

A GEOGRAPHICAL-POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF GOOD GOVERNANCE IN IRAQ: THE INTERNAL DETERMINANTS AS A MODEL

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Abstract

The state is the main actor in the implementation of good governance as it is concerned with setting the general policies through the formulation of laws and legislation and the development of appropriate mechanisms for their application. This is in addition to its role in motivating the masses to popular participation in decision-making, maintaining security and respecting the principles of human rights, as well as freedom of the media and achieving Social justice and the protection of women's rights. Besides that, it has a great role in providing housing, environmental protection and justice in the distribution of resources. The countries vary in the level of their application of good governance. This variation is due to internal and external factors that obstruct the path of the state and determine its behavior. Indeed, there is no evidence for that in Iraq, which was subjected to determinants both Internal and external distances kept it away from adopting the principles of good governance. Therefore, this paper comes to reveal the internal determinants that afflicted the state and undermined good governance in it, as well as providing effective solutions.

Keywords: good governance, consociationalism, partisan quotas, indebtedness, the private sector

Introduction

There is an impact of the political transition process that Iraq witnessed after 2003 on the structure of the political system and the mechanisms of governance in the state. This is because the transition from absolute dictatorial rule to a system of rational governance that takes the means of democracy, pluralism, protection of human rights and achieving justice faced several political, economic and social challenges. This is due to the lack of preparation of the Iraqi society and its political elites of the process of political transformation on the one hand, and the weakness of the economic structures that weakened the state on the other hand. The state's success in implementing good governance is based on its ability to properly manage its financial resources in a way that enhances economic growth and the multiplicity of its sources of income. In addition, the Iraqi societal system tends mostly to solve its problems and social conflicts away from the authority of the state. In fact, its authority exceeded the authority of the government after 2003. This is an indication of the weakness of

the rule of law in the state and the growing strength of the clan on the expense of government in a way that contributed to the growth of clan instead of the national identity of the majority of Iraqi society. This, in turn, complicated the internal structure of the state and made it unable to adopt the principles of good governance.

Problem statement

The research problem can be presented in the form of the following questions:

-What is good governance? and What are its internal determinants in Iraq after 2003?

Hypothesis

Based on the problem statement, the researcher assumes the following hypothesis:

The internal political, economic and social factors formed a major determinant of building the state according to the standards of good governance in Iraq after 2003.

Research Methodology

The researcher relied on two methodologies in the course of this research. The functional approach is adopted in tracking the political, economic and social performance of the state. On the other hand, the power analysis method has been used in throughout the study to analyze the role of internal determinants in keeping Iraq away from adopting the means of good governance.

Research Structure

The research included a comprehensive introduction and three demands: The first demand deals with the political determinants of implementing good governance in Iraq. The second one presents a study of the economic determinants of implementing good governance in Iraq. The third demand deals with the social determinants of implementing good governance in Iraq. This is in addition to the results, recommendations and a list margins and sources.

The first demand: the political determinants of implementing good governance in Iraq

After the collapse of the regime in 2003, the Iraqi state witnessed a clear political transition, apparently based on the foundations of the peaceful exchange of power in accordance with the constitution and partisan pluralism. However, its reality is based on quotas and partisan consensus, as the distribution of high positions in the state is based on ethnographic (religious, sectarian, national) bases, which results in the loss of the system's unity and harmony. This made the goal is to maximize the political gains of one social component on the expense of others, which weakened the state's structure and entity. This is in addition to the difficulty of the democratic experiment on the Iraqi political elites and societal components due to the sudden transition from a state of absolute dictatorship to a disorderly democracy that does not fit the nature of Iraqi society and is above the level of thinking of its political elites ⁽¹⁾. In order to understand the topic, the political determinants are addressed as follows:

First - Uncontrolled pluralism

Political parties represent one of the most important manifestations of political freedoms, as the maturity of the democratic system is not complete without its presence. However, Iraq, which was under the domination of a single party before 2003, then moved to a state of democratic openness that opened the way wide for multiple party movements and organizations to practice political work in its various

forms without the existence of mechanisms regulating its operation. This negatively affected the structure of the state and the form of governance and its mechanisms. This could be attributed to the following reasons ⁽²⁾:

A - Despite the passage of more than 17 years for the work of the parties inside Iraq, their plans are not clear, due to the diversity of the goals and objectives they aimed at. In addition, most of them have only a limited number of popular bases, not to mention the immaturity of their ideas because they are affected by tribal and sectarian extensions besides the external influence on most of them.

B - The different ideologies of the parties and the state of transition from one direction to another made them lose their goals. Despite they agree, after they were in exile, to change the regime and shift towards democracy, they find their actions affected and not influential. Thus, the main concern of most of them was to achieve political gains before they built a new political system.

C - Political personalization, since these parties represent people who do not have real political goals or programs. This means that the strength of the party depends on the strength of the leader.

D - The weakness of the capabilities of the parliamentary practice of the parties. The reason for this is due to the origin of these parties and their work in secret conditions.

E - The lack of clarity of the political programs of the parties and their weak ability to attract the masses. Most of them were built on sectarian and ethnic foundations, with the absence of the role of national identity which is reflected on political scene and the state of instability.

F - Most of these parties have traditional culture, unclear political programs and traditional political discourse, and their elites are incompetent, which is reflected in sectarian quotas and a decline in national identity and national loyalty.

Most of these ruling parties adopt the method of exclusion and marginalization among themselves instead of finding a constructive political dialogue that brings the views of their leaders closer. This has led to the exacerbation of political problems without solving them. This, in turn, has contributed to the fragmentation of political life in the state as well as the excessive plurality of political parties that reached about (223) parties in the electoral cycle of 2005, to decrease to (179) parties in the electoral cycle of 2010 due to the merging of some political entities. However, it quickly rose again in the 2014 elections to reach about (277) parties due to the fissures that they witnessed for both the political parties and entities at that time (see Table (1)).

Based on the foregoing, it can be said that the number of political entities in Iraq has exceeded the required limit. The political pluralism has become burdensome to the state due to its rivalry and draining of resources in addition to its immaturity and loss of political programs that fit the requirements of life and the aspirations of the people, which made it go according to the mechanisms of rational governance to serve the interests of their narrow partisanship.

Table (1) Number of political entities during the period (2005-2014)

No.	Year	The Number of Political entities
1	2005	223
2	2010	179
3	2014	277

Source: Republic of Iraq, Independent Electoral Commission, unpublished data for 2017.

Second - the dominion of the principle of quotas and political consensus

There is no doubt that the political process in Iraq after 2003 is a product of the plans of the United States of America, which aims to impose its hegemony on the Iraqi decision-makers. Therefore, it worked on building a weak political process far from the principles of true democracy as it is based on quotas and political consensus, which constitutes a serious and specific challenge. For good governance in the state, the political conflicts and the escalating differences witnessed inside Iraq were resolved through political consensus at the expense of the people's interest and aspirations⁽³⁾.

It appears from the foregoing that the Iraqi political parties and entities tended to adopt quotas and political consensus in the electoral benefits, as it guarantees them to maintain the privileges and benefits they obtained through that abhorrent principle (consociationalism). This kept the state away from the possibility of implementing good governance in Iraq, since its application requires the existence of a constitution that governs political action in the state away from emergency behaviors and extraneous political practices.

Third - The crisis of limited legitimacy of government

It is represented by the lack of confidence between the government and the people. One of the indicators of this crisis is the resort to the use of political violence against the ruling system, in order to seek rights and social justice. There is no evidence for this from the political system in Iraq in which this crisis emerges, because the people see that it is the source of the authorities and does not recognize the institutions of the state, which did not achieve its aspirations. The reason for this is the failure of state institutions to achieve the interests of the state and the requirements of its citizens. This is due to the failure of the political elite to choose the efficient elements that address the performance of the executive work (technocrats), who represent the decisive factor in accomplishing the tasks of the state and overcoming its crises. However, it was unable to achieve these demands due to improvised action without planning⁽⁴⁾. This contradicts with the mechanisms of good governance that are based on transparency in work and the implementation of state policy in a way that achieves social justice.

Fourth - Political Sectarianism

It indicates "the social organization adopted by a group (religious or political) to show its loyalty and identity when compared to other groups within the same society". Political sectarianism is one of the main determinants that weakened the Iraqi state, especially after the state witnessed a clear and unprecedented development of killing on the Identity, liquidation of opponents, bombing of markets and other densely

populated areas. This is not evidenced by the escalation of these criminal acts in the years (2006-2007), in which the abhorrent ideological intolerance emerged, that coincided with the weakness of the state. Light weapons and silencers were used in targeting innocent people without knowing the reasons to intimidate people and spread panic and fear among them and forced displacement until the number of forcibly displaced Iraqi families in 2014 reached about 150,296 families. Table (2), provides that these terrorist acts have the main goal of destabilizing Iraq's unity and national identity (5). Accordingly, it can be said that the emergence of the phenomenon of political sectarianism has contributed to the weakening of the state and disrupted the process of building it according to the mechanisms of good governance.

Table (2) The geographical distribution of forced displacement to the Iraqi governorates for the year 2014

No.	Governorate	Number of migrated families	Percentage
1.	Kirkuk	54060	35,9
2.	Baghdad	29323	19,6
3.	Diyala	25640	17
4.	Babylon	8544	5,7
5.	Karbala	11033	7,3
6.	Wasit	3409	2,3
7.	Najaf	10436	6,9
8.	Qadisiyah	2725	1,9
9.	Double	1010	0,7
10.	Dhi Qar	1445	0,9
11.	Maysan	1070	0,7
12.	Basra	1601	1,1
13.	the total	150296	100

Source: Done by the researcher based on: Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Central Bureau of Statistics, National Survey of Displaced Persons in Iraq, Baghdad, published data for 2015.

The second demand - the economic determinants of implementing good governance in Iraq

There are multiple economic determinants that have affected the Iraqi economy a lot . They contributed to the failure of development plans and the accumulation of internal and external indebtedness, in addition to the decline in the performance of the private sector and the deterioration of the agricultural sector. These led to high rates of unemployment and poverty. Thee economic determinants could be summarized as the following:

First – the Iraqi mono-economy

It refers to the economy that depends mainly on a major source of national income. Iraq represents a model for this type of economy ⁽⁶⁾. The Iraqi oil is the main source of

revenue, which makes it subject to external dependence, as it depends for its national income on oil only. There are no features in the possibility of change and the diversity of sources of income. This is due to the subjection of Iraq to many internal and external influences whose goal lies in the survival of Iraq on its reality without any change ⁽⁷⁾. In 2005, Iraqi oil exports amounted to about \$18.4 billion, or 96.8% of its total exports of \$19 billion, while non-oil exports did not exceed 3.2% of total exports for the same year. In 2007 it reached 87.8 billion dollars, or (99.5%) of the total exports amounting to (88.2) billion dollars, compared to non-oil exports, which went down to (0.5%) of the total exports of the same year. This indicates that oil is the base for the government to provide its revenues and budget, which led to Iraq's lack of economic flexibility in facing crises ⁽⁸⁾. This is in addition to the failure of the successive Iraqi government to develop this strategy, which made it unable to address the problems that were and still stand in the way in building the economic structures required to implement good governance in the country.

Second – The absence of the role of the private sector

After 2003, the private sector in Iraq was absent from playing its role in advancing the Iraqi economy and contributing to its growth. After the change that took place in 2003, there was a theoretical trend to encourage this sector within the policy of economic, financial and commercial openness adopted by the new state due to the lack of specific strategies and planned mechanisms. This led to the tyranny of import at the expense of the local manufacturing process, in addition to the fragility of the security situation, which led to the migration of local capital owners abroad ⁽⁹⁾.

In sum, supporting the private sector and giving it the opportunity to work according to clear mechanisms will contribute to improving the economic reality within the state and create a spirit of competition. In addition, the effectiveness of the private sector is one of the main pillars in implementing good governance, and therefore its weakness weakens the possibility of Iraq taking the paths of good governance.

Third- The weakness of the structure of the Iraqi economy

There are structural imbalances in the Iraqi economy that contributed to its weakness and made it unable to cope with the crisis it faced after 2003, in addition to the weakness of public economic institutions in the state clearly dependent on the outside in meeting its needs. This created a commodity imbalance in the state's economy, not to mention its dependence on Oil revenues mainly in financing its budget, which generated a financial imbalance ⁽¹⁰⁾.

Fourth - the migration of Iraqi capital abroad

The deterioration of the security situation in Iraq after 2003 led to the migration of Iraqi capital abroad in search of a secure geographical environment. The number of Iraqi companies in Jordan is about (25,324) companies 2004-2006. This reveals the amount of the Iraqi financial contribution to the growth and recovery of the Jordanian economy. The migration of Iraqi families during 2005 due to the violence in Iraq contributed to activating (2) billion dollars as an additional amount in the Jordanian markets. A similar role of migration of Iraqis towards Syria contributed in a similar way especially during 2004 ⁽¹¹⁾.

The Iraqi funds that were abandoned due to the deteriorating security and political conditions in the country. These could have been beneficial in providing the Iraqi economy with a backing of the public sector of the state and helping it to face its multiple economic crises and enabling it to implement good governance that depends on the role of official and unofficial state institutions.

Fifthly, the size of the Iraqi debt

The size of Iraq's debt, according to the data of the International Monetary Fund, amounted about (127) billion dollars in addition the huge debt on Iraq due to the second Gulf War as a result of Iraq's entry into Kuwait and the compensation for the first and second Gulf wars. This matter has a negative impact on the state and its entity, Instead of being one of the countries with good cash reserves, Iraq became a prisoner of indebtedness, as well as the benefits that would accrue from the years of repayment ⁽¹²⁾. Besides that, the continuation of the successive Iraqi governments after 2003 on the policy of borrowing has shackled the state and kept it away from the application of good governance, which requires the strength of economic institutions and the efficiency of the mechanisms according to which it proceeds away from borrowing and dependence on others.

Sixth – The absence of strategic planning

It means the long-term economic plans in the light of which the structure of the economy is managed and comprehensive development is achieved. However, countries vary in the strength of their plans. What concerns us here is Iraq, which failed to develop effective plans after 2003 due to the political and economic transformations that the country witnessed, which made its economy subjected to those changes that are considered an obstacle in the development and implementation of constructive plans.

The third demand - the social determinants of implementing good governance in Iraq. The fragile social situation has contributed largely in confusing the state of political stability in the state and curtailing its aspirations to improve the mechanisms of governance and the required demands. These are as follows:

First - Weakness of national identity

The Iraqi society consists of several nationalities, religions and sects. At the level of the national composition, the Arabs constitute about (80) percent of the population of Iraq, who have contributed to set its historical identity over the years, followed by the Kurds, Turkmen, Chaldo-Assyrians and others. These nationalities differ in their religiosity, as Muslims constitute about (95%) of the total population of Iraq, and the rest belong to other religions such as the Christians, the Sabians and others. due to some practices of the enemies of Iraq, the ethnic pluralism has become a source of threat to the unity of Iraq.

It should be noted that the Iraqi governments did not take into account that pluralism and were not able to build the spirit of Iraqi citizenship, which is a clear indication of their real inability to create a unified national identity to which all these societal components belong. Thus, this problem created a set of developmental problems that Iraq suffers from after democracy implementation ⁽¹⁵⁾. However, the establishment of a national political culture is achieved through the fusion of sub-loyalties in favor of

the mother identity. The problem of the Iraqi constitution fails to define that identity, and thus permits political conflict and paves the way for regional and international interventions. In addition to the problem of federalism, specifically Kurdistan region, and a demand for the inclusion of Kirkuk, which has diverse ethnic groups and tense political discourse stimulated the sectarian tone between the years 2006-2007⁽¹⁶⁾. To overcome the Iraqi identity crisis, serious steps are required to be done by the authority itself towards responding quickly to the demands of society with its multiple components and then absorbing them into state institutions and showing them the feeling of embracing so that they can express themselves and make them feel of belonging and citizenship. In addition, they need to increase the political participation and preventing exclusivity in power and creating a favorable climate for spreading Public opinion, curbing sedition and terrorism, and undertaking activities that enhance loyalty to the homeland⁽¹⁷⁾.

The inability of the state to fuse and manage social diversity in Iraq has negatively affected the building of the state and its formal and informal institutions, making it unable to perform its functions in the face of that social diversity and limiting its orientations towards implementing good governance.

Second - The fragility of the Iraqi social contract

The social contract means “an organizational process of rights and duties between two parties, hypothetically or realistically”. This exists within the political aspect within any society that seeks to regulate its political, administrative, economic and social requirements. In the sense of describing the relationship between the ruler and the ruled people that is subject to a kind of popular mandate granted to decision makers in order to manage the government in a way that guarantees rights and duties. The procedural aspect of the social contract is in accordance with the legal framework⁽¹⁸⁾. According to the course of events in Iraq, it is noted that it lacks the features of a clearly defined social contract. This can be attributed to the state’s subordination to external intellectual ideologies that made it fall into the dilemma of contradiction and duplicity as the political forces do not have a real vision of building for the restoration of the Iraqi social contract and building a state of institutions⁽¹⁹⁾.

Third - the dominance of the tribal and clan system

Despite the presence of manifestations of civil progress in Iraq after 2003, the prevailing mentality is of a religious and tribal nature because the cleric and the head of the tribe have influence in the souls of society. this is not an insult, but sometimes this phenomenon worsens the event of the state’s weakness and becomes an alternative to its power. Regarding Iraq, it clearly took on the two roles, and the tribal practices had the effect in directing the freedom of the individual and his choices. Tribalism stood as an obstacle to the growth of democratic values, which limited the plans for political development in the state, as well as the negative impact on the processes of political reform and modernization. The soil of authoritarianism and the mentality of the tribe made the individual compelled to reorganize his affiliation according to a hierarchy from the family rather than the state⁽²⁰⁾.

It is noted from the foregoing that the tribe and clan played two main roles in Iraqi political life, one of which is to preserve the social components and their history in the

state, and this is a commendable work. As for the second, some clan groupings have weakened the state's authority and taken its place in solving social problems, not to mention its electoral role that is biased towards the members of the clan, regardless of their capabilities, and this in itself is a determinant of any orientation towards the implementation of good governance in Iraq.

Conclusions

1. The research showed the fragility of the political structure in Iraq resulting from the conflicts and intersections of the parties and the departure of the political process in the state from working with the constitution and resorting to political consensus. It has become a political manifestation inherent to the political process after 2003. This contradicts the principles of good governance.
2. The reliance on the principle of partisan quotas in the management of state institutions and the senior positions in them has harmed the work of these institutions. In addition, it made them captive to that principle that is alien to political life in Iraq and the size of the aspirations of the Iraqi people in implementing good governance and advancing the deteriorating reality of the state.
3. The research revealed the immaturity of the Iraqi political parties and entities and their lack of modern mechanisms and programs for the management of the state, as well as their inability to perform their functions at the political, economic and social levels.
4. The research revealed the weakness of the economic structures in Iraq due to the absence of strategic planning and the state's dependence on the single economy (oil). This was greatly affected by the fluctuation of oil prices in the global market, which distanced the state from implementing good governance, as it requires solid economic structures that contribute to strengthening the state's power and achieving social justice.
5. The study showed the role of the clan that competes with the authority of the state, in addition to directing the freedom of the individual and his choices. Thus, it constitutes an obstacle in achieving political reform and modernizing state institutions in a way that is compatible with the political transformation that the state witnessed after 2003.

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