or beginner voters occupying about 30% of the total voters; moreover, it is the novice voters or millennials who dominated the social media users (Rahmawati, 2014). It is the focus

of the 2019 PKS Legislative Election that further maximized the campaign strategy via Twitter to increase party electability.

Twitter social media is the foremost choice of political parties as an ideal means of party promotion. Besides, it is also due to the high interactivity and low cost in presenting campaigns being different from some other media (Graham et al., 2013; Jungherr, 2014). PKS since 2014 has remained consistent as the government's opposition party along with other parties. Therefore, the tweets posted on Twitter @PKSejahtra timeline were related to the programs that would be carried out if it won the 2019 Legislative Elections. Moreover, it also criticized the program or policy, a government that was not on the target or has not been implemented for five years. The campaign strategy used by PKS can be seen from the following figure:

Figure 4.4.1

Campaign Strategy of Partai Keadilan Sejahtera in January−April

Source: Processed using *Nvivo 12+*

Figure 4.4.1 reveals that during the campaign period, PKS posted more tweets using the targeting and positioning strategies. The targeting strategy consisted of campaigns and figures, while the positioning strategy comprised political images, messages, and work programs. The campaign strategy of the party is presented in the following figure:

Figure 4.4.2

Campaign Strategy of Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)

Source: Processed using *Nvivo 12+*

Figure 4.4.2 presents that PKS in its tweets on Twitter @PKSejahtra during the four months campaign highlighted about campaign activities carried out by the party in various regions in Indonesia. One of the PKS news material in the 2019 Elections concerning its political promises if winning the election was to realize the Bill on the protection of *Ulama*, religious leaders, and religious symbols. Another creative method the party used during the campaign was flashmob throughout Indonesia, as well as the programs on removing the motor tax, life-long driving licenses, and income tax exemption of eight million and below. Solid PKS cadres socialized these issues. Furthermore, in the campaign in various regions, these programs were also socialized by the party and non-party figures, including presidential and vice-presidential candidates, together with the coalition party. It can be seen from the following figure

Figure 4.4.3

Targeting and Positioning Strategies of Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)

Source: Processed using *Nvivo 12+*

Some party and non-party figures helping to campaign for the PKS, as shown in Figure 4.4.3, were Sandiaga Uno as the vice-presidential candidate promoted from several coalition parties. He had a more dominant role in the PKS campaign in the news on Twitter @PKSejahtra during the four-month campaign period. During this time, he also became a highlight in the news, followed by two other figures, namely presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto carried by the coalition party together with PKS and M.Sohibul Iman, PKS chairman. In the 2019 Elections, PKS ranked sixth in the acquisition of national votes. Image of PKS in the campaign carried out with the slogan #2019gantiPresiden (#2019replaced the President) became trending on Twitter and was considered effective in raising party electability. In addition, the figure of Sandiaga Uno, known as a millennial vice-presidential candidate, became a campaign strategy for PKS and had a positive impact on the national votes. It can be seen from the following image:

Figure 4.4.4

News (Tweets) Analysis of Figures of Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) in January-April

Source: Processed using *Nvivo 12+*

Figure 4.4.4 indicates that the figure of vice-presidential candidate Sandiaga Uno had an essential role in increasing the electability of the supporting coalition parties and also for presidential candidate Prabowo because he had a unique charm in the PKS news on Twitter. He was famous among millennials and women compared to other figures. Moreover, the results of the Kompas Research and Development Institute survey showed Sandiaga was favored because of his educational or intellectual background, known as a successful entrepreneur, having attractive physical appearance, excellent communication skills, relatively young age compared to other presidential and vice-presidential candidates, and wealth he owned (cnnindonesia.com). The political campaign strategy used by each party via Twitter in the 2019 Elections gave positive results, especially for the four Islamic political parties. Furthermore, these four parties were declared to have passed the parliamentary threshold of 4% with the recapitulation results of the 2019 DPR RI Legislative Election, including the following:

Table 4.1

Recapitulation of the Indonesian Legislative (DPR) Elections Results in 2019 and 2014

No	Political Parties	Vote Acquisition in 2019	Presentation	Vote Acquisition in 2014	Presentation	Ideology
1	PDI Perjuangan	27,053,961	19.33%	23. 681,471	18.95%	Nationalist
2	Partai Gerindra	17.594. 839	12.57%	14,760.371	11.81%	Nationalist
3	Partai Golkar	17,229,789	12.31%	18,432.312	14.75%	Nationalist
4	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa	13,570,097	9.69%	11,298.957	9.04%	Islam
5	Partai Nasional Demokrat	12,661,792	9.05%	8,350.812	6.72%	Nationalist
6	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera	11,493,663	8.21%	8,480.204	6.79%	Islam
7	Partai Demokrat	10,876,507	7, 77%	12,728.913	10.19	Nationalist
8	Partai Amanat Nasional	9,572,623	6.48%	9,481.621	7.57%	Islam

9	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan	6,323,147	4.52%	8,157.488	6.53%	Islam

Source: KPU RI, 2019

Table 4.1 shows that one of the successes of Islamic parties being able to compete and pass the parliamentary threshold of 4% in the acquisition of votes in the 2019 Elections was by using Twitter as a more effective campaign media. During the four-month campaign period (January to April), Islamic parties created a campaign program on Twitter with various news or crucial issues that could attract the attention of their followers or other Twitter users. The pattern of the connectedness between the campaign strategy used by political parties and figures influencing the party is presented in figure 4.4.5

Figure 4.1
Relationship between the Political and Non-Political Islamic Parties Figures and the   Strategies Used
on Twitter (January-April)

Source: Processed using *Nvivo 12+*

Figure 4.1 implies that not all political party and non-political party figures participating in the 2019 Elections had a pattern of linkages with campaign strategies in tweets on Twitter. However, Sandiaga Uno, as a vice-presidential candidate carried by the coalition of political parties, was found to have much connection with several strategies. PAN and PKS campaigned for the figure of Vice President Sandiaga Uno as the party's selling point having a role as the most helped strategy in campaigning the party on Twitter. He influenced all strategies (segmentating, positioning, and targeting). In the segmentating strategy, Sandiaga Uno had much news associated with campaign activities carried out in various regions along with coalition parties. Sandiaga Uno had an essential role in increasing

the electability of the supporting coalition parties and also for presidential candidate Prabowo due to the various news in the media. Sandiaga Uno had its own charm as a figure of a vice-presidential candidate. Furthermore, age-segmented, he was the most popular figure during the campaign period, especially among novice voters or millennials and women. The image inherent in Sandiaga Uno was as a candidate for millennials and women, as well as a successful entrepreneur. Together with the coalition parties, he made programs as a solution to the economic problems of the Indonesian people today.

Sandiaga Uno also had a connection in the news of the work program of the party, as well as the party's campaign with PKS Chairperson M. Sohibul Iman. In addition, another figure associated with him was the presidential candidate, Jokowi promoted from coalition parties. PPP and PKB were a combination of several other parties carrying Jokowi and KH. Makruf Amin in the 2019 Presidential Elections. The news on the campaign strategy of PPP and PKB was about government work programs in Jokowi's administration. In the 2019 Elections, Jokowi was paired with KH. Maruf Amin, a religious figure or *Ulama* from one of the largest organizations in Indonesia, NU. PPP and PKB news was related to religious segmentation, government programs, and *Ulama*'s support for Jokowi. Jokowi's relationship with KH. Maruf Amin and K.H Maemon Zubaer showed that he, as the incumbent, received support from the largest Islamic organization, NU and the *Ulama*. Jokowi's electability in the 2019 Elections was still high compared to other candidates. The news during the campaign in various regions stated that the community was satisfied with his performance. Other news about him revealed that he was known as a down to earth figure and friendly to the community, making him a figure loved by the public. The news about him during the four-month campaign period also had a positive impact on the supporting parties as it raised the parties' electability. It is related to the campaign strategy and other figures within the parties.

Figure 4.2

The Relation between Islamic Political Parties and Strategy Used on Twitter (January-April)

Source: Processed using *Nvivo 12+*

Figure 4.2 shows that the highest value of similarity news (tweets) on Twitter made by each party in the 2019 Elections was achieved by PKS 0.379, followed by PAN 0.329, PPP 0.291, and PKB 0.212. The political campaign strategy used during the four-month campaign period showed that the highest segmentating similarity was 0.946, followed by targeting of 0.931, positioning 0.919, campaign 0.896, political image 0.820, figure 0.590, geography 0.528, religion 0.445, location 0.440, work program 0.411, behavior 0.393, age, 0.336, and gender 0.256. In addition, the level of news used between Islamic political parties from the highest to the lowest were PKS and PAN 0.225, followed by PPP and PKS 0.190, PPP and PAN 0.185, PKB and PAN 0.165. These are shown in table 4.2, table 4.3 and table 4.4.

Table 4.2

Calculating the Closeness or Similarity of Words in the News (Tweets) of Each Islamic Political Party in Using the Campaign Strategy (January-April)

Code A	Code B	Jaccard's coefficient
Segmentation\Age	Cases\\PKS	0.379973
Segmentation\Behavior	Cases\\PAN	0.329253
Position\Work Program	Cases\\PPP	0.291432
Segmentation\Age	Cases\\PAN	0.264727
Position\Work Program	Cases\\PKS	0.261435
Position\Work Program	Cases\\PAN	0.231481
Segmentation\Age	Cases\\PPP	0.214866
Position\Work Program	Cases\\PKB	0.212223
Segmentation\Age	Cases\\PKB	0.185215

Source: Processed using *Nvivo 12+*

Table 4.3

Calculating the Closeness or Similarity of Words in the News (Tweets) of Each Campaign Strategy (January-April)

Code A	Code B	Jaccard's coefficient
Nodes\\Targeting	Nodes\\Segmentating	0.946545
Nodes\\Targeting	Nodes\\Targeting	0.931849

Nodes\\Segmentating	Nodes\\Positioning	0.91906
Nodes\\Positioning	Nodes\\Targeting\Campaign	0.896331
Nodes\\Segmentating	Nodes\\Positioning\Political image or message	0.820866
Nodes\\Segmentating	Nodes\\Targeting\Figure	0.590492
Nodes\\Positioning\Work Program	Nodes\\Segmentating\Geography	0.528951
Nodes\\Positioning\Political image or message	Nodes\\ Segmentating \Religion	0.445727
Nodes\\Targeting	Nodes\\ Segmentating \Location	0.440621
Nodes\\Targeting	Nodes\\Positioning\work Program	0.411193
Nodes\\Segmentating	Nodes\\ Segmentating \Behavior	0.39396
Nodes\\Segmentating\Age	Nodes\\Positioning\Political image or message	0.336568
Nodes\\Segmentating\Age	Nodes\\ Segmentating\Gender	0.256299

Source: Processed using *Nvivo 12+*

Table 4.4

Calculating the Closeness or Similarity of Words in the News (Tweets) of Each Islamic Political Party (January-April)

Code A	Code B	Jaccard's Coefficient
Cases\\mcc	Cases\\PAN	0.225209
Cases\\PPP	Cases\\mcc	0.190963
Cases\\PPP	Cases\\PAN	0.185025
Cases\\PKB	Cases\\PAN	0.165579
Cases\\PPP	Cases\\PKB	0.159505
Cases\\mcc	Cases\\PKB	0.15508

Source: Processed using *Nvivo 12+*

Table 4.2, table 4.3 and table 4.4 indicate that the value of the closeness of Twitter news carried out for four months by each party utilized segmentating strategy, such as PKS using age segmentation, and PAN employing behavior segmentation. The news posted by PKS on Twitter mostly focused on reporting the vice-presidential candidate Sandiaga Uno as he was popular among the millennials or new voters. The news about him campaigning with PKS in

various regions became the highlight on Twitter @PKSejahtra as it was an effective campaign strategy. Such effort aimed to gain voters from 341,000 PKS followers spreading in various regions in Indonesia. Besides, a massive number of its followers were millennial groups.

The use of a behavior segmentation strategy in the tweets showed more connectedness of PAN as a party that, together with PKS, carried Prabowo and Sandiaga Uno as presidential and vice-presidential candidates. PAN, as an opposition party in the 2019 Elections, made many posts on Twitter @official_PAN about its concerns regarding the current state situation. The issues raised by PAN on Twitter were about the burning of the monotheism flag, the discrimination of the *Ulama*, and the LGBT emergency. In addition, PAN also gave a call or invitation to maintain behavior and ethics in the 2019 Elections. During campaigning on Twitter, PAN's strategy correlated with other news strategies. It also discussed more gender issues campaigned in various regions with several party and non-party figures. Therefore, the behavior segmentation used by PAN had a close relationship with gender segmentation. In the 2019 Elections, PAN had succeeded in building an image as a party being in the line of *Ulama* and defending women. Indeed, the campaign strategy used was also more effective in gaining the attention and support of Twitter users, especially followers of @official_PAN, wanting to replace the president, in the 2019 Elections.

As a party becoming the coalition of the Jokowi-JK government for a period, in the 2019 Elections, the PPP rejoined the coalition by proposing the pair Joko Widodo and K.H. Maruf Amin as the presidential and vice-presidential candidates. PPP showed more closeness of the news by using the work program positioning strategy. The political campaign used by PPP on Twitter @DPP_PPP was related to the success of the government in terms of regulations or programs having been implemented for five years, such as PKH, village funds, and infrastructure. Jokowi's government programs received support from the *Ulama*, because it was able to reduce poverty and unemployment number. The support of the *Ulama* also became the issue appearing in the news having a link between government work programs and religious segmentation. Therefore, the news on Twitter was adequate to get the attention and support from the community, especially PPP followers.

Along with PPP, PKB rejoined the coalition to support Joko Widodo and K.H. Maruf Amin in the 2019 Elections. As a government party, PKB also demonstrated the connectedness of the news by using the positioning strategy of work programs. The political campaign carried out by PKB on Twitter @DPP_PKB discussed government programs, one of which was the village funds. Moreover, the party also emphasized news related to the success of the village funds during the Jokowi's administration. In addition, this program correlated with government programs on road infrastructure and several other programs having a connection with the PKB news strategy on Twitter. As a party having a mass base from NU community organization and also its vice-presidential candidate was a member of NU, the strategy used by PKB was more effective since it could provide socialization of government programs to NU followers, as well as party socialization to society wanting Jokowi to become president again. It is shown in the following figure.

Figure 4.3

The Relation between Islamic Political Parties and Strategy Used on Twitter (January-April)

Source: Processed using Nvivo 12+

V. CONCLUSIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The election held simultaneously for the first time in 2019 affected the strategy carried out by each political party, especially Islamic political parties. An open campaign is a crucial stage for all political parties to get people's attention, one of which is by using Twitter as a campaign media. Rising voices of Islamic parties surprised the 2019 Elections, as seen from the results of the 2019 Legislative Elections showing that there were nine political parties, including four Islamic political parties (PAN, PKB, PPP, and PKS) passing parliamentary threshold 4%. The success of the four parties is an achievement and the first step to success in the 2024 Elections later. Islamic political parties have succeeded in utilizing the momentum towards the growing phenomenon of Islamic populism in various countries, one of which is in Indonesia.

Twitter users in Indonesia are the highest in the world. Therefore, in the 2019 Elections, the digital political campaign on Twitter became the primary choice strategy for political parties today. PAN, together with the coalition parties, supported Prabowo and Sandiaga Uno as the presidential and vice-presidential candidates in the 2019 Elections. During the four-month campaign period from January to April, PAN utilized gender and behavior segmentation strategies on its Twitter @official_PAN news. Gender issues had been campaigned in various regions with several party and non-party figures. The analysis results of the dominance of party figures revealed that Zulkifli Hasan, the party's general chairman, as a national campaigner had more roles and functions. Under his command, PAN, in the 2019 Elections, succeeded in building an image as a party being on the side of the *Ulama* and defending women. The campaign strategies PAN used in the 2019 Elections were more effective in gaining the attention and support of Twitter users, especially @official_PAN followers who wanted to replace the president.

As it did before, in the 2019 Election PKB was also in the Joko Widodo's government coalition. The strategy used during the campaign period was posting news on Twitter @DPP_PKB by utilizing the targeting strategy. The news on the figure of Muhaimin Iskandar, the party chairperson, was more widely reported during the campaign. In addition to serving as chairman of PKB, Muhaimin Iskandar also became a santri commander since he had contributed a lot to the development of Islamic boarding schools. Furthermore, he also became the campaigner of PKB and the

Presidential Election. As a government party, PKB was found to employ a positioning strategy of the work program. The political campaign used by PKB on Twitter @DPP_PKB discussed government programs, one of which was the village funds. The party reported a lot about the success of village funds during the Jokowi's administration. As this party had a mass base of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) community organizations and its vice-presidential candidate was also a member of NU, the strategy used became more effective since it could be a socialization of government programs to NU citizens as well as socialization of the party to the community supporting Jokowi to become president for two periods.

Same as PKB, PPP was also a party having re-formed a coalition with the Jokowi-JK government in the 2019 Elections by becoming an incumbent coalition. The campaign strategy used by PPP on Twitter was related to the success of the government regarding the programs having been implemented for five years using the religion segmentation strategy. As an Islamic political party, PPP involved *Kyai* and *santri* in its structural and cultural aspects and made them as traditional voters having a role as the party's power base. In the 2019 Elections, the consolidation carried out by the PPP against several senior party figures and outside the party, such as the *Kyai*, was a form of commitment to avoid the distribution of votes and to remain consistent with party policies, namely supporting the presidential and vice-presidential candidate pairs Joko Widodo and KH Maruf Amin. It can be seen from the news made by PPP on Twitter @DPP_PPP during the four months of the campaign reporting K. Maemoun Zubair as a key figure from traditional voters as well as from *Kyai*.

During the campaign period, PKS posted more news on Twitter using targeting and positioning strategies. The targeting strategy consists of campaigns and figures of the party, while the positioning strategy comprises political images and messages and work programs. PKS focused its campaign objectives on millennials in the age segmentation strategy. The news on Twitter @PKSejahtra regarding the figure of Sandiaga Uno's as the vice-presidential candidate was also the strategy of PKS, because, on various social media, he was famous among millennials or novice voters. In the 2019 Elections, PKS having a nationalist religious ideology ranked sixth in the national vote acquisition. Besides, the PKS image with the slogan #2019gantiPresident became trending on Twitter, and it was considered to be effective in raising the electability of the party. PKS campaigns in various regions raised issues regarding PKS work programs, including realizing the Bill on the protection of *Ulama* and religious leaders, eliminating motorbike tax, lifelong driving license, and tax-free for the income of eight million and under.

The campaign strategy carried out by each of the Islamic political parties in the 2019 Elections gave positive results and could increase the electability of the parties' vote acquisition. Therefore, this paper contributes to explaining the campaign model used by Islamic parties. In addition, this paper also discovered the patterns of connectedness between the party and non-party figures in each Islamic political party appearing on Twitter during the four-month campaign period. This paper successfully revealed the use of Islamic political party campaign strategies via Twitter. Nevertheless, it has limitations on the data analysis approach applied as it did not yet describe the triangulation analysis between qualitative and quantitative data. For this reason, further studies require to discuss the comparison of Islamic and nationalist political party campaign strategies in the 2019 Elections using the mix-methods approach.

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