

Inter-Party Defection: Does Tanzania Need Anti-Defection Law?

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Abstract--In spite of a manifested increase in the number of legislative representatives who defect from one party to the other in Tanzania, there has been scanty literature to understand why this massive defection taking place now. This research article embarked to fill this gap of knowledge. The authors presented empirical findings obtained in Tanzanian political context whereby defectors were purposively sampled for in-depth understanding of a phenomenon. A total of thirty (30) key informants from different registered political parties were prudently chosen to participate in the study. The results of this research revealed that there various political reasons that influences inter-party defection amongst politicians in Tanzania; these include, personal interests, intra-party conflict, national interests, and ethnic group interests. Thus, the study recommends to policy makers and other political stakeholders to consider adoption of anti-defection law so that to regulate or control un necessary defection done by sitting legislators or representatives. By doing so it will help to protect unreasonable utilization of national scanty resources for repeatedly by-elections.

Key words--Inter-Party Defection, Defection, Anti-Defection Law, Game Theory, Politicians, By-election, Tanzania

I. INTRODUCTION

The inter-party defection has rapidly increased in the past two decades in developing countries as well as in some developed countries across the globe (Ali & Mohamed, 2018). In politics, defection viewed as a process of giving up trustworthiness to one party in exchange for allegiance to another, in a manner which is reflected illegitimate by the first party (Katyal, 2002; Posner, 2009). Such defections are preferably done based on individual's political ambitions, interests, principles, philosophy, ideology and other hidden agendas (Posner, 2009). Countries across the globe are now struggling on how to handle this rapid spreading political illness, particularly in multiparty democracies (Janda, 2009).

For instance, in United Kingdom, party defection started early in seventeen centuries, predominantly in their parliamentary struggles for the political power. During this time, large number of different party membership resorted to defection repeatedly. For example, in 1832, William Gladstone, respected as the "grand old man" of British liberalism began his parliamentary career as a conservative and later on crossed to the liberal side where he was appointed as secretary of state for the colonies (Ridpath, 1898; Shannon, 2008).

Moreover, studies (Relhan, 2017; Kudrati, 2019) indicate that in early 1960s in India, party defection was like a political fashion. With no apparent reasons, member of political parties together with elected legislative

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representatives were massively crossing from one party to another as a result such movement affected legislative activities. Regarding this massive defection which was compromising democracy and manipulating unnecessary utilization of national resources, India in 1985 introduced the so called ant-defection law to control politicians from these undesirable political behaviors.

In African context, the current trend shows that there has been massive inter-party defection in developing countries like Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, and Tanzania (Goeke & Hartmann, 2011). Some key politicians in developing countries appear to have multiple defections in just short period of time, of which raises a question on their political integrity, reliability and accountability. This massive defection in multiparty states not only makes vulnerable the young democracy but also affect the pace of social and positive political development (LeBas, 2013).

Regarding defection in Tanzania previous studies (Whitehead, 2000; Matenge, 2012; Morse, 2014) indicate that, instead of inter-party defection to be a catalyst for a good political entrepreneurship, this initiative has been a burden to citizens in the area of social and political development. Inter-party defection, appears to have no comprehensive legal mechanism to accommodate and regulate it, as a result the entire process ends up in consuming millions of Tanzanian money in by- elections (Makulilo, 2012). For instance, in past five years ago, Tanzania has experienced large number of politically elected representatives crossing from one party to the other with claims of intra-party misunderstandings. For instance, in 2015, two Ex-Prime Ministers, three Ministers, some Member of Parliament, Councilors and other ordinary party members crossed from the ruling party (CCM) to the opposition party (CHADEMA) (Sambaiga, Baez-Camargo & Koechlin, 2018; Machiko, 2019). Ever since, inter-party defection has been a fashion in Tanzania's politics.

Since there is scanty study conducted to understand this scenario and its magnitude in Tanzania; this research conducted as an initiative to inform the policy and decision makers about the magnitude of this problem and provide them with adequate empirical findings that can be used to conceptualize and come up with a concrete democratic sustainable solution to deal with inter-party defection in Tanzania so that to regulate defection practice of politically elected politicians, essentially at this precious flash of time towards the 2020 general election.

II. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Currently, Tanzania is experiencing vast expenditure in dispensing by-election as result of inter-party defections. The inter-party defection trend shows that from 2016 to 2018, a total of 129 Ward Councilors, and 9 Members of parliament have defected from opposition parties (Chadema and CUF) to the ruling Party (CCM); it is an immense registered defection of politically elected leaders in African multiparty democracy in short span of time. Contemporary, statistical records by Tanzania National Electoral Commission (NEC, 2016, 2017, 2018) indicate that, one by-election for a ward councilor, costs two hundred and fifty million Tanzanian shillings or (roughly one hundred and twenty five thousand United States dollars), meanwhile, on the other hand, one billion Tanzanian shillings or (roughly, five hundred thousand US dollars) are spent in by-election of a new constituent Member of Parliament as a result of defection. Citizens across the Tanzania have been complaining against inter-party defection as it consumes much of their time and resources in by-elections (Whitehead, 2000; Kjær & Therkildsen, 2013). Some citizen confidently heard complaining that, this huge amount of money spent in by-election could be much better if had to be utilized for the betterment of their constituency development rather than entertaining defections.

Essentially, this political scenario poses a dilemma as to why do such politicians defects from one party to the other. It is a critical political problem that cannot be ignored as it appears to relate to an adverse political entrepreneurship. Regardless of cumulative claims that defectors have, essentially, in the curiosity of the state's interests or their constituency interests, but for others it is absolutely egotistical gains. At the preliminary stage, the scene is dominated and associated by intra-party conflicts with incompetence to observe the internal democratic principles that grew to inter-party defections and mostly from the oppositions to the ruling party (Mozaffar & Scarritt, 2005; Shayo, 2005; Matenge, 2012).

Furthermore, in Tanzania, such inter-party defection appears to have negative consequences in terms of national scarce resources intended for public and social development; as presently there is no guideline or law to regulate inter-party defection in political system. The current election Act, embraces by-election to each and every position which is vacant as a result of defection. Such in acted law, appears to fuel defection and unnecessary utilization of little resources the country has for maintaining inter-party defectors. Currently, the study interested in bridging the gap of knowledge as there is no study conducted in Tanzania to explore inter-party defection in political organizations. Therefore, this study embarked on understanding why such politicians defect from one party to the other and what are the possible measures to be taken to regulate such political inter-party defections.

III. OBJECTIVES

The overall objective of this study was to explore politicians' motive behind inter-party defection in Tanzania political system. In other words, this study intended to realize how inter-party defection is perceived, strategized and implemented by politically elected representatives in Tanzanian politics. The subsequent specific objectives framed to guide the study in the course of exploring key facts as follows.

- a) To analyse critical perceived reasons that influence inter-party defection
- b) To suggest possible measures that can be used to address inter-party defection.

IV. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

4.1 Understanding Party defection perspectives

Etymologically, the term "defection" appears to have been derived from the Latin word "defectus" representing "an act of abandonment of a person or a cause to which such person is bound by reasons of allegiance or duty, or to which he has willfully attached himself" (Merriam Webster, 2019). In a broad sense, defection entails deserting a person, cause or principle to which one is bound by some stalemate, as allegiance or duty. In that sense, the defector is often considered a traitor by his original side (Bjørge, 2008).

Likewise, party defection theorists (Mauss, 1969; Colman, 1995; Camerer, 2003; Durkheim, 2018; Carpio, 2019) view party defection in different perspectives. There are those who perceive defection as political entrepreneurship that intends to bring new innovative political strategies, ideas or rebranding the party (Carpio, 2019). On the other hand, there those who consider inter-party defection as betrayal to doctrine, ideology, philosophy, allegiance or duty which a person willfully attached himself (Mauss, 1969; Colman, 1995; Camerer, 2003; Durkheim, 2018).

Furthermore, previous studies (Janda, 2009; Gomez, 2012; Mershon, 2014; Abdullah, 2016) demonstrate that in some other countries, party defection or inter-party defection takes a procedure of politicians declining to support their political parties in partnership related initiatives or shared governance. This transpires essentially regularly in countries with no well-established political parties, like Vanuatu and French Polynesia whereby in 2004, a few members of various parties left the governing coalition, forcing it to collapse (Badejo & Buraimo, 2016).

Besides, another feature of inter-party defection, is that happens when there is a formation of new parties or when there is an intra-party conflict on individual's political interests or political ambitions (Brass, 1968; Willis, 2002; Boucek, 2009). For instance, in the early nineteen century, inter-party defection was common in the United Kingdom. For example Winston Churchill's political occupation was manifested by reiterated inter-party defection (Wager, 2017). Churchill instigated his parliamentary lifetime as a conservative. However, in 1904 he defected from the conservative party and crossed over to the liberal party (Jenkins, 2012). Ever since, he remained as liberal partisan.

Additionally, studies (Brass, 1968 Booyesen, 2006; Wallack, 2008) indicate that India and Israel have achieved to regulate inter-party defections and other forms of defection in political arena. It was in 1985 India passed the so called ant-defection law to control and regulate all forms of defections practices after realized mis-use of country's resource in political defection practices (Janda, 2009). There was a tendency in India whereby politicians were changing political parties with no reasons, of which cost the country to re-run by-election to refill the vacant positions. The only solution to stop this evil behavior was to initiate ant-defection law that put to an end all unnecessary defections.

In this study it has been observed that inter-party defection is a man-made political phenomenon that always pre-determined by the nature of existing political atmosphere. Defection is the end result of various hidden agendas by a politician. It has been found in this study that most of politicians enter into politics as entrepreneurs. Their first and foremost ambition is to create more materialistic opportunities for their personal gain. If defection habit is not regulated, the political system and other democratic processes are expected to be at risk of deterioration.

4.2 A Brief background of political system and Party defections in Tanzania

4.2.1 Inter-party defection in single party system in Tanzania

Tanzania is a republic union of two merged countries, namely Tanganyika and Zanzibar which united in 1964. At independence in 1961, Tanzania Mainland had a multiparty political system (Makinda, 1996; Nyirabu, 2002; Killian, 2008). However, Tanganyika African National union (TANU) became the dominant party in Tanzania mainland and Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) became dominant party in Tanzania Islands. According to (URT, 2004) other political parties of this era include; the United Tanganyika Party (UTP), the African National Congress (ANC), and the All Muslim National Unity of Tanganyika (MNUT). In Zanzibar there were three dominant political parties prior and after independence. These are Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP), Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), and Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples' Party (ZPPP), (Mukandala & Othman 1994).

Besides, before independence, studies (Van Cranenburgh, 1996; Rakner & van de Walle, 2007) indicate that there was marginal party switching or defection in Tanzanian politics. However, during this time, inter-party

defection was not highly acceptable as it was treated as the highest level of betrayal and disloyalty to socialism party's ideology and philosophy (Mwase & Raphael, 2001). Moreover, there were minimal political incentives to attract defection compared to date. On the other hand studies (Pinkney, 1997) indicate that, in order to control defectors and multipartism movement after independence, ASP as the ruling party in Tanzania-Islands of Zanzibar and TANU in Tanzania mainland, merged to form Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) or Revolutionary Party in 1977. This merging process resulted into ban of other political parties meanwhile retaining TANU and ASP to continue with political activity across the union (Karume, 2005). The ban for multi-political parties became a challenge for the growth of democracy in Tanzania. The merging of TANU and ASP which gave birth to CCM became the solely legal political party in Tanzania. Thus, during political elections there was no room for inter-party defection as all candidates were from the same political party platform.

4.2.2 Inter-party Defection in multiparty system in Tanzania

Studies (Ngasongwa, 1992; Mmuya & Chaliga, 1992; Nyirabu, 2002) indicate that Tanzania became an official multiparty democracy in 1992. Currently, Tanzania has 22 officially registered political parties (Killian, 2017). After introduction of the multiparty system, inter-party defection practices slowly started to gain momentum as some political entrepreneurs in the ruling party (CCM) perceived it as a new political opportunity to establish opposition parties so that to enhance competitive political space between the ruling party and new formed opposition parties (Pinkney, 1997; Minde, Roop & Tronvoll, 2018). Currently, the inter-party defection trend shows that from 2015 to 2018, a total of 129 Ward Councilors, and 9 Members of parliament have defected from opposition parties (CHADEMA and CUF) to the ruling Party (CCM) (NEC, 2018).

Before inception of this study, it was not clear what triggered such massive inter-party defection in this few years after 2015 general election; as before the 2015 election, CCM witnessed massive defection of its members to other opposition political parties, of which CHADEMA became the beneficiary of this switching process. Due to such defection process, CCM lost its extensive dominance countrywide, as opposition parties appeared to have gained strength by that moment. Likewise, in the 2015, as the fifth multi-party election, the CCM's presidential candidate obtained 58 per cent of the votes whereby his opponent who was the former Prime Minister and top leader in CCM, defected to the main opposition party (CHADEMA) and obtained 40 per cent of votes; meanwhile the rest 2 per cent became divisible amongst the least opposition parties (NEC, 2016; Paget, D. 2017). During this study it was observed that majority of participants who interviewed happened to associate their defection decisions with tremendous performance of the current ruling regime.

Studied across developing countries (Awofeso & Irabor, 2016; Beardsworth, 2016; Yardımcı-Geyikçi & Tür, 2018) indicate that inter-party or party switching or crossing carpet politics is becoming a political fashion as politicians appear to bet in political powers pursuit for their personal egoistical gain. There is an emerging adverse political entrepreneurship in this movement. For instance, in Nigeria and Kenya, politicians conspire inter-party defection in relation to power sharing (Buba, 2017; Ahere, 2018). They are ready to sacrifice their political capital and strategize for the payoff political game. Scholars (Nikolenyi & Shenhav, 2015; Sood, 2017; Novaes, 2018) argue that if inter-party defection is not regulated or controlled in young multiparty democracies, there is a threat to multiparty democracy and their national resources in these particular grounds.

4.4 Modified Model of Defection

A modified model of defection is an attempt by this study to modify models by Nikolenyi & Shenhav (2015) and Geddes (1991) with an intention to describe political scenarios that leads to defection game. This model suggests two anticipated defection features. In this context the model argue that there are two players in political game. These are the ruling party or government in power which can be the single party or coalition of parties and the opposition. In this defection game, both opposition and the government in power or ruling party, customarily have genuine plans and strategies to follow. In order to achieve their ruling or acquiring power plans and goals, both sides may tend to look for defectors from either side. Consequently, an assumption is that the rudimentary defection rests on various outcomes depending on the both side players' choice and strategies to achieve their defections.

In real sense, defection outcomes can be categorized into two foremost approaches: the first defection approach is all about status quo; this means that there would be no defection from both sides (the ruling party or government-G in power and opposition-OP) and the second one is all about mutual defection, this means that both sides, the government in power or the ruling party and the opposition pursue defectors from on another; and for this course there would be flocking of defectors from opposition to the ruling party government particularly when the government seeking majority in legislative bodies or vice versa. However, flocking of defectors from the ruling party government to opposition depends on various reasons such as ambition to preserve national interests that appear to be under threat of the ruling party, or seeking majority in decision machineries.




Figure 4.1: Modified model of Defection

Source: Adapted from Nikolenyi & Shenhav (2015)

Therefore, in an observable action to redress inter-party defection, party switching or carpet crossing, the Israel legislative body “Knesset” in 1991 and Indian parliament in 1985 passed constitutional amendment so that to enact anti-defection law aimed at nurturing enhanced unanimity in the positions of the legislative parties (Nikolenyi & Shenhav, 2015). Furthermore, the Knesset, and the Indian parliament, deliberately increased the costs that individual representatives deserve when they defect from the party that elected them to parliament and join the other

side. In common similarities of these two cases, the anti-defection laws were conceded by vast number of parliamentary majorities, which is very rare in the parliamentary records of both nations. Thus, if this critical anti-defection move would attain, possibly the defection trend would not be controlled or regulated, and would result into democracy shambles.

4.5 Theoretical framework

In order to have comprehensive epistemological and methodological understanding of the party defection concept and practice in politics, this research article is tailored together with the game theory to backing up the literature, methodological and results or findings of this study. The Game theory is appropriate to this study, because it has laid down flexible and adaptable theoretical and methodological support to this piece of research work.

The theoretical underpinning of game theory was found by Zermelo, Borel, von Neumann, and others in the 1920s and 1930s (Leonard, 2010; Erickson, 2015). The early game theorists considered the main objective of the theory to be that of advocating what strategies rational players ought to discern to maximize their payoffs. In this wisdom, the theory, in its traditional form, is predominantly normative rather than optimistic or imaginative (Zeleny, 2012; Mereshon, 2014). In real sense the game theory attempts to presume that, people commonly, endeavor to do the unsurpassed for themselves in any given atmospheres, of which it makes this theory relevant to the empirical behavioral social sciences (Giannetti & Benoit, 2008).

The Game theory is among of few epistemological theories used in social sciences to understand an interactive decision making process (Lee, 2008). It has been utilized to exemplify any decision comprising two or more decision makers, known as players. It is clear that, in the game theory, a player can represent a certain specific human decision maker or a company decision-making organization or body (Colman, 2013). The players in the context of this study can be associated to politicians whom their defection decision making initiatives have impact not only in their political premises but also in social and economic aspects.

In the Game theory, the art of acting and making certain decisions are called strategies that intend to defined preferences among the possible outcomes (Osborne, 2004). Literally, as the Game theory articulates, strategies are wide-ranging plan of achievement used in-advance to predetermine what action a player would make in every scenario that might ascend. Consequently, politicians as key players as articulated, and theorized in the Game theory, always tend to make strategies that would help them to counter all possible moves of the other side.

In political systems, particularly in a single party system there is minimal pressure of party defection than it is in multiparty system. As it is articulated in the Game theory, politicians are always looking for handsome payoff or green pastures. In consequence, strategies and decision of carpet crossing in multiparty system can be perceived as political entrepreneurship initiatives. Thus, understanding individual's political perception, ambition, interest and decisions in matters related to inter-party defection, requires a comprehensive knowledge of how a human person can behave and strategize for his choices as it has been reflected in the Game theory.

V. METHODOLOGY

The present research article employed qualitative method for exploring the inter-party defection and the rise of political entrepreneurship in Tanzania. The sampling procedure of the key informants of this study was purposively done through snowball quota sampling (Creswell & Creswell, 2017). Male and female key politicians were purposively selected from different political parties as presented in the table below. The criterion for selection was based on informant's current political status, defection experience, education background, gender partisanship, and future political aspiration. A total of thirty (30) participants were carefully selected to participate in the study. In addition, semi-structured interview guideline and observation were used a source of data collection. The interview worksheet consisted of diverse categories of questions such as demographic information of respondents followed by the relevant about inter-party defection in Tanzanian politics. Furthermore, ethical concern was highly taken in to account throughout the course of data collection workout. The collected in-depth interviews were documented, transcribed, and thematically analyzed and triangulated with observed facts.

Table 1: Distribution of key informants as selected from each registered political party

	Party	Acronym	Number of informants selected
1.	Alliance for Change and Transparency	ACT	2
2.	Alliance for Democratic Change	ADC	1
3.	Alliance for Tanzanians Farmers Party	AFP	n/a
4.	Attentive Democracy Party	MAKINI	n/a
5.	Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo	CHADEMA	5
6.	Chama Cha Mapinduzi	CCM	5
7.	Civic United Front	CUF	3
8.	Democratic Party	DP	n/a
9.	Justice and Development Party	CHAUSTA	1
10.	National League For Democracy	NLD	1
11.	National reconstruction alliance	NRA	1
12.	National Convention for Construction and Reform	NCCR-M	2
13.	Party for People's Redemption	CHAUMMA	1
14.	People's Voice	SAU	n/a
15.	Progressive Party Of Tanzania- Maendeleo	PPT- MAENDELEO	1
16.	Social Party	CCK	1
17.	Tanzania Democratic Alliance	TADEA	1
18.	Tanzania Labour Party	TLP	1
19.	Traditional Dhow		1

20.	Union for Multiparty Democracy	UMD	1
21.	United Democratic Party	UDP	1
22.	United Peoples' Democratic Party	UPDP	1
Total of key informants			30

Table 2: Demographic and Social Characteristics of In-depth Interview of key informants

Demographic characteristics	Number of key informants
Gender:	
Male	20
Female	10
Age:	
18-35	3
36-50	20
51-70	7
71+	0
Education level:	
Primary Certificate	3
Secondary Certificate	11
College Diploma	6
University Degree	10
Political occupation:	
Sub-ward leader/Village leader	5
Ward Councilor	15
Member of Parliament	2
Party leader	4
Ordinary party member	2
Political related bureaucrats	2

Source: Field data (2019)

VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

After thorough analysis of the data set, the findings of the study discovered that there various political reasons that influences inter-party defection in Tanzania. These reasons have been categorized into four major themes such as; *personal interests*, *intra-party conflict*, *national interests*, and *ethnic group interests*. Moreover, these key informants were also asked to suggest a solution in order to put to an end inter-party defection.

Regarding *personal interests*, majority of participants admitted that most of inter-party defections are influenced by personal interests, specifically monetary material gain. It was found that politicians were ready to tradeoff their personalities because of material gain or corruption. It was very interesting revealed truth about defection. One of defectors interviewed had the following views as quoted below:

“As a politician I know exactly what I want in this political game. I have been in politics for more than ten years now and I have benefitted nothing from my former party. To me defection was inevitable this time, as for now I want politics that pays. As you see me, imagine at this age, I don’t have even a small car or good house, why don’t I opt to defect! Let them talk, but for me, defection paid me a lot compared to my previous status. I can assure you that, I’m also going to win the coming by-election, now I’m confident enough because I have all kind of support from the ruling party.” (JJM, 43 years, Male defector).

Additionally, another participant had related opinion, when asked to explain why he decided to defect from his former political party, he claimed that:

“I have made a great choice to cross over from my former party to this new party. I was a Councilor. I cannot tell you exactly how did they approach me, but my ambition was to earn something from this initiative. If I could have reasonable education, I would have been appointed somebody in the ruling government today. Anyway, nothing wrong, yet I have regained my seat in spite of defection. Let me tell you the truth, it easy to win any by-election when you are on the ruling party side.” (SMK, 38 years old, female defector)

From these two quotes above, it can be specified that party defection is a result of hidden agendas that a person conspires. Regardless of party ideology, doctrine and philosophies that bind a person to party’s allegiance, yet individuals appear to have their own choice and strategies towards achieving political goals. As it has been reflected in the game theory, that the art of acting and making certain decisions are called strategies that intend to defined preferences among the possible outcomes, individual politicians may easily defect since they have their own decision and preferred outcomes (Myerson, 2013). Some scholars (Bob-Milliar, 2012; Mershon, 2014) also have related findings in this respective area; that in politics, politicians have their own ambitions and strategies of achieving those ambitions. For instance, in Nigeria and Kenya studies (Oloo, 2007; Awofeso & Irabor, 2016) indicate that politician defect or cross over from one party to another simply because of material gain, money in particular. Therefore, it is undeniably that, defection in developing countries relates closely to a new form of political entrepreneurship by which defector strategizes how to use his political capital for material gain.

Another reason is that influence inter-party defection is that associated with *intra-party conflicts*. Majority of participants or informant of this study happened to have much to explain about this factor. There were those who saw intra-party conflicts as a catalyst to current inter-party defection in the sense that there was no enough political space in their parties that could accommodate their personal interests. Such conflicts were related to nomination procedures, biasness on special seats recommendation, particularly for women, breach of constitutional dogmas and principles, patronage politics and ethnicity politics as narrated in the following quote:

“In my view people tend to defect from their former political parties to other parties due to the following reasons; first, some top leaders in my party have been in the forefront in breaching our party constitution. For

instance, during primaries and nomination of candidates, it is easy to see new educated member qualified and nominated for candidature in expense of long served members in the party. Secondly, there is observable biasness on special seats recommendation. Thirdly, there is ethnicity politics that relates to nepotism and finally, there is a question of transparency in utilization of party's resources, particular the party's subsidize. I have lot of to share with you, but I think these are enough for today." (DCM, 50 years old, Male Party leader).

Based on the response from above analyzed quote, it can be noted that intra-party conflict has big contribution to inter-party defection. Similarly, during the study it was observed that intra-party conflicts take different forms and perspectives. There were intra-party conflicts fueled by weak institutional arrangement, poor intra-party democracy, and poor constitutional framework, individual egoistic, poor accountability on party's resource utilization, lack of transparency, patronage politics, some petty dictatorship and other political conspiracies. Additionally, previous studies (Real-Dato, 2009; Ichino & Nathan, 2013) also demonstrate to have similar findings on how intra-party can cause party switching. For instance Saalfeld (2008) conducted a study on party switching in 17 Western European democracies and found that intra-party conflicts were amongst the highest ranked factors for party switching or defection in European politics. Thus, it is important to admit that party defection in contemporary politics, not only a political problem related to developing countries but also a challenge even to most developed countries.

Considering *national interest* as identified to be amongst defection factors, some key informants of this study explained that, for them, if they were asked to choose between their party's interests and national interests, they would prefer to discern national interest instead. They said, they are not defecting because of losing confidence with their political parties but they opted to remain nationalistic patriotic. One of these key informants when asked in an in-depth interview, she illustrated that:

"I'm not ashamed of my defection decision, it high time to choose between party's interest and national interests. The current president is doing marvelous work, I have decided with all my heart to support him, because I have seen his efforts of defending national interests, particularly, our natural resources for the national development. I tell you the truth that I cannot turn back again to opposition politics, I'm on this side to use my talent in serving the nation." (XYZ, 41 years old, female Defector).

However, there was very interesting contrary contribution made by another key informant in this area. This key informant had a view that:

I have served in this government for more than five years; I know how this government operates. I tell you, my defection from the ruling party to opposition party is driven by irrational utilization of national interests, particularly national natural resources like gas and minerals. These are the national interests, but few politicians from the ruling party have compromised the national interests for their personal gain, meanwhile citizens are suffering shortage of services in every sector. In fact we need new a constitution to address all these politics in Tanzania." (ABC, 56 years old, Male Defector).

During the study it was observed that, currently in Tanzania, those defectors who claimed to have been touched by preserving national interests appeared to defect from opposition parties to the ruling party. There were

rare cases of defection from ruling party to opposition as it has been presented above. This means that the nation interests concept still a puzzle to some politicians. Not only in Tanzania, there has been similar finding in other counties like Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, Asia, America and Europe whereby politicians tend to defect under the umbrella of defending national interest (Holloway, 2006; Moltz, 2011).

Regarding *ethnic group interests*, it was an interesting finding across the data set because in Tanzania, ethnicity politics it was assumed to have remained in history of past politics, essentially before colonialism. However, this study has found that, there is creeping ethnic group interest as a new political trend that perpetuate inter-party defection. Some key informants interviewed, mentioned ethnic or tribal group interest as among of those reasons fuels inter-party defection. One of these key informants had a view that:

"I'm appearing to be restless simply because it is my second time to defect within a short period of time. As you know, wherever the old man is, I am also there. He is my tribal met and we share a lot in common. I think you can easily remember what happened in 2015 when the old man crossed from the ruling party to opposition party. Almost everybody in our ethnic region defected from the ruling party to follow him to the opposition party. To be honest, next year, there will be some defection from opposition to ruling party as the old man has defected to the ruling party again. In fact this matter consumes huge amount of money to cater for now and then by-elections. Anyway to me I think, we need a law to regulate this movement." (XLL, 58 years old, Male defector).

Based on key informants' responses, it significant to note that, inter-party defection has expanded from individual's egoistic to a broader sense in Tanzania. During the study it was observed that ethnicity politics are creeping into Tanzanian politics and this circumstance is anticipated to affect internal party democracy in the coming elections. It was observed that some politicians were confident enough to associate themselves with their ethnic group's interests, of which it is a danger to a young democracy like Tanzania. It was interesting to note that defection in this context of ethnic group not only jeopardizing national unity and solidarity, but also fuels growth of tribalism and nepotism in Tanzanian politics. During the study, it was observed that such creeping politics in Tanzanian requires immediate regulatory framework in order to protect national unity. Taking an example of Nigeria and Kenya, previous studies (Omolo, 2002; Kendhammer, 2010) indicate that in Nigeria, and Kenya inter-party defection is based on ethnicity politics; related tribes come together to form alliances in order to win elections. However, this kind of politics has splitted Nigeria's and Kenya's national unity into tribal ethnic groups. Therefore, there is a lesson to learn from Nigerian and Kenyan inter-party defection context. This will help other developing countries to come out with concrete solution to related problem.

Basically, it is important to note that this study has attempted to reveal the innermost personal reason towards defection. Regardless of circumstantial and political observable environment, this study opens our mind toward analytical factors that influence inter-party defection in Tanzania as well as in developing countries. Principally, *personal interests*, *intra-party conflict*, *national interests*, and *ethnic group interests* have been analytically discussed here as major themes that illustrate universal defection practice.

VII. CONCLUSION

In a broad sense it can be concluded that inter-party defection in Tanzania is becoming a serious problem if it will not be addressed properly soon. The tendency of politicians to recycle themselves from one party to the other appears to cost the country huge amount of money to rerun by-election as a result of defections. In a true democratic process, there is nothing erroneous for a partisan to defect from one party to another party. However, majority of these defectors appear to initiated defection because of personal gain or egoistic gain. During this research, it was observed that majority of defectors attempted to hide their personal defection agenda or ambitions under the umbrella of safeguarding constituency or national interests. But in real sense is that, most of these politicians do play this political game as egoistic political entrepreneurs. The current defection trend as presented in this study, threatens a little development attained under multiparty democracy in Tanzania. Defection not only harms democracy but also denies citizens right to hold defectors accountable. In fact, the prevailing weakness of the current political Act, number 5 of 1992 provides a loophole for mores defectors to re-cycle themselves in the same political positions they defected from. Therefore, with this defection trend, there would be critical implication in future if personal interests, intra-party conflict, ethnic group interests and deceptive motive behind of national interests, will certainly not be addressed properly in the laws guiding political matters in Tanzania. It is high time for Tanzania to have a law that will address and regulate defection process so that to minimize the risk of misusing scanty resources for unnecessary by-elections. This study recommends to policy makers, policy implementers, citizens and other stakeholders to pay attention on this matter by advocating reforms in the current political situation so as to introduce anti-defection law to control un-necessary defections for the national and democracy benefits at large.

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